CITY OF OAKLAND

Privacy Advisory Commission

August 5, 2021 5:00 PM
Videoconference
Meeting Agenda

***Commission Members**: **District 1 Representative**: Reem Suleiman, **District 2 Representative**: Chloe Brown, **District 3 Representative**: Brian Hofer, Chair, **District 4 Representative**: Lou Katz, **District 5 Representative**: Omar De La Cruz, **District 6 Representative**: Gina Tomlinson, **District 7 Representative**: Robert Oliver, **Council At-Large Representative**: Henry Gage III, Vice Chair **Mayoral Representative**: Heather Patterson*

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1. Call to Order, determination of quorum

2. Open Forum/Public Comment

3. Surveillance Equipment Ordinance – DPW – Illegal Dumping Camera Surveillance program impact report and proposed use policy – review and take possible action

4. Surveillance Equipment Ordinance - OPD – presentation of Annual Reports – review and take possible action:

    a. Automated License Plate Reader 2019
    b. Automated License Plate Reader 2020

5. Surveillance Equipment Ordinance – OPD – Automated License Plate Reader impact report and proposed use policy – review and take possible action

City of Oakland

Public Works Department Surveillance Impact Report for Illegal Dumping Surveillance Cameras

A. **Description:**

Verkada's License Plate Recognition (LPR) solution provides intelligent software for real-time license plate monitoring to streamline vehicle-related investigations. Powered by Verkada's industry-leading edge-based processing and computer vision technology, specially placed cameras are designed to capture license plate images and provide City users with a private, searchable list of license plate numbers. These license plate captures are linked to live or recorded video for complete context around the subject vehicle. Utilizing Verkada's hybrid cloud approach, using LPR has minimal impact on bandwidth (<100 kbps), and all video, images, and license plate data are encrypted at rest and in transit. Specifically, Verkada LPR:

- Utilizes a dual-camera system powered by Verkada's Bullet Camera Series.
- Cameras are specially mounted and angled.
- One camera is dedicated to detecting close-up views of license plates (LPR Camera). It leverages the powerful zoom capabilities of Verkada's Telephoto Bullet Series to deliver high-resolution, close-up license plate captures. Each LPR Camera operates in a dedicated LPR Mode, which records all footage using the Bullet Series' long-range IR sensors.
- In real-time, the LPR Camera uses a powerful onboard processor to analyze each individual plate, surfacing the string of characters for easy monitoring and search.
- Each LPR Camera is paired with a Context Camera to provide whole scene coverage. While the LPR Camera is focused on capturing the perfect plate image, the Context Camera records the broader scene, including the vehicle, driver, and other pertinent details.
- Users can drill into the historical footage, as well as digitally zoom, capture a screenshot or archive the footage for further investigation. For even greater context, users can pair additional Context Cameras to see incidents from multiple angles or hone in on particular scene details.
- From the LPR page, users can search all detected plates for partial or complete license plate matches and see time-stamped events for all vehicle sightings. Users can also filter results based on certain cameras or date ranges. For any given search, the complete list of license plate results can be exported to a CSV file for offline analysis.

B. **Purpose:** From a broader perspective, the purpose of the Context and LPR cameras (collectively - “cameras”) is to demonstrate the City’s resolve to identify, prosecute, and hold dumpers to account. The most immediate goal of installing cameras near chronic illegal dumping hot spots is to increase the likelihood of the City capturing video evidence to identify dumpers in the act of dumping. Once the City succeeds in prosecuting illegal dumping cases using video evidence with the EEOs’ supporting investigative work, and dumpers are on notice that the City of Oakland has a zero-tolerance policy around illegal dumping, the surveillance cameras shall serve as an effective, ongoing deterrent to potential dumpers

C. **Location:** Cameras will be placed Citywide in public rights of way nearest to chronic dumping “hot spots” where EEOs cannot find evidence to connect the dumped piles to dumpers. Such public rights of way include but are not limited to City assets such as street light poles, traffic signal poles, bus stop shelters (through coordination with AC Transit), self-installed wooden posts, etc.

   The cameras will be mounted with mounting straps in tamper-proof housing units by AMS.Net and potentially Keep Oakland Clean & Beautiful (KOCB) staff under AMS.Net’s guidance/ oversight. Preliminary plans are for the City to deploy surveillance systems in phases based on available funding and Cityworks data on the most chronic hot spots.

D. **Impact:** Oakland Public Works (OPW) recognizes that all people have an inalienable right to privacy and are committed to protecting and safeguarding this right.

   OPW is not proposing to track movement of individuals. The cameras’ technology collects information from license plates of vehicles. However, OPW understands that the public may be concerned that the collection and analysis of this information over time could potentially be used to generate a detailed profile of an individual’s movement or abused for other inappropriate purposes.

   Specifically, the OPW recognizes the following public concerns:

   - **Identity capture.** The public may be concerned that the cameras will capture personally identifiable information without notice or consent. Although LPR does not independently generate information that identifies vehicle occupants, license plate information can be used to determine the registered owner. In addition, vehicle occupants or immediate surroundings (including addresses) may be pictured. As a result, it is possible that individuals with access to this data could do additional research to identify the individual.

- **Misidentification.** The public may be concerned that, if cameras' data is widely accessible and inaccurate, individuals may be misidentified as the person driving a vehicle and is doing the dumping. This could lead to government actions against such individuals in error.
- **Activity monitoring.** The public may be concerned that the cameras' data will enable individuals' behaviors to be revealed to and/or monitored by OPW or other government agencies, their partners or affiliates, companies interested in targeted marketing, and/or the public. Such concerns may include basic information about when individuals are in certain locations, as well as concerns about what government or individuals may infer from this data (i.e. marital fidelity, religious observance, or political activity). Although LPR data is gathered from public places, this could conflict with an individual's expectation of locational privacy.

E. **Mitigations:** OPW will take a number of general steps to mitigate privacy concerns:

- **Surveillance systems will be deployed for the purpose of capturing illegal dumping activities only**. Surveillance & LPR cameras will be installed in public rights of way at known hot spots where chronic dumping occurs only.
- OPW will use LPR data and video footage strictly for the enforcement of illegal dumping and will only forward footage containing potentially criminal activities to the Oakland Police Department (OPD) or when requested by (OPD).
- OPW will limit advanced user permissions to (2) Organization Managers who have the ability to add additional users and/or change camera settings.
- General authorized users will not have access to enable audio and face match / face search features that are built-in to the Verkada surveillance platform. By default, both of these capabilities are disabled out-of-the-box. Only Organization Managers have access to enable these features.
- OPW will apply surveillance camera and LPR technology according to the proposed Illegal Dumping Enforcement Use Policy (attached) as well as all applicable laws, policies and administrative instructions.
- OPW has no plans or intentions of using or deploying the surveillance camera technology in a manner that is discriminatory, viewpoint-based, or biased via algorithm.
- Data that do not contain illegal dumping activity will be purged after 365 days as per California state statutes. Data containing illegal dumping or other possible criminal activities will be archived by City staff to a secured folder for further investigation. OPW will establish the shortest retention schedule necessary to comply with local and state laws.

- Data will be purged by authorized staff only.
- OPW will conduct annual audits of LPR data and video footage to ensure compliance with retention schedule and to verify that operators, administrators and authorized vendors are following Use Policy.
- OPW will keep the Privacy Advisory Commission informed of changes to LPR usage, as well as changes that would significantly affect privacy, civil rights, or civil liberties.

F. **Data Types and Sources:**

- Image, video, and audio (if enabled) recordings
- License plate information captured by video data
- "People Analytics" information which includes the facial features and physical attributes of people that appear in video footage captured by a Verkada camera Product. Our Product features (e.g., Person History, Face Search and Vehicle History) allow customers to gather, search, and organize People Analytics information.
- Email address and phone numbers
- Camera stats (bandwidth and uptime information)
- Camera location/address
- Audit logs

G. **Data Security:** All data is encrypted end to end including in transit, at rest, and in use. Only authorized City users that have the correct permissions will be able to review the data. All video footage is saved locally on the camera, and the LPR data is sent and kept in the cloud. Verkada uses AES 128 encryption on the camera and AES 256 in the cloud. Data in transit is encrypted by using TLS 1.2.

Verkada uses Amazon Web Services (AWS) for cloud servers and storage of archived video. AWS is a datacenter operator that meets high industry standards for data security, disaster recovery, physical and privacy, including ISO 27001, SSAE16/ISAE 3402 Type II: SOC 2, and SSAE16/ISAE 3402 Type II: SOC 3 certifications.

Verkada also allows customers to enable two factor authentication (2FA) to reinforce security of their accounts. When enabled, the user will have to enter a code that's texted or generated on their phone after entering their username and password. Client Administrators have the ability to enforce 2FA for all users in the organization. If Client Administrators require 2FA for users, users will set up their 2FA in the process of accepting the invite.

H. **Fiscal Cost:** TBD - however, it is worth noting that Verkada's product offerings are up to 10x less costly than the next viable surveillance camera vendor City staff reviewed. A multi-year subscription service is required. Additional staffing may be required to review/manage surveillance data as OPW deploy more cameras throughout the City.

I. **Third Party Dependence:** AMS.net is a network integrator under contract with the City of Oakland through the Department of Information Technology (DIT) and OPW. AMS.net will be tasked to source, deploy and maintain the Verkada dual-camera LPR surveillance systems and all ancillary requirements to sustain optimal system operability.

Verkada uses Amazon Web Services (AWS) for cloud servers and storage of archived video. AWS is a datacenter operator that meets high industry standards for data security, disaster recovery, physical and privacy. Since Verkada manages the encryption keys for customer data, it is not possible for AWS to decrypt Verkada's customers' video/image data.

J. **Alternatives:**

Status Quo - do not deploy surveillance cameras: there will not be any additional financial outlay if the City continues as is. The City will need to answer to the constituents demanding the City take decisive action against dumpers. The City will continue to struggle with addressing dumping at chronic hot spots.

Sting Operations with OPD - request assistance from OPD to conduct sting operations at chronic hot spots to catch dumpers in the act. This is not a viable solution because: 1) it is cost prohibitive; 2) OPW has been advised in multiple instances OPD does not have the resources to assist with illegal dumping enforcement due to higher priority crimes; 3) the Mayor and CAO will likely not support allocating sworn officers for illegal dumping enforcement.

Hire More EEOs - bring on more EEOs to patrol hot spots and to catch dumpers. More funding to hire additional EEOs is slated for FY22-23. However, this is also not a viable long term solution because: 1) it may be cost prohibitive to hire an adequate number of EEOs to provide sufficient coverage of areas prone to chronic dumping; 2) more EEOs does not necessarily translate to greater success in catching dumpers if there is insufficient evidence to prosecute. Without supporting evidence, the only way an EEOs can catch a dumping violator is to witness the individual in the act of dumping.

K. **Track Record:** California cities such as Irvine and Sacramento have been using LPR surveillance technology for many years. Verkada surveillance systems are currently deployed in San Diego, San Jacinto, Daly City, and Sunnyvale.

   Verkada has put in place protocols that limit employee and third-party access to the surveillance data. The vendor is committed, in partnership with AMS.net to ensure such protocols are in place and maintained to safeguard against civil rights and civil liberty abuses.

City of Oakland

Public Works Department Surveillance Technology Use Policy for Illegal Dumping Surveillance Cameras

A. Purpose

From a broader perspective, the purpose of the Context and LPR cameras (collectively - "cameras") is to demonstrate the City's resolve to identify, prosecute, and hold dumpers to account. The most immediate goal of installing cameras near chronic illegal dumping hot spots is to increase the likelihood of the City capturing video evidence to identify dumpers in the act of dumping. Once the City succeeds in prosecuting illegal dumping cases using video evidence with the EEOs' supporting investigative work, and dumpers are on notice that the City of Oakland has a zero-tolerance policy around illegal dumping, the surveillance cameras shall serve as an effective, ongoing deterrent to potential dumpers

License Plate Recognition (LPR) technology shall be used to automate the real-time capture and processing of vehicle license plate information by transforming images into alphanumeric characters with computer vision technology to deliver highly accurate license plate detection and recognition that is searchable by authorized City users in a web-based portal. The LPR system will store license plate info and video, including time and date information. The license plate captures are linked to live and recorded video for complete context around vehicle events.

B. Authorized Use

Authorized uses of video surveillance and license plate recognition technology include:

- surveilling illegal dumpers within the City of Oakland's jurisdiction
- surveilling other criminal activities captured in the course of illegally dumping
- tbd

OPW will go through an extensive vetting process with the Privacy Advisory Commission and the City Council prior to using the subject technology. Once deployed, limited OPW staff in the Keep Oakland Clean & Beautiful (KOCB) will be granted authorization to access/view the surveillance data.

C. Data Collection

Data collection occurs via a pole-mounted, dual-camera LPR system deployed at chronic illegal dumping hot spots throughout the City. In this dual-camera system, a dedicated camera is angled for detecting close-up and zoomed-in views of license plates (LPR Camera) to deliver high-resolution license plate captures. Each LPR Camera operates in a dedicated LPR Mode, which records all footage using the Bullet Camera Series' long-range IR sensors. In real-time, the LPR Camera uses a powerful onboard processor to analyze each individual plate, surfacing the string of characters for easy monitoring and search within the web-based portal for authorized users. Each LPR Camera is paired with a Context Camera to provide whole scene coverage. While

the LPR Camera is focused on capturing the perfect plate image, the Context Camera records the broader scene, including the vehicle, driver, and other pertinent details.

Images of vehicle license plates are processed using optical character recognition, time and geo-stamped, and analyzed in real time. Powered by edge-based processing and computer vision technology, specially placed LPR and Context Cameras are designed to capture license plates and provide authorized City users a custom searchable list of license plates via Verkada's web-based user interface. Only authorized City users may access and search the list of license plates captured by City cameras. In fact, all surveillance data captured is owned solely by the City; Verkada staff do not have access to surveillance data without advance authorization by authorized City staff. Please see *Section D. Data Access* for more details.

The Verkada dual-camera LPR system retains data on each Verkada security camera's built-in, industrial-grade solid state storage. All video, images and license plate data are encrypted at rest and in-transit.

Depending on the device model, continuously recorded video may be stored for up to 365 days depending on the City's retention requirements or preferences. Once the City's specified retention for a device is reached, the camera will automatically delete all data that is stored on the camera - and in the cloud - beginning with the oldest recordings. Authorized users may archive video clips relevant for illegal dumping enforcement if and when needed for record-keeping or investigative purposes. **Otherwise, all video recordings, thumbnail images, and metadata (i.e.: camera settings and status, including time and network connectivity) will be permanently deleted from on-camera storage and the cloud.**

Verkada partners with cloud services provider Amazon Web Services (AWS) for cloud servers and storage of archived video. AWS is a datacenter operator that meets high industry standard for data security, disaster recovery, physical and privacy including ISO 27001, SSAE16/ISAE 3402 Type II: SOC 2, and SSAE16/ISAE 3402 Type II: SOC 3 certifications.

Casey Keller is our technical resource at Verkada and we can call on him during PAC meeting to explain each of these certifications in layman terms if and when needed

When a video clip is archived by an authorized City user through the Verkada web-based user interface, it is retained in Verkada's cloud service (AWS) indefinitely until one of the following events occurs:

1) City user deletes the file or camera in Verkada Command
2) City terminates Verkada account

D. Data Access

Authorized staff include:
Oakland Public Works' KOCB Operations Manager, select staff within the Environmental Enforcement Unit, and the Bureau of Environment's Administrative Services Manager.

By default, only the City has access to camera images and video data. OPW will limit advanced user permissions to two (2) “Organization Managers” who have the ability to add additional users and/or change camera settings. Other authorized users will not have access to add additional users, or change camera settings. Verkada cameras have built-in audio and face match / face search features that are disabled by default. Only Organization Managers have access to enable these features.

The City also has the option to enable two factor authentication (2FA) to reinforce security of their accounts. When enabled, the City user must enter a code that’s texted or generated on their phone after entering their username and password. Client Administrators have the ability to enforce 2FA for all users in the organization. If Client Administrators require 2FA for users, users will set up their 2FA in the process of accepting the invite.

If the City user needs support, he or she can give Verkada’s Support Team temporary access by using the Support Permission System (SPS). When SPS is enabled, its default setting limits customer-approved access to six hours. Even so, during the 6-hour window, Verkada Support has no access to customer video data unless that access is explicitly granted. In addition, the Verkada system automatically sends SPS notifications via email to all City administrators (as designated by the City) when a SPS token is used by Verkada Support staff.

See below for a visual guide on how City users can give Verkada Support temporary access to your account for troubleshooting purposes when requested:





E. Data Protection

All data is encrypted end to end including in transit, at rest, and in use. Only authorized City users that have the correct permissions will be able to review the data. All video

footage is saved locally on the camera, and the LPR data is sent and kept in the cloud. Verkada uses AES 128 encryption on the camera and AES 256 in the cloud. Data in transit is encrypted by using TLS 1.2.

Verkada uses Amazon Web Services (AWS) for cloud servers and storage of archived video. AWS is a datacenter operator that meets high industry standards for data security, disaster recovery, physical and privacy, including ISO 27001, SSAE16/ISAE 3402 Type II: SOC 2, and SSAE16/ISAE 3402 Type II: SOC 3 certifications.

Verkada also allows customers to enable two factor authentication (2FA) to reinforce security of their accounts. When enabled, the user will have to enter a code that's texted or generated on their phone after entering their username and password. Client Administrators have the ability to enforce 2FA for all users in the organization. If Client Administrators require 2FA for users, users will set up their 2FA in the process of accepting the invite.

F. Data Retention

OPW will retain surveillance data for one year in compliance with California Government Code 34090.6.(a), or upon conclusion of any pending litigation.

> *Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 34090, the head of a department of a city or city and county, after one year, may destroy recordings of routine video monitoring, and after 100 days may destroy recordings of telephone and radio communications maintained by the department. This destruction shall be approved by the legislative body and the written consent of the agency attorney shall be obtained. In the event that the recordings are evidence in any claim filed or any pending litigation, they shall be preserved until pending litigation is resolved*.

Retention options available for further discussion. - Lauren Spears

G. Public Access

Except where prohibited or limited by law, the public may access the City's video data through public records requests.

H. Third Party Data Sharing

As referenced throughout this Use Policy, Verkada does not have access to the City's data recorded on Verkada cameras without explicit advanced approval by authorized City staff. Please refer to the *Section D: Data Access* for reference to Verkada Support Permission System (SPS).

AWS is a datacenter operator that meets high industry standards for data security, disaster recovery, physical and privacy, including ISO 27001, SSAE16/ISAE 3402 Type

II: SOC 2, and SSAE16/ISAE 3402 Type II: SOC 3 certifications. In layman's terms, AWS takes privacy very seriously and has ongoing audits to ensure they are compliant. Since Verkada manages the encryption keys for customer data, it is not possible for AWS to decrypt Verkada's customers' video/image data.

I. Training

Training for operating Verkada LPR System will be provided jointly by the system vendor AMS.net and Verkada. Training will be limited to authorized City staff. Staff will direct Verkada to incorporate this use policy and related privacy policies and procedures into its training materials.

J. Auditing and Oversight

The Administrative Services Manager in Public Works' Bureau of Environment shall conduct annual assessments to ensure City users are in compliance with the Use Policy.

All user and device activity that occurs within Verkada's web-based interface is logged at the per-camera level and Citywide level. Designated surveillance administrators can access and view these detailed audit logs at the camera or Citywide level.

The audit log tracks system access and ties each action to a user for events like:

- User Logins
- User Management (add, edit, delete users)
- Organization, Site and Group creation
- Camera moves between sites
- Video footage (live, historical, archives) viewed
- Verkada Support actions



K. Maintenance

The City's third-party vendor, AMS.net, will maintain the integrity of the Verkada Surveillance Camera and LPR system. Details of the mechanisms and procedures are included in the City's contract with AMS.net.

OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT

Surveillance Impact Use Report for the Automated License Plate Reader

A. **Description:** *Information Describing the Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) and How It Works including product descriptions and manuals from manufacturers*.*

ALPR technology consists of cameras that can automatically scan license plates on vehicles that are publicly visible (in the public right of way and/or on public streets). The Oakland Police Department (OPD) uses only ALPR cameras mounted to patrol vehicles so that license plates can be photographed during routine police patrol operations. Each camera housing (two housings per vehicle) consists of a regular color photograph camera as well as an infrared camera (for better photography during darkness). ALPR reads these license plates with a lens and charge-coupled device (CCD) that senses and records the image (can be parked or moving vehicle plates) and connects the image to an optical character recognition (OCR) system that can connect the image to that actual license plate characters.

The ALPR system in a patrol vehicle is activated when the user logs into the software from their vehicle-based computer and starts the system.~~.~~ Once initiated, the system runs continuously and photographs vehicles until turned off manually;[1] ALPR cameras typically record hundreds of license plates each hour but exact recording rates depend on vehicle activity and how many vehicles are encountered. The system compares license plate characters against specific databases, and stores the characters along with the date, time, and location of the license plate in a database.~~;~~ OPD's ALPR system updates daily with three California Department of Justice (CA DOJ) hotlists: felony wants, stolen plates, and stolen vehicles.~~;~~ OPD can also add vehicle plates to internal OPD-created hotlists. There is no OPD ALPR connection to any federal databases.

Authorized personnel within OPD can also enter specific license plate numbers into the system so that active vehicle ALPR systems will alert the officer in the vehicle if there is a real-time match between the entered license plate and the photographed license plate.

OPD personnel will contact OPD Communications Division (dispatch), or verify via their vehicle computers, ~~-~~anytime the ALPR system signals that a license plate on a database has been seen and OPD personnel always personally check with Communications before ~~actually~~ stopping a vehicle based on a ALPR license plate match.

The platform software allows authorized personnel to query the system to see if a

[1] Data captured by the ALPR system will be uploaded onto the OPD ALPR database when the computer is turned off – typically at the end of a patrol shift.

certain license plate (and associated vehicle) have been photographed. The system will show the geographic location within Oakland for license plates that have been photographed, as well as time and date. Authorized personnel can see the actual photographs that match a particular license plate query – the OCR system can incorrectly match alpha-numeric characters so the actual photographs are vital for ensuring the accuracy of the license plate query.

New Features in Boss4

OPD seeks to upgrade its current ALPR version to BOSS4, which is recommended for the improved audit capabilities of the system. If OPD upgrades to BOSS4, the following features will become available:

- The ability to search by vehicle color (e.g., Red, Black, Blue)
- The ability to search by vehicle make (e.g., Chevrolet, Ford, Mazda)
- The ability to search by vehicle type (e.g., Sedan, Truck, Van)

The ability to search by vehicle specifics (e.g., Roof Racks, Logos, Spare Tires) is also currently available in BOSS4. OPD acknowledges that this feature may implicate additional privacy concerns. OPD has already asked the vendor to disable this feature in OPD's ALPR system. If the vendor is unable to disable this feature, then OPD will only upgrade to the base BOSS4 version to improve audit capabilities.

Anticipated Hotlists in BOSS4

Authorized personnel within OPD will be able to add specific license plate numbers into the system as either an alert hotlist or a covert hotlist. Alert hotlists will alert officers in their ALPR equipped vehicles if the plate that was added to the hotlist has been located. Additionally the officers receive further instructions including who to contact regarding the alert. Covert hotlists will not alert officers via the ALPR system. Instead, the alert will be sent to the appropriate investigator for further follow up. This ensures any real-time information necessary to further an investigation is provided to the appropriate individual.

Internal OPD specific hotlists are to be added to the system only upon the approval of the BOS Deputy Director or their designee. The designated approver must be documented in writing with a specific name or departmental position authorized to act as designee.

In addition, the following criteria/information must be provided for each request to add a license plate to any OPD hotlist:

- Vehicle must be part of an existing OPD investigation
- License Plate Number and State of Issuance
- OPD report number
- Vehicle Description
- Explanation for the request
- Which hotlist to add the plate to: Alert or Covert
- Requester's Name and Serial Number

Disapproved lists will be kept on file. Approved requests are to be added to the specific hotlist requested with a maximum run time of 30 days. License plates will be deleted automatically from the system after that time. The requester must resubmit a new request to extend the time an additional 30 days. Should the requester desire

to remove the plate from the hotlist before the 30th day, the requester must contact OPD IT by emailing opditu@oaklandca.gov to request early removal.

* As part of the purchase of the ALPR business from 3M, Neology acquired all intellectual property rights of the ALPR portfolio, including documentation such as the BOSS3 manual, as well as corresponding copyright/confidentiality elements. Neology has confirmed to OPD that they do NOT waive the copyright notice for the BOSS3 manual as it remains a relevant piece of intellectual property which Neology acquired.

B. Purpose: *How OPD intends to Use ALPR Technology*

OPD uses ALPR for two purposes:

1. The immediate (real time) comparison of the license plate characters against specific databases such as those provided by the California Department of Justice listing vehicles that are stolen or sought in connection with a crime or missing persons; and
2. Storage of the license plate characters – along with the date, time, and location of the license plate – in a database that is accessible by law enforcement agencies (LEA) for investigative purposes.

ALPR technology helps OPD personnel to leverage their public presence and to more effectively use their limited time for more critical activity. The technology can alert officers to vehicles that are stolen or connected to a serious felony crime (e.g., aggravated assault, homicide, robbery, sexual assault) immediately (by being automatically connected to criminal databases). Officers can then use the information to notify OPD personnel and/or stop the vehicle as justified by the information. The automatic process decreases the need for laborious data entry processes; therefore, officers have more time for observing public activity and speaking with members of the public. ***Appendix A*** to this report showcases 101 cases where an officer's vehicle ALPR system alerted them to a vehicle on one of the CA DOJ hotlists.

ALPR also provides an important tool for criminal investigations. The information collected by analysts and investigators can determine where a plate has been in the past, which can help to confirm whether or not a vehicle has been at the scene of a crime. Additionally, accurate photos of vehicles from the ALPR system make searching for vehicles much easier – how the vehicle differs from every other vehicle of the same make and model. The photos frequently show distinctive vehicle aspects (e.g. dents, scratches, stickers). Investigators can also confirm that the vehicle matches the license plate and whether the license plate has been switched from a different vehicle. Such information may help personnel to find new leads in a felony crime investigation.

OPD has not historically quantified ALPR usage for vehicle stops, nor for later criminal investigations[2] in a way that easily allows for impact analysis. However, OPD is developing more automated processes for tracking ALPR usage in connection with investigations – OPD and the City's IT Department are currently

[2] Current policies mandate documenting reasons for vehicle stops and reported race and gender of persons stopped. OPD is reviewing how to ensure that investigators note when ALPR was instrumental in criminal investigations for documenting ALPR impact.

engaged in a multi-year new CAD/RMS implementation which will greatly improve this type of data tracking. Furthermore, a new BOSS 4 system (see ***Section E*** below) will also allow for better use tracking.

OPD's Criminal Investigations Division (CID), in preparation for this report, has found several cases where ALPR license plate locational data was instrumental in the ultimate arrest and arraignment of at least two homicide suspects, and with the conviction of at least one of them. (***Appendix B*** attached to this report). The following highlights specific cases from the year 2020 where ALPR played a pivotal role in supporting CID investigations:

The ALPR data used to investigate these cases varies widely. A recent analysis of ALPR queries shows that most revealed data that was less than one month old (13 cases), and the number of cases using older data diminishes. However, there are still valuable cases using data even 18-24 months old. The chart below illustrates the recent age of this query data.



C. Location: *The Locations and situations in which ALPR Camera Technology may be deployed or utilized.*
OPD owns 35 sets (left and right) of ALPR vehicle-mounted cameras. Authorized personnel (as described in the Mitigations Section below) may operate ALPR camera technology on public streets in the City of Oakland, while engaged in the course of their duties.

D. Privacy Impact: *How is the OPD ALPR Use Policy Adequate in Protecting Civil Rights and Liberties and whether ALPR was used or deployed, intentionally or inadvertently, in a*

manner that is discriminatory, viewpoint-based, or biased via algorithm.
OPD recognizes that the use of ALPR technology raises significant privacy concerns. There is concern that the use of ALPR technology can be utilized to ascertain vehicle travel patterns over periods of time. People are generally creatures of habit and often drive in their vehicles the same way to work, to visit friends and associates, to houses of worship, and neighborhood grocery stores. Research shows that "metadata", such as individual data points such as phone numbers called, and time of day or vehicle locations, can be combined to create patterns that identify individuals. Using a simple algorithm, Stanford University lawyer and computer scientist Jonathan Mayer was able to accurately identify 80 percent of the volunteers in his study, using only open source databases such as Yelp, Facebook, and Google[3].

OPD can use the ALPR technology to see if a particular license plate (and thus the associated vehicle) was photographed in particular places during particular times; however, OPD can only use the system to make such determinations by ~~such by~~ manually querying the system based upon a right to know (see Mitigation section below). OPD also recognizes that ALPR cameras may photograph extraneous data such as images of the vehicle, the vehicle driver and/or bumper stickers or other details that affiliate the vehicle or driver with particular groups. As explained in the Description Section (A) above and the Mitigation (E) section below, authorized personnel can only manually query the ALPR system for particular license plates (or all plates within a defined area) and only for particular reasons as outlined in OPD policy. In addition, current technology cannot be used to query data based upon vehicle drivers, or based on any type of article (e.g., bumper sticker) affixed to a vehicle. Additionally, OPD has instituted many protocols (see Mitigation section below) to safeguard against the unauthorized access to any ALPR data.

OPD is also working with the ALPR vendor to disable any feature that would allow searching for a vehicle by using affixed articles in any future update.
The 2013 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) report titled, "YOU ARE BEING TRACKED[4]" cites that privacy concerns about ALPR data tracking increase the longer the data is retained. The report states, "While holding onto "hit" data while an investigation or case is ongoing is legitimate, law enforcement agencies should not be storing data about people who have done nothing wrong" (page 16). OPD shares the concerns of the ACLU that the misuse of retained data (e.g., datamining) could lead to the abuse of privacy of people who have committed no crime. OPD is committed to restricted use policies to impede the use of ALPR data for any use outside of authorized uses (e.g., criminal investigations.).

There is concern that ALPR camera use may cause disparate impacts if used more intensely in certain areas such as areas with higher crime and greater clusters of less-advantaged communities. OPD does not affix ALPR cameras to fixed infrastructure. OPD deploys ALPR camera-affixed vehicles through every area of Oakland[5], even though there may be times when OPD Commanders request that ALPR cameras be used in particular areas for short periods of time to address crime patterns. Additionally, ALPR usage does not lead to greater levels of discretionary police stops; ALPR use leads to vehicle stops

[3] Today, data scientists can accurately identify over 95% of individuals based solely on four geospatial (time, location) data points.
[4] https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/071613-aclu-alprreport-opt-v05.pdf
[5] OPD often must use ALPR camera-equipped vehicles for standard patrol activity regardless of location because of limited fleet reserves.

only where a real-time photographed license plate matches a stop warrant for a stolen vehicle or serious crime in a criminal database.

Databases such from the State of California Department of Justice (DOJ) can contain some outdated or inaccurate data. ALPR systems, just as in the case of a manual query in a police vehicle computer, will provide the license plate data from the related database. ALPR systems simply make the query faster. In such cases personnel will follow standard policies and procedures for stopping a motorist and requesting personal identification (explained on page 1 above in connecting to CA DOJ felony wants, stolen plates, stolen vehicles hotlists).

OMC 9.64.010 "Definitions" now requires that the Annual Surveillance Report, Section E "A summary of community complaints…" also requires that:

> *"The analysis shall also identify the race of each person that was subject to the technology's use. The Privacy Advisory Commission may waive this requirement upon making a determination that the probative value in gathering this information to evaluate the technology's impact on privacy interests is outweighed by the City's administrative burden in collecting or verifying this information and the potential greater invasiveness in capturing such data. If the Privacy Advisory Commission makes such a determination, written findings in support of the determination shall be included in the annual report submitted for City Council review."*

The ALPR technology captures a photograph of the vehicle license plate and vehicle - the driver of the vehicle may be different from the actual registered owner in each case. Therefore, the system cannot determine the vehicle driver at the time the photograph is taken. OPD could run inquiries for the many thousands of plates and would still not know if the person driving the vehicle was the registered owner identified by such inquiries. Therefore, there would not only be an extreme administrative burden to analyze the plates captured by the system – but the information gathered would not necessarily provide accurate information. OPD therefore requests a waiver from collecting race-specific ALPR data for future annual reports.

E. Mitigations: *Specific, affirmative technical and procedural measures that will be implemented to safeguard the public.*

Oakland residents and visitors have a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the California Constitution. OPD may, however, photograph state-issued license plates when those plates are in public view. Because surveillance technology like ALPR allows OPD to use electronic, automatic tools that allow OPD to collect and compare publicly appearing license plate images beyond the capability of an individual officer to quickly collect and compare license plates, OPD recognizes that there may exist concerns about the accuracy, use, and storage of such information. Therefore, OPD's ALPR policy attempts to mitigate potential invasiveness by limiting the use and storage of real-time and aggregated ALPR data.

OPD's ALPR system, (as mentioned in Section 1 above), uses OCR to capture license plate data. ALPR cameras are designed to focus on license plates cameras, and the OCR only records the license plate characters. The Use Policy does allow that newer versions of ALPR systems may also capture vehicle attributes such as vehicle make, model and color and allow for querying of this type of data. Extraneous data (e.g. human faces) may

be captured in an ALPR image capture as well. However, OPD's current BOSS ALPR database can only query license plate numbers.
OPD's ALPR system is maintained on premises. OPD, with City Information Technology Department support, maintains and controls its ALPR data. There are 3rd party ALPR systems available for police departments, where the ALPR data is shared with other ALPR clients. OPD does not utilize these systems and ensures that its ALPR data is only shared via explicit requests where OPD believes a right to know and need to know threshold has been achieved.

ALPR can only be used for authorized purposes consisting only of queries related to criminal investigations and other authorized law enforcement functions, as explained in DGO I-12.B-2 "Restriction on Use: 1. "Department members shall not use, or allow others to use, the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53); authorized purposes consist only of queries related to criminal investigations and other authorized law enforcement functions.". Additionally, OPD is required to provide an annual report to the PAC (per OMC 9.64) documenting ALPR usage during the prior calendar year. The annual report will contain audit data of system queries (e.g., document aspects of use activity - time, date, and what is searched). DGO I.12, Part 2 "Restrictions on Use," provides a number of internal safeguards, including:

> Department members shall not use, or allow others to use, the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51.; Civil Code § 1798.90.53). Authorized purposes consist only of queries related to criminal investigations, administrative investigations, missing persons cases, or other situations where there is a legal obligation to provide a information related to an investigation. Any situation outside of these categories requires approval of a commander at the rank of Deputy Chief, Deputy Director, or higher.
>
> a. No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.
>
> b. No ALPR operator may access department, state or federal data unless otherwise authorized to do so pursuant to Section B.2 "Restricted Access".
>
> c. Accessing data collected by ALPR requires a right to know and a need to know. A right to know is the legal authority to receive information pursuant to a state or federal statute, applicable case law, or a court order. A need to know is a compelling reason to request information such as involvement in an active investigation.

F. **Data Types and Sources:** *A list of all types and sources of data to be collected, analyzed, or processed by the surveillance technology, including "open source" data, scores, reports, logic or algorithm used, and any additional information derived therefrom.*

ALPR data is composed of photographs of license plates, which can be linked through OCR software to identify license plate alpha-numeric characters. License plate photographs, as detailed in Section One above, may contain images of the vehicle with particular visual details of the vehicle (such as vehicle make or model or bumper stickers). Photographs may also contain images of the vehicle driver. However, the ALPR system only annotates photographs based on license plate characters (newer systems have more

advanced functionality where users can query for vehicle type and color); therefore, there is currently no way to query the system based on vehicle details (such as bumper stickers) or individuals associated with a vehicle.
All ALPR data downloaded to the server shall be purged from the server at the point of 365 days in alignment with Government Code section 34090. Data may be retained outside the database for the following purposes:

1. Criminal Investigations
2. Administrative Investigations
3. Missing Persons Investigations
4. Investigations from other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies where there is a legal obligation to provide information.

Any situation outside of these categories requires approval from a commander at the rank of Deputy Chief, Deputy Director, or higher.

California law does not mandate a specific retention period for ALPR data. California Civil Code Title 1.81 .23 governs "Collection of License Plate Information."
Although the Civil Code requires ALPR operators to adopt a "usage and privacy policy" that specifies the "length of time ALPR information will be retained", it does not mandate a specific retention period. However, when the legislature has not prescribed a retention period for a particular type of document, the two-year "catch-all" retention period in California Government Code section 34090 applies.

Section 34090.6 specifically addresses "routine video monitoring" and the destruction of video "recordings," and stipulates that the head of a department of a city may destroy recordings of routine video monitoring after one year. However, there is no legislative history or case law interpreting or suggesting that this is the appropriate retention period for ALPR data. The City ultimately believes that a 730-day data retention period is the most appropriate retention period, but that a 365-day data retention period still aligns with state law. Any data retention short of 365 days would open the City to liability risks; staff therefore believes that a 365 day ALPR data retention period aligns with internal investigatory need and State law while balancing public privacy concerns.

G. Data Security: *information about the steps that will be taken to ensure that adequate security measures are used to safeguard the data collected or generated by the technology from unauthorized access or disclosure.*
OPD takes data security seriously and safeguards ALPR data by both procedural and technological means. OPD will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

1. All ALPR data downloaded to the mobile workstation and in storage shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by username, license number or other data elements used in the search, name, date, time and purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.52).
2. Members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate LEA purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.

OPD ALPR's system is connected to the City's virtual private network (VPN) gateway and is encrypted through the transport. The encrypted data ends at the VPN gateway and the

ALPR data goes into the internal SQL database where records can be search using the OPD internal BOSS3 server. Both the BOSS3 server and ALPR SQL database are internal services that can only be accessible within the OPDnet network.

The current OPD BOSS ALPR system is not-cloud based; ALPR-camera equipped vehicle computers can download (not upload) State DOJ databases as described above. However, OPD will look to upgrade this outdated system should the City Council approve DGO I-12. Only authorized OPD personnel have access to the OPD ~~the~~ ALPR ~~BOSS~~ system. The ALPR coordinator is responsible for providing training on the ALPR system use to authorized personnel.

H. **Fiscal Cost:** *The fiscal costs for the surveillance technology, including initial purchase, personnel and other ongoing costs, and any current or potential sources of funding.*

OPD spent $293,500 in 2014 to purchase the ALPR system from 3M. Neology later purchased the ALPR product line from 3M. OPD does not have a maintenance contract with Neology and therefore relies on EVO for ALPR maintenance. OPD has spent approximately $50,000 annually with EVO-Emergency Vehicle Outfitters Inc. for ALPR vehicle camera maintenance. OPD relies on EVO to outfit police vehicles with many standard police technology upgrades (e.g. vehicle computers) as well as ALPR camera maintenance. However, OPD's current ALPR camera fleet are no longer covered by a maintenance contract and OPD now only spends approximately $3,000 annual for software support.
The following information is a financial estimate to upgrade OPD's entire ALPR system:

- New Hardware and support for 35 vehicles: $363,000
- New BOSS4 software (On-premise 1 year license): $15,000
- New BOSS4 software (Hosted storage 1 year license): $43,000

I. **Third Party Dependence:** *Whether use or maintenance of ALPR technology will require data gathered by the technology to be handled or stored by a third-party vendor on an ongoing basis*

OPD relies upon third party technology vendors to install and provide maintenance for ALPR systems (currently EVO as explained in Section H above). Vendors contracted with the City for vehicle ALPR installation and maintenance of the systems will not handle or store the ALPR data. Data gathered from each vehicle system is uploaded from the vehicle to the server for secure storage.

Maintenance of the server may require vendor supplying OPD with the server software to handle data stored in it; this access will be controlled by the City's IT Department.

J. **Alternatives Considered:** *A summary of all alternative methods considered in-lieu of ALPR, including the costs and benefits associated with each alternative and an explanation of the reasons why each alternative is inadequate*

OPD officers and investigators rely primarily on traditional policing techniques to gather

evidence related to criminal investigations such as speaking to witnesses and suspects, gathering information from observations, and using standard data aggregation systems. These methods will continue to be employed as primary investigative tools that will be supplemented by use of BWCs to document police activity.

ALPR technology provides LEA personnel with a fast and efficient way to connect vehicles to violent and felonious criminal activity. This tool helps OPD's authorized personnel increase their ability to find wanted suspects and help solve crimes in a way that is unique – by creating a time map of vehicle locational activity. OPD recognizes the privacy concerns inherent in such a technology but has in place the numerous mitigations and data security protocols described in sections five and seven above respectively. However, OPD believes that the alternative to ALPR usage would be to forgo its observational and investigatory benefits. OPD personnel, without access to ALPR data, would rely on patrol officer observations and other basic investigatory processes. For example, OPD would forgo information regarding real-time stolen vehicle information without access to the ALPR system that provides real-time notifications from ALPR hits against CA DOJ databases; OPD would ultimately rely on more manual processes for writing down stolen vehicle plates – an extremely manual and less accurate process. OPD data suggest that some future violent felonies would also remain unsolved as well if there were no access to these ALPR investigatory leads.

K. Track Record of Other Entities

Numerous local and state government entities have researched and evaluated the use of ALPR cameras. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) documents many recent reports[6]. The AICP report, "News Stories about Law Enforcement ALPR Successes September 2017 - September 2018"[7] presents scores of cases from different national LEA jurisdictions where ALPR data helped lead to the capture of violent criminals. A July 2014 study[8] from the Rand Corporation research organization found that ALPR cameras have proven useful for crime investigations in numerous cities and states, and that systems with the most database access and longest retention policies provide the greatest use in terms of providing real-time information as well as useful investigation data. The findings in this report also indicate that privacy mitigations are critical to ensuring legal use of ALPR and public privacy protections.

Personnel have reached out to local agencies to assess their experience using ALPR. Fremont Police Department personnel stated that they use their ALPR system daily. Moreover, they stated that the system has been of great benefit to their investigations over the years, However, they also stated that they do not specifically track its use in investigations and cannot easily provide quantitative data. They stated that there have not been any unexpected costs or technical system problems. The Livermore Police Department (LPD) replied that they believe their ALPR system is worthwhile to them, but they do not have any quantitative information about the efficacy. LPD personnel stated that they have quantitative data regarding the number of hits as well as search queries, but not regarding usage of the system and the effectiveness. LPD staff also stated that there have not been any unanticipated costs nor system failures. They also stated that they conduct regular audits and have not identified any civil rights or civil liberties abuses.

[6] https://www.theiacp.org/projects/automated-license-plate-recognition

[7] https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/ALPR%20Success%20News%20Stories%202018.pdf

[8] https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR467.html

OPD personnel are still waiting to hear back from other agencies.

Appendix A:

Cases Where the Vehicle ALPR System Alerted Officers to Vehicle on a California Department of Justice Hot List: January 1, 2020-December 31, 2020

1. 20-000094 1/3/2020: Oakland Police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 1/1/20. Two days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. Officers recovered the vehicle from the 800 Blk of 35th Street. Age of Data 2 days.

2. 20-001459 1/8/2020: Hayward police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 1/4/20. Four days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. Officers recovered the vehicle from the 1500 Blk of 32nd Street. Age of Data 4 days.

3. 20-005991 2/21/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 1/31/20. Twenty one days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. Officers recovered the vehicle from the 1200 blk of E 17th St. Age of Data 22 days.

4. 20-004363 1/26/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 1/23/20. Three days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. Officers were able to set up surveillance on the vehicle and observe the suspect return to the vehicle. The suspect drove the vehicle away and was stopped a short distance later where he was arrested. The vehicle was then recovered from the 1700 Blk of International Blvd. Age of Data 3 days.

5. 20-005852 1/30/2020: San Francisco police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 1/25/20. Five days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 900 Blk of Adeline Street. Age of Data 5 days.

6. 20-007296 2/22/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 2/6/20. Sixteen days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted to the stolen vehicle by their vehicle ALPR system. The officer conducted a vehicle stop on the vehicle where they arrested a parole who was driving the vehicle. The vehicle was then recovered from the 1600 Blk of 84th Ave. Age of Data 16 days.

7. 20-007088 2/5/2020: San Jose police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 2/1/20. Four days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 300 Blk of Chestnut Street. Age of Data 4 days.

8. 20-009430 2/18/2020: Emeryville police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 2/11/20. Seven days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 1500 block of E 17th St. Age of Data 7 days.

9. 20-009783 2/19/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 2/12/20. Seven days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. Officers observed a suspect in the vehicle. The suspect was arrested and showed to be on probation for theft. The vehicle was then recovered from the parking lot of 5701 Foothill Blvd. Age of Data 7 days.

10. 20-010282 2/26/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 2/22/20. Four days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 4400 Blk of Macarthur Blvd. Age of Data 4 days.

11. 20-009885 2/26/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 2/20/20. Six days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 3650 Blk of Greenacre Rd. Age of Data 6 days.

12. 20-011144 3/5/2020: Oakland technician took a report of a stolen vehicle on 2/26/2020. Seven days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 600 block of Sycamore Street. Age of Data 7 days.

13. 20-011926 3/4/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 3/2/20. Two days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 1900 blk of 8th Ave. Age of Data 2 days.

14. 20-011826 3/1/2020: San Francisco police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle. Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 2800 block of School St.

15. 20-012142 3/3/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 3/2/20. One day later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 800 Blk of 77th Ave. Age of Data 1 day.

16. 20-012178 3/3/2020: San Leandro police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle. Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 1000 Blk of 77th Ave.

17. 20-012182 3/3/2020: Hayward police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle. Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 7600 Blk of Spencer St.

18. 20-012187 3/3/2020: Salinas police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle. Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 800 Blk of 77th Ave.

19. 20-012378 3/5/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 3/3/20. Two days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 1900 blk of 11th Ave. Age of Data 2 days.

20. 20-014139 3/18/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 3/12/20. Six days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 2500 blk of 11th Ave. Age of data 6 days.

21. 20-014288 4/6/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a carjacking on 3/13/20. Twenty four days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted to the carjacked vehicle parked on the side of the road by their vehicle ALPR system. Officers set up surveillance on the vehicle and a suspect was arrested for possession of the stolen vehicle. The vehicle was then recovered from the 2200 Blk of E 20th St. Age of Data 24 days.

22. 20-014273 3/13/2020: San Mateo police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 2/21/20. Twenty three days later Oakland officers on patrol were

alerted to a stolen vehicle driving in the 1000 block of Pine St by their vehicle ALPR system. Officers stopped the vehicle and arrested two suspects out of the vehicle. The vehicle was then recovered. Age of Data 23 days.

23. 20-014139 3/18/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 3/12/20. Six days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 2500 blk of 11th Ave. Age of Data 6 days.

24. 20-015252 5/15/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 3/20/20. Fifty Six days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 3300 block of E 16th St. Age of Data 56 days.

25. 20-016962 4/8/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a carjacking on 3/30/20. Nine days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted to the carjacked vehicle parked on the side of the road by their vehicle ALPR system. A suspect was observed in the vehicle. The suspect was arrested. The vehicle was recovered from the 1400 Blk of 16th Ave. Age of Data 9 days.

26. 20-017760 4/4/2020: San Leandro police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 3/31/20. Four days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 1100 Blk of 2nd Ave. Age of Data 4 days.

27. 20-017979 4/10/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 4/6/20. Four days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 1800 Blk of E 15th St. Age of Data 4 days.

28. 20-018110 4/10/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 4/7/20. Three days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. A suspect was in the vehicle and was on probation for stealing vehicles. The suspect was arrested. The vehicle was then recovered from the 3900 blk of Alameda Ave. Age of Data 3 days.

29. 20-019320 4/17/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of an embezzled vehicle on 4/15/20. Two days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. A suspect was in the vehicle and was arrested for the embezzlement of

the vehicle. The suspect was on probation for stealing a vehicle. The vehicle was then recovered from the 1400 block of Lakeshore Ave. Age of Data 2 days.

30. 20-018994 4/22/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 4/13/20. Nine days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 2500 Blk of High St. Age of Data 9 days.

31. 20-019089 4/17/2020: Oakland technician took a report of a stolen vehicle on 4/13/20. Four days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 900 block of 10th Ave. Age of Data 4 days.

32. 20-019145 4/15/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 4/14/20. One day later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted to a stolen vehicle by the vehicle ALPR system. The vehicle was being driven in the 8400 Blk of San Leandro St. The driver was able to evade officers and fled. Age of Data 1 day.

33. 20-020185 4/21/2020: San Leandro police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 4/17/2020. Four days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 2700 block of 10th Ave. Age of Data 4 days.

34. 20-036667 7/25/2020: Patrol Officers were alerted by the ALPR system affixed on top of their patrol vehicle of a Stolen Vehicle parked on the street in the 1400 block of 19th Ave. The vehicle was occupied by Two (2) individuals who fled and were later detained by officers. Two (2) Loaded Firearms were recovered with additional ammo kept on their person. A large amount of Narcotics were also seized as well scales and small individual baggies. Both individuals were arrested for the above detailed offences. Age of Data 4 days.

35. 20-057145 11/20/2020: Patrol Officers were alerted by the ALPR system affixed on top of their patrol vehicle of Stolen Vehicle. Officers on viewed the stolen vehicle traveling east bound on the 6500 block Foothill Blvd. One (1) individual fled the vehicle and was later arrested by on viewing Officers for Vehicle Theft and Being in Possession of Stolen Property. Age of data missing.

36. 20-043136 8/30/2020: Patrol Officers were alerted by the ALPR system affixed on top their patrol vehicle traveling southbound on the 1100 block 9th Ave. Two(2) individuals were taken into custody without incident. Officers located Loaded Firearm on one of the individuals. Both individuals were arrested for being in

possession of a stolen vehicle as well as various Firearm charges. Age of Data 8 days.

37. 20-019145 4/15/2020: Patrol Officers were alerted by the ALPR system affixed on top their patrol vehicle of a stolen vehicle traveling on the east bound on the 6900 block of San Leandro St. Officers attempted to detain the occupants of the vehicle but the occupants fled at a high rate of speed. Officers elected to not continue further action. Suspects still outstanding. Age of Data 1 day.

38. 20-059390 12/05/2020: Patrol Officers were alerted by the ALPR system affixed on top of their vehicle of a stolen vehicle traveling west bound on Highway 580 on Seminary Ave. One (1) individual was taken into custody without incident. The suspect was charged with Vehicle Theft and in Possession of a Stolen vehicle. Age of Data 2 days.

39. 20-063338 12/28/2020: While on Patrol Officers located an unoccupied Stolen vehicle at 201 Embarcadero (Estuary Park). Officers were alerted by their ALPR system affixed on top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Age of Data 1 day.

40. 20-060937 12/12/2020: While on Patrol Officers located an unoccupied Stolen vehicle on the 800 block of Pine St. Officers were alerted by their ALPR system affixed on top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Age of data 25 Days.

41. 20-059195 12/11/2020: While on Patrol Officers located a unoccupied Stolen vehicle in the area of Macarthur Ave and Pierson St. Officers were alerted by their ALPR system affixed on top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Age of Data 8 days.

42. 20-054176 11/2/2020: While on Patrol Officers located an unoccupied Stolen Vehicle on the 800 block of Broadway. Officers were alerted by their ALPR system affixed on top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Age of Data 4 days.

43. 20-058452 11/28/2020: While on Patrol near 7th St and Campbell St, Officers were alerted by their ALPR system affixed on top of their vehicle of a Stolen Vehicle. Officers detained One (1) individual without incident. The individual was later arrested for Vehicle theft and possession of a Stolen Vehicle. Age of Data missing.

44. 20-036580 11/27/2020: While on Patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle on the 600 block of 32nd St. Officers were alerted by the ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol Vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Age of Data 1 day.

45. 20-057842 11/24/2020: While on Patrol Officers were alerted of a Stolen Vehicle traveling southbound on the 2600 block of Fruitvale. Officers were alerted on the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol Vehicle. One (1) Individual was taken into custody without incident. The individual was arrested for Vehicle Theft. Age of Data 1 day.
46. 20-057430 11/22/2020: While on Patrol Officers were alerted of a Stolen Vehicle traveling south bound on the 16th Ave bridge heading towards Embarcadero Ave. Officers were alerted by the ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol Vehicle. One(1) individual was taken into custody without incident. That individual was arrested for vehicle theft, possession of a stolen vehicle, and in possession of marijuana. Age of Data 14 days.

47. 20-057357 11/21/2020: While on Patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle on the 1300 block of 5th St. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to the top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Age of Data 4 days.

48. 20-047595 11/15/2020: While on Patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle on the 4500 block of Roberts Ave. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to the top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 9/25/2020.

49. 20-056291 11/15/2020: While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle IFO 1643 8th St. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 11/15/2020.

50. 20-049020 11/11/2020: While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle on the 1200 block 12th St. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to the top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of theft 9/19/2020.

51. 20-052629 11/09/2020: While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle on the 3400 block of Magnolia. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to the top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 11/08/2020.

52. 20-054734 11/08/2020: While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle on the 2200 block of E 19th St. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to the top of their patrol vehicle. The vehicle had been carjacked earlier that week. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 11/05/2020.

53. 20-055061 11/14/2020: While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle on the 3200 block of Kingsland Ave. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to the top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 11/08/2020.

54. 20-054880 11/07/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system that is affixed on top of their patrol vehicle of a stolen vehicle traveling south bound on the 1200 block of 19th Ave. One (1) individual was taken into custody without incident. The individual was arrested for an outstanding Felony Bench warrant as well as for stolen vehicle and knowingly being in possession of a stolen vehicle. This individual was on probation for various past crimes including stealing vehicles. Date of Theft 11/06/2020.

55. 20-053512 11/02/2020: While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle on the 1700 block of 16th St. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 10/29/2020.

56. 20-054063 11/2/2020: While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle on the 2600 block of Chestnut. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 10/29/2020.

57. 20-053879 11/1/2020: While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle on the 800 block Mandela Parkway. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 8/1/2020.

58. 20-052301 10/27/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by the ALPR system affixed to the top of their patrol vehicle of a stolen vehicle traveling west bound on the 1700 block of E 12th St. One (1) individual was taken into custody without incident. The individual was arrested for vehicle theft, being possession of a stolen vehicle, and probation violation. Date of Theft 10/23/2020.

59. 20-052736 10/26/2020: While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle on the 300 block of Peralta. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 10/13/2020.

60. 20-052724 10/25/2020: Robbery Investigator sent out a department wide email on 07 Aug 20 detailing the robbery and sent an Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) photo of the suspect vehicle. Field contact reports of occupants inside the suspect vehicle were requested. Officers viewed this email, including the attached suspect vehicle photo. The subject was also wanted in connection to a

murder investigation. Officers used ALPRS hits to track down known location of the suspect and patterns of places traveled. Officers located the suspect vehicle and that individual was taken into custody and transported to CID investigations. Date of original incident 08/7/2020 2 Months Apart.

61. 20-052629 10/25/2020: While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle IFO 3420 Magnolia St. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 10/15/2020.

62. 20-052428 10/23/2020: While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle IFO 3420 Magnolia St. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 10/20/2020.

63. 20-053299 10/23/2020: Outside Agency Report No.: Berkeley Report 20-48997 While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle IFO 100 Admiral Toney Way. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 11/23/20.

64. 20-051391 10/27/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to a unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 900 block of 10th St. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 10/23/2020.

65. 20-040168 10/6/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to a unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 900 block of 10th St. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 10/6/2020.

66. 20-049103 10/6/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked IFO 1212 Center St. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 10/4/2020.

67. 20-048660 10/5/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by the ALPR system affixed to the top of their patrol vehicle of a stolen vehicle parked in the lot of 3232 Foothill Blvd. One (1) individual was taken into custody without incident. The individual was arrested for vehicle theft, being possession of a stolen vehicle, and probation violation. Date of Theft 10/1/2020.

68. 20-049020 10/11/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 1200 block of Peralta St.

The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 9/19/2020.

69. 20-049008 10/3/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system of a stolen vehicle traveling west bound on the 1500 block of E 12th St. The Officers were alerted by ALPR system affixed on top of their vehicle. One (1) individual was taken into custody without incident. This individual was later arrested for stolen vehicle and possession of burglary tools. Date of Theft 9/3/2020.

70. 20-049103 10/4/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 1200 block of Center St. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 10/4/2020.

71. 20-048696 11/1/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 3400 block West St. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 10/1/2020.

72. 20-47676 9/25/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the area of Rilea Wy and Kellar Ave. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Suspect still outstanding.

73. 20-047595 11/15/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 4500 block of Roberts Ave The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Date of Theft 9/25/2020.

74. 20-042657 8/28/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system on a Stolen License plate on a vehicle that later identified as a stolen vehicle. Officers used the ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol vehicle. Two (2) individuals were detained pending further investigation. One (1) individual was later arrested after determining that the vehicle was stolen after a file check of the vehicles VIN. Date of theft 5/7/2020.

75. 20-035085 8/22/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system on a Stolen Vehicle traveling east bound on the 2600 block of E 12th St. Officers used the ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol vehicle. Two (2) individuals were detained for further investigation. One (1) individual was later

arrested for stolen vehicle and probation violation for committing a felony while on probation. Date of Theft 7/16/2020.

76. 20-037402 8/20/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 3500 block of Diamond Ave. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 7/29/2020.

77. 20-038282 8/20/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system on a Stolen Vehicle traveling south bound on the 3500 block of Fruitvale Ave. Officers used the ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol vehicle. One (1) individual was detained for further investigation. That individual was later arrested for stolen vehicle and possession of a stolen vehicle. Date of Theft 8/3/2020.

78. 20-040555 8/6/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 4600 block of Meldon Ave The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 7/28/2020.

79. 20-040352 8/14/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system on a Stolen Vehicle traveling north bound on the 1100 block of 16th Ave. The ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol vehicle alerted the Officers and the Officers confirmed that the vehicle was indeed stolen. One (1) individual was detained for further investigation. That individual was later arrested for stolen vehicle and possession of a stolen vehicle. Date of Theft was 8/12/2020.

80. 20-040168 10/6/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 2400 block 21st Ave. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. After verifying the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. The owner of the vehicle was very happy to be able to recover his vehicle. Date of Theft 8/13/2020.

81. 20-038507 8/4/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system on a Stolen Vehicle traveling east bound 2100 block of International blvd. The ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol vehicle alerted the Officers and the Officers confirmed that the vehicle was indeed stolen. One (1) individual was detained for further investigation. That individual was later arrested for stolen vehicle, possession of a stolen vehicle and parole violation. Date of theft 8/3/2020.

82. 20-037670 7/31/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system on a Stolen Vehicle traveling east bound 1400 block of 19th Ave. The ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol vehicle alerted the Officers and the Officers confirmed that the vehicle was indeed stolen. One (1) individual was detained following a foot pursuit. A firearm was recovered. That individual was later arrested for stolen vehicle, possession of a stolen vehicle, Various firearm charges (Loaded firearm in public, concealed loaded firearm in vehicle), and a probation violation. Date of Theft 7/21/2020.

83. 20-036747 7/26/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 200 block of Wayne Ave. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. After verifying the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. The registered owner was notified and later arrived on scene and was very happy to retake ownership of his vehicle.

84. 20-036580 7/25/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 600 block of 32nd St. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding.

85. 20-035588 7/20/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the Helen St. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 7/5/20.

86. 20-035206 Outside Agency Report No.: Suisun PD 20-1881 7/18/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system on a Stolen Vehicle traveling east bound 700 block of 17th St. The ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol vehicle alerted the Officers and the Officers confirmed that the vehicle was indeed stolen. Three (3) individuals were detained. One (1) individual was determined to be the driver was later arrested for stolen vehicle, possession of a stolen vehicle, and a probation violation. Date of Theft 7/13/20.

87. 20-034760 7/16/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 1000 block of E 20th St. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding.

88. 20-034795 Outside Agency Report No.: Richmond PD# 20-6125 7/15/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied

stolen vehicle parked on the W. Macarthur Ave. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding.

89. 20-031006 Outside Agency Report No.: Berkeley PD 20-29303 6/25/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 3300 block of 13th Ave. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding.

90. 20-036747 7/26/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 200 block of Wayne. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding.

91. 20-026866 5/31/20: Officers observed a vehicle fleeing the area at a high rate of speed after a fire had been set near the OPD gas pumps (6th St and Washington St). Officers attempted to conduct a stop of the vehicle but lost the vehicle as it fled from Officers. Officers conducted an ALPR search for past hits throughout Oakland. The search resulted with the suspect vehicle parked on the 2300 block of E15th St. Officers searched the area and located the suspect vehicle on the 1500 block of Miller St. The suspect was arrested for fleeing and Arson.

92. 20-021377 5/20/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 2000 block of 13th Ave. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding.

93. 20-025087 Outside Agency Report No.: San Francisco 200277033 5/20/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 1300 block of E 20th St. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding.

94. 20-024942 Outside Agency Report No.: San Pablo S20-1363 5/19/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 1700 7th Ave. The ALPR system that is affixed above their

patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding.

95. 20-024499 5/19/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 2500 block 10th Ave. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. One (1) of the license plates had been switched with another stolen license plate of another similar vehicle. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding.

96. 20-024795 5/19/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by the ALPR system of a stolen vehicle traveling south bound on the 1900 block of Embarcadero. The ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol vehicle alerted the Officers and the Officers confirmed that the vehicle was indeed stolen. One (1) individual was detained for further investigation. That individual was later arrested for stolen vehicle, possession of a stolen vehicle and an Ex-felon in possession of Body Armor.

97. 20-015252 5/15/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 3300 block of E 16th St. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 3/19/20.

98. 20-021429 5/1/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 2600 block of E 27th St. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding.

99. 20-021830 4/30/20: While On patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system of a stolen vehicle parked on the 4500 block of Macarthur Blvd. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. An individual was detained without incident pending further investigation. After conducting a file check, it was determined that the plates had been switched. One (1) of the license plates had been switched with another stolen license plate of another similar vehicle. The individual was later cited and release for Burglary Tools.

Appendix B:

Automated License Plate Use Cases

20-042436
On August 26, 2020 a residential burglary occurred. The suspect vehicle description and license plate number were obtained and the ALPR system was queried. The system showed a recent location where the vehicle had been parked. The vehicle information along with the location where the vehicle was seen parked were disseminated to officers for extra patrols in the area to search for the vehicle. (Data age 3 months)

20-042543
On August 27, 2020 an armed robbery occurred. A suspect vehicle license plate was obtained, and an ALPR query was conducted. A picture showing distinctive things about the vehicle was obtained from the system and it was disseminated to officers. (Data age 3 months)

20-054741
On November 5, 2020 a patrol unit received an alert on their vehicle computer that their ALPR system had just identified a stolen vehicle. The officers confirmed that the vehicle was stolen and conducted a high-risk vehicle stop on the vehicle. The driver was arrested for the stolen vehicle and a search of the vehicle was conducted. Officers found explosives, two firearms, ammunition, counterfeit money, and marijuana for sales. (Real Time Usage)

20-054097
On November 2,7 2020 an accident occurred in the city of Oakland, The driver of one of the vehicles refused to exchange information with the other driver and instead retrieved a firearm from his vehicle and proceeded to rob the other driver at gunpoint. When officers arrived on scene the victim of the robbery provided them with the license plate of the suspect vehicle. Officers queried the ALPR system which revealed a match to the suspect vehicle. Officers were able to locate the vehicle which resulted in additional evidence. (Data Age 3 months)

20-057415
On November 22, 2020 an armed carjacking occurred. An armed suspect approached a vehicle and ordered the victim out of the vehicle at gunpoint. The suspect then fled with the vehicle. The investigator used the ALPR system to locate a photograph of the vehicle which was disseminated to officers. The vehicle was later located. (Data age 6 months)

20-032901
On July 5, 2020 a suspect physically assaulted a victim by punching her in the head ten to twelve times and then stole her property. The victim was able to give the suspects license plate to officers. An ALPR query was conducted which revealed a picture of the vehicle which was disseminated to officers. (Data age 2 months)

20-038069
On August 2, 2020 a strong-armed carjacking occurred. The victim was being followed by two vehicles which boxed him in preventing his escape. The suspects pulled the victim from the vehicle and proceeded to punch and kick him. The suspects then fled with the victim's vehicle. The Investigator ran a query of the victim vehicle license plate in the ALPR system which revealed a photo of vehicle. The photograph was disseminated to officers. (Data age 1 month)

20-058470
On November 28, 2020 an armed carjacking occurred. Two suspects approached the victim who had just parked his car. The suspects proceeded to rob him at gunpoint and took his vehicle. The investigator ran a query in the ALPR system and obtained a photo of the victim's vehicle which he disseminated to officers. (Data age 1 month)

20-042319
On August 26, 2020 an attempted robbery occurred. A suspect approached the victim who was sitting in his car and pointed a firearm at him while trying to enter the vehicle. The victim was able to flee the scene and observed the suspect getting into a vehicle. The victim was able to see a partial plate on the suspect vehicle. The investigator was able to conduct an ALPR query on the partial plate and was able to identify a possible suspect vehicle and full license plate. The photograph of the vehicle was disseminated to officers. (Data age 3 months)

20-063066
On December 26, 2020 a residential burglary and assault with a deadly weapon occurred. The suspect entered the victim's basement and then left. Another victim followed the suspect who then shot at the victim and fled the area in a vehicle. Officers were able to obtain a partial license plate of the suspect vehicle. The investigator was able to conduct a partial plate query on the suspect vehicle which revealed a possible license plate and vehicle photo. The photograph was disseminated to officers. (Data age 1 month)

20-003497
On January 19, 2020 an assault on a police officer occurred. An Oakland Police officer in full uniform and in a fully marked patrol vehicle observed several motorcycles and ATVs driving recklessly. The officer attempted to conduct a vehicle stop for the reckless driving. One of the ATVs rammed the officer's driver door as he got out causing injury to the officer. An ALPR query on a Pickup truck license plate which had been transporting the Suspects and their ATVs was conducted which revealed a photograph of the suspect vehicle and common areas where the vehicle had been in the past. The photograph of the suspect vehicle was disseminated to officers. (Data age 4 months)

20-004940
On January 26, 2020 an assault with a deadly weapon occurred. The victim was assaulted by two suspects while in his vehicle. One of the suspects shot the victim in the neck and then both suspects fled the scene in another vehicle. The license plate of the suspect vehicle was obtained, and an ALPR system query revealed a photograph of the vehicle. The photograph of the vehicle was disseminated to officers who were able to locate it. The vehicle was processed

for evidence and the suspects were taken into custody. (Data age 6 months)

21-002381
On January 15, 2021 an armed robbery occurred. Two suspects approached two victims as they walked out of a sandwich shop and robbed them at gunpoint, physically ripping their purses out of their possession. The suspects fled in a vehicle and a partial license plate was obtained. Officers were able to conduct an ALPR system query which revealed a possible suspect vehicle with full license plate as well as matching damage as described by the victims. Officers disseminated the photograph of the vehicle along with the locations where the vehicle had been in the past. (Data age 1 year)

21-002808
On January 18, 2021 an armed robbery occurred. A suspect armed with a firearm approached victims who were exchanging groceries. The suspect pointed a firearm at the victims and robbed them. The suspect fled in a vehicle. A partial license plate was obtained for the suspect vehicle. Officers conducted an ALPR system query which revealed an entire license plate for the suspect vehicle. (Data age 1 month)

21-04318
On January 28, 2021 an assault with a deadly weapon occurred. A suspect vehicle was seen chasing and shooting at another vehicle. The suspect missed the intended vehicle and struck a passing vehicle with three people as well as a business. A license plate was obtained for the suspect vehicle and the Watch commander conducted an ALPR system query which revealed a photograph of the suspect vehicle. The photograph added additional details for officers to be able to locate the vehicle. (Data age 6 months)

RD# 20-016214
Missing Person + Homicide Case – A female was reported missing. During the CID investigation, a positive hit was recorded by an ALPR system (based on the vehicle license plate registered to the missing person). Officers responded, and her deceased remains were found in the truck of the vehicle. There is an ongoing homicide investigation. (Data age TBD)

RD# 20-017986
Human Trafficking Case – A juvenile was a victim of human trafficking. The CID investigator utilized ALPR to identify the suspect. The victim was safely relocated. A Ramey warrant[9] was authorized for the suspect's arrest. (Data age TBD)

RD# 20-017986
Human Trafficking Case – A DOE was kidnapped and the victim was able to provide investigators with a license plate. Investigators inputted the license number into the OPD ALPR

[9] A Ramey Warrant is an arrest warrant that is obtained by a police agency directly from a judge and bypassing the district attorney (DA) (who otherwise issues arrest warrants). In the interest of faster processing due to the nature of the crime and/or DA availability, a police agency may skip the district attorney and go directly to a judge. The police agency must submit a declaration, along with a report, to the judge setting out their reasons for requesting that the judge issue the warrant; the judge must believe that there is probable cause, and sufficient evidence that the suspect has committed a crime.

system so officers could identify a suspect if there was an ALPR hit. (Data age TBD)

RD# 20-043740
Human Trafficking Case – undercover OPD officers were working a sting operation when they were approached by a subject who attempted to kidnap them. The suspect was arrested and taken into custody, but his accomplice fled the scene. Body-worn camera (BWC) footage and officer observation captured the suspect vehicle. A Ramey warrant is now pending for the outstanding suspect. (Data age TBD)

RD# 20-000543
Sexual Assault – A person was sexually assaulted. ALPR was used to locate and arrest the suspect. This case has been charged by the DA's Office. (Data age TBD)

DEPARTMENTAL GENERAL ORDER

I-12: AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS

Effective Date: XX
Coordinator: Information Technology Unit

The Oakland Police Department (OPD) strives to use technology that promotes accountability and transparency. This policy provides guidance for the capture, storage and use of digital data obtained through the use of ALPR technology while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public.

A. Description of the Technology: *Information describing the surveillance technology and how it works.*

OPD uses Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images. There are two components to the ALPR system:

1. Automated License Plate Readers: Device components include cameras which can be attached to vehicles or fixed objects and a vehicle-based computer that processes the photographs and compares the data against California Department of Justice (CA DOJ) hotlists. D~~; d~~ata is transmitted for comparison (the hotlists are downloaded to the vehicle at the start of the patrol shift and then compared from that list). Authorized personnel can also manually enter license plates to internal OPD generated hotlists only accessible to personnel authorized to access the OPD ALPR system.

2. ALPR Database: A central repository stores data collected and transmitted by the Automated License Plate Readers.

B. Purpose of the Technology

ALPR technology works by automatically scanning license plates on vehicles that are publicly visible. ALPR reads these license plates, compares the license plate characters against California Department of Justice (CA DOJ) ~~specific~~ databases, and stores the characters along with the date, time, and location where the photograph was taken, in a database. This process allows for two functions by ALPR:

1. Immediate (real time) comparison of the license plate characters against CA DOJ databases listing vehicles that are stolen or sought in connection with a crime and/or with OPD-generated internal lists.

2. Storage of the license plate characters – along with the date, time, and location where the photography was taken – in a database that is accessible to enforcement agencies with authorized access (as defined in "Authorized Use" below) for investigative query purposes.

C. Authorized Use: *The specific uses that are authorized, and the rules and processes required prior to such use.*

1. **Authorized Users**

Personnel authorized to use ALPR equipment or access information collected through the use of such equipment shall be specifically trained in such technology. Sworn personnel, Police Service Technicians, -or other authorized Department personnel may use the technology. Authorized users other than sworn personnel or police services technicians (PST) must be designated by the Chief of Police or designee.

2. Restrictions on Use

Department members shall not use, or allow others to use, the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51.; Civil Code § 1798.90.53). Authorized purposes consist only of queries related to criminal investigations, administrative investigations, missing persons cases, or other situations where there is a legal obligation to provide information related to an investigation. Any situation outside of these categories requires approval from a commander at the rank of Deputy Chief, Deputy Director, or higher.

a. No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.

b. No ALPR operator may access department, state or federal data unless otherwise authorized to do so pursuant to Section D "Data Access" below.

c. Accessing data collected by ALPR requires a right to know and a need to know. A right to know is the legal authority to receive information pursuant to a state or federal statute, applicable case law, or a court order. A need to know is a compelling reason to request information such as involvement in an active investigation.

D. Data Collection: *The information that can be collected by the surveillance technology. Where applicable, list any data sources the technology will rely upon, including "open source" data.*

ALPR technology works by automatically scanning license plates on vehicles that are publicly visible. ALPR reads these license plates, compares the license plate characters (as well as vehicle attributes such as vehicle color or make and model with some ALPR systems) against specific databases, and stores the characters along with the date, time, and location where the photograph was taken, in a database.

E. Data Access: *The category of individuals who can access or use the collected information, and the rules and processes required prior to access or use of the information.*

ALPR server data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law.

All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data contains investigatory and/or confidential information, it is not open to public review.

F. Data Protection: *The safeguards that protect information from unauthorized access, including encryption and access control mechanisms.*

All data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. OPD will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

1. All ALPR server data shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by username, license number or other data elements used in the search, name, date, time and purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.52). In the event that the system cannot perform these functions, OPD personnel shall explain in writing to the City's Chief Privacy Officer within seven days of receiving notice of the diminished functionality.

2. Members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for law enforcement purposes only, as set forth above in Section B.2(1)(c) "Restrictions on Use."

3. Data will be transferred from vehicles to the designated storage per the ~~with~~ automated ALPR technology data transfer protocol.

G. Data Retention: *The time period, if any, for which information collected by the surveillance technology will be routinely retained, the reason such retention period is appropriate to further the purpose(s), the process by which the information is*

regularly deleted after that period lapses, and the specific conditions that must be met to retain information beyond that period.

All ALPR data uploaded to the server shall be purged from the server at the point of ~~730~~ 365 days from initial upload. ALPR information may be retained outside the database for the following purposes:

1. Criminal Investigations
2. Administrative Investigations
3. Missing Persons Investigations
4. Investigations from other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies where there is a legal obligation to provide information.

Any situation outside of these categories requires approval from a commander at the rank of Deputy Chief, Deputy Director, or higher.

H. Public Access: *how collected information can be accessed or used by members of the public, including criminal defendants.*

Requests for ALPR information by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in Departmental General Order M-9.1, Public Records Access, in accordance with (Civil Code § 1798.90.55, Government Code § 6253 et seq., and applicable case law and court orders.

I. Third Party Data Sharing: *If and how other City departments, bureaus, divisions, or non-City entities can access or use the information, including any required justification or legal standard necessary to do so and any obligations imposed on the recipient of the information.*

ALPR server data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law. All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Personnel may also grant ALPR server access to law enforcement agencies with whom OPD has an MOU that allows data sharing. Because such data contains investigatory and/or confidential information, any requests for public records access or requests must go through the protocol as set forth in E., F, and H (above).

OPD personnel may share ALPR server data with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies when there is a legal obligation, such as a court mandate, to share such information.

Requests for ALPR server data, where there is not a legal obligation to provide the data, shall be made in writing and approved by the BOS Deputy Director or designee. These requests shall be maintained in a secure folder so that information about these requests can be shared in required annual reports with the PAC.

J. Training: *The training required for any individual authorized to use the surveillance technology or to access information collected by the surveillance technology.*

The Training Section shall ensure that members receive department-approved training for those authorized to use or access the ALPR system and shall maintain a record of all completed trainings. (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code §1798.90.53).

Training requirements for employees shall include the following:

- Applicable federal and state law
- Applicable policy
- Functionality of equipment
- Accessing data
- Safeguarding password information and data
- Sharing of data
- Reporting breaches
- Implementing post-breach procedures

K. ***Auditing and Oversight:*** *The mechanisms to ensure that the Surveillance Use Policy is followed, including internal personnel assigned to ensure compliance with the policy, internal recordkeeping of the use of the technology or access to information collected by the technology, technical measures to monitor for misuse, any independent person or entity with oversight authority, and the legally enforceable sanctions for violations of the policy.*

ALPR system audits shall be conducted annually by BOS to ensure proper system functionality and that personnel are using the system according to policy rules via sample audits, reviews of training records, and all requirements outlined in OMC 9.64 Section E "Data Protection" above explains that designated personnel will notify the City's Privacy Officer within seven days upon a finding that the ALPR system cannot fully produce system audits due to technical issues with the system.

L. ***Maintenance:*** *The mechanisms and procedures to ensure that the security and integrity of the surveillance technology and collected information will be maintained.*

1. **ALPR Administration:** All installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the BOS.

2. **ALPR Administrator:** The BOS Deputy Director shall be the administrator of the ALPR program, and shall be responsible for developing guidelines and procedures to comply with the requirements of Civil Code §

1798.90.5 et seq. The BOS Deputy Director is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection, and retention of ALPR data.

3. **ALPR Coordinator:** The title of the official custodian of the ALPR system is the ALPR Coordinator.

4. **Monitoring and Reporting:** The Oakland Police Department will ensure that the system is remains functional according to its intended use…. maintained according to monitor its use of ALPR technology to ensure the proper functionality of the system as defined in the policy guidelines of this document, including required audits, training, and data access records.

   The ALPR Coordinator shall provide the Chief of Police, Privacy Advisory Commission, and Public Safety Committee with an annual report pursuant to OMC 9.64 (Oakland Surveillance Technology Ordinance).

By Order of

LeRonne L. Armstrong
Chief of Police Date Signed:

CITY OF OAKLAND

MEMORANDUM

TO:	LeRonne L. Armstrong Chief of Police, Chief of Police	**FROM:**	Drennon Lindsey, Deputy Chief of Police OPD, Bureau of Investigations
SUBJECT:	Automated License Plate Reader – 2019 Annual Report	**DATE:**	July 6, 2021

Background

Oakland Police Department (OPD) ALPR Policy 430 (430.8 Agency Monitoring and Controls) states that the "ALPR Coordinator shall provide the Chief of Police and Public Safety Committee with an annual report for the previous 12-month period." This report was completed in 2021, later than the requirement of ALPR Policy 430. OPD did not complete this report in 2020 or initially present it to the PAC and City Council as personnel were focused at this time on development of a new ALPR Policy. OPD's ALPR Surveillance Use Policy (SUP) is still undergoing review by the PAC at the time of the production of this report.

2019 Annual Report Details

A. A description of how the surveillance technology was used, including the type and quantity of data gathered or analyzed by the technology:

Table 1 *shows the total scans by month – the total license plate photographs made and stored each month (7,871,254 total for the year). The table also shows the number of times the vehicle-based systems had a match ("hit") with a California Department of Justice (CA DOJ) database (8,596 total for 2019). OPD's very outdated ALPR system can only quantify these two figures; the system can no longer quantify individual queries or perform any audit functions, as the software is no longer supported from the original vendor. Prior to the loss in functionality, the system could run reports that detailed the reasons for queries (e.g. a type of criminal investigation). OPD can only provide more comprehensive use data if and when a newer ALPR system is acquired.*

Table 1: 2019 OPD ALPR Scans and Hits

Month	Year	Scans	Hits
Jan	**Jan**	718,492	918
Feb	**Feb**	709,900	786
Mar	**Mar**	859,603	757
Apr	**Apr**	653,588	646
May	**May**	677,340	744
Jun	**Jun**	772,016	694
Jul	**Jul**	817,540	840
Aug	**Aug**	731,297	742
Sep	**Sep**	523,283	569
Oct	**Oct**	508,108	637
Nov	**Nov**	483,950	615
Dec	**Dec**	416,137	648
2019 Totals		**7,871,254**	**8,596**

B. Whether and how often data acquired through the use of the surveillance technology was shared with outside entities, the name of any recipient entity, the type(s) of data disclosed, under what legal standard(s) the information was disclosed, and the justification for the disclosure(s):

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had access to OPD ALPR data without following the standard data access request protocols outlined in Policy 430.9 "Releasing or Sharing ALPR Data;" OPD provides this level of access because there is a Council-approved Safe Streets Task Force Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)[1]. The following police agencies made specific requests to OPD for ALPR data related to specific criminal cases (the number to right of agency = amount of data requests):

- *San Francisco Police Department - 4*
- *Fremont Police Department - 5*
- *Piedmont Police Department - 1*
- *Alameda County Sheriff's Office - 1*
- *Berkeley Police Department - 4*
- *California Highway Patrol - 1*
- *Alameda County District Attorney's Office - 1*
- *San Mateo County Sheriff's Office - 3*
- *Union City Police Department - 1*

OPD personnel provided the requested ALPR data in each of these data request cases, as each case complied with the Policy 430.9, including a request with name of agency, person making request, and intended purpose for the data with approvals being reviewed by authorized personnel with records maintained. OPD has developed new protocols and

[1] The mission of the FBI San Francisco Violent Crimes Safe Streets Task Force MOU is to identify and target for prosecution criminal enterprise groups and individual responsible for crimes of violence such as murder and aggravated assault, as well as other serious crimes. The MOU does not specifically address the sharing of ALPR data; however, the MOU does specifically articulate protocols for data sharing.

automated forms for internal tracking of future requests which will be part of future ALPR annual reports.

C. Where applicable, a breakdown of what physical objects the surveillance technology hardware was installed upon; using general descriptive terms so as not to reveal the specific location of such hardware; for surveillance technology software, a breakdown of what data sources the surveillance technology was applied to:

The ALPR cameras are installed upon fully marked OPD patrol vehicles (29 operational; 6 inoperable).

D. Where applicable, a breakdown of where the surveillance technology was deployed geographically, by each police area in the relevant year:

These vehicles are assigned to the Bureau of Field Operations I (administered out of the Police Administration Building in downtown Oakland) as well as Bureau of Field Operations II (administered from the Eastmont Substation). The vehicles are deployed throughout the City in a patrol function to allow for large areas of the City to have ALPR coverage as the patrol vehicles are used to respond to calls for police service.

E. A summary of community complaints or concerns about the surveillance technology, and an analysis of the technology's adopted use policy and whether it is adequate in protecting civil rights and civil liberties:

Members of the public have spoken at PAC meetings regarding concerns of negative impacts to privacy protections (e.g. that OPD could use ALPR server data to establish travel patterns of particular vehicles associated with particular license plates, and/or that ALPR data can be inadvertently released through inadequate privacy protocols). OPD has also heard comments that more advanced ALPR systems may be used to track other vehicle attributes (e.g. bumper stickers). Furthermore, OPD personnel are aware of media reports of ALPR systems where a lack of updates between local systems and State CA DOJ databases lead to inaccurate stolen vehicle notifications, which have led law enforcement to stopping motorists because of stolen vehicle notifications.

F. The results of any internal audits, any information about violations or potential violations of the Surveillance Use Policy, and any actions taken in response unless the release of such information is prohibited by law, including but not limited to confidential personnel file information:

*2019 audits were performed solely to ensure system functionality. The current system is outdated, and the software is not supported from the original vendor. Prior to this loss in function, the system could be used to run reports for sample audits that detailed the reasons for queries (e.g., type of criminal investigation). The ALPR system can currently quantify only hit and scan data as noted in Part A above. However, with support from the software vendor as well as the Information Technology Department, 2019 data has since been audited for accuracy (see **Appendix A** to this report below).*

OPD can only provide more comprehensive use data if and when a newer ALPR system is acquired. OPD has developed a plan for future robust ALPR system audits - should OPD be allowed to purchase an updated system after approval of the updated ALPR SUP. A more robust system oversight and review protocol will include: Use Policy review and training, same use audits, authorized user control, IT oversight, and review of the requests for ALPR data from outside agencies.

ALPR 430 lists a six-month ALPR server data retention policy. However, OPD has maintained a 730-day data retention policy during 2019, based upon legal counsel, and in alignment with the draft DGO I-12 ALPR Policy. The draft Surveillance Impact Report for draft DGO I-12 ALPR, Section F. "Data Types and Sources" provides more detailed information about OPD's ALPR data retention protocols.

OPD's ALPR 430 Policy does not explicitly delineate a separate data-sharing process for law enforcement agencies where there is a Council-approved MOU in place (as explained in Section B above). OPD recognizes that current data-sharing practice does not align with the limits set forth in ALPR 430. The new draft DGO I-12 ALPR Policy, Section I. "Third Party Data Sharing," provides for separate protocols for 3rd party data sharing where there is a Council-approved agreement or taskforce, and when the data is shared in connection with criminal investigations.

G. Information about any data breaches or other unauthorized access to the data collected by the surveillance technology, including information about the scope of the breach and the actions taken in response:

The City's Information Technology Department (ITD) confirmed to OPD that they have not detected any ALPR information breaches at the time of OPD's inquiry for the production of this annual report.

H. Information, including crime statistics, that helps the community assess whether the surveillance technology has been effective at achieving its identified purposes:

The ALPR system does not allow for automated connections to the many cases where ALPR is instrumental in either immediate notifications to stolen vehicles and/or vehicles connected to other crimes. The system also does not offer any automation to cases where crimes are investigated, and ALPR provides useful data. Therefore, OPD has conducted time-consuming research as part of updating the Surveillance Impact Report for review of a new Surveillance Use Policy. The Surveillance Impact Report, which was offered for presentation as part of the ~~being sent to the~~ February and March 2021 PAC meetings (as the PAC reviewed a draft ALPR Surveillance Use Policy), highlights many uses (see ***Attachments A and B)*** of the draft Surveillance Impact Report***). Section.*** *(A) above shows that there were 8,596 hits against CA DOJ cases. OPD estimates that there were hundreds of cases in which ALPR was in OPD investigations in 2019. In 2019, there were 254 OPD incident reports that had either the keyword LPR or ALPR or both in the narrative (including supplements). Auto thefts represent most of these cases; however, these reports also relate to cases of violent crime. OPD personnel conducted manual reviews of 2020 cases where vehicle ALPR system data alerted officers to vehicles on CA DOJ hotlists as well as cases where OPD CID investigated criminal cases using ALPR data. However, these reviews were for 2020 data, and include many stolen vehicle and car jackings (as well as some cases related to homicide, rape and human trafficking).*

I. Statistics and information about public records act requests regarding the relevant subject surveillance technology, including response rates:

OPD received six ALPR-related PRRs in 2019; there are 11 open ALPR-related PRRs as of December 31, 2019. These requests related to the number of ALPR camera systems (see Section C above), ALPR data (the license plate number, date, time, and location information for each license plate recorded for related to either specific license plates or all captured data during certain time periods), and OPD emails related to ALPR data. Other requests related to the sharing of data with other agencies as outlined in Section B above. There are also PRRs relating to technology contracts.

For all ALPR PRRs, OPD can generally provide date and time information. OPD cannot provide information related to locations where license plates were photographed, nor information related to the specific vehicle. The following is the list of PRRs outstanding during 2019:

- RT 16630
- RT 17577
- RT 17949
- 18-391
- 18-649
- 19-1546
- 19-1897
- 19-2270
- 19-3334
- 19-6125
- 19-1382

J. Total annual costs for the surveillance technology, including personnel and other ongoing costs, and what source of funding will fund the technology in the coming year:

Zero; OPD did not incur any maintenance, licensing, or training costs. T~~t~~raining is completed using OPD's online training portal as well as staff time.

K. Any requested modifications to the Surveillance Use Policy and a detailed basis for the request:

OPD and the PAC are developing and reviewing a new ALPR Surveillance Policy contemporaneous to the production of this report for OPD ALPR Use Policy 430. OPD is requesting PAC review and recommendation to City Council of this new Surveillance Use Policy (SUP). This new policy will cover all required areas of OMC 9.64.

Respectfully submitted,

_____

LeRonne L. Armstrong,
Chief of Police

Reviewed by,
Drennon Lindsey, Deputy Chief
OPD, Bureau of Investigations

Paul Figueroa, Captain
OPD, Criminal Investigations Division

Carlo Beckman, Police Services Manager
OPD, Research and Planning Section

Tracey Jones, Police Services Manager
OPD, Research and Planning Section

Prepared by:
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David Pullen, Officer
OPD, IT Unit, Bureau of Services

Appendix A

2019 ALPR Accuracy Audit

Policy 430 states in section 430.7(c) System Monitoring and Security: ALPR system audits shall be conducted on a regular basis by the Bureau of Services. The purpose of these audits is to ensure the accuracy of ALPR Information and correct data errors.
Determining accuracy of captured ALPR data is difficult based on the fact that license plates can be in length from 1 character to 7 characters. These characters can be in many different formats due to the age and type of the vehicle as well as personalized plates. The one thing that remains constant with California plates is the character limit is set at 7. Per the policy this audit is meant to correct data errors. This audit cannot correct the errors. What this audit can do though is show how the system is working on a year to year basis to make sure the ALPR system optical recognition algorithm is operating as it should and the error rate stays very low.
Method of Audit:

- Compiled all captures for the year.
- Sorted all captures to identify all that were over 7 characters.
- Divided the number of bad captures by the total captures to obtain the percentage of time the system was not correct.

2019 Audit
A query of all plates for 2019 revealed 6,616,879 captures. A sort of captures containing over 7 characters was completed. The amount of captures over 7 characters resulted in 7,804 captures. The percentage of bad captures with over 7 characters equals 0.118% of the total captures. After looking at the bad captures it appears that the system sometimes captures road signs and other objects containing text. Due to the very low percentage of incorrect captures it appears the system is working correctly but the optical recognition system has some small issues with identifying license plates. It should be noted that the photo obtained at the time of the system capture will show the user what the optical character recognition thought was a license plate.

2019 ALPR Justifications Audit

Lexipol Policy 430 Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) was created prior to the implementation of justification and auditing features being activated on our ALPR system. In the policy there is mention of a right to know and a need to know prior to accessing ALPR data but there is no mention to what must be entered into the software justification fields. The Current ALPR system has the following fields in the justifications tab: (Audit, BOLO Post Scan Query, Crime Scene Query, Criminal Investigation, Test, Trend Analysis). One of the above Justifications must be selected prior to continuing with the Query. There are two additional free form boxes (Justification Note and File Number). The Justification Note box must have something entered in order to continue with the query. The File Number can be bypassed without entering anything.

SB34 (Automated license plate recognition systems: use of data) was passed by the California Legislature. In this law there are several requirements that a government entity must abide by.
In Section 1798.90.52 the law states, “If an ALPR operator accesses or provides access to ALPR information, the ALPR operator shall do both of the following:

a. Maintain a record of that access. At a minimum, the record shall include the following:
    1. The date and time the information is accessed.
    2. The license plate number or other data elements used to query the ALPR system.
    3. The username of the person who accesses the information, and, as applicable, the organization or entity with whom the person is affiliated.
    4. The purpose for accessing the information.

b. Require that ALPR information only be used for the authorized purposes described in the usage and privacy policy required by subdivision (b) of Section 1798.90.51.

In February of 2021 raw ALPR Justification data was retrieved by City IT and the Neology vendor for years 2019 and 2020. This raw data was extracted directly from the database and was not retrieved as it normally would have been from the software included with the BOSS3 system.

Method of Audit:

Ensure the following state requirements were included in the ALPR queries to include:

1. Data and time of Query
2. License plate of other data used to query
3. Username of person accessing
4. Purpose of the access

The 2019 ALPR justification data consisted of 5547 queries. All the queries included an identifiable Username as well as a date and time of the query. There were 108 queries that had no license plate or other querying characters. There was only 1 query that had no purpose of access identified. A character must be entered into the plate tab to conduct a query as well as a justification reason (purpose of the access). Due to these sections being completely blank it is unknown if the system allowed this to occur, which is highly unlikely, or if it was due to the way the raw data was extracted from the server. The current system is unable to run automated justification audits at this time. The department was only able to run these audits after obtaining the raw data and going through the data manually.

CITY OF OAKLAND

MEMORANDUM

TO:	LeRonne L. Armstrong Chief of Police	**FROM:**	Drennon Lindsey, Deputy Chief of Police OPD, Bureau of Investigations
SUBJECT:	Automated License Plate Reader – 2020 Annual Report	**DATE:**	July 6, 2021

Background

Oakland Police Department (OPD) ALPR Policy 430 (430.8 Agency Monitoring and Controls) states that the "ALPR Coordinator shall provide the Chief of Police and Public Safety Committee with an annual report for the previous 12-month period." This report was completed in 2021, later than the requirement of ALPR Policy 430. OPD did not complete this report in 2020 or initially present it to the PAC and City Council as personnel were focused at this time on development of a new ALPR Policy. OPD's ALPR Surveillance Use Policy (SUP) is still undergoing review by the PAC at the time of the production of this report.

2020 Annual Report Details

A. A description of how the surveillance technology was used, including the type and quantity of data gathered or analyzed by the technology:

*The number of times ALPR technology was used in 2020 is shown in **Table 1**. More specifically, Table 1 shows the total scans by month – the total license plate photographs made and stored each month (2,591,990 total for the year). Table 1 also shows the number of times the vehicle-based systems had a match ("hit") with a California Department of Justice (CA DOJ) database (4,150 total for 2020). OPD's very outdated ALPR system can only quantify these two figures; the system can no longer quantify individual queries or perform any audit functions, as the software is no longer supported from the original vendor. Prior, the system could run reports that detailed the reasons for queries (e.g. a type of criminal investigation). OPD can only provide more comprehensive use data if and when a newer ALPR system is acquired.*

Table 1: 2020 OPD ALPR Scans and Hits

Month	Year	Scans	Hits
Jan	**2020**	391,547	552
Feb	**2020**	276,834	396
Mar	**2020**	316,767	379
Apr	**2020**	336,103	662
May	**2020**	316,319	571
Jun	**2020**	149,050	255
Jul	**2020**	116,318	169
Aug	**2020**	118,521	213
Sep	**2020**	93,011	117
Oct	**2020**	102,491	171
Nov	**2020**	207,760	372
Dec	**2020**	167,269	293
2020 Totals		**2,591,990**	**4,150**

B. Whether and how often data acquired through the use of the surveillance technology was shared with outside entities, the name of any recipient entity, the type(s) of data disclosed, under what legal standard(s) the information was disclosed, and the justification for the disclosure(s):

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had access to OPD ALPR data without following the standard data access request protocols outlined in Policy 430.9 "Releasing or Sharing ALPR Data;" OPD provides this level of access because there is a ~~data only for collaboration on the~~ Council-approved Safe Streets Task Force Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)[1]. The following police agencies made specific requests to OPD for ALPR data related to specific criminal cases (the number to right of agency = amount of data requests):

- *Berkeley Police Department – 2*
- *Daly City Police Department – 1*
- *Fremont Police Department - 5*
- *Livermore Police Department - 2*
- *San Francisco Police Department - 1*
- *San Jose Police Department – 1*

OPD personnel provided the requested ALPR data in each of these data request cases, as each case complied with the Policy 430.9, including a request with name of agency, person making request, and intended purpose for the data with approvals being reviewed by authorized personnel with records maintained. OPD has developed new protocols and automated forms for internal tracking of future requests which will be part of future ALPR annual reports.

[1] The mission of the FBI San Francisco Violent Crimes Safe Streets Task Force MOU is to identify and target for prosecution criminal enterprise groups and individual responsible for crimes of violence such as murder and aggravated assault, as well as other serious crimes. The MOU does not specifically address the sharing of ALPR data; however, the MOU does specifically articulate protocols for data sharing.

C. Where applicable, a breakdown of what physical objects the surveillance technology hardware was installed upon; using general descriptive terms so as not to reveal the specific location of such hardware; for surveillance technology software, a breakdown of what data sources the surveillance technology was applied to:

The ALPR cameras are installed upon fully marked OPD patrol vehicles (29 operational; 6 inoperable).

D. Where applicable, a breakdown of where the surveillance technology was deployed geographically, by each police area in the relevant year:

These vehicles are assigned to the Bureau of Field Operations I (administered out of the Police Administration Building in downtown Oakland) as well as Bureau of Field Operations II (administered from the Eastmont Substation). The vehicles are deployed throughout the City in a patrol function to allow for large areas of the City to have ALPR coverage as the patrol vehicles are used to respond to calls for police service.

E. A summary of community complaints or concerns about the surveillance technology, and an analysis of the technology's adopted use policy and whether it is adequate in protecting civil rights and civil liberties:

Members of the public have spoken at PAC meetings regarding concerns of negative impacts to privacy protections (e.g. that OPD could use ALPR server data to establish travel patterns of particular vehicles associated with particular license plates, and/or that ALPR data can be inadvertently released through inadequate privacy protocols). OPD has also heard comments that more advanced ALPR systems may be used to track other vehicle attributes (e.g. bumper stickers). Furthermore, OPD personnel are of media reports of ALPR systems where a lack of updates between local systems and State CA DOJ databases lead to inaccurate stolen vehicle notifications, which have led law enforcement to stopping motorists because of stolen vehicle notifications.

F. The results of any internal audits, any information about violations or potential violations of the Surveillance Use Policy, and any actions taken in response unless the release of such information is prohibited by law, including but not limited to confidential personnel file information:

2019 audits were performed solely to ensure system functionality. The current system is outdated, and the software is not supported from the original vendor. Prior to this loss in function, the system could be used to run reports for sample audits that detailed the reasons for queries (e.g., type of criminal investigation). The ALPR system can currently quantify only hit and scan data as noted in Part A above. However, with support from the software vendor as well as the Information Technology Department, 2019 data has since been audited for accuracy (see ***Appendix A*** *to this report below).*

OPD can only provide more comprehensive use data if and when a newer ALPR system is acquired. OPD has developed a plan for future robust ALPR system audits - should OPD be allowed to purchase an updated system after approval of the updated ALPR SUP. A more robust system oversight and review protocol will include: Use Policy review and training,

same use audits, authorized user control, IT oversight, and review of the requests for ALPR data from outside agencies.

*ALPR 430 lists a six-month ALPR server data retention policy. However, OPD has maintained a 730-day data retention policy during 2019, based upon legal counsel, and in alignment with the draft DGO I-12 ALPR Policy. The draft Surveillance Impact Report for draft DGO I-12 ALPR, Section F. "*Data Types and Sources*" provides more detailed information about OPD's ALPR data retention protocols.*

OPD's ALPR 430 Policy does not explicitly delineate a separate data-sharing process for law enforcement agencies where there is a Council-approved MOU in place (as explained in Section B above). OPD recognizes that current data-sharing practice does not align with the limits set forth in ALPR 430. The new draft DGO I-12 ALPR Policy, Section I. "Third Party Data Sharing," provides for separate protocols for 3rd party data sharing where there is a Council-approved agreement or taskforce, and when the data is shared in connection with criminal investigations.

G. Information about any data breaches or other unauthorized access to the data collected by the surveillance technology, including information about the scope of the breach and the actions taken in response:

The City's Information Technology Department (ITD) confirmed to OPD that they have not detected any ALPR information breaches at the time of OPD's inquiry for the production of this annual report.

H. Information, including crime statistics, that helps the community assess whether the surveillance technology has been effective at achieving its identified purposes:

The ALPR system does not allow for automated connections to the many cases where ALPR is instrumental in either immediate notifications to stolen vehicles and/or vehicles connected to other crimes. The system also does not offer any automation to cases where crimes are investigated, and ALPR provides useful data. Therefore, OPD has conducted time-consuming research as part of updating the Surveillance Impact Report for review of a new Surveillance Use Policy. The Surveillance Impact Report, which was offered for presentation as part of the ~~being sent to the~~ February and March 2021 PAC meetings (as the PAC reviewed~~s~~ a draft ALPR Surveillance Use Policy), highlights many uses (see ***Attachments A and B)*** of the draft Surveillance Impact Report***). Section.*** *(A) above shows that there were 4,150 hits against CA DOJ cases. OPD estimates that ALPR was hundreds of times in OPD investigations in 2020. In 2020, there were 180 OPD incident reports that had either the keyword LPR or ALPR or both in the narrative (including supplements). Auto thefts represent most of these cases; however, these reports also relate to cases of violent crime. OPD personnel conducted manual reviews of 2020 cases where vehicle ALPR system data alerted officers to vehicles on CA DOJ hotlists as well as cases where OPD CID investigated criminal cases using ALPR data. The data includes many stolen vehicle and car jackings (as well as some cases related to homicide, rape and human trafficking).*

Appendix A to the ALPR Surveillance Impact Report (***Attachment A***), the parallel document to the draft SUP being presented to the PAC for review, provides over 100 cases where the vehicle ALPR System alerted officers to vehicles on a CA DOJ hot list during the 2020 year. These examples are a few of the hundred cases listed:

- Example #25 20-016962 4/8/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a carjacking on 3/30/20. Nine days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted to the carjacked vehicle parked on the side of the road by their vehicle ALPR system. A suspect was observed in the vehicle. The suspect was arrested. The vehicle was recovered from the 1400 Blk of 16th Ave. Age of Data 9 days.
- Example #82: 20-037670 7/31/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system on a Stolen Vehicle traveling east bound 1400 block of 19th Ave. The ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol vehicle alerted the Officers and the Officers confirmed that the vehicle was indeed stolen. One (1) individual was detained following a foot pursuit. A firearm was recovered. That individual was later arrested for stolen vehicle, possession of a stolen vehicle, Various firearm charges (Loaded firearm in public, concealed loaded firearm in vehicle), and a probation violation. Date of Theft 7/21/2020.
- Example #95 - 20-024499 5/19/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 2500 block 10th Ave. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. One (1) of the license plates had been switched with another stolen license plate of another similar vehicle. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding.

  Most cases alerted OPD to stolen vehicles - the ALPR hits led to the recovery of scores of stolen vehicles. In some cases, the ALPR system alerted officers to vehicles connected to carjackings – an ALPR hit on April 8, 2020 led to the arrest of a carjacking suspect. In another case in August 2020, an ALPR photo connected to a robbery case led to the arrest of a suspect connected to a homicide investigation. In the case noted on July 31, 2020 in the Appendix A, officers were alerted to a stolen vehicle while traveling east bound on 19th Ave. One individual was detained following a foot pursuit. A firearm was recovered. That individual was later arrested for stolen vehicle, possession of a stolen vehicle, various firearm charges (included having a loaded firearm in public, and a concealed loaded firearm in a vehicle), and a probation violation.

I. Statistics and information about public records act requests regarding the relevant subject surveillance technology, including response rates:

OPD has received zero PRRs in 2020 related to ALPR; there are 11 total open ALPR-related PRRs as of December 31, 2020. These requests related to the number of ALPR camera systems (see Section C above), ALPR data (the license plate number, date, time, and location information for each license plate recorded for related to either specific license plates or all captured data during certain time periods), and OPD emails related to ALPR data. Other requests related to the sharing of data with other agencies as outlined in Section B above. There are also PRRs relating to technology contracts.

For all ALPR PRRs, OPD can generally provide date and time information. OPD cannot provide information related to locations where license plates were photographed, nor information related to the specific vehicle. The following is the list of PRRs outstanding during 2019:

- RT 16630
- RT 17577
- RT 17949

- 18-391
- 18-649
- 19-1546
- 19-1897
- 19-2270
- 19-3334
- 19-6125
- 19-1382

J. Total annual costs for the surveillance technology, including personnel and other ongoing costs, and what source of funding will fund the technology in the coming year:

Zero; OPD did not incur any maintenance, licensing, or training costs. Training is completed using OPD's online training portal as well as staff time.

K. Any requested modifications to the Surveillance Use Policy and a detailed basis for the request:

OPD and the PAC are developing and reviewing a new ALPR Surveillance Policy contemporaneous to the production of this report for OPD ALPR Use Policy 430. OPD is requesting PAC review and recommendation to City Council of this new Surveillance Use Policy (SUP). This new policy will cover all required areas of OMC 9.64.

Respectfully submitted,

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Appendix A

2020 ALPR Accuracy Audit

Policy 430 states in section 430.7(c) System Monitoring and Security: ALPR system audits shall be conducted on a regular basis by the Bureau of Services. The purpose of these audits is to ensure the accuracy of ALPR Information and correct data errors.
Determining accuracy of captured ALPR data is difficult based on the fact that license plates can be in length from 1 character to 7 characters. These characters can be in many different formats due to the age and type of the vehicle as well as personalized plates. The one thing that remains constant with California plates is the character limit is set at 7. Per the policy this audit is meant to correct data errors. This audit cannot correct the errors. What this audit can do though is show how the system is working on a year to year basis to make sure the ALPR system optical recognition algorithm is operating as it should and the error rate stays very low.

Method of Audit:
- Compiled all captures for the year.
- Sorted all captures to identify all that were over 7 characters.
- Divided the number of bad captures by the total captures to obtain the percentage of time the system was not correct.

2020 Audit

A query of all plates for 2020 revealed 2,592,055 captures. A sort of captures containing over 7 characters was completed. The amount of captures over 7 characters resulted in 2,843 captures. The percentage of bad captures with over 7 characters equals 0.111% of the total captures. After looking at the bad captures it appears that the system sometimes captures road signs and other objects containing text. Due to the very low percentage of incorrect captures it appears the system is working correctly but the optical recognition system has some small issues with identifying license plates. It should be noted that the photo obtained at the time of the system capture will show the user what the optical character recognition thought was a license plate.

2020 ALPR Justifications Audit
Lexipol Policy 430 Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) was created prior to the implementation of justification and auditing features being activated on our ALPR system. In the policy there is mention of a right to know and a need to know prior to accessing ALPR data but there is no mention to what must be entered into the software justification fields. The Current ALPR system has the following fields in the justifications tab: (Audit, BOLO Post Scan Query, Crime Scene Query, Criminal Investigation, Test, Trend Analysis). One of the above Justifications must be selected prior to continuing with the Query. There are two additional free form boxes (Justification Note and File Number). The Justification Note box must have something entered in order to continue with the query. The File Number can be bypassed without entering anything.
SB34 (Automated license plate recognition systems: use of data) was passed by the California Legislature. In this law there are several requirements that a government entity must abide by.

In Section 1798.90.52 the law states, "If an ALPR operator accesses or provides access to ALPR information, the ALPR operator shall do both of the following:

a. Maintain a record of that access. At a minimum, the record shall include the following:
    1. The date and time the information is accessed.
    2. The license plate number or other data elements used to query the ALPR system.

3. The username of the person who accesses the information, and, as applicable, the organization or entity with whom the person is affiliated.
4. The purpose for accessing the information.

b. Require that ALPR information only be used for the authorized purposes described in the usage and privacy policy required by subdivision (b) of Section 1798.90.51.

In February of 2021 raw ALPR Justification data was retrieved by City IT and the Neology vendor for years 2019 and 2020. This raw data was extracted directly from the database and was not retrieved as it normally would have been from the software included with the BOSS3 system.

Method of Audit:

Ensure the following state requirements were included in the ALPR queries to include:

1. Data and time of Query
2. License plate of other data used to query
3. Username of person accessing
4. Purpose of the access

The 2020 ALPR justification data consisted of 3996 queries. All the queries included an identifiable Username as well as a date and time of the query. There were 166 queries that had no license plate or other querying characters present. There was only 1 query that had no purpose of access identified. A character must be entered into the plate tab to conduct a query as well as a justification reason (purpose of the access). Due to these sections being completely blank it is unknown if the system allowed this to occur, which is highly unlikely, or if it was due to the way the raw data was extracted from the server. The current system is unable to run automated justification audits at this time. The department was only able to run these audits after obtaining the raw data and going through the data manually.