



OAKLAND POLICE COMMISSION

REGULAR MEETING AGENDA

May 11, 2023

5:30 PM

The purpose of the Oakland Police Commission is to oversee the Oakland Police Department to ensure its policies, practices, and customs conform to national standards of constitutional policing, and to oversee the Office of the Inspector General, led by the civilian Office of Inspector General for the Department, as well as the Community Police Review Agency (CPRA), led by the Executive Director of the Agency, which investigates police misconduct and recommends discipline.

Pursuant to California Government Code Section 54953(e) having been rescinded, members of the Police Commission, as well as the Commission's Counsel and Community Police Review Agency staff, will no longer participate in public meetings via phone/video conference, and physical teleconference locations are required.

**Please note that Zoom links will be to observe only.
Public participation via Zoom is not possible currently.**



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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

The Oakland Police Commission welcomes public participation. During this time of transition back to in-person meetings, we are currently prohibited from implementing hybrid meetings. Please refer to the ways in which you can observe and/or participate below:

OBSERVE:

- To observe, the public may view the televised video conference by viewing KTOP channel 10 on Xfinity (Comcast) or ATT Channel 99 and locating City of Oakland KTOP – Channel 10
- To observe the meeting by video conference, please click on this link <https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85164672050> at the noticed meeting time. Instructions on how to join a meeting by video conference are available at: <https://support.zoom.us/hc/en-us/articles/201362193>, which is a webpage entitled “Joining a Meeting”
- To listen to the meeting by phone, please call the numbers below at the noticed meeting time: Dial (for higher quality, dial a number based on your current location):

+1 669 900 9128 or +1 669 444 9171 or +1 719 359 4580 or +1 253 215 8782 or +1 346 248 7799 or +1 646 931 3860

Webinar ID: 851 6467 2050

After calling any of these phone numbers, if you are asked for a participant ID or code, press #. Instructions on how to join a meeting by phone are available at: <https://support.zoom.us/hc/en-us/articles/201362663>, which is a webpage entitled “Joining a Meeting By Phone.”

Use of Zoom is limited to observing, public comment will not be taken via Zoom

PROVIDE PUBLIC COMMENT IN PERSON:

- Public comment on each agenda item will be taken. Members of the public wishing to comment must fill out a speaker card for each item they wish to comment on. Speaker cards will be accepted up until Public Comment for each item begins. Please submit your cards to the Chief of Staff before being recognized by the presiding officer.
- Comments must be made on a specific agenda item covered in the meeting that the comment was submitted for, and that item must be written on the speaker card, or they will be designated open forum comments.
- Comments designated for open forum, either intentionally or due to the comments being outside of the scope of the meeting's agenda/submitted without a including a written agenda item, will be limited to one comment per person.

E-COMMENT:

- Please email written comments to opc@oaklandcommission.org. E-comments must be submitted at least **24 hours** prior to the meeting with the agenda item to which it pertains. Open Forum comments are limited to one per person.



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- I. **Call to Order, Welcome, Roll Call and Determination of Quorum**
Chair Tyfahra Milele

Roll Call: *Vice Chair Jordan; Commissioner Brenda Harbin-Forte; Commissioner Rudolph Howell; Commissioner Jesse Hsieh; Commissioner Regina Jackson; Commissioner Marsha Peterson*

Excused: *Alternate Commissioner Angela Jackson-Castain; Alternate Commissioner Karely Ordaz*

- II. **Closed Session** (approximately 5:30-7:30 p.m.)
The Police Commission will take Public Comment on the Closed Session items.
THE OAKLAND POLICE COMMISSION WILL ADJOURN TO CLOSED SESSION AND WILL REPORT ON ANY FINAL DECISIONS DURING THE POLICE COMMISSION'S OPEN SESSION MEETING AGENDA.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE/DISMISSAL/RELEASE
(Government Code Section 54957(b))

PUBLIC EMPLOYEE APPOINTMENT/EMPLOYMENT
(Government Code Section 54957(b))
Title: Executive Director of the Community Police Review Agency

- III. **Open Forum Part 1** (2 minutes per speaker, 15 minutes total)
Members of the public wishing to address the Commission on matters that are not on tonight's agenda but are related to the Commission's work should submit a speaker card prior to this item. Comments regarding agenda items should be held until the agenda item is called for discussion. Speakers not able to address the Commission during this Open Forum will be given priority to speak during Open Forum Part 2. ***This is a recurring item.***

- IV. **Consider and Approve Request to OPD and City of Oakland for Investigation Files and Records (Charter § 604(f)(2)) related to IAD Case No: 23-0459. (Attachment 4)**
 - a. Discussion
 - b. Public Comment
 - c. Action, if any

- V. **Office of the City Attorney (OCA) Semiannual Report (Attachment 5 — Supplemental)**
Deputy City Attorney Veronica Harris will provide a semiannual report on behalf of OCA.
 - a. Discussion
 - b. Public Comment
 - c. Action, if any

- VI. **Update from Office of the Inspector General**
Inspector General Michelle N. Phillips will provide an update on the OIG's work. Topics discussed in the update may include project priorities under the City Charter; staffing updates; community engagement and outreach. ***This is a recurring item. (Attachment 6)***
 - a. Discussion
 - b. Public Comment
 - c. Action, if any



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- VII. Consider Approval of Directing CPRA to Review Bey Case**
- a. Discussion
 - b. Public Comment
 - c. Action, if any
- VIII. Review and Discussion of 2022 Militarized Equipment Annual Report ([Attachment 8 — Supplemental](#))**
Pursuant to OMC 9.65.010(A)(1), the Commission shall place the Militarized Equipment Annual Report as an agenda item for an open session of a regular meeting.
- a. Discussion
 - b. Public Comment
 - c. Action, if any
- IX. Discussion and Possible Approval of CPRA Standard Operating Procedures Manual ([Attachment 9](#))**
The CPRA Ad Hoc Committee will present on the standard operating procedures and policies developed for the Community Police Review Agency (CPRA).
- a. Discussion
 - b. Public Comment
 - c. Action, if any
- X. 2022 Police Commission Annual Report for Review and Discussion ([Attachment 10](#))**
The Annual Report Ad Hoc Committee (Commissioners Jackson and Peterson) and Interim Chief of Staff Yun will present on the 2022 Annual Report for the Oakland Police Commission.
- a. Discussion
 - b. Public Comment
 - c. Action, if any
- XI. Consider Approval of Resolution in Support of Creation of an Independent Sherriff Oversight Board and Office of Inspector General by Supervisor Resolution ([Attachment 11](#))**
- a. Discussion
 - b. Public Comment
 - c. Action, if any
- XII. Approval of Meeting Minutes ([Attachment 12](#))**
The Commission will review and possibly amend or approve meeting minutes for March 23 and April 27.
- a. Discussion
 - b. Public Comment
 - c. Action, if any



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XIII. Committee Reports

Representatives from Ad Hoc Committees will provide updates on their work.

This is a recurring item. (Attachment 13)

- **Staff Searches: CPRA Director, Chief of Staff, Police Chief (Commissioners Milele, Jordan, Howell)**
The Staff Searches Ad Hoc Committee is responsible for the recruitment and hiring of staff vacancies, including the CPRA Executive Director, Commission Chief of Staff, and OPD Police Chief.
- **Community Outreach (Commissioners Howell, Jordan, Ordaz)**
The objective of this Ad Hoc is to increase public awareness and knowledge of the Commission's work and ensure broad community voices, especially from the most marginalized, are elevated. This Ad Hoc will also oversee the community engagement and outreach of the CPRA, the IG's office and to some extent the OPD. Additionally, this Ad Hoc will work to set the guidelines for how Commission Ad Hoc's are formed and run.
- **Staff Evaluations: IG, CPRA (Commissioners Harbin-Forte, Jordan, Howell)**
The mission of this Ad Hoc is to establish the criteria upon which the Inspector General and CPRA Executive Director will be evaluated by the Police Commission.
 - a. Discussion
 - b. Public Comment
 - c. Action, if any

XIV. Upcoming/Future Agenda Items

The Commission will engage in a working session to discuss and determine agenda items for the upcoming Commission meeting and to agree on a list of agenda items to be discussed on future agendas. *This is a recurring item. (Attachment 14)*

- a. Discussion
- b. Public Comment
- c. Action, if any

XV. Open Forum Part 2 (2 minutes per speaker, 15 minutes total)

Members of the public wishing to address the Commission on matters that were not on tonight's agenda but are related to the Commission's work should submit a speaker card prior to the start of this item. **Persons who spoke during Open Forum Part 1 will not be called upon to speak again without prior approval of the Commission's Chairperson. This is a recurring item.**

XVI. Adjournment

NOTICE: In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, for those requiring special assistance to access the videoconference meeting, to access written documents being discussed at the Discipline Committee meeting, or to otherwise participate at Commission meetings, please contact the Police Commission's Chief of Staff, Kelly Yun, at kyun@oaklandca.gov for assistance. Notification at least 48 hours before the meeting will enable the Police Commission to make reasonable arrangements to ensure accessibility to the meeting and to provide any required accommodations, auxiliary aids, or services.

CITY OF OAKLAND



CITY HALL • 1 FRANK H. OGAWA PLAZA • OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA 94612

Police Commission

May 5, 2023

Via Electronic Submission

Mr. Steven Falk
Interim City Administrator
Office of the City Administrator
sfalk@oaklandca.gov

Mr. Darren Allison
Acting Chief of Police
Oakland Police Department
dallison@oaklandca.gov

Ms. Veronica Harris
Deputy City Attorney
Office of the City Attorney
vharris@oaklandcityattorney.org

RE: Request for Coordination with CPRA on CDC Investigation (IAD Case No. 23-0034)

On behalf of the Police Commission, I write to request prompt and direct coordination by Clarence Dyer Cohen, LLP (CDC) with the Community Police Review Agency (CPRA) on CPRA's potential parallel investigation into IAD Case No. 23-0034, pursuant to CDC's contract as an outsider investigator.

As you know, the City of Oakland via email on March 14, 2023 notified me as Chair of the Commission about an additional investigation (IAD No. 23-0034) that CDC is conducting. This additional investigation relates to the series of outside investigations conducted by CDC in 2022: IAD Case Nos. 22-0443, 22-0858, and 22-1723. The Commission has taken action to seek the CPRA Director's involvement and coordination in the case, in order to form a recommendation back to the Commission about the merit in potentially exercising the Commission's authority to direct CPRA to open a parallel investigation. In order to facilitate that work, the Police Commission at its March 23, 2023 meeting, voted unanimously in support of a Charter Section § 604(f)(2) request, which was delivered, seeking the following records and files: IAD and City personnel files and records, including complaints, related to IAD Case Nos: 22-0443, 22-0858, 22-1723, and 23-0034.

In the near term, the Commission requests the City of Oakland and the Oakland Police Department activate the language in the CDC contract that requires CDC to interface with CPRA

to coordinate its parallel investigation. The Commission would expect such coordination to include, without limitation:

- Coordinating with CPRA Director Jones (or her designee) for CPRA to participate in all investigation interviews conducted by CDC;
- Informing CPRA about any and all its findings prior to submission to the City, the Court Monitor, or OPD, consistent with the Oakland City Charter; and
- Notifying CPRA of any additional members of OPD who are subjects of investigation and discipline.

I am available for a phone call if I can provide any clarity about the purpose or scope of this request. Thank you for your time and attention to this matter.

Sincerely,



Tyfahra Milele
Chair, Police Commission

Cc: Oakland Police Commissioners
Charlotte Jones, Executive Director of CPRA
Commission Counsel



ONEFRANKH.OGAWAPLAZA 6THFLOOR OAKLAND , CALIFORNIA 94612

Office of the City Attorney Barbara J.

Parker

City Attorney

(510) 238-3601

FAX: (510) 238-6500

TTY/TDD: (510) 238-3254

May 10, 2023

OAKLAND POLICE COMMISSION

Re: Office of the City Attorney's Support for the Police-Discipline Process and Recent Arbitration Decisions

Police Commission Chair Milele and Members of the Oakland Police Commission:

I. INTRODUCTION

This report summarizes recent efforts by the Office of the City Attorney (OCA) to help improve the police-discipline process, including the outcomes of recent arbitration hearings.

Our last report was dated November 2, 2022.

II. CIVIL MATTERS

Leal, et al. v. City of Oakland, et al.

Alameda Superior Court – Case No. 22CV012266

Petitioners sought a writ of mandate in Alameda Superior Court, challenging the City's denial of their untimely grievance of discipline. Petitioners are a police canine officer and sergeant who the City disciplined for their involvement in an out-of-compliance canine bite that caused serious injury to a member of the public. The underlying case was also investigated by the Community Police Review Agency (CPRA). The CPRA Director and the Chief agreed on both the sustained findings and the discipline imposed. Petitioners allege they are entitled to grieve their discipline and to an administrative appeal because the City's notices of discipline were inadequate.

The City has denied the allegations and is fighting the case, which when we last reported, was in the discovery phase. The case has since advanced, and oral argument was completed on Friday, April 28, 2023.

III. TRAININGS

OCA has provided support and guidance to OPD's discipline process by participating in

Re: OCA’s Support for the Police Discipline-Process and Recent Arbitration Decisions

various trainings of OPD personnel. This includes both informal training which happens continuously and more formal trainings.

OCA is currently working on several trainings supporting investigations and accountability at OPD. These include a *Skelly* refresher training for commanders who play the role of *Skelly* hearing officer in the discipline process, as well as, a training regarding the *Skelly* process and serving as a *Skelly* officer for newly appointed captains. Last year, the City of Oakland retained an independent law firm to investigate alleged misconduct by Oakland Police Department personnel as well as the department's investigation into the misconduct. The investigations revealed serious weaknesses in the Department’s internal investigation processes and resulted in numerous recommendations for improvement. *Allen v. City of Oakland*, Case No. C00-4599 WHO, Docket no. 1564 (*Order Re Conclusions and Recommendations Re Vehicle Collision and Elevator Discharge Incidents*) (Jan. 18, 2023). OCA is supporting OPD in creating trainings regarding various topics that relate to the recommendations, including but not limited to, investigative sufficiency, collecting and assessing evidence, conflicts and recusals, and conducting parallel criminal and administrative investigations.

IV. ARBITRATIONS

Since our last report, we have received two arbitration decisions related to Department accountability. Note that one of the two arbitrations involved the termination of a police evidence technician, who is not a police officer but one of the Department’s professional staff playing a key role in law enforcement. We are providing the information in order to provide a more comprehensive, contextual view of accountability for the Commission.

	GRIEVANT/VIOLATION	CITY’S DISCIPLINE	ARBITRATOR’S DECISION	DECISION DATE
1	Officer V Performance of Duty – PDRD	7-day suspension	Grievance Sustained	December 2, 2022
2	Police Evidence Technician W Falsification of Records	Termination	Grievance Denied	March 31, 2023

V. OTHER EFFORTS - TRANSPERANCY

In addition to the above, our office has continued to work on ensuring transparency regarding police accountability to the extent permissible by law. We understand that transparency

is essential to accountability and thus have dedicated significant resources to make police personnel records accessible to the public. By law, most police personnel records, including public complaints and discipline, are confidential. However, over the past several years, with the passage of SB 1421 and SB 16, certain uses of force and misconduct investigations are no longer precluded from disclosure under the California Public Records Act.

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Re: OCA's Support for the Police Discipline-Process and Recent Arbitration Decisions

Regarding these categories of police personnel records, our office has committed existing and new resources, working tirelessly to comply with these important new laws.

Oakland is committed to transparency and providing the public with access to Oakland Police records under SB 1421 & SB 16 (Penal Code § 832.7(b)). And thus, in addition to public access to such records through the City's public records request portal – NextRequest – which is not particularly user-friendly, we have been working to create access via the City's website.

We are excited to announce that the police personnel records website is now live: <https://www.oaklandca.gov/topics/sb-1421-police-personnel-records>. We believe the website provides easier access and greater ability to search for desired records, for example, organizing the cases by disclosable category and allowing searches across cases by officer name.

VI. CONCLUSION

OCA respectfully submits this report.

City Attorney

vh

BARBARA J. PARKER



Type text here

By: Veronica Harris
Special Counsel



AGENDA REPORT

TO: Oakland Police Commission

FROM: Michelle N. Phillips
Inspector General

SUBJECT: Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
Progress Report

DATE: May 11, 2023

PURPOSE

The Inspector General reports to the Police Commission and members of the public. This report outlines updates from the OIG, since the Inspector General reported out on March 9, 2023. This informational report is intended to answer OIG specific questions raised at the last meeting, by members of the public and the Police Commission.

CITY CHARTER AND NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (NSA, MEASURE S1 OIG MANDATE)

Task 42 Compliance Evaluation

The Field Training Officer (FTO) program, outlined in Task 42, is an important area of review for the OIG. The FTO program is the first opportunity for new officers to work in the field, post-academy¹ and provides critical training in department culture, community interactions, and job execution. Since the last update, the OIG sent OPD two additional information requests to ensure the Task 42 compliance evaluation was thorough and complete. The OIG anticipates providing the report to OPD by the end of May for review and response.

Office of the Inspector General and Office of Internal Accountability (OIA) Work Group

The OIG has initiated a work group with members of OIA to determine how the entities will engage, communicate, and collaborate on current and future work products. This group will also establish a work plan, cross sectional procedures and a subsequent policy to govern interactions moving forward. This process will assist in effective oversight and accountability of OPD. The first meeting was conducted on May 3, 2023 and will be ongoing.

¹ Negotiated Settlement Agreement with stipulations revised December 2008 can be found at <https://oaklandca.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/government/o/OPD/a/publicreports/oak060142.pdf>

CITY COUNCIL AUDIT

The OIG reviewed the original request from the City Council and met with Council President Nikki Fortunato-Bas and her staff over several months. The OIG conducted internal and external research, as well as collected relevant empirical data to help provide the appropriate scope and recommendation to the City Council. Ultimately, the OIG provided a memorandum with its recommendations to the City Council and Police Commission on March 22, 2023, The OIG recommended that the City of Oakland allocate funding resource for a staffing study and resources analysis for OPD. This type of comprehensive evaluation will allow the City to understand what is currently allocated and what is needed for optimal functionality, response, training, and support.

The OIG recognizes the City of Oakland is facing fiscal challenges, and that this request must align with funding availability. The memo provided to the City Council and the Commission has been attached to this packet.

THE BEY MATTER

Prior to the appointment of the current Inspector General, in November of 2021, the Oakland Police Commission voted to refer the Bey matter to the newly created OIG. The expressed goal was to review specific records and report to the Commission any policy recommendations for changes to procedures and practices going forward. At this time the Inspector General is still the only individual authorized to review subpoenaed documents associated with this matter, resulting in the Inspector General being the only OIG staff member assigned to review. The review is progressing; however, in the last two weeks there has been additional information that needed to be reviewed associated with complaint 07-0553. Currently, the Inspector General has determined that 07-0553 will need additional time for review. This complaint, and resulting investigation, is extremely complex and will require sufficient time for a proper inspection.

The Inspector General will proceed with the reviews of the other complaints, with plans to provide a singular report on 07-0553 later. It must be noted that the Inspector General does not have a timeline for completion of this review, given the limited resources of the office. While there has been significant progress made on the Bey Matter, the OIG has Charter, Municipal Code and administrative duties that must also be prioritized.

OTHER OIG PROJECTS

The Commission has requested information and/or updates regarding the OIG’s progress in fulfilling its requirements as outlined in the enabling ordinance. With minimal resources and staffing, the OIG is working diligently to complete the tasks. The OIG has prioritized the following tasks as required by the enabling ordinance:

Enabling Ordinance Requirements: OIG	OIG Updates
OIG Annual Report	Anticipated completion September 2023 (18 months-January 2022 to June 2023)
Monitor/evaluate # of officers receiving training on profiling, implicit bias, de-escalation, and other key topics	This information has been received from OPD and reviewed. This project will be assigned to the next available staff member.
Monitor/evaluate/make recommendations re: OPD Policies the Commission seeks to create or modify	The OIG is working with OIA and the Policy and Publications unit to get an exhaustive list of all Department General Orders and Training Bulletins
Monitor/evaluate/make recommendations re: OPD’s risk mgmt. practices	The OIG has started to review the Risk management policies and practices and will assigned to the policy analyst once they are hired and onboarded
Develop and present a plan to the Commission to measure the performance of each element of the Department’s discipline process for sworn officers	All measurement tools provided by the Independent Monitoring team are under review for edits and updates
Complete all audits/reviews requested by the Mayor, City Administrator, City Council	The OIG submitted a memo with recommendations to the City Council regarding their requested audit in March 2023 The OIG submitted an informational report to the Public Safety Committee in March 2023 regarding there request for a review of the Bey Matters
Monitor/evaluate/make recommendations re: Recruiting and hiring sworn personnel	The OIG will assign this task once a staff member is available

The OIG has also finalized a draft strategic plan for fiscal years 2024 and 2025. The OIG has three community forums scheduled to receive input and will distribute drafts to stakeholders for any comments.

OIG STAFF UPDATE

The OIG has been working closely with the City’s Human Resources Department and City Administration to ensure the OIG is able to move forward with filling the positions of Inspector General Performance Auditor and Inspector General Policy Analyst. The City of Oakland initiated a hiring freeze in April 2023 regarding positions funded by the general fund. This included all OIG vacant positions. The OIG requested an exemption from the City Administrators Office, and it was granted. The interview and hiring process for both positions are still ongoing.

The review of the OIG job specifications for the Deputy Inspector General position has been put on hold at this time. The OIG is prioritizing the recruitment of a permanent Chief of Audits and Evaluations. The primary staffing goal at this point is to ensure all OIG staff are in permanent positions in accordance with the civil service rules. As the OIG builds and assesses its needs, possible organizational changes may be requested in the future.

OIG COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND OUTREACH

The OIG continues to expand its outreach and engagement with the community via social media, service projects, and strategic partnerships. From speaking at neighborhood council meetings, to hosting educational discussions, the office is determined to combine both the substantive work with robust and easily accessible communications. Additionally, the OIG released its first quarterly newsletter in March 2023. The newsletter was created to be transparent with community about how the OIG is delivering on its mission.


Currently, the OIG has three social campaigns that have been designed to educate members of the public, while also uplifting their perspectives. These weekly campaigns include:

- #CandidConversation – In alignment with our office’s mission to build community trust and enhance transparency, we are elevating community members’ direct thoughts on Oakland’s current public safety conditions and police accountability.
- #TheMoreYouKnow – At the OIG we understand that one of the best ways to ensure that OPD officers are compliant with their departmental policies is to make the community aware of the rules they should be following when interacting with the public.
- #FAQFriday – This campaign allows us to educate residents about police oversight, by answering their most common questions.

Additionally, in partnership with the Bay Area Urban League, The Unity Council, and Allen Temple Baptist Church’s Public Ministry, the OIG is hosting a series of strategic planning sessions, to provide the community the opportunity to help shape the office’s path forward. On May 13, 2023, at 10:00 a.m., the OIG is also partnering with Higher Ground, East Oakland Youth Development Center, Building Opportunity for Self Sufficiency, and Youth Uprising to host a Youth Safety Conference.

For questions regarding this report, please contact Michelle N. Phillips, Inspector General, at OIG@oaklandca.gov.

Respectfully submitted,



Michelle N. Phillips
Inspector General
Office of the Inspector General

City Council MEMO

March 22, 2023

**Office of the
Inspector General**

Memo

To: Nikki Fortunato-Bas, City Council President
Honorable Members of the City Council
Tyfahra Milele, Police Commission Chair
Members of the Police Commission

From: Michelle N. Phillips, Inspector General

Date: March 22, 2023

Re: Recommendation for Staffing Study & Resource Analysis

Summary: The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) recommends that the City of Oakland conduct a staffing study and resource analysis of the Oakland Police Department (OPD), prior to the OIG completing an audit for calls for service and resource or response allocation. To date, the OIG was unable to identify recent (within the last five years) baseline staffing resource data for OPD that can be used as benchmarks for success in this area. A staffing study, or a similar review, would help to:

- Identify current resources
- Determine the number of officers needed in a particular geographic area
- Decide how staffing and operational resources should be allocated

Calls for service audits and resource allocation reviews are best when tied to a staffing study. If the City of Oakland's objective is to determine if police are responding to calls for service in an efficient timeframe, it is critical to first know the number of available officers, target timeframes, and how alternate resources can be used to supplement services.

Background

On June 24, 2021, the City of Oakland City Council directed “the Police Commission Inspector General to complete an independent, comprehensive audit of the Police Department, by December 2022, and to provide a report to Council outlining the scope of the audit prior to its initiation.” The directive required that “[t]he audit shall include, but not be limited to, an in-depth analysis of calls for service data, an accurate time study for officers on patrol, and special units including Ceasefire, Investigations, Special Events, Felony Assault, Homicide, and Special Victims, and a detailed assessment of performance and clearance rates to measure how resources are being used and the effectiveness of those resource allocations to inform the analysis of the second phase of Reimagining Public Safety. Recommendations shall include, but not be limited to, diverting certain non-violent and non-criminal calls for service to alternative responses and focusing resources on violent and serious crime response, investigation, and deterrence.”

As a new office, the OIG reviewed contextual information and study methodologies from David Muhammad, Executive Director of the National Criminal Justice Reform. Mr. Muhammad was contracted to conduct a calls for service audit for the City of Oakland, prior to the appointment of the Inspector General. After several meetings with Mr. Muhammad and a review of previous OPD studies, audits, and assessments, the OIG determined that the City of Oakland should establish a baseline for the number of officers and resources needed to properly respond to calls for service within each geographic area in Oakland. A baseline provides a data starting point, to compare, and subsequently determine optimal levels of resources. After the assessment, the City of Oakland can make an informed decision on what resources need to be decreased, reallocated, reclassified, or increased to maximize effectiveness and efficiency in OPD’s public response.

Currently, the data on OPD calls for service and available resources is limited. The OIG hopes this memo successfully communicates the City of Oakland’s need to have a comprehensive study that reviews and analyzes:

1. The types of calls for service
2. The types of resources (equipment, personnel, etc.) required to respond to calls for service
3. Whether current resources can effectively and efficiently meet the needs of the caller and community

This scope can be expanded based on communication from the City Council.

Unsurprisingly, “the manner and speed with which police respond to citizens' calls for service have long been a focal point in policing.”¹ Understanding that police response to calls consumes most of patrol time, it is essential to know the types of calls a department receives. However, this data area of policing has not received enough attention from scholars.² According to the Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing (COPS), there has been much consideration given to areas such as “police recruitment, retention, and, in this economic context, how to maintain police budgets and existing staffing

¹ U.S. Department of Justice - National Institute of Justice “Calls for Service: Citizen Demand and Initial Police Response,” last accessed February 13, 2023, <https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/78362NCJRS.pdf>

² Ashby MPJ. Changes in Police Calls for Service During the Early Months of the 2020 Coronavirus Pandemic. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*. 2020 Jun 25:paaa037. doi: 10.1093/policing/paaa037. PMID: PMC7337826. Last accessed, February 13, 2023, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7337826/>

positions...[much] less has centered on adequately assessing the demand for police service and alternative ways of managing that demand.”³

The core mission of most law enforcement agencies is to answer calls for service from the public.⁴ “One of the fundamental questions for police departments is how many sworn personnel are needed to efficiently and effectively perform policing functions in a given jurisdiction? Unfortunately, there is no single standard method for answering this question.”⁵

The types of services provided by law enforcement agencies as well as their size and location reflect differently on the demands of the community. The challenge is to identify the proper distribution and deployment to meet that demand.⁶ The City of Oakland is unique in its complex policing history and present crime rates, which would make a one size fits all approach inadequate to addressing questions and issues of efficiency.

Limited Scope Police Staffing Research

A police department’s calls for service reflect the number of requests for police assistance in a specific location, made via phone. The call for service may require law enforcement’s presence to resolve, correct and/or assist with the matter at hand.⁷ Depending on the circumstance, a call for service to a police department is either a standard “911” emergency call, or a non-emergency call.⁸

A staffing study would showcase the existing staffing distribution for OPD, as well as outline a step-by-step method to evaluate its own patrol staffing needs, based on workload and performance goals. Therefore, the completion of a staffing study would help to “determine the number of sworn patrol staff [needed] to meet their service obligations according to their communities’ preferences, expectations, and requirements.”⁹

³ Wilson, Jeremy M., and Alexander Weiss. 2014. *A Performance-Based Approach to Police Staffing and Allocation*. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Last accessed, February 13, 2023, <https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-p247-pub.pdf>

⁴ Ashby MPJ. Changes in Police Calls for Service During the Early Months of the 2020 Coronavirus Pandemic. *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice*. 2020 Jun 25:paaa037. doi: 10.1093/police/paaa037. PMID: PMC7337826. Last accessed, February 13, 2023, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7337826/>

⁵ Institute of Crime Science - School of Criminal Justice University of Cincinnati. “Sycamore Township Police Staffing Study,” Last accessed, February 13, 2023, <https://services.dps.ohio.gov/OCCS/Pages/Public/Reports/Sycamore%20Staffing%20Analysis%20Final.pdf>

⁶ International City/County Management Association (ICMA). “An analysis of police department staffing: How many officers do you really need? A Review of 62 Police Agencies Analyzed by the ICMA / CPSM,” Last accessed, February 13, 2023, https://icma.org/sites/default/files/305747_Analysis%20of%20Police%20Department%20Staffing%20_%20McCabe.pdf

⁷ The call for service may not require an alternative response that can be dispatch from the 911 call center, for example Mobile Assistance Community Responders of Oakland (MACRO)

⁸ Police Data Initiative. “Calls for Service.” Last accessed, February 13, 2023, <https://www.policedatainitiative.org/datasets/calls-for-service/>

⁹ Wilson, Jeremy M., and Alexander Weiss. 2014. *A Performance-Based Approach to Police Staffing and Allocation*. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Last accessed, February 13, 2023, <https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-p247-pub.pdf>

In January 2022, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) completed the **Minneapolis Police Department and Emergency Communications Center Staffing and Operations Assessment and Review of Problem Nature Codes**. The purpose of this study was to complete the following goals and objectives:

Recommend staffing resources that can effectively and efficiently meet the demand for service
 Review internal business processes and identify gaps and areas for improvement
 Inform needs for resource allocations that are aligned with City needs and demand for public safety services; and
 Position the MPD for future success by providing the tools to further adapt staffing and processes to future changes in demand for service.

In the study completed by CNA:

“The data...included detailed information about each call, such as the location where the call originated; the date and time the call was received and completed; the incident type, priority level, and disposition of the call; and other administrative indicators. By providing a detailed overview of the demand for police service in the city, these data allow CNA to better estimate the MPD’s workload and staffing needs.”¹⁰

To determine if OPD is efficiently and effectively responding to calls, the same data must be collected and assessed by the City of Oakland. Below is the Staffing Analysis Approach, outlined and completed by CNA for Minneapolis, MN. Their staffing analysis infused elements of calls for service into its approach.

CNA Staffing Analysis Approach

CNA conducted a staffing analysis for the MPD to systematically determine patrol staffing needs based on actual workforce demand, which included the following six tasks:

1. **Analyze the distribution of calls for service.** Calls for service can differ by the hour of the day, day of the week, and month of the year. The MPD’s peak call times have implications for resource allocation decisions, such as the use of overtime and scheduling training activities. Findings from this analysis will help the City understand when the highest levels of patrol staffing are needed.
2. **Analyze the nature of calls for service.** Understanding the nature of the MPD’s calls for service, including the seriousness of calls based on how the call is coded and priority levels, provides important information on the types of police work being conducted in the agency. The nature of calls for service also varies across precincts, requiring the MPD to staff areas accordingly.

¹⁰ Thorkildsen, Z., Peterson, B., Richardson, K., Jenkins, M., Land, A., Cox, J., Komiss, B., and Flynn, E. Minneapolis Police Department and Emergency Communications Center Staffing and Operations Assessment & Review of Problem Nature Codes. Arlington, VA: CNA, Last accessed, February 13, 2023, <https://lms.minneapolismn.gov/Download/RCAV2/26161/Minneapolis-Staffing-Operations-and-PNC-Assessment-FINAL.pdf>

3. **Review the time used for calls for service.** This task involves determining how long calls for service typically take from initial response to final paperwork, which is key to understanding how much time officers spend responding to calls for service during their shifts.
4. **Calculate the shift-relief factor.** The shift-relief factor is the relationship between the maximum number of patrol days officers are available to work and the number that they actually work. The shift-relief factor is a critical piece of data in estimating the number of officers that should be assigned to a patrol shift to ensure that the bureau is optimally staffed. This task involves calculating the shift-relief factor by dividing the total number of hours necessary to be fully staffed in a shift by the total number of off hours (i.e., hours outside of shift assignments) to which an officer is entitled.
5. **Identify performance objectives.** This task involves identifying commonly used performance objectives regarding the fraction of an officer's shift that should be devoted to calls for service and the fraction that should be devoted to other activities. This analysis provides critical information to the City about how varying performance objectives affect overall patrol staffing projections.
6. **Estimate staffing levels.** Drawing on results from the previous tasks, this task involves estimating the number and distribution of officers required to answer calls for service, accounting for the proposed performance objectives as well as the fact that data are unlikely to capture calls that require multiple officer dispatches. We also estimated staffing levels for several subgroups of calls that could potentially be service d by an alternative nonpolice response.

However, the OIG acknowledges that the City of Oakland may need to broaden the scope of a staffing study to include a comprehensive staffing assessment and resource study, similar to the one conducted on the Albuquerque Police Department.

Weiss Staffing Analysis Approach

In December 2015, Alexander Weiss Consulting, LLC, studied five areas during their review of the Albuquerque Police Department. Those five areas are outlined below:

1. **Patrol Operations.** This area focused on common staffing approaches and demonstrated how agencies may develop and use a workload-based assessment of patrol staffing needs that incorporates performance objectives for discretionary time. Additionally, a comprehensive assessment for the patrol operation is focused in this area.
2. **Work Schedule.** The second component of patrol assessment was the patrol work schedule. The work schedule is critical because it is a tool to ensure that resources are aligned with organizational objective and expectations.

3. **Managing the Demand for Police Service.** This portion of the study was focused on ways to examine how the department manages demand by:
 - a. Reducing calls for false alarms
 - b. An alternative response to traffic accidents
 - c. Web-based crime reporting.

4. **Operational Support Staffing.** This portion of the study reviewed assignments and use of resources dedicated to specialized units. Areas of review included:
 - a. Investigations Bureau
 - b. Special Investigation Division
 - c. Criminal Investigation Division
 - d. Property Crimes Division
 - e. Special Services Bureau
 - f. Canine Unit
 - g. Metro Traffic
 - h. Open Space Division
 - i. Police Academy

5. **Professional Accountability Bureau.** There was a particular concern to this area of the study as the staffing for the new Internal Affairs Division (IAD) was vital. This was a focus to ensure timely compliance with the United States Department of Justice agreement.

6. **Administrative Services Bureau.** The study identified areas that could enhance the administrative functions within the department. Specifically, the study, albeit outside of the scope, identified areas that were hampered by optimal results and outcomes, due to outdated policies and practices.

The scope of the Albuquerque Police Department staffing analysis is an example of a broader scope that encompasses many vital and operation-essential functions that could identify deficit areas and yield more recommendations.

Conclusion

The OIG recommends that the City of Oakland allocate funding resources for a staffing study and resource analysis to be completed, similar to the aforementioned studies.


To assist with establishing a clear baseline, the OIG is willing to complete the following tasks:

- Present a request for proposal to the City Council for scope consideration and approval
- Provide guidance to the City Council on an appropriate budget for procuring a qualified firm or organization for the study
- Monitor and oversee this study, should the City Council accept this recommendation

Enclosed below are the above-referenced studies, including Mr. Muhammad's report, for guidance and review. In addition, there are several other studies that may align with the City Council's vision.

The OIG will await collective feedback and/or directives from the Council.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Michelle N. Phillips".

Michelle N. Phillips, Inspector General
City of Oakland, Office of the Inspector General

**Albuquerque Police Department
Comprehensive Staffing Assessment and
Resource Study**

**ALBUQUERQUE POLICE DEPARTMENT
COMPREHENSIVE STAFFING ASSESSMENT
AND RESOURCE STUDY**



ALEXANDER WEISS
CONSULTING

FINAL DRAFT REPORT
December 11, 2015

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Albuquerque Police Department Staffing Study

In December 2014, the City of Albuquerque engaged Alexander Weiss Consulting, LLC to conduct a staffing and organizational analysis of the Albuquerque Police Department (APD). This report describes the results of that analysis. Our work is based on interviews with department staff and examination of records, policy and procedure.

Introduction

The Albuquerque Police Department is a full service law enforcement agency. The FY15 budget for the agency was \$149,875,000.

As of November 25, 2015 the department staffing was as follows:

Sworn Positions	
Police Officers	762
Part-Time Rehire	8
Full-Time Rehire	65
Metro Court	6
Non-sworn Positions	
Cadet	47
Non-sworn	391
Crossing Guards	133
Community Service Assistants	22
Police Service Aides	16
Total Sworn	841
Total Non-sworn	609
Total Employees	1450

Table 1 Total APD Employees

The following table illustrates the distribution of sworn personnel by grade. Note that it uses a different classification scheme than the one shown in Table One.

Albuquerque Police Department
Staffing Study

Chief	1
Assistant Chief	1
Deputy Chief	2
Major	3
Commander	13
Lieutenant	35
Sergeant	99
Sergeant Ranger	2
Patrolman second class	48
Police officer first class	648
Cadet	47
Open Space Ranger	6
Metro Court Officer	6
Community Service Asst	22
Total	933

Table 2 APD Sworn Positions by Grade

One thing to note is the span of control. First, the ratio of commanders to lieutenants is 1:2.5, and the ratio of lieutenants to sergeants is 1: 2.9. The ratio of sergeants to police officers (PO1 PO 2 and Open Space) is 1:6.9.

Based on our analysis the APD will be adequately staffed at the level of 1000 sworn personnel (Reference Table 9 on page 24 and Table 10 on page 26).

- The APD has five major bureaus:
- Professional Accountability Bureau
 - Field Services Bureau
 - Administrative Support Bureau
 - Investigative Bureau
 - Special Services Bureau

The bureau reporting structure is illustrated below.



Figure 1 APD Bureau Structure

The department has a modest degree of decentralization. There are six area commands that consist largely of officers assigned to patrol and a small number of investigators assigned to “Impact” teams. A substantial fraction of sworn personnel, however, are not assigned to the area commands, including personnel assigned to the investigative bureau and the special services bureau. The area command distribution is illustrated in Figure 2.




Figure 2 APD Area Command Boundaries

Our study of staffing and deployment examines a number of key questions including:

- Is the patrol division staffed and organized to perform its core mission?
- Do the agency structures support concepts of unity of command, and span of control?
- Are lines of authority and responsibility well defined?
- Is authority temporally or spatially focused?
- What is mix of sworn and non-sworn positions? Are sworn personnel occupying positions that could be performed more efficiently or effectively by non-sworn personnel?
- What is the degree of functional specialization and how does that influence performance?
- To what extent, if any, do employee labor agreements limit the ability to effectively and efficiently manage resources?
- Does the organizational structure impede effective internal communication?

To summarize, our study will attempt to answer five questions:

- What does the police department do?
- What does it want to accomplish?
- How does it do it?
- Are there better ways to do what they do now?

- How many people are needed to accomplish its mission?

Patrol Operations

In the face of increasing costs and shrinking revenues, many communities are asking how many police officers are required to ensure public safety. Put another way, what number of officers would help an agency most cost-effectively meet the demands placed on it? This is a fundamentally different question than how many officers does a community want or can a community support. Yet answering the need question effectively frames a discussion about *want and affordability*.

Unfortunately, law enforcement administrators have few resources to guide them in determining the number of officers they need. To be sure, there are multiple approaches to answering this question, ranging from the simple to the complex each with a range of advantages, disadvantages, and assumptions.

The sections that follow highlight common staffing approaches and demonstrate how agencies may develop and use a workload-based assessment of patrol staffing needs that incorporates performance objectives for discretionary time. Where possible, workload-based approaches are superior to others in that they can help provide a better and more objective way to determine staffing needs. Additionally, comprehensive assessments for patrol help to answer a host of critical questions regarding resource allocation and deployment.

Traditionally, there have been four basic approaches to determining workforce levels: per capita, minimum staffing, authorized level, and workload-based. Each differs in its assumptions, ease of calculation, usefulness, validity, and efficiency. Each is reviewed below to provide context for developing an evidence-based approach to police staffing.

The Per Capita Approach

Many police agencies have used their resident population to estimate the number of officers a community needs. The *per capita* method compares the number of officers with the population of a jurisdiction. To determine an optimum number of officers per population—that is, an optimum officer rate—an agency may compare its rate to that of other regional jurisdictions or to peer agencies of a similar size. Although it is difficult to determine the historical origin of, or justification for, the per capita method, it is clear that substantial variations exist among police departments.

Advantages of the per capita approach include its methodological simplicity and ease of interpretation. The population data required to calculate this metric, such as census figures and estimates, are readily available and regularly updated. Per capita methods that control for factors such as crime rates can permit communities to compare themselves with peer organizations. The disadvantage of this method is that it addresses only the relative quantity of police officers per population and not how officers spend

their time; the quality of their efforts; or community conditions, needs, and expectations. Similarly, the per capita approach cannot guide agencies on how to deploy their officers.

Agencies using the per capita method may risk a biased determination of their policing needs. There are several reasons for this. First, a generally accepted benchmark for the optimum-staffing rate does not exist. Rather, there is considerable variation in the police rate depending on community size, region, and agency structure and type. For example, it is generally known that police rates are substantially higher in the northeastern than in the western regions of the United States. When comparing individual jurisdictions, it is not uncommon for similar communities to have per capita rates that are substantially different.

Given the disadvantages noted above as well as others, experts have strongly advised against using population rates for police staffing. The IACP warns, "Ratios, such as officers-per-thousand population, are totally inappropriate as a basis for staffing decisions Defining patrol staffing allocation and deployment requirements is a complex endeavor which requires consideration of an extensive series of factors and a sizable body of reliable, current data."

The Minimum Staffing Approach

The *minimum staffing* approach requires police supervisors and command staff to estimate a sufficient number of patrol officers that must be deployed at any one time to maintain officer safety and provide an adequate level of protection to the public. The use of minimum staffing approaches is fairly common and is generally reinforced through organizational policy and practice and collective bargaining agreements.

There are two principal reasons a jurisdiction may use a minimum staffing approach. First, policy makers in many communities believe a minimum number of officers are needed to ensure public safety. This may be particularly common in small communities where there are relatively few citizen-generated demands for police service yet residents expect a minimum number of officers to be on duty at all times. Second, police officers themselves may insist (often through collective bargaining) that a minimum number of officers be on duty at all times. In some communities, the minimum staffing level is established by ordinance.

There are no objective standards for setting the minimum staffing level. Agencies may consider population; call load, crime rate, and other variables when establishing a minimum staffing level. Yet many agencies may determine the minimum necessary staff level by *perceived* need without any factual basis in workload, presence of officers, response time, immediate availability, distance to travel, shift schedule, or other performance criteria. This may result in deploying too few officers when workload is high and too many officers when it is low. To be sure, the minimum staffing level is often higher than what would be warranted by the agency workload. Ironically, even when the minimum staffing is not workload based, it is not uncommon to hear police officers

suggest that an increase in the agency's workload should warrant an increase in the minimum staffing level.

Minimum staffing levels are sometimes set so high that it results in increasing demands for police overtime. When staffing falls below the minimum standard, police managers typically must hire back officers on overtime to satisfy the minimum staff requirement. It is not uncommon for some agencies to hire back officers nearly every day due to officers taking time off for sick leave, vacations, or other reasons. Additionally, some agencies use a very narrow definition of available staffing. For example, agencies may hire back to fill a vacancy in patrol, even though there are a number of other officers on the street, including those in traffic, school resource units, and supervisors. Inefficiency increases when there are minimum staffing levels on overlapping shifts, leading to a higher number of officers on duty at a time that may not coincide with workload demand.

Most police officers, given a choice, would prefer to have more officers on the street, lending credence to a minimum-staffing model. Nevertheless, increasing the minimum staffing level will not, by itself, improve agency performance or necessarily increase officer safety. In fact, officers hired back to work extra shifts are likely to be fatigued, increasing the risk of injury to themselves or others.

Minimum staffing can also decrease the extent to which an agency can be nimble and flexibly deploy officers based on changing workload demands.

Finally, in some agencies the minimum staffing level may become, by default, the perceived optimal staffing level. In these situations, agencies often use the minimum level as a method to decide, for example, whether an officer can take a benefit day off. Others build work schedules so as to ensure that the minimum level is on duty. In these situations, staffing decisions are based on meeting the minimum level rather than optimizing the available resources to meet workload demand.

The Authorized Level Approach

The *authorized level* approach uses budget allocations to specify a number of officers that may be allocated. Although the authorized level may be determined through a formal staffing assessment, it is often driven by resource availability and political decision-making. The authorized level does not typically reflect any identifiable criteria such as demand for service, community expectations, or efficiency analyses, but may instead reflect an incremental budgeting process.

The authorized level can become an artificial benchmark for need, creating the misperception among police leadership, line staff, and the community that the agency is understaffed and overworked if the actual number of officers does not meet the authorized level. Additionally, unless an agency staffs above the authorized level, fluctuations in recruitment, selection, training, and attrition may lead to the actual staffing levels falling below authorized levels.

Because the authorized level is often derived independently of workload considerations, an agency may be able to meet workforce demand with fewer officers than authorized. Still, the *perception* of being understaffed, resulting when officials bemoan the department operating below authorized strength, can diminish morale and productivity and make it appear that the community is not adequately funding public safety.

The Workload-based Approach

A more comprehensive attempt to determining appropriate workforce levels considers actual police workload. *Workload-based* approaches derive staffing indicators from demand for service. What differentiates this approach is the requirement to systematically analyze and determine staffing needs based upon actual workload demand while accounting for service-style preferences and other agency features and characteristics. The workload approach estimates future staffing needs of police departments by modeling the level of current activity. Conducting a workload analysis can assist in determining the need for additional resources or relocating existing resources (by time and location), assessing individual and group performance and productivity, and detecting trends in workload that may illustrate changing activity levels and conditions. Furthermore, a workload analysis can be performed at every level of the police department and for all key functions, although it is more difficult to assess workload for some units than others. The importance of the workload-based approach to staffing is evidenced by it being codified as a standard (16.1.2) by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies: The agency allocates personnel to, and distributes them within, all organizational components in accordance with documented workload assessments conducted at least once every three years.

Unfortunately, there is no universally accepted standard method for conducting a workload-based assessment. Defining and measuring work varies by agency. Knowing that staff decisions are based upon calls for service and the time required to respond to them, officers may not have an incentive to be efficient in their response to calls or even to engage in activities that reduce calls. Learning how to conduct a workload-based assessment may be challenging for police administrators. Typical workload models are complicated and require intensive calculations. They also require decisions on a wide array of issues that are very difficult for officials and communities to make—such as how frequently streets should be patrolled—and do not uniformly account for discretionary activities, such as time for community policing and other officer-initiated activities.

Even with shortcomings, allocation models based on actual workload and performance objectives are preferable to other methods that might not account for environmental and agency-specific variables. Agencies could benefit from a more popularized workload-based methodology of staffing analysis that is easy to learn and comprehend; is employed by administrators; and, importantly, helps to effectively manage discretionary time. No single metric or benchmark should be used as a sole basis for determining an agency's staffing level. Rather, agencies should consider metrics in light of professional expertise

that can place them in an appropriate practical context.

A step-by-step approach for conducting a workload-based assessment should include the following:

1. *Examining the distribution of calls for service by hour, day, and month.* Calls for service can differ by the hour of the day, the day of the week, and the month of the year. Peak call times can also differ by agency. Knowing when peak call times occur can help agencies determine when they must have their highest levels of staff on duty.
2. *Examining the nature of calls for service.* Reviewing the nature of calls can help better understand the work that an agency's officers are doing. Types of police work required can vary by area within a single jurisdiction and require agencies to staff differing areas accordingly.
3. *Estimating time consumed on calls for service.* Determining how long a call takes, from initial response to final paper work, is key to determining the minimum number of officers needed for a shift. This is most straightforward when a single officer handles the call and completes resulting administrative demands (e.g., reports, arrests) prior to clearing it.
4. *Calculating agency shift-relief factor.* The shift-relief factor shows the relationship between the maximum number of days that an officer can work and *actually* works. Knowing the relief factor is necessary to estimating the number of officers that should be assigned to a shift in order to ensure that the appropriate number of officers is working each day.
5. *Establishing performance objectives.* This encompasses determining what fraction of an officer's shift should be devoted to calls for service and what portion to other activities. For example, an agency might build a staffing model in which officers spend 50 percent of their shift on citizen-generated calls and 50 percent on discretionary activities.
6. *Providing staffing estimates.* Staffing needs will, as noted earlier, vary by time of day, day of week, and month of year, among other variables. Agencies should distribute their officers accordingly. For example, a shift with only half the number of calls than another shift will require half the number of officers. These numbers may also vary by the type of calls, and the time and officers they require, in each shift. For example, one large urban agency assigns two officers to each unit in its evening shift, affecting the number of officers needed for units to respond to calls. Another responds to the same type of calls in different ways in different shifts (for example, sending a unit in some shifts, but requesting citizens file a report in person at a station during others).

Following this model we will now describe our staffing analysis for Albuquerque.

We examined data for the period of March 1 2014 – February 28 2015. During that period the department handled 405,404 citizen-generated calls for service (CFS), of which

officers assigned to the area commands handled 383,158. We define these calls as those in which a citizen contacts the police and an officer(s) is dispatched. This category of calls does not include officer initiated activity like traffic stops or department initiated activity like directed patrol.¹

To provide some sense of the magnitude of call demand, consider that 383,158 calls equate to about 1000 CFS per day or the equivalent of 42 calls per hour. The following illustrates CFS by area command. As we can see in Figure four there is significant variation by command. The Southeast Area Command handled 24% of all citizen-generated calls for service, while the Southwest Command handled 12%.




Figure 3 Number of CFS in Each Area Command

¹ It can be difficult to disaggregate citizen-generated calls from others and while there may be some calls in our data that are officer-initiated, we are confident that the data can be used reliably in this analysis.




Figure 4 Percentage of CFS by Area Command

Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of citizen-generated calls for service by hour of day for the department. Like most police agencies the peak demand for service occurs is in late afternoon hours. We can also observe the drop-off in dispatched calls around the hours of 1500 Hours and 2200 Hours. This is generally consistent with calls having been held pending shift change. This holding of calls, while it can help to reduce overtime and officers working beyond their scheduled time, may have two significant consequences. First, it causes citizens to wait inordinate amounts of time for police response. Second, when officers start their shifts there is a backlog of calls, and thus it contributes to their frustration and tends to reinforce the notion that the department is understaffed.




Figure 5 CFS by Hour (City-wide)

In Figure 6 we observe the distribution of calls by hour of day in each of the six commands. Although the number of calls varies by hour, the hourly patterns are similar.




Figure 6 CFS by Hour by Area Command

Figure 7 shows the distribution of calls by day of week. There is relatively little variation by day of week. In fact, we observe that although Friday is the busiest day of the week, it

is not that much busier than the other days. **Nevertheless, on Friday, all of the APD Field Services Bureau personnel are assigned to work.**




Figure 7 CFS by Day of Week (city-wide)

Next we observe the distribution of calls by month. Again, this is what we expect based on experience with similar agencies.




Figure 8 CFS by Month

Finally, we observe the percentage of calls by shift. It is interesting to note the relatively small fraction of CFS activity occurring after midnight.




Figure 9 CFS by Shift

The following figure illustrates how we consider time in the context of a call for service.




Figure 10 Model of CFS Time

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Once a call has been created in the CAD system it is placed in **queue** awaiting dispatch. **Travel time** is the time from when the call is dispatched until the first officer arrives on scene. In our analysis the **time consumed** on the call is reflected by the time from dispatch until the time the last officer has cleared. Table 3 illustrates the average times in each category for APD.

Queue for all Priority One calls	1 Minute, 47 Seconds
Queue (for all calls, average)	14 Minutes 48 Seconds
Travel	8 Minutes 31 Seconds
Dispatch to Clear	48 Minutes 15 Seconds

Table 3 Components of CFS Time (city-wide)

The city has a three priority system for assignment of calls to officers with a priority one (calls with weapons or significant injury or potential for injury) being assigned the highest level, a priority one call. It should be noted each call is evaluated to determine what occurred, how long ago the incident occurred, if weapons were involved and/or if there are injuries. With these factors known, a priority is then assigned to the call and it is entered in to the system and queued for the dispatch of officers.

Our analysis of all three priority types of calls indicated the average time spent on scene of a call for service was 48 minutes and 15 seconds. This call duration is relatively long compared with similar jurisdictions. This may reflect a few factors. First, the Albuquerque area commands cover large geographical areas and thus travel times can be significant. Second, in our experience, when officers face backlogs of calls for service they tend to complete more work at the scene rather than wait and do it later in the shift. Interestingly we found that the travel times and total times were nearly identical across the area commands.

Of particular concern was that all calls requiring the response of an officer are held in queue on average nearly 15 minutes. This figure is a total for all three priorities of calls. This could include calls where a person is reporting a theft of a piece of property from a week ago where immediate officer intervention isn't as critically necessary as well as a call of a violent nature which just occurred (armed robbery). In order to examine this more closely we disaggregated high priority calls and calculated the queue times.

Figure 11 illustrates queue times for high priority (life threatening) calls by area command. These times indicate APD has the capacity to respond promptly to critical calls. **Their performance on this measure is the best we have seen in our studies in other cities.**

Although the average CFS time is about 48 minutes, as we can see in the Figure 12 a substantial fraction of calls takes far less time. In fact 56% of calls consume less than 40 minutes, including travel time.




Figure 11 Queue Time for Priority One CFS by Area Command




Figure 12 Distribution of CFS Total Time

Next, we examine the nature of calls for service. Table 4 illustrates the top call for service categories. These call types represent 65% of all calls for service in the city.

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Type of Call	Number
Suspicious Person/Vehicle	81506
Disturbance	55583
Non-injury Traffic Crashes	28029
Contact	22495
Burglar Alarms	22082
Theft/Fraud/Embezzlement	18798
Family Dispute	17080
P-watch	16970
Direct Traffic	15606

Table 4 Largest CFS by Category (city-wide)

There are several illustrative items in this list:

- There a number of calls that could be reduced through alternative response strategies including alarms, property damage accidents, theft and “contact”.
- Some calls could be handled by non-sworn staff such as property damage crashes or directing traffic.
- P-watch calls are sometimes for informational purposes, and officers will handle them as time permits.

The next step in our staffing estimate is to calculate the shift relief factor. The shift relief factor tells us the number of officers that we need to assign to a shift in order to ensure that a sufficient number of officers are on duty to meet performance objectives. We obtained data for the study period concerning time off for 904.8 FTE sworn personnel. That data is shown in Table 5.

Benefit Time Off	Hours
Birthday	6,682
Hazard Duty	1,740
Holiday	73,598
Jury Duty	8
Military	22,123
Paid Leave	468
Personal Leave	1,116
Sick	52,199
Vacation	93,334
Comp Time	93,970
Float Holiday	1,415
Injury	19,735
Education	184
Total	366,571

Table 5 Summary of Benefit Time Off

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In Table 6 we calculated the ratio of the maximum hours they could have worked to the hours worked. That result is 1.74.

Maximum Hours Possible	Benefit Time Off	Regular Days Off	Total Time Off	Total Working	Shift Relief Factor
2642016	366571	754820	1121391	1520625	1.74

Table 6 Calculation of Shift Relief Factor

The shift relief factor tells us how many officers we would have to assign to a shift in order to ensure that a sufficient number were working. For example, if we wanted 10 officers to be on duty during the day shift we would need to assign 17.4 (18) officers to the shift $(10 \times 1.74)^2$.

One of the factors that can influence a staffing model is time spent on preparation of reports. In some communities officers respond to calls for service and prepare their reports while on-scene. As a result, the time for report preparation is included in the total call time. However, if an officer clears the call and prepares the report at a subsequent time that time will appear as a portion of their uncommitted time. In order to capture this data in Albuquerque we looked at the disposition of calls and whether a report was prepared. During our study period a report was written on 24% of calls for service. Thus for the vast majority of calls no additional time is consumed on report writing.

In order to use this staffing model agencies must make two critical decisions. First, the agency must decide whether it is more appropriate to assume that 25% or 50% of calls require a backup. The most reliable choice will be based on consideration of the setting. APD responds to many calls that require backup including alarms, domestic violence, and many traffic crashes. Of course, the incidence of calls that require backup will vary significantly by neighborhood and time of day.

The second decision focuses on the allocation of officer time. We know that police officers do many things other than answer citizen calls for service. Our model includes time for those other activities at various levels. We are often asked whether there is some standard or benchmark that an agency should adopt in this area. In fact, this should be a community-based decision. There are a number of factors that influence that choice:

- Some agencies have a high degree of specialization including traffic, street crime, and tactical units. Those agencies generally have lower expectations about proactive activities by patrol officers than those that are more generalized

² The shift relief factor is based on the assumption that officers work five eight-hour shifts per week. The shift relief factor will be larger for officers that work four ten-hour shifts per week. See section on work schedules.

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- Some agencies expect patrol officers to engage in community policing and problem-solving activities. These task can take up a lot of time
- In some agencies there is a philosophy that the principle job for officers assigned to patrol is to answer citizen calls for service and to remain available for emergency response.

Most police executives agree that the key question is not how much discretionary time is available, but how is that time being utilized.

Now we can turn to our staffing estimate. Estimates based on an eight-hour schedule are shown in Tables 7 and 8. Table 7 is based on the assumption that 25% of all calls require a backup unit and Table 8 is based on the assumption that 50% of calls require a backup.³ In all other respects the tables are the same. As you can observe there is a staffing estimate for each area command.⁴

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
SW	CFS	25%	ADJCFS	HOURS	UNITS	50%CFS	XSRF
0700-1500	16158	4039.5	20197.5	16158	5,5	11.1	20.0
FH							
0700-1500	19255	4813.8	24068.8	19255	6.6	13.2	23.0
VA							
0700-1500	25895	6473.8	32368.8	25895	8.9	17.7	31.0
NE							
0700-1500	28930	7232.5	36162.5	28930	9.9	19.8	35.0
NW							
0700-1500	18135	4533.8	22668.8	18135	6.2	12.4	22.0
SE							
0700-1500	33062	8265.5	41327.5	33062	11.3	22.6	40.0

Table 7 Staffing Estimates (25% Backup)

³ It is very difficult to obtain reliable data about backup units from CAD Data, so we estimate that value.

⁴ APD has requested that the patrol allocation be based on the assumption that 25% of calls on the day shift require a backup and that 50% of calls on the afternoon and midnight shifts require a backup.

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	18
SW	CFS	50%	ADJCFS	HOURS	UNITS	50%CFS	XSRF
1500-2300	20587	10293.5	30880.5	24704.4	8.5	16.9	30
2300-0700	8932	4466	13398	10718.4	3.7	7.3	13
FH							
1500-2300	23708	11854	35562	28449.6	9.7	19.5	34
2300-0700	10151	5075.5	15226.5	12181.2	4.2	8.3	15
VA							
1500-2300	27386	13693	41079	32863.2	11.3	22.5	40
2300-0700	11593	5796.5	17389.5	13911.6	4.8	9.5	17
NE							
1500-2300	34679	17339.5	52018.5	41614.8	14.3	28.5	50
2300-0700	14975	7487.5	22462.5	17970	6.2	12.3	22
NW							
1500-2300	20762	10381	31143	24914.4	8.5	17.1	30
2300-0700	10323	5161.5	15484.5	12387.6	4.2	8.5	15
SE							
1500-2300	40643	20321.5	60964.5	48771.6	16.7	33.4	59
2300-0700	17984	8992	26976	21581	7.4	14.8	26

Table 8 Staffing Estimates (50% Backup)

In the first column of Tables 7 and 8 we have divided the day into 3 eight-hour shifts (day shift for Table 7 and swing and midnight shifts for Table 8). You will note the number of calls during each shift in column 2. In the third column we make the backup unit adjustments (adding 25 and 50% of calls respectively). Column 4, which includes the backup unit adjustment, is the basis for our analysis. In Column 5 we estimate the total time consumed on calls (in hours) by shift. In the next column we identify the number of units required to handle these calls if a unit worked every day and 365 days per year. This calculation is based on the total time consumed divided by 2920, the number of hours that an officer would work if they worked an eight-hour shift every day. **The unit value (Column 6) is the number of officers that should be on duty if they only answered calls for their entire shift, and if they worked every day.**

Next (column 7) we multiply the unit value times the performance objective. In this case the model is based on providing enough officers to permit them to spend 50 percent of their time on calls for service and fifty percent on other activity.

In column 8 we multiply the required units times the appropriate shift relief factor. This tells us the number to **assign** to the shift in order to ensure that the appropriate number of units were on duty.⁵

⁵ The convention is to round up at this point.

Using these tables we can estimate staffing requirements for each area command by shift. This analysis is illustrated in Table 9. Based on this model APD would require 522 police officers assigned to patrol.

8 HOUR WORK SHIFT ANALYSIS

SW	
0700-1500	20
1500-2300	30
2300-0700	13
FH	
0700-1500	23
1500-2300	34
2300-0700	15
VA	
0700-1500	31
1500-2300	40
2300-0700	17
NE	
0700-1500	35
1500-2300	50
2300-0700	22
NW	
0700-1500	22
1500-2300	31
2300-0700	15
SE	
0700-1500	40
1500-2300	59
2300-0700	26
Total	522

Table 9 Staffing Estimates for Area Commands

When using the workload-based approach it is important to consider some of the potential limitations. First, this model relies heavily on averages in producing the estimates. To the extent that workload demands exceed averages, relying on averages for scheduling may affect agency performance. An example of where this might occur is during substantial emergencies, concurrent major calls, or some unplanned event. In these sorts of unpredictable situations, the workload-based model, like other approaches, may not provide for an adequate number of officers. The main effect of this shortfall will be to reduce the availability of discretionary time. Second, the models do not

differentiate about the job functions of the police units. That is, we assume that calls are handled by police officers. To the extent that calls are handled by supervisors or by non-sworn staff, officer-staffing requirements will diminish. Third, we include the response time as a component of the call for service time, which we believe is reliable in most communities. In communities with large geographical patrol zones, agencies may find that even when officers are available for calls for service, travel time to answer calls exceeds that needed to provide acceptable performance. In these agencies it is important to consider re-designing patrol zones to ensure that officers can respond to calls appropriately.

Finally, it is important to note that the workload-based approach works best when a community responds to at least 15,000 citizen-generated calls per year. Otherwise, the time required for calls for service is so low that the number of officers recommended is far fewer than is thought reasonable. While this is generally not an issue in large communities, we do see some evidence of this problem in the APD analysis. For example, several areas had fewer than 15,000 calls on the midnight shift, and as a result, the staffing estimates may be unreasonably low. It is important for the agency to utilize its institutional knowledge to address these anomalies.

One approach to addressing this problem of inadequate staffing on midnight shifts is to adopt a 12 Hour work schedule.⁶ By staffing on two shifts rather than three or more you can introduce some efficiencies and having a more balanced staffing by shift.

⁶ See page 31 for a discussion of twelve-hour work schedules.

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Using the APD workload data we constructed a staffing table based on two twelve-hour shifts starting at 0600 Hours and 1800 Hours. It is shown below.

12 HOUR WORK SHIFT ANALYSIS

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
SW	CFS	ADJ	ADJCF5	HOURS	UNITS	50% Obl.	XSRF
0600-1800	25645	6411	32056	25645	5.9	11.8	31
1800-0600	20032	10016	30048	24038	5.5	11	29
FH							
0600-1800	29938	7485	37423	29938	6.8	13.6	36
1800-0600	23176	11588	34764	27811	6.4	12.8	34
VA							
0600-1800	39244	9811	49055	39244	9	18	47
1800-0600	25629	12815	38444	30755	7	14	37
NE							
0600-1800	45785	11446	57231	45785	10.5	21	55
1800-0600	32799	16399	49198	39358	9	18	47
NW							
0600-1800	28108	7027	35135	28108	6.4	12.8	34
1800-0600	21112	10556	31668	25334	5.8	11.6	31
SE							
0600-1800	51683	12921	64604	51683	12	24	63
1800-0600	40007	20000	60007	48006	11	22	57
Total							501

Table 10 Staffing Estimates for 12-Hour Shifts

This model is very similar to the one used for the eight hour schedule with a few exceptions:

- We assumed that 25% of calls on day shift required backup and 50% on night shift required backup. In the eight-hour model we were assuming 50% backup for 16 hours per day-in this one 12 hours per day.
- We have utilized a shift relief factor of 2.6 (typical for 12 hour schedules) however it should be noted that 12-hour schedules result in a 42-hour workweek. The actual shift relief factor will vary based on how the department adjusts for that anomaly.

Based on these assumptions APD would require **501 officers in patrol**.

Work Schedule

The second component of patrol resource analysis is the work schedule. The work schedule is critical because it is a tool to ensure that resources are aligned with organizational objectives.

Our work in Albuquerque suggests that patrol performance is significantly affected by work schedule. Among the critical issues are:

- Work schedules are not well aligned with the workload
- There are several different work schedules in use, resulting in unnecessary complexity
- In some cases work schedules were implemented to motivate police officer performance. While this may have been beneficial for the officers, it appears that these schedules are not based on deployment requirements.

In order to better understand these issues it is instructive to review the scheduling process.

Police work schedules come in all shapes and sizes. Although each seems unique there is a methodology to apply so that we can compare work schedules. Among the important components of a work schedule are:

- Average work week
- Shift length
- Number of consecutive work days
- Weekend time off
- Staffing by day of week.
- Percentage of officers on duty each day.

Consider the following figure that illustrates a common work schedule.

	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	Off	Off					Off
2		Off	Off				
3			Off	Off			
4				Off	Off		
5					Off	Off	
6						Off	Off
7	Off						Off
% On	71	71	71	71	71	71	71

Figure 13 Example of 5-2 Work Schedule

Figure 13 illustrates a work schedule in which officers work a five-day on/two-day off schedule with eight-hour days. We observe that the shift has unique properties:

- Fixed days off
- Three groups of officers have either a full or partial weekend day off
- Equal staffing by day of week
- Longest on duty cycle is five days.

Importantly, we observe that on every day, 71 percent of the officers are assigned to be on duty, and that the number of officers on duty each day is the same. These are two very important criteria that can be used in evaluating a work schedule.

Figure 14 shows how we can build a schedule that increases staffing on weekends. Let’s say we have a workgroup with nine officers and we wish to provide staffing proportional to the daily workload. Each officer is assigned a day off group, but groups two and three each have two officers. This allows the reduction of staffing on some days, and the increase on others. This schedule is particularly attractive to employees that want fixed days off. It works well for officers that are going to school, and may be beneficial for those that assist in childcare. The disadvantage is that a substantial portion of employees never gets a weekend off.

	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	Off						Off
2 (2)		Off	Off				
3 (2)			Off	Off			
4				Off	Off		
5					Off	Off	
6						Off	Off
7	Off	Off					
On	7	6	5	6	7	7	7
Off	2	3	4	3	2	2	2
% On	77%	66%	55%	66%	77%	77%	77%

Figure 14 Example of 5-2 schedules with variable staffing by day of week

Another schedule that is based on an eight-hour day is commonly described as a “six and two” schedule. Over the course of the seven-week duty cycle each officer will work the following pattern:

- 6 on 3 off
- 5 on 3 off
- 6 on 2 off
- 6 on 2 off
- 6 on 2 off
- 6 on 2 off

It is illustrated below.

Week	S	M	T	W	TH	F	S
1			Off	Off			
2				Off	Off		
3					Off	Off	
4						Off	Off
5	Off						Off
6	Off	Off					
7		Off	Off				
% On	71	71	71	71	71	71	71

Figure 15 6/2 Work Schedule

This schedule has several interesting attributes:

- The percentage of officers assigned each day is the same as a 5/2 schedule
- Rotating days off
- Each officer gets two three-day weekends during each duty cycle.

Ten- Hour Shifts

More than 30 years ago, several law enforcement agencies began adopting the “4–10” plan. Under this plan, officers work four 10-hour shifts and have 3 days off each week. The plan appeals to officers because it reduces the number of days worked, the likelihood of working on a holiday, and commuting time. The plan can also appeal to agencies. Because the work schedules have an “overlap” period between shifts, when officers on two shifts are working, the agency can double staffing during peak demand times. The following figure illustrates a typical 4/10 plan; one that is based on a seven week duty cycle.

	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	OFF	OFF					OFF
2	OFF	OFF	OFF				
3		OFF	OFF	OFF			
4			OFF	OFF	OFF		
5				OFF	OFF	OFF	
6					OFF	OFF	OFF
7	OFF					OFF	OFF
%	57	57	57	57	57	57	57

Figure 16 4-10 Plan

Compared to 8-hour shifts, the above 10-hour schedule significantly reduces the proportion of officers assigned to be on duty; dropping from 71% to 57%. This happens

because the agency must use the same number of officers that are used to provide 24 hour staffing to provide 30 hours of staffing a day. In many agencies, those additional 6 hours of coverage are unnecessary. Moreover, 10-hour shifts require additional police vehicles to cover overlap times, which may reduce productivity for some officers.

Consider the following example. A department has 84 officers assigned to patrol (28 officers are assigned to each eight-hour shift). On each shift we would expect about **20 officers** (71%) to be assigned to duty.

The department decides to implement a 4/10 plan with shift times of 0600 to 1600, 1400 to 2400, and 2200 to 0800. If we continue to assign 28 officers to each shift we would expect that on each shift **16 officers** (57%) would be assigned to work. The resulting deployment scheme is illustrated below.




Figure 17 Comparison of 8 and 10-hour deployment

In Figure 17 we observe what happens when we shift from an eight-hour to a 10-hour work schedule with the same number of officers. The blue line depicts the eight-hour schedule. As we see, except for the six hours of overlap when the staffing doubles, there are fewer officers assigned than when officers are working eight-hour shifts. The only way to reach the level of staffing provided under the eight-hour scheme is by adding officers. Importantly, it may be the case that an agency can use the additional capacity that comes from the ten hour plan to its advantage, but they must understand that any advantage it experiences may be at the expense of another goal.

APD Field Services uses two different work schedules. Officers on the day shift and swing shift work a 5 on, 2 off eight-hour day schedule with fixed days off. Officers on the graveyard shift work a 4 on, 3 off schedule with ten-hour days with fixed days off.

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First, let's examine the eight hour schedule.

	M	T	W	T	F	S	S
SQUAD1						OFF	OFF
SQUAD2	OFF	OFF					
SQUAD3			OFF	OFF			
% ON	66	66	66	66	100	66	66

Figure 18APD Work Schedule (Day and Swing Shift)

This schedule has three critical attributes. First, as we can observe one third of the officers get every weekend off, while the others never do. Second, on six days of the week 66% of officers are assigned to work-a five percent reduction in productivity as compared to a more traditional 5 on 2 off schedule. Finally, we observe that on Friday the entire shift is scheduled to work.

Next we examine the 4/10 plan used on the graveyard shift. Figure 19 illustrates the distribution of personnel (23 officers) in the Valley Area Command.

OFFICERS	M	T	W	T	F	S	S
4					OFF	OFF	OFF
5	OFF					OFF	OFF
5		OFF	OFF	OFF			
2			OFF	OFF	OFF		
4	OFF	OFF					OFF
3	OFF	OFF	OFF				
ON DUTY	11	11	13	16	17	14	10
OFF DUTY	12	12	10	7	6	9	13
% On Duty	48	48	57	70	74	61	43

Figure 19 APD Graveyard Shift Work Schedule

This schedule has also has unique aspects. First, we observe that 13 officers (57%) get either a full or partial weekend off. Second, we observe that there is proportional staffing by day of week but it is not well aligned with the workload. For example, there are considerably more officers assigned to work on Thursday than Monday or Tuesday. Finally, proponents of the 4/10 plan often tout the benefit of the overlap coverage. In the APD schedule the overlap occurs between the hours of 2200 and 0000, clearly not the busiest time. Moreover, it is important to note that an officer scheduled to work on Friday actually begins work at 2200 Hours on Thursday, so the department's biggest deployment under this schedule is on Wednesday and Thursday nights. **We recommend that APD abandon the use of 10 hour shifts unless the unit assigned to that schedule is providing 10 or 20 hours of service per day.**

Twelve-Hour Shifts

One of the most interesting recent changes in police work scheduling has been the widespread adoption of the 12-hour shift. Hundreds of agencies have adopted this approach, and the number of implementations continues to increase. Evidence, both anecdotal and more systematic, suggests that this approach can be highly effective⁷. One of the advantages for such a schedule is that it would eliminate the inefficiency of the 10-hour schedules currently in use.

The twelve-hour schedule is relatively straightforward. It is a fourteen-day duty cycle. The pattern consists of: 2 days on / 2 days off, 3 days / 2 days off, 2 days / 3 days off. This schedule results in a 42-hour average workweek. Over the two-week cycle officers would earn four additional hours. All officers are assigned to one of two groups. This schedule makes it easier for supervisors and officers to work on the same schedule. A typical work schedule is illustrated below.

	Su	M	T	W	T	F	Sa
One				Off	Off		
Two	Off	Off	Off			Off	Off
% On	50	50	50	50	50	50	50

Table 11 Example of 12 Hour work schedule

As can be seen, officers have rotating days off during the duty cycle, but the pattern is repeated every two weeks. Thus, an officer could expect, for example, to have every other Monday and Tuesday off. Officers assigned to this pattern would have every other weekend off.

At first glance it looks like 12-hour shifts actually reduce resource availability, but recall that the agency need only staff two shifts per day. Staffing 7 officers on 12 hour shifts is equivalent to staffing 10 officers assigned to eight hour shifts.

Twelve-hour shifts, while growing in popularity, do have several disadvantages including:

- Officers engage in more outside activities
- Officers are more willing to live farther from the community
- The potential of more off-duty court time
- More difficult to schedule training
- Greater fatigue/ lower productivity

⁷ A Look at the 12-Hour Shift: The Lincoln Police Department Study. Captain Jon Sundermeier, Lincoln, Nebraska, Police Department. *The Police Chief*. March 2008.

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- Uniform staffing by day of week and by shift
- Fewer works days per officer per year
- More difficult to maintain communications
- Results in 42 hour average work week

There are a number of advantages to this approach:

- Two shifts instead of three-easier to administer
- Fewer shift changes
- More days off per year
- More time for outside activities
- Fewer trips to and from work
- Less overtime
- Less sick leave
- Greater productivity
- Easier supervision

Agencies that adopt 12-hour work schedules are particularly concerned about fatigue. The evidence on this issue is mixed. On its face a 12-hour shift seems very long and one could easily predict an increase in accidents and injuries related to fatigue. However, the schedule does provide significant amounts of time off, and most agencies that adopted this approach have not experienced those anticipated increases. In fact, most agencies report that officers on 12-hour schedules use less sick time, and have lower levels of stress and illness.

The key to successful implementation is effective management of off duty time, particularly during the 12-hour break between consecutive days on duty. It is critical that officers get sufficient rest during their time off. For the department that means closely monitoring off-duty employment, court, and other obligations that may diminish the opportunity for sleep.

Managing the Demand for Police Services

Much of our discussion to this point has focused on supplying enough police officers to meet citizen demands for service. Now we examine ways in which APD can more effectively manage demand.

Reducing Calls for False Alarms

During our study period APD responded to the 22082 burglar alarms. If we use an average CFS time of 30 minutes and assume that two officers are required for these calls, this equates to roughly 22,000 officer hours are consumed responding to alarms, the vast

majority of which are false. APD officers work, on average 1680 hours per year. Thus, the department consumes the equivalent of 13 FTE just to answer alarm calls.

Nationwide, police departments respond to millions of false alarms annually at a cost that tops \$1 billion. In cities for which we have data, 90 to 99 percent [of these alarms] are false. False alarms are a wasteful use of police resources and a problem that many law enforcement agencies struggle to manage. "Solving the problem of false alarms would by itself relieve 35,000 officers from providing an essentially private service." Moreover, an alarm signal is NOT an indicator of a criminal activity; in most instances, it is designed to detect motion, including "human error, system malfunctions and abnormal conditions, most of which have little to do with crime." Police departments and the municipalities that finance their needed services can realize significant savings and increase productivity by reducing this often unproductive use of officers' time.⁸

Many communities are taking an aggressive approach to reducing response to false alarms. For example, the Milwaukee Police Department implemented the Verified Response Policy for burglar alarms in September 2004. Under this policy, the Milwaukee Police Department does not respond to the report of a burglar alarm activation that was not first verified by a Private First Responder Service. Milwaukee reduced the number of calls for service due to alarms from more than 30,000 to 620 in 2012 as a result of their policy change.

In 2008, the San Jose Police Department conducted a study of false alarms and found that over 98% of all alarm calls were false alarms. The cost of these false alarms to the Department was \$662,000. A subsequent study in 2010, revealed 12,450 alarm responses resulted in only two arrests and 113 police reports.

As a result of this research, San Jose adopted a Verified Response Protocol on January 1, 2012, and no longer responds to alarms solely on the request of alarm monitoring companies. The police will continue to respond to panic and robbery alarms. The department will also respond to "verified" alarms. Verification may come in the form of sound, video, or eyewitness accounts that indicate a crime is occurring and thereby constituting a "verified" response. Alarm verification can also be accomplished when an alarm company agent, property owner or any witness is at the scene of activation and affirms that police are needed because a crime is occurring or has occurred.⁹

⁸ Opportunities for Police Cost Savings Without Sacrificing Service Quality: Reducing False Alarms. Philip S. Schaenman, Aaron Horvath, Harry P. Hatry, The Urban Institute, January 2013

⁹ http://www.sjpd.org/Records/Verified_Response.html

Alternative Responses to Traffic Accidents

During our study period APD area command officers investigated 28,000 property damage only traffic crashes. Traffic accident investigation is a labor-intensive task, often involving more than one officer. Moreover, when vehicles are in the roadway (including emergency vehicles) it causes traffic delays and increases the risk of secondary collisions.¹⁰

Many police departments are revising their policy with respect to minor traffic accidents. In Minneapolis, for example, officers respond to the scene and ensure that no one is injured, that there are no DUI's and that the participants are willing to exchange information. If the crash meets these criteria the officer provides a packet of information and forms for the drivers to complete.

In Philadelphia, police do not investigate crashes in which:

- There are no personal injuries, and no damage to physical property surrounding the accident, such as commercial, residential or government-owned property (damage is associated with vehicles only)
- All vehicles may continue to be driven safely from the scene of the accident
- All drivers remain at the scene of the accident and agree to exchange owner/vehicle information.

Philadelphia drivers can report the auto accident in person at the police district office where the crash occurred or on the phone. After reporting the accident, they receive a "District Control" (DC) number, or accident record number, and can contact their insurance carrier with the DC number.

The San Diego Police Department responds only to injury and hit-and-run accidents. If it is a minor hit-and-run, drivers may be directed to the nearest police substation to complete a report. If it is a property damage accident, drivers exchange information with the other driver.

Finally, since 2014 the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department no longer investigates or prepares reports on non-injury accidents. It is the responsibility of the drivers in the collision to exchange identification and insurance information. Metro still responds to other types of accidents including:

- Accidents with injuries or fatalities;
- A driver under the influence of alcohol, narcotics or other substances;

¹⁰ Albuquerque encourages drivers to move crash vehicles from roadway. Thus the value of the officer investigation is limited.

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- A driver who doesn't have a driver's license, proof of insurance or registration;
- A hit and run;
- A vehicle disabled on the roadway as a result of an accident; an
- An uncooperative driver (i.e. will not exchange information) or any other disturbance meriting a police response.

Web-based Crime Reporting

APD is currently using a Telephone Reporting Unit (TRU) to take citizen crime reports by phone. TRU handles the following types of incidents:

- Auto Burglary
- Auto Theft
- Larceny
- Lost Items (i.e. cell phones, purse)
- Vandalism/Graffiti
- Runaways
- Simple Assault and Battery
- Harassment/Threats
- Embezzlement
- Indecent Exposure
- Fraud/Forgery

The APD also employs an on-line reporting system that permits the reporting of the following offenses:

- Lost Property
- Vandalism
- Vandalism of a Vehicle
- Theft/Larceny
- Auto Burglary
- Telephone Harassment

In our view APD could do more to increase the use on citizen self reports. First, the department should ensure that the web-based system mirrors the TRU. Second, the department should examine the policy and procedure that is used to screen TRU calls. We were informed by a number of members of the organization that TRU call takers often refuse to take a report claiming they cannot take a report when the suspect is known. This occurs even when the victim provides the scantest of suspect information. Ironically, the criteria for this parameter for self-reporting on-line is "You know who committed the crime." This is a much more reasonable standard.

One additional advantage to the on-line approach is that the victim receives a report number immediately and prints a copy of a report. This is better for citizens and reduces demand on the records division. We recommend that the department transition away from a telephone based system to a web-based system.

Operations Support Staffing

This section of the report examines the assignment and utilization of resources currently committed to specialized units within the department. When analyzing the staffing for specialized or support units, it is important to note that there is no universally accepted “one size fits all” formula for police departments. Rather, the evaluation must be based on a number of factors such as:

- The agency’s policing philosophy
- The agency’s policies and procedures defining the roles and responsibilities of support units
- The availability of alternative resources to provide equivalent services currently being provided by the support and specialized units
- The effectiveness of the support and specialized units
- Community expectations
- City and police department budgets and resources
- Collective bargaining agreements

Investigative Bureau

A deputy chief leads the investigative bureau. There are five divisions in the bureau:

- Special Investigations
- Criminal Investigations
- Scientific Evidence Division
- Property Crimes Division
- Real Time Crime Center

APD employs a combination of centralized and decentralized approaches to managing criminal investigations. Each area command is assigned investigators. They are referred to as “impact” officers. These officers do both proactive work under the direction of the area commander and investigate cases that have not been assigned to investigative units.

APD Policy 2-24 describes the procedures to be followed by a field service officer:

A. Preliminary Investigations

1. *Field Services officers will conduct preliminary investigations on all felony and misdemeanor crimes and any other incidents of a suspicious nature.*

2. *Field Services officers will determine the exact nature of the call and either begin a preliminary investigation or call out a specialized unit.*
3. *Field Services supervisors will be dispatched to the following:*
 - a. *Fatal and Serious Accidents*
 - b. *Accidents Involving Police Vehicles*
 - c. *Pursuits*
 - d. *Violent Crimes*
 - e. *Unattended Death*
 - f. *Suicide*
 - g. *Serious Injury*
 - h. *Hostage/Barricaded Subject/Sniper Situations*
 - i. *Hazardous Materials Incidents*
 - j. *Use of Force*
 - k. *Injury to an Officer*
 - l. *Riots/Civil Disorders or other Major Incidents*
 - m. *When Requested by an Officer*
4. *In the event that a case is assigned to a specialized unit, the primary officer called to the scene will write the initial offense/incident report. The last sentence of the narrative will indicate the officer and/or specialized unit the case was assigned to.*

In most cases, the officer, in conjunction with their supervisor will decide whether the case will be assigned to a specialized unit and whether or not the specialized unit should respond to the scene.

The policy also mandates that the primary field services officer “will submit a copy of the original offense report and all related documents to the assigned detective by the end of shift.” During our interviews several senior level managers gave differing interpretations of which unit (Investigative Bureau of Area Commands) had the primary responsibility for follow-up.

It is interesting to note that the decision about who will be assigned to follow up a case lies with FSB, and that it is incumbent upon FSB to forward cases to the appropriate unit for follow-up. We were told that on occasion this does not occur in a timely manner. That is, sometimes a case has not been forwarded to investigators and they only learn about it later when they are reviewing cases in the information management system.

Not only is there some uncertainty about how cases are assigned to specialized units, there is no policy that describes how cases are assigned to detectives for follow-up, nor is there any policy or procedure to manage the timely completion of investigations. The department does not use a formal system of case management based on solvability or

seriousness, a strategy widely employed in agencies across the country.¹¹

Another remarkable aspect of the Investigative Bureau is that a very small fraction of the detectives work at night or weekends. Moreover, there is relatively little use of detectives assigned to one division to support the work of another.

Special Investigation Division

The SID has three sections each headed by a lieutenant:

- Career Criminal Section
 - Gangs (1 sergeant, detectives)
 - Criminal Intelligence Unit (1 sergeant, 3 detectives)
 - Joint Terrorism Task Force (1 detective)
 - Investigative Support (1 sergeant, 5 detectives)
- Narcotics
 - Central Narcotics (1 sergeant, 7 detectives)
 - Meth Unit (1 csa., 1 detectives)
 - Vice (1 sergeant, 3 detectives)
 - Air Support (1 sergeant, 4 police officers)
- HIDTA
 - FBI Safe Streets (2 detectives)
 - DEA Task Force (3 detectives)
 - HIDTA Region 1 (3 (non-sworn))
 - HIS Task Force (1 sergeant, 3 K-9 officers)

Most of the activity performed by these units is proactive in nature, and is based either on intelligence information, citizen complaints, or projects conducted in cooperation with area commands. There is a high degree of cooperation and collaboration with federal law enforcement agencies.

With respect to SID deployment there are several critical issues:

- All of these sworn personnel are assigned to work Monday through Friday during normal business hours. This does not align very well with the nature of this activity, and thus detectives are often called out on overtime to assist FSB. Unit commanders could not provide any rationale for this approach to scheduling.
- There is significant uncertainty in the agency about the jurisdiction of the Gang Unit. Policy indicates, “The Gang Unit is responsible for investigating all crimes involving individuals who are documented gang members....” Some members of the agency reported that the threshold for notifying the Gang Unit was actually

¹¹ Moving the work of criminal Investigators towards crime control. Anthony A. Braga, Edward A. Flynn, George L. Kelling and Christine M. Cole. National Institute of Justice, 2011.

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that the offense or offender had to be related to gang activity.

- The SID utilizes an information system to collect intelligence data on gang members. There appears to be very limited analysis of this data, particularly link analysis.¹² Ironically, staff assigned to the department's Crime Analysis Unit does not have access to the gang data.
- The agency has made a strong commitment to participating in federal task forces. While laudable, this strategy should be evaluated in the context of critical staffing shortages.

Criminal Investigations Division (CID)

CID consists of four units:

- Family Advocacy Center
- Violent Crimes
- Crisis Intervention Team
- Juvenile

The largest part of the division is Violent Crimes. Its staffing is:

- 3 lieutenants
- Homicide (1 sergeant, 7 detectives)
- CACU (1 sergeant, 8 detectives)
- Robbery (1 sergeant, 6 detectives)
- SORD (1 detective)
- Cold Case (1 sergeant, 6 detectives)
- FASTT (1 sergeant, 2 detectives)
- CED (1 sergeant, 2 detectives)
- Sex Crimes (1 sergeant, 4 detectives)
- CIU (1 sergeant, 6 detectives)

All of these members work normal business hours with weekends off.¹³ As we can observe there is a high degree of specialization within the Violent Crimes Unit. With 9 sergeants and 42 detectives the nominal span of control is 1:4.6.

The Homicide unit responded to 25 homicides in 2014. Interestingly, their jurisdiction is limited. That is, the Gang Unit investigates homicides involving gang members, and

¹² The Corner and the Crew: The Influence of Geography and Social Networks on Gang Violence. Andrew V. Papachristos, David M. Hureau, Anthony A. Braga. American Sociological Review June 2013 vol. 78 no. 3 417-447.

¹³ CACU works a 4/10 plan schedule with days off on Friday, Saturday and Sunday, or Saturday, Sunday, Monday.

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homicides involving children are assigned to Crimes Against Children Unit. Homicide also responded to in custody deaths and officer involved shootings, but it is our understanding that the Force Investigation Team will handle these incidents in the future.

The Armed Robbery Unit conducts follow-up investigations on assigned cases and will respond to call-outs for robberies that meet APD criteria (generally when the suspect is in custody) and may be asked to respond to other violent crime call-outs.

The FASTT unit describes its core functions as dealing primarily as a liaison and advocate for victims of domestic violence and to investigate “high-lethality” cases.

The Missing Persons Unit appears to do much of its work by telephone and computer. They ensure that the information provided by the investigating officer is correct and they use financial records and mobile phone activity to help locate subjects. It is not clear from department reports whether these strategies are successful.

Cold Case Units and the Task Forces are difficult to assess, however a recent study by RAND concluded:

- “Clearing a cold case does not automatically lead to making an arrest. A substantial portion of successful investigations in all sites (from one in three to one in two) did not result in an arrest for a variety of reasons, including the inability to locate witnesses, uncooperative witnesses, a suspect being deceased or incarcerated, or DNA results that implicated multiple individuals or were otherwise inconclusive.
- In sexual-assault cold cases, even when a suspect DNA match has been made, about one- third of cases are not filed because of problems with victim cooperation, credibility, or availability of suspects who are deceased or in prison. However, those cases that are prosecuted resulted in convictions and lengthy prison terms more than 90 percent of the time.
- Cooperation between police and prosecutors can improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of cold-case investigations. Typically, a prosecutor is not brought into the picture until a cold-case investigation has produced results. But, when police consult with prosecutors beginning at case screening, as they do in Denver, prosecutors can offer advice on whether the case is likely to produce a conviction if cleared and on what kinds of evidence will be most compelling in court.”¹⁴

The Crisis Intervention Unit staffing is defined, in part, by the Settlement Agreement.

Paragraph 123 of the agreement states that “APD shall maintain a **sufficient number of**

¹⁴ Cold-Case Investigations: An Analysis of Current Practices and Factors Associated with Successful Outcomes. Robert C. Davis, Carl Jensen, Karin E. Kitchens. RAND, 2011.

crisis intervention certified responders who are specially trained officers across the Department who retain their normal duties and responsibilities and also respond to calls involving those in mental health crisis. APD shall also maintain a Crisis Intervention Unit (“CIU”) composed of specially trained detectives housed at the Family Advocacy Center whose primary responsibilities are to respond to mental health crisis calls and maintain contact with mentally ill individuals who have posed a danger to themselves or others in the past or are likely to do so in the future. **APD agrees to expand both the number of crisis intervention certified responders and CIU.”**

Paragraph 124 indicates that, “The number of crisis intervention certified responders will be driven by the demand for crisis intervention services, with an initial goal of 40% of Field Services officers who volunteer to take on specialized crisis intervention duties in the field. **Within one year of the Effective Date, APD shall reassess the number of crisis intervention certified responders, following the staffing assessment and resource study required by Paragraph 204 of this Agreement.**

Paragraph 135 mandates that, “Within three months of completing the staffing assessment and resource study required by Paragraph 204 of this Agreement, APD shall develop a recruitment, selection, and training plan to assign, within 24 months of the study, 12 full-time detectives to the CIU, **or the target number of detectives identified by the study, whichever is less.”**

The department is in the process of providing crisis intervention training for all officers in the Field Services Bureau, and is expected to reach that goal in December 2015. We concur with the recommended staffing level of 12 full time detectives for CIU.

Property Crimes Division

The property crimes division consists of two sections, each directed by a lieutenant. The Property Crime Section includes:

- Auto Theft (1 sergeant, 5 detectives)
- Burglary (1 sergeant, 5 detectives)
- Night Investigation Teams (1 sergeant, 4 detectives)

The Economic Crime Section includes:

- Criminal Nuisance Abatement (1 sergeant, 2 detectives)
- Organized Crime (1 sergeant, 3 detectives)
- White Collar Crime (1 sergeant, 3 detectives)
- Pawn Shop Detail (1 sergeant, 3 detectives)
- Crime Stoppers (1 sergeant, 1 detective).

With the exception of the NITE teams that focus on bait car operations, all of these detectives work during the day and have weekends off.

Special Services Bureau

The Special Services Bureau (SSB) is directed by a deputy chief, and contains four divisions:

- Special Operations
- Metro Traffic
- Open Space
- APD Academy

The Special Operations Division (SOD) is directed by a commander and a lieutenant, and includes the following units:

- SWAT (2 sergeants, 11 officers)
- K-9 (1 sergeant, 7 officers)
- Bomb Squad (1 sergeant, 3 full-time officers, 3 part-time officers)

APD maintains a full-time SWAT team. The team works a 4/10 schedule with hours from 1000 to 2000. The team is off Saturday, Sunday and Monday. Of the four days that the team is working one day is used for training, one day is allocated to assist with staffing in the area commands and the other two days are used for a variety of activities.

The following table illustrates SWAT team callouts through September for the past two years.

	2014	2015
January	5	4
February	3	7
March	9	2
April	3	2
May	4	7
June	4	5
July	5	8
August	5	0
September	1	1
	39	36

Table 12 APD SWAT Activations Year to Year Comparison

One of the issues that agencies face is whether a SWAT team should be full or part time. Each approach has merit. It can be argued that a full-time team will be more cohesive, and will attain more experience. However, most full-time teams do not operate 24/7 and as a result, critical time may be lost in activation. The APD team only works 40 hours a week, thus it is more likely than not that an incident will occur requiring their services while they are off duty. Another disadvantage of a full time team is that they might be

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used on an incident *because* they are available. That is, they might be assigned to an incident because they are working-an incident that may have been resolved in another way if the team was not readily available

By contrast, part time SWAT teams must work harder to ensure that members are properly trained and have enough exposure to the range of incidents they are likely to encounter. However, because officers are on duty 24/7 they are much more likely to be available to respond to an active shooter incident.

A recent survey conducted by the US Bureau of Justice Statistics revealed that of the 95 participating agencies with 100 or more sworn officers, 30% maintained a full-time SWAT Team.¹⁵ The Louisville METRO Police Department (1200 sworn officers) recently conducted a review of its part-time SWAT team, and decided to maintain that structure.

The Tucson Police (940 sworn) SWAT team is operationally deployed on average 200 times every year; and those calls for assistance include calls with other local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. The team consists of one lieutenant, four sergeants, and 40 officers. Three of the officers and one sergeant are full time and they make up the SWAT team. This squad is responsible for vehicles, equipment, weapons maintenance, setting up training, and various other assignments. The rest of the team members all have other full time jobs within the police department.¹⁶

The Indianapolis Metro Police Department (1700 sworn) recently shifted from a part-time team to a full-time team with a very focused mission. In an interview with the Indianapolis Star the chief indicated, "They're targeting those violent offenders in those areas where we have violent crime," he said. In the past, the city's SWAT team operated on a callout basis, suiting up specifically to deal with dangerous situations such as crowd violence or armed suspects barricaded inside buildings. The full-time SWAT team, with about a dozen members, has a different mission: to seek out and neutralize violent offenders.

That objective, said Lt. Chris Bailey, means the heavily armed SWAT officers are often "working with district personnel to identify hot areas and -conduct covert investigations. The anti-crime plan, fully operational since last month, has the blessing of top city officials, from Mayor Greg Ballard to Public Safety Director Troy Riggs. It has other components, as well: community meetings in neighborhoods within 72 hours after a shooting; close monitoring of people with a history of violence; careful tracking of robbery felons recently released from prison. The permanent members are getting a hand from about 35 part-

¹⁵ Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) Survey, 2013.

¹⁶ <http://www.tucsonaz.gov/police/swat>

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time SWAT team members, Bailey said".¹⁷

Canine Unit

The APD Canine unit is staffed from 1800 hours until 0400 hours. It is estimated that the police service dogs are deployed 7 to 10 times per week. Canine officers also receive tactical training, and three of the dogs are trained to detect explosives.

In some cities canine units are assigned to a patrol sector. For example, the Minneapolis Police (MPD) Canine Unit currently has 17 canine teams working in the city. The 17 teams attend roll call at the police kennel and are assigned shift duties from that location. Canine teams are on duty almost 24 hours a day and can also be called in at any hour. Canine teams patrol all parts of the city.

MPD Canine teams work regular uniform patrol in their assigned precinct and respond to assist on alarm calls; burglary calls; building searches; article searches; suspect tracking; area and building searches for suspects; narcotics and bomb calls; and officer safety assists. Canine officers may also assist on other police calls but they try to stay available for calls where their dog might be deployed.

The Austin Police K9 Unit's main responsibility is to support the Patrol Division. When on duty, Patrol K9 teams remain on patrol until they are called to assist patrol officers. Typically the K9 teams are used to locate suspects who have fled the scene of a crime, but on occasion are requested to search for missing individuals and evidence. Two of the K9 teams are also SWAT-certified and deploy for all SWAT related incidents.

The final component of SOD is the Bomb Squad. It consists of full and part-time personnel. The full-time staff is assigned to the day shift. Like the other SOD activities, ordinance work requires extensive training and certifications. There are a number of ways to staff and deploy for EOD calls. For example, in many cities such as Dallas, Ft. Worth, San Diego, Orlando, and Cincinnati, bomb disposal is a function provided by the fire department, sometimes in collaboration with the police.

Metro Traffic

A commander directs the Metro Traffic Division. Their principle activities are traffic enforcement, accident investigation, DWI enforcement and hit and run follow-up investigation. There are two sections each headed by a lieutenant: the Traffic Section and the DWI Section.

The Traffic Section consists of 2 sergeants and 11 officers, all of whom use motorcycles

¹⁷ <http://www.thecrimereport.org/news/crime-and-justice-news/2014-07-indy-swat-team>

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for traffic duties. The unit works from Monday through Friday 0700 to 1500. During other hours officers are on call for fatal traffic crashes. Their key duties are to investigate traffic crashes and to enforce traffic laws.

The following figure illustrates the distribution of traffic accident calls in the city. As we see the peak demand time for traffic accident investigation is in late afternoon.




Figure 20 APD Crashes by Hour of Day.

The DWI program is based on a model that is designed to encourage officers in the field to make DWI arrests. The notion is that if field officers believe that someone else will relieve them of the burden of processing DWI offenders they will pursue these cases. The DWI Unit consists of one sergeant and 10 officers. They are assigned from 1800 Hours until 0400 Hours (4/10 plan) with Sunday, Monday and Tuesday off. The section often uses grant funds to provide coverage on the other nights.

During 2014 the DWI Unit made 2302 DWI arrests, or an average of 225 per officer. Based on an officer working 1680 hours per year it equates to a DWI arrest about every 7.5 hours.

Open Space Division

When the Albuquerque Open Space Division was created there were three sections: Operations and Maintenance, Law Enforcement and Visitor Services. The Operations and Maintenance Section was charged with the responsibility of overseeing all park maintenance needs, including fencing, trail work, and building upkeep.

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The Law Enforcement Section was added to the Division in 1986. Open Space law enforcement officers were fully commissioned police officers that ensured the protection of the natural and archaeological resources within Open Space Division managed lands. This section had 15 positions, including one chief and three sergeants. After 2000 Open Space officers were absorbed into APD.

Today a commander directs the Open Space Unit as well as several support units including:

- Prisoner Transport
- Metro Court Protection
- Office of Emergency Management
- Homeland Security
- Horse Mounted Unit

Of particular interest is the Open Space Unit that consists of one lieutenant, 2 sergeants, and 8 officers. The day shift consists of 1 sergeant and 4 officers. Two officers are off Friday and Saturday and the other two are off on Sunday and Monday. The staffing is the same on the night shift. It is hard to understand why officers with these types of assignments would be scheduled to be off on the weekends.

The other critical issue is that given the relative low staffing and the fact that Open Space facilities are all over the city, it seems unlikely that these officers could handle much of what takes place in the Open Space. That is, most of the calls are being assigned to area command officers.

It seems that the principle contribution of the open space officers is their unique skills in search and rescue. While laudable, it would seem that these tasks could be performed in cooperation with the many search and rescue groups in the area and the Albuquerque Fire Department. Alternatively, the APD could take the lead in organizing volunteers to perform this important work.

APD Academy

As a result of the Settlement Agreement, (SA) the department must deliver significantly more training to personnel. These requirements cannot be met with the current Academy staffing levels. Using officers from the Field Services Bureau to supplement the Academy staff would place a significant burden on the already understaffed Field Services Bureau.

The department can avoid that burden by hiring part-time contracted employees who have law enforcement experience as well as teaching certifications for law enforcement. The contracted employees could be used on an as needed basis in order to meet the requirements of the Settlement Agreement. Among the possible types of training the contracted employees could assist with include (SA paragraphs referenced):

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- | | |
|---|----------------------|
| • Paragraph 33 – Annual ECW Recertification | 2 Hours |
| • Paragraph 86 – Use of Force | 40 Hours |
| • Paragraph 86 – Use of Force Refresher | 24 Hours |
| • Paragraph 88 – Supervisor Use of Force | 24 Hours |
| • Paragraph 89 – Firearms Training | 8 Hours |
| • Paragraph 150 – Training on New Policies | Yet to be determined |
| • Paragraph 158 – FTO School | 40 Hours |
| • Paragraph 199 – Misconduct Investigation | 24 Hours |
| • Paragraph 199 – Misconduct Inv. Refresher | 8 Hours |
| • Paragraph 209 – New Sergeant Training | 40 Hours |
| • Paragraph 211 – Supervisor Management | 32 Hours |

The courses listed above are in addition to the other ongoing training conducted by Academy staff.

We recommended the Albuquerque Police Department supplement its current Academy staff with up to twenty (20) additional part-time contracted staff, and that this level be closely monitored to ensure that it is appropriate.

Professional Accountability Bureau

An Assistant Chief heads the Professional Accountability Bureau (PAB). The Professional Accountability Bureau is comprised of the East and West Field Services Bureaus, the Communications Division, Internal Affairs, Operations Review and the Department's Public Information Officer.

Of particular concern to this study is the staffing for the new Internal Affairs Division (IAD). The Division will have two components: Critical Incident Review Team and Internal Affairs.¹⁸ This division will play a key role in APD's efforts to gain compliance with the USDOJ agreement.

The Settlement Agreement states that:

"The City shall ensure that APD and the Civilian Police Oversight Agency have a sufficient number of well-trained staff assigned and available to complete and review thorough and timely misconduct investigations in accordance with the requirements of this Agreement. The City shall re-assess the staffing of the Internal Affairs Bureau after the completion of the staffing study to be conducted pursuant to Paragraph 204. The City further shall ensure sufficient resources and equipment to conduct thorough and timely investigations."

¹⁸ The Force Investigation Team will report directly to the Assistant Chief

As part of the staffing study we interviewed the commander of the division and examined the proposed procedures and staffing for the division. The proposed organization is illustrated below:




Figure 21 Proposed Staffing for IAD

We concur with this proposed staffing plan with one important caveat. The Settlement Agreement has identified a number of tasks to be performed to increase accountability and transparency of Internal Affairs. It is difficult to forecast the labor demands of these activities. Therefore we recommend that **APD conduct regular semi-annual analyses to ensure the staffing levels in the division are appropriate.**

The other major unit in PAB is the Communications Center. The center is staffed by:

- 74 911 Operators
- 12 NCIC operators
- 42 Dispatchers
- 10 Supervisors

The center answers 911 calls for police and fire but only dispatches for police.

The current daily staffing of the center is as follows:

Hours	Supervisors	NCIC Operators	911 Operators	Dispatchers
0700-1500	1 or 2	2	13	8
1500-2300	1 or 2	2	14	8
2300-0300	1	2	13	8
0300-0700	1	1	10	8

Table 13 Communication Center Daily Staffing

There are a number of issues that affect the communications unit performance.

First, comparable sized PSAP organizations have middle management to act as Assistant Manager, Lead Supervisors and Quality Control Supervisor to ensure policy and procedure is followed and training is ongoing. In this center, the operational management staff is a staff is very limited (one FTE). The administrative management staff does provide on call back up for absences, however, operations questions still are referred to the center manager. The center supervisors are often unable to assume managerial responsibilities due to the nature of the work they do to manage the increasing volume of 9-1-1 calls coming into the center, the calls for service and the level of dispatch oversight that is required. This also reduces their ability to offer additional training and development.

Second, there is an organization and structural barrier between the communication Center and the Albuquerque Fire Department (fire dispatch is physically separated from the rest of the center). Since the key job of the center is to facilitate the delivery of all public safety service, this disconnect can be problematic. The evidence of this structural issue can be seen in the city’s response to “man down” calls for service. Whenever the 9-1-1 Center receives a call about a medical call, the fire department insists that the police respond to the scene first to ensure security. While this might be a sound strategy for calls that are clearly violent (e.g. shootings) it makes far less sense for cases where individuals are passed out on a sidewalk.

A recent article in *Fire Engineering* summed up this dilemma:

“These violent activities to which firefighters respond can include shootings, stabbings, domestic disputes, gang activities, or assaults. In far too many cases when these calls for assistance are received, the police may or may not be on the scene and may be unaware of the nature of the call to which firefighters/EMS are responding. It is clear that these incidents are, for the most part, a law enforcement incident. However, equally important is the need for immediate emergency medical aid. The responding companies need to

take steps to ensure their safety while at the same time providing the emergency medical aid that is required. ¹⁹

In our view the key to providing police and fire response to these types of incidents is coordination and this can best be done through a unified communication system; that is through non-sworn cross-trained dispatchers for police, fire and EMS. All personnel in the Communications Center should report to the Director of the center.

Third, as we can observe in Table 13 there is little variation in staffing by hour of day. As APD adopts a more workload driven staffing model for patrol it will become necessary to make adjustments in communication center staffing. For example, the numbers of police officers on duty during peak demand times may be double that of off-peak times. It will be important for the communication center to monitor this closely. If they retain their current configuration they are likely to be understaffed at times and overstaffed at others. Like patrol, we believe that the center would benefit if there were one work schedule for all employees.

Finally, we believe that the TRU should be organizationally housed in the Communication Center. This will provide more integrated and consistent public service.

Administrative Support Bureau

The Administrative Support Bureau was formed in late 2014 and consists of the Planning Division, Fiscal Division, Records Division, Personnel and Payroll Division, and Inspections/Audit.

Most of these units are relatively small and appropriately staffed. The largest unit is the Records Division. While it is beyond the scope of this study, it appears that the Records Unit is hampered by some legacy policy and procedures that result in less than desirable results. For example, a significant amount of staff time is devoted to reviewing and correcting police reports (the unit supervisor indicates that 100% of reports have missing data). Some of these corrections are a result of the lack of correspondence between the software that officers use to prepare reports, and the software used to submit UCR and NIBRS reports. We were also told that when officers investigate a crime and stolen property needs to be entered in NCIC, the officer must *telephone* the Records Unit and provide a list of the property and the serial numbers. The officer must enter that same information into the case report. It seems as though this process is both time-consuming and the likelihood of an error in transmittal seems much greater on the phone than electronically.

¹⁹ <http://www.fireengineering.com/articles/2015/05/fire-and-ems-responses-to-violent-incidents-tactical-considerations.html>

Conclusion and Recommendations

In a recent study conducted by the Police Executive Research Forum police respondents were asked to describe the effects of the economic downturn on their agency's staffing²⁰.

The actions taken included:

- Cut overtime spending: 66%
- Eliminated or reduced police employee salary increases: 58%
- Imposed a hiring freeze for sworn positions: 43%
- Imposed a hiring freeze for civilian positions: 43%
- Reduced staffing levels through attrition: 36%
- Laid off employees: 22%
- Implemented unpaid furloughs: 16%.

Indeed, the recent past has been extraordinarily challenging for communities as they struggled to provide high quality public safety services under unusual fiscal constraints. However, one of the byproducts of that effort has been a heightened awareness of how important it is to critically examine the deployment of police personnel. In many cases police executives have had to ask tough questions. Whereas in the past those inquiries focused largely on what the agency does and how does it do it; more recently that focus has shifted to why the agency does things and who should do it?

The Albuquerque Police Department is in a period of significant change. A heightened level of scrutiny, coupled with challenges in recruitment and retention has prompted the organization to make significant organizational changes. Many of these actions will help to rectify previously problematic staffing issues. Our perspective is that there are two components to the police-staffing question. The first, of course, is whether there are enough officers to meet performance standards. The second question is whether an agency is using its staff in the most effective and efficient manner. Before offering our recommendations we will summarize some of the key findings and observations of our study.

APD is a highly compartmentalized, and fragmented organization. At a high level APD appears to be a decentralized police organization with a strong orientation towards neighborhood based policing. There are, for example, area commands and majors that have responsibility for a geographic region. This image, however, is not very accurate. Most of the decentralization is, in fact, in the Field Services Bureau. By contrast, most of the units that are designed ostensibly to support patrol in the other bureaus, are strategically and operationally disconnected from field service delivery. One only need look at the work schedules for these units to see how disconnected they are. Senior level managers we interviewed had difficulty in demonstrating how the Investigative Bureau

²⁰ <http://policeforum.org/library/critical-issues-in-policing-series/Econdownturnaffectpolicing12.10.pdf>

and the Special Services Bureau integrated with the Field Services Bureau, or integrated within each Bureau to advance a cohesive and comprehensive crime fighting strategy or plan.

APD Area Commanders are accountable to their communities, but lack the authority and resources to accomplish their mission. In recent years policing has placed great emphasis on accountability-not just for officer misconduct, but for the control of crime and disorder. APD has charged the area commanders with the task of working with their communities to establish confidence in the department's ability to make their neighborhoods safe. Unfortunately, even though the area commanders must face tough questions about APD performance from those communities, they have relatively little control over the resources they need to address these issues. What can they say, for example, about their ability to address burglary, when all the decisions about the department's response to burglary are made elsewhere. In our interviews, managers would often refer to headquarters-type units as being "inside," and those in the FSB as "outside". Clearly, this suggests that those assigned to patrol have a lower status. This must change for the organization to be more effective.

APD has very limited flexibility in how it deploys sworn personnel. Like most departments that operate under a collective bargaining agreement, APD has constraints in the way in which officers are deployed. However, in our view, these constraints are unusually challenging in APD. First, it appears that once an officer in patrol has selected a shift and day-off group, the officer *may* be involuntarily reassigned, but we were told that it rarely happens. Many managers, in fact, said it could not be done. Similarly, everyone we spoke to told us that a person assigned to a special unit could not be reassigned to field services unless a unit was disbanded. Many managers also argued that an officer could not be transferred within a bureau, for example from robbery to burglary. Ironically all of these officers hold the same rank and thus the agency should not have the kinds of problems that occur when "detectives" hold a different rank. We often heard managers talk about the "property rights" of an officer assigned to a specialized unit.

Concerns about staffing have caused managers to adopt very conservative deployment strategies. Senior level managers routinely and repeatedly spoke of "under-staffing or manning issues." These statements were heartfelt; however, beyond the simple analysis that X number of years ago there was Y number of officers, no senior level managers articulated any analysis that demonstrated an understanding of the optimal staffing levels in the past or today. Senior level managers simply concluded that the number of personnel in place now was below the staffing level in the past – therefore, the unit under discussion was understaffed. Some unit managers have significantly restricted how and when these units are used (e.g., SWAT, Traffic, Open Space) and that raises the question as to whether or not those units should be staffed at all. Some units such as the SWAT team, as one example, could become regionalized in a cooperative agreement with neighboring cities, county or State Police.

APD has made significant progress in optimizing the use of nonsworn personnel. This is particularly evident in the criminalistics area where nonsworn field investigators have replaced sworn evidence technicians. APD has, for a number of years, used nonsworn staff to investigate minor traffic crashes. We recommend that this be expanded.

Recommendation One. The APD should adopt a “flatter” organizational structure that will facilitate communication and accountability.

As APD introduces an organizational strategy that places greater emphasis on the area commands it will become necessary to refine and balance the responsibilities of the senior leadership group. In order to accomplish this we are recommending an alternative organizational structure. In this model the department eliminates the position of deputy chief, and the five bureau majors and executive director report directly to the Assistant Chief of Police.²¹



Figure 22 Proposed Leadership Structure

Recommendation Two. The APD should adopt the verified response model for burglar alarms.

APD uses a traditional method to control false alarms. That is, after a certain number of false alarm calls, the resident or business is fined. Unfortunately, evidence suggests that this approach is of limited value. There are many communities that have adopted verified

²¹ The special operations bureau has been renamed Operations Support and contains the Special Operations, Metro Traffic and Open Space Divisions.

response with good results. There will likely be some resistance to this approach, particularly from the alarm industry, but the results speak for themselves.

Recommendation Three. APD should adopt a more strategic approach to criminal investigation.

For many years researchers have sought to better understand the criminal investigation function and its relationship with other police personnel.²² Police administrators have found it difficult to make substantial changes in how investigations are conducted and how they are organized. In fact, a recent study done by researchers at Michigan State University concluded that, “the criminal investigation process has remained relatively unchanged in the face of the many paradigm shifts in the profession of policing over the past 30 years.”²³

Of particular concern in Albuquerque is the lack of a systematic approach to case assignment. Many organizations combine solvability factors with crime seriousness to craft a score for each crime. For example, case review might include the following:

- Can the identity of the suspect/s be established through:
 - Useable fingerprints being discovered
 - Significant physical evidence being located –Victims/witness/informant information
 - A license number of or a significant description of the vehicle used in the offense
- Is there serious physical harm or threat of serious physical harm to the victim?
- Did the suspect(s) utilize a deadly weapon?
- Is there a significant m.o. that will aid in the solution of the offense?
- Is it a sex offense in which the victim and suspect(s) had physical contact?
- Can a suspect be named?
- Can a suspect be identified?
- Can a suspect be described?

We recommend that all investigation of property crime be assigned to the area commands. Moreover, we recommend that investigator work schedules should more closely reflect the temporal nature of police work.

²² For example see: John Eck. (1983) Solving Crime: A study of burglary and robbery. Police Executive Research Forum.

²³ Frank Horvath; Robert T. Meesig; Yung Hyeock Lee (2001) National Survey of Police Policies and Practices Regarding the Criminal Investigations Process: Twenty-Five Years After Rand

Recommendation Four. The APD Special Operations Division should be repurposed to provide better and coordinated support to the area commands. A case can be made for a part time SWAT team in Albuquerque, particularly given the relatively low frequency of activations. However, because of its size APD must often take the lead responsibility for these functions in the region, and thus a full time team may be warranted.

If the agency opts to maintain a fulltime team we would recommend a different strategic approach. First, because a relatively small fraction of their on-duty time will be devoted to activations it is important that their unobligated time be well managed. They may be able to assist during peak calls for service demand times, or to work with area commands on tactical plans. These officers could be an important part of the agency's problem-solving efforts, particularly when the agency is seeking to increase police visibility.

Recommendation Five. APD should add resources to Metro Traffic while ensuring that these resources are effectively deployed. One of the most significant challenges for an urban police department is how to effectively and efficiently manage resources in order to ensure traffic safety. This is particularly true in communities in which there is widespread concern about crime and disorder.

There are a number of factors that may impede a city's ability to provide an effective police traffic management program. Among these are:

- There is a generally held belief that traffic crashes are "accidents" and are not preventable,
- Police traffic enforcement, the principal tool in the department's crash prevention program, is rarely applied, and when it is applied, it may not be done at the places where traffic crashes are occurring,
- Most citizens care a great deal about traffic safety, but they do not see the nexus between traffic law enforcement and crash prevention. Many citizens view traffic law enforcement principally as a tool for generating revenue.

There are several reasons that a police department must devote resources to traffic safety:

- Traffic violations are significant contributing factor in traffic crashes,
- Traffic violations, particularly speeding and red-light running, pose significant threats to the quality of life in neighborhoods,
- Traffic stops are an important opportunity for police-citizen interaction, and
- Traffic law enforcement has shown to have significant deterrent effects on non-traffic crime.

One of the most challenging aspects of providing police traffic services is the best way to handle citizen traffic complaints. Almost every department receives numerous complaints from citizens about speeding cars or reckless drivers in their neighborhood. The typical response to these complaints is to "increase patrol" in the area or in some cases an

agency may assign an officer to monitor the location for violators. Very often the officer spends an hour or two at the location, and reports back that there was very little traffic, and even fewer violators. Many police officials view this activity as unproductive.

In spite of this apparent inefficiency, we suggest that citizen generated traffic complaints are critical for several reasons. First, the nature of these offenses is not amenable to citizen response. That is, unlike some types of crime in which citizens can take preventive action (alarms, lights, and target hardening) there are few actions that citizens can do to control traffic in their neighborhood. Second, whether or not there really is a speeding problem is arguably irrelevant. The fact that citizens perceive a threat (particularly to their children) makes the threat very real in their mind. Finally, these situations provide great opportunities for officers to interact with citizens in problem solving. To the extent that they are successful in handling these problems, it could result in benefits in other areas.

Another benefit of traffic law enforcement is the opportunity that it provides for police-citizen interaction. According to a recent study conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, each year about 19% of the adult population in the United States has a face-face contact with a police officer. *About one half of those contacts are during traffic stops.* The implications of this are important. For many citizens the only contact they have with an officer is during a traffic stop. Thus, these encounters provide a unique opportunity to influence how citizens view their police department and its members.²⁴

Finally, we know from years of empirical research that under certain circumstances traffic enforcement can be an effective deterrent to crime²⁵.

We recommend adding additional resources to Metro Traffic but under a different model:

- The main function of the Traffic Unit should be to investigate serious and fatal accidents and to conduct traffic enforcement at high accident locations. They should no longer handle property damage only accidents. APD should examine alternative ways to handle minor accidents including citizen self-reports and the enhanced use of non-sworn accident investigators.
- The Traffic Unit should provide coverage seven days a week, at least 20 hours per day.
- Officers must maintain acceptable levels of productivity in order to remain in the unit.

²⁴ Contacts between Police and the Public Series, Bureau of Justice Statistics

²⁵ Weiss, Alexander. DDACTS: An Historical Overview. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. July 2013.

- Even though APD staffs a centralized Traffic Unit it is critical that the agency adopts the following strategy:
 - Accident prevention must be a core value, and every member of the department must understand that it is a critical part of the mission,
 - The program must emphasize that accident prevention is an agency-wide responsibility, not just the responsibility of the Traffic Unit,
 - Area commanders should be accountable for accident prevention
 - The department should provide the necessary training, equipment and staffing to support the program

Recommendation Six. APD should adopt a career development program that includes a strong emphasis on the importance of patrol and mandates periodic transfers from specialized assignments back to patrol.

There are a number of factors that influence the careers of law enforcement officers. First, the nature of the enterprise requires that most officers will be assigned to uniformed service delivery; with the resulting requirement for shift work. Second, as officers age their capacity to perform the duties of patrol may be diminished. Third, in most agencies police officers reach top pay in four to five years. Finally, a relatively small percentage of officers are likely to be promoted in their careers.

In the face of these constraints many officers seek specialized assignments. Depending on the agency there can be many different opportunities including, traffic, investigations, community affairs, SWAT, etc. These assignments often offer significant benefits including better hours and working conditions, additional pay, advanced training, and the opportunity to become highly skilled in a discipline that might have application outside of policing.

APD has a number of specialized units and positions and as a general rule members can stay in those assignments indefinitely. This is true not only for police officers but for supervisors and commanders as well.

Unfortunately, the methods that are used in many law enforcement agencies to staff these units are problematic for a number of reasons:

- The factors that influence whether a person receives an assignment may not be merit based, or at least not perceived to be²⁶
- In many organizations officers can remain in specialized assignments indefinitely, thus limiting opportunities for others
- Specialized units often define the nature of their responsibilities; at times they are not consistent with the agency mission

²⁶ Each specialized position in Lansing Michigan PD has a set of formal job requirements but in practice the posts are assigned largely on the basis of seniority.

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- Specialized unit commanders often think that they have the best possible individuals in their units, often ignoring the fact that there may be others more qualified that have not been afforded access
- Managers in specialized units have limited exposure to the requirements of managing other units.

It is not uncommon to hear police executives proclaim, “Patrol is the backbone of the department. “ While this sounds good we find that in many departments there is a disconnect between their rhetoric and reality. For example, it is not uncommon to find departments in which vacancies in special units are filled as soon as they occur, even though it means that the patrol unit will be short-staffed. Moreover, in some departments once an officer leaves patrol there is a relatively high probability that they will not return.

The best strategy to address this issue is to implement systematic job rotation for officers and supervisors assigned to special units back to patrol.

Job rotation has been common in police organizations since the 1980’s. Nonetheless, it still has many critics. To some, it is inefficient to remove highly trained and experienced officers and return them to patrol. To others, special assignments are a reward for years of service in patrol, and serve a useful function in the organization. Finally, critics of job rotation argue that there are some officers that cannot be in patrol because of physical or other limitations, and special units provide a place for them.

These critiques, of course, aren’t consistent with good organizational development. When an officer with experience and training returns to patrol, those skills aren’t lost-rather they bring those skills with them. This improves their performance and ostensibly the performance of their squad. Secondly, police officers that are not able to perform the functions of their job should be released.

Recommendation Seven. APD should adopt a more strategic approach to crime control that focuses on the area command.

As we have pointed out elsewhere in this report APD is a highly centralized organization. A substantial fraction of resources are devoted to specialized units that have, in some cases, become isolated from the core mission. We believe that it is fundamental to good policing that the agency should focus its resources at the neighborhood level. To that end we are suggesting a new model for area command organization. It is illustrated below.




Figure 23 Area Command Organizational Structure

This model introduces a number of changes in the way in which the area command operates. **Under this new model 75% of APD sworn staff are assigned to area commands.**

- Patrol is organized under a 12-hour work schedule. On each watch there are two day off groups (“A” and “B”). A lieutenant heads each group. In this approach there is nominally a lieutenant on duty seven days a week, 24 hours a day.²⁷ On many days there will six lieutenants on duty round the clock in Albuquerque.
- Officers are assigned to a watch and a day off group. Sergeants will be assigned based on a span of control of 6 or 7, but in no case greater than eight. For example, if 28 officers were assigned to the day watch, “A” team, we would assign 4 sergeants. Each officer is assigned to a specific sergeant, but all of the sergeants and officers will work the same schedule, and thus be familiar with each other and each other’s work. This can be important when an officer is involved in a use of force incident and his or her sergeant is not on duty.
- Each area command will have an administrative lieutenant. In addition to assisting the area commander, the lieutenant will supervise area command support personnel, including area investigators, school resource officers, and the newly formed neighborhood policing team.
- Each area command will deploy 12 investigators²⁸, and two sergeants to direct them. They should staff day and evening shifts, but be flexible enough to

²⁷ Of course, there will some days when the lieutenant is off due to illness, training, etc.

²⁸ This is the initial level of staffing and should be periodically reviewed.

accommodate the needs of the command. The area commander will choose area command Investigators and sergeants.

- Area commands will deploy a neighborhood policing team (NPT) with six officers and a sergeant. Neighborhood policing is an approach that seeks to increase contact between the police and local communities. Neighborhood policing emphasizes a local approach to policing that is accessible to the public and responsive to the needs and priorities of neighborhoods. Its key elements can be summarized as:
 - The presence of visible, accessible and locally known figures in neighborhoods,
 - Community engagement in both identifying priorities and taking action to tackle them; and
 - The application of targeted policing and problem solving to tackle public concerns in neighborhoods.

Members of the NPT should be volunteers and be chosen by the Area Commander. Members should agree to serve in the post for a minimum of three years.

Appendix One: Sworn Officer Staffing by Unit of Assignment

	Chief	AC	Major	Comm.	LT	SGT	PO	Total
Office of Chief	1							1
PIO							1	1
PAB		1						1
FIT					1	1	4	6
IA				1	2	2	9	14
Ops Review					1		1	2
Field Services East			1					1
Foothills				1	5	11	91	108
South East				1	5	20	141	167
Northeast				1	5	19	124	149
Field Services West			1					1
Valley				1	5	16	105	127
Northwest				1	5	13	86	105
Southwest				1	5	11	81	98
Investigation			1					1
Mayor's Detail							3	3
SID				1	3	7	37	48
CID				1	3	8	42	60 ²⁹
SED				1				1
Operations Support			1					1
SOD				1	1	4	29	35
Metro Traffic				1	2	4	30	37
Open Space				1	1	2	14	18
Training			1		1	2	11	15
TOTAL	1	1	5	13	45	120	809	1000

²⁹ Includes six additional detectives for CIU

Minneapolis Police Department and Emergency Communications Center Staffing and Operations Assessment and Review of Problem Nature Codes



JANUARY 2022



Final Report

MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT AND EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS CENTER STAFFING AND OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW OF PROBLEM NATURE CODES

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Introduction

The City of Minneapolis requested a study to evaluate the current staffing and operational efficiency of the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) and recommend improvements. In addition, the City recognized the need for a review of the Minneapolis Emergency Communications Center's (MECC's) use of problem nature codes to characterize incidents. CNA has executed both studies, and the results are presented in this report. This important effort will inform the City regarding whether the MPD's personnel resources effectively align with current and anticipated demand for public safety services and with emerging and best practices for public safety delivery. It will also assess fidelity of use of problem nature codes in the MECC, make recommendations to improve the use of these codes, and provide an understanding of the relationship between the codes and operational outcomes.

Goals and objectives

This analysis will achieve the following:

- Recommend staffing resources that can effectively and efficiently meet the demand for service.
- Review internal business processes and identify gaps and areas for improvement.
- Inform needs for resource allocations that are aligned with City needs and demand for public safety services.
- Position the MPD for future success by providing the tools to further adapt staffing and processes to future changes in demand for service.

Areas of focus and approach

Our report is organized into four major focus areas: staffing analysis, operations analysis, and problem nature code analysis, and business processes analysis.

- **Staffing analysis.** Using a workload-based approach, CNA produced estimates of the staffing required to support the MPD's current patrol workloads and evaluated the use of different shift lengths. In addition, we analyzed breakouts by specific call response types to estimate the effects of changing response policies (e.g., implementing alternate response models for mental health calls and property crimes) on staffing needs.
- **Operations analysis.** Using data collected from personnel interviews as well as review of the literature and peer agency practices, CNA assessed MPD operations and policies, including the use of one- versus two-person patrols, relative levels of civilianization, alternative response models (which also have implications for the staffing analysis), and information technology enterprise system use.

- **Problem nature code analysis.** Using calls-for-service data, including 9-1-1 call data, CNA reviewed the use of problem nature codes in the MECC using an exploratory descriptive analytical approach.
- **Business process analysis.** Using information from personnel interviews as well as review of operational documents, CNA assessed business processes in the MECC, Patrol Bureau, specialty units, and the investigative functions at MPD. We used a process mapping and pain points identification approach to map how business processes currently function and areas to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of these processes.

Across each of these focus areas, CNA relied on both quantitative and qualitative data from the MPD and MECC. These data sources included calls-for-service and 9-1-1 call data from 2016 through 2020, staffing data, documentation of MPD and MECC policies and procedures (including training materials), and information gathered through interviews with MPD and MECC personnel. Data sources and analytical techniques are described in more detail in each of the sections below.

For most of the quantitative analyses in the report, we used data from 2016 through 2020. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as changes in policing practice and policy after the death of George Floyd, policing response in 2020 differed from preceding years in substantive ways. Specifically, in Minneapolis as well as other cities across the country, nearly all measures of police activity were lower in 2020. However, we included 2020 in our analyses for the following reasons:

- Despite being unusual, 2020 represents the most recent year of data available at the time we performed analysis, and timely data are almost always preferable to older data.
- For the majority of our analyses, we relied on a five-year period of data, and thus the inclusion of 2020 did not drive the results.
- Trends seen in 2020 continued into 2021 for agencies nationwide; it is unclear whether or when police activity levels will return to pre-2020 levels, so to discount 2020 data as irrelevant would be improper.

Overview of the report

This report contains six sections, including this introductory section. Following this section are sections presenting analysis, findings, and recommendations related to the staffing analysis, operations analysis, problem nature code analysis, and business processes analysis. The report closes with a brief conclusion section.

Section 1: Staffing Analysis

Approach

CNA conducted a staffing analysis for the MPD to systematically determine patrol staffing needs based on actual workforce demand. Although there are several common approaches to staffing analyses, workload-based analysis provides the most accurate and objective way to determine current and future staffing needs (Wilson & Weiss, 2012). In line with the approach outlined by Wilson and Weiss (2012), our analysis involved the following six tasks.

1. **Analyze the distribution of calls for service.** Calls for service can differ by the hour of the day, day of the week, and month of the year. The MPD's peak call times have implications for resource allocation decisions, such as the use of overtime and scheduling training activities. Findings from this analysis will help the City understand when the highest levels of patrol staffing are needed.
2. **Analyze the nature of calls for service.** Understanding the nature of the MPD's calls for service, including the seriousness of calls based on their problem nature codes and priority levels, provides important information on the types of police work being conducted in the agency. The nature of calls for service also varies across precincts, requiring the MPD to staff areas accordingly.
3. **Review the time used for calls for service.** This task involves determining how long calls for service typically take from initial response to final paperwork, which is key to understanding how much time officers spend responding to calls for service during their shifts.
4. **Calculate the shift-relief factor.** The shift-relief factor is the relationship between the maximum number of patrol days officers are available to work and the number that they actually work. The shift-relief factor is a critical piece of data in estimating the number of officers that should be assigned to a patrol shift to ensure that the bureau is optimally staffed. This task involves calculating the shift-relief factor by dividing the total number of hours necessary to be fully staffed in a shift by the total number of off hours (i.e., hours outside of shift assignments) to which an officer is entitled.
5. **Identify performance objectives.** This task involves identifying commonly used performance objectives regarding the fraction of an officer's shift that should be devoted to calls for service and the fraction that should be devoted to other activities. This analysis provides critical information to the City about how varying performance objectives affect overall patrol staffing projections.
6. **Estimate staffing levels.** Drawing on results from the previous tasks, this task involves estimating the number and distribution of officers required to answer calls for service, accounting for the proposed performance objectives as well as the fact that data are unlikely

to capture calls that require multiple officer dispatches. We also estimated staffing levels for several subgroups of calls that could potentially be serviced by an alternative nonpolice response.

To execute these tasks, CNA primarily analyzed calls-for-service data provided by the MECC, the City's 9-1-1 call dispatch center. These data included all calls initiated by Minneapolis community members for police services between January 1, 2016, and December 31, 2020 (five complete years of data). We chose to use five years of data for most of the staffing analyses to provide a better overall representation of calls for service and police activity in Minneapolis. However, note that the most recent year of data (2020) is likely different from the overall reporting period because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the social unrest that occurred in Minneapolis after the killing of George Floyd. Therefore, this section also notes when the results of the analyses using only 2020 data differ from those using the 2016–2020 data.

Calls for service are received by the MECC and dispatched to responders. The calls-for-service data also included “onsites,” which are officer-initiated activities such as traffic stops, foot beats, and business checks. These are called into dispatch by the officer and added into the department's computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system. In total, the 2016–2020 data included 1,794,408 calls for service. Of these, 1,558,145 calls involved an MPD officer being dispatched to the scene. Some calls involved crimes or complaints outside of the MPD's jurisdictional area and were thus transferred to the appropriate emergency dispatch center. Other calls could be resolved directly by the dispatcher and did not require an officer to be dispatched.

The data also included detailed information about each call, such as the location where the call originated; the date and time the call was received and completed; the incident type, priority level, and disposition of the call; and other administrative indicators. By providing a detailed overview of the demand for police service in the city, these data allow CNA to better estimate the MPD's workload and staffing needs. We cleaned the calls for service data and analyzed them using descriptive statistics.

In addition to calls for service, CNA collected and analyzed timesheet data from the department to calculate the shift-relief factor (task four). These data covered all the planned and actual shift deployments for MPD personnel for the most recent complete year of data available (i.e., January 1 to December 31, 2020).¹ Information in this dataset included officers' rank, assignments, staffing activity, and shift start and end times. Findings from our analyses are organized by the six tasks listed above and presented in the following section.

¹ This is the only analysis we restricted to 2020 data. To ensure the robustness of our results, we conducted the shift-relief factor analysis using 2019 data as well, but we found that the results did not differ substantively from those seen in 2020. Thus, we opted to use the most recent year of data available. See further explanation on page 16 for more information.

Findings

Task one: analyze the distribution of calls for service

Figure 1 shows the aggregate of the MPD's calls for service between 2016 and 2020 across its five precincts.² The MPD received more than 1.5 million total calls for service over this period, which means that the MPD dispatched officers to roughly 853 calls for service on an average day over this five-year period. Figure 1 also illustrates the variation in calls for service among the MPD's precincts. The 3rd and 4th precincts had the most demand for police services, whereas the 2nd precinct had the lowest volume of calls for service.

Figure 1. Calls for service by MPD precinct (2016–2020)






Figure 2 shows the MPD's aggregate calls for service by time of the day over the same reporting period. The peak hours of demand for MPD services appear to be between 11 a.m. and midnight, with the most active hour of the day between 9 and 10 p.m. Calls for service are generally less frequent in the early morning hours, particularly between 3 and 7 a.m. These findings are consistent with those observed in other police agencies across the country and consistent across the five years of MECC data.

² MPD responded to 34,810 calls for service that were outside city boundaries over this period. Thus, the aggregate of calls in figures in this section does not add up to 1,558,145.


Figure 2. Calls for service by hour of the day (2016–2020)



The distribution of calls for service by day of the week is presented in Figure 3. Across the five years of data analyzed for this report, the MPD experienced the most calls for service on Fridays and the fewest on Sundays. However, Tuesday through Friday, on average, experienced higher amounts of calls for service (totals between 234,997 and 238,118) than Saturday through Monday (totals between 187,915 and 219,398). These trends are also consistent within each of the five years of available data.

Figure 3. Calls for service by day of the week (2016–2020)

Next, CNA examined the number of calls for service by month (Figure 4). Analyses of crime and police activity data consistently find that demand for law enforcement services increases in summer months when the weather is warmer. These trends are reflected in the MPD's calls-for-service data: peak call levels occurred between May and August, with the lowest levels occurring in November through February. Of note, this trend is consistent across all the years examined for this analysis except for 2020. In 2020, the number of calls for service was proportionally lower during the summer months relative to the previous four years of data. In fact, every month in the second half of the year (June through December) experienced fewer calls for service than any month in the first half of the year (January through May). This trend corresponds to the timeline of George Floyd's killing and the following social unrest in the city, which likely affected community members' calls for police services. Fewer officers were also working during this period because of departures and because many were working in specialized units to respond to unrest.

Figure 4. Calls for service by month of the year (2016–2020)

These analyses indicate that calls are not evenly distributed across geographic areas or time periods. Thus, to best meet the service demands of the City, the MPD's staffing allocations and shift assignments should reflect these distributions. For example, based on this five-year data reporting period, the MPD should have proportionally more officers assigned to the 3rd and 4th precincts, on Tuesdays through Fridays, and on shifts that cover the late morning through late evening hours (11 a.m. to midnight).

Task two: analyze the nature of calls for service

The next task involved analyzing the nature of the MPD's calls for service. This task is critical in determining the nature of calls for service within a jurisdiction as well as the type and scope of responses provided by the police department. Results from this task, particularly those regarding the problem nature codes, will also inform the final task (the estimation of staffing levels).


Problem nature codes

There were 158 distinct categories assigned as the final problem nature code (PNC) in the calls-for-service data. The top 20 categories, accounting for more than 70 percent of all calls for service, are listed in Figure 5. The most common PNC was directed patrol activities, which involves assigning officers to patrol areas within the city where crime is expected to occur based on internal analysis of crime reports and other intelligence gathered by the department. The other most common PNCs were business checks, traffic enforcement, responding to disturbances, checking on suspicious persons or vehicles, and welfare checks.

The most common PNC categories were similar in the 2020-only data, but the ordering was different. Most notably, directed patrol activities was the 20th most common PNC in 2020, whereas it was the

most common across all five years of data. This finding is consistent with findings from CNA's interviews with MPD personnel, who indicated that the number of directed patrol and other officer-initiated activities has dropped since the summer of 2020.

Figure 5. Calls for service by final problem nature code (2016–2020)



In addition to examining the most common PNCs, CNA examined the frequency of four PNC subgroups. These subgroups are *exclusive* in the sense that no PNC falls in more than one of these groups but they are not fully *inclusive* of all PNCs, some of which were not included in the subgroup analyses. A complete list of PNCs within in each subgroup is included in Appendix C.

1. **Police officer statute PNCs.** This subgroup includes all calls for service with a PNC that requires a sworn officer response by state law. This subgroup includes many of the PNCs that involve life-threatening situations (e.g., assaults, shootings, and domestic abuse) as well as calls that generally require a police response (e.g., directed patrol activities, business checks, triggered alarms, suspicious persons or vehicles, and crimes in progress).
2. **Behavioral health PNCs.** This subgroup includes incidents involving a person who appears to lack essential reasoning faculties or who exhibits bizarre behavior as well as requests from friends or relatives to check on old, sick, or vulnerable persons. As discussed in more detail in Section 2, these types of calls could be handled through alternative response models that do not necessarily involve police response.

3. **Theft-reporting PNCs.** This subgroup includes calls in which a person is reporting a property-related crime after it has already been committed (i.e., not a crime in progress). This subgroup includes reporting on a theft, forgery, burglary, or incident resulting in property damage. These calls also represent a category of responses that could be handled by means other than sworn officer response.
4. **Other alternative response PNCs.** This subgroup includes all calls not included in the previous two subgroups to which an alternative agency or group could reasonably respond. This subgroup includes complaints about unoccupied parked vehicles, reports of road hazards, requests to check abandoned buildings or construction sites, animal control incidents (e.g., bites, off-leash or aggressive animals, animal fights), and general disturbances (e.g., loud noises, consumption of alcohol in public, public urination, idling vehicles).

These subgroups allow for a better understanding of the types of services that require a police presence versus those that could potentially be handled by an alternative entity (e.g., a community group or non-law enforcement City or county agency). For some of these subgroups, the City is already piloting nonpolice responses. In late 2021, for example, the City began its partnership with Canopy Mental Health and Consulting to deploy behavioral health response teams. These teams are dispatched to some of the behavioral health PNCs in lieu of MPD officers.

Table 1 presents the aggregate calls for service for these PNC subgroups across the five-year data collection period. Calls that statutorily required a police officer response accounted for 1,126,515 calls, or 72.3 percent of all calls for service during this period. Each of the other three subgroups accounted for between 5.4 and 6.6 percent of all calls for service. In other words, approximately 17.6 percent of all calls for service between 2016 and 2020 that involved MPD officers being dispatched could potentially have been handled through a nonpolice response.

Table 1. Summary of final problem nature code subgroups (2016–2020)

	Total	Percentage of All Calls ³
Police officer statute PNCs	1,126,515	72.3%
Behavioral health PNCs	84,589	5.4%
Theft-reporting PNCs	87,867	5.6%
Other alternative response PNCs	102,658	6.6%

Response types


CNA also examined the distribution of calls for service by the type of response from MPD officers. The MPD employs both one-officer squad cars and two-officer squad cars in its patrol shifts. The MECC priority policy states that the type of response to calls for service is determined by the resources needed to respond to the initial incident. Thus, the CAD software makes recommendations based on each call's initial PNC. For example, based on an analysis of the 2016–2020 data, more than 98 percent of calls assigned an initial PNC of “assault in progress” received a two-officer squad response,

³ Note that the total does not sum to 100 percent, as not all PNCs are included in the subgroup analyses.

whereas more than 90 percent of calls assigned a PNC of “assault report only” (i.e., a call in which a community member wanted to report an assault after it had taken place) received a one-officer squad response. Likewise, more than 98 percent of disturbances, welfare checks, and suspicious person calls received two-officer responses, whereas nearly all parking problem, property damage, and theft-reporting calls received a one-officer response. In addition to the one-officer or two-officer response assigned by the MECC when a community member initiates a call for service, the MECC categorizes officer-initiated calls (e.g., business checks, community engagement activities, directed patrol, traffic law enforcement) as “Miscellaneous/Administrative.”

As shown in Figure 6, the most common type of response was a two-officer squad car (nearly 50 percent of all calls). The next most common response category was Miscellaneous/Administrative (roughly 32 percent of all calls), followed by one-officer responses (fewer than 19 percent of all calls).

Figure 6. Calls for service by response type (2016–2020)



Priority levels

Next, the assessment team examined how calls for service were distributed among the MPD’s priority categories. According to the MECC priority policy, call prioritization is meant to (1) establish common working definitions about the urgency of any situation to facilitate service delivery, (2) organize calls in a dispatcher’s pending queue, and (3) provide a measurable method to assess the delivery of public safety services. Calls are assigned an initial priority, which affects the scope and speed of the police response. However, the priority may be raised or lowered as the situation evolves and after officers arrive on scene to assess the situation. The MECC uses five priorities:


- Priority 0 is assigned to calls involving a known crisis that threatens the life of an individual. This priority is preassigned to only a few types of calls. It is the highest possible priority and is meant to elicit the fastest possible response times.
- Priority 1 is assigned to calls involving situations in which risk to personal safety or health or risk of loss or damage to property exists and conditions at the scene of the call are

unstable. Speedy responses are important to protect personal safety or limit property damage.

- Priority 2 is assigned to calls involving situations in which no immediate threat of harm exists. Officers are supposed to be dispatched to these calls within 10 minutes, when available.
- Priority 3 is assigned to calls involving stable conditions that may be handled at the convenience of available units as competing demands permit.
- Priority 9 is assigned to “onsite” calls initiated directly by an officer in the field.

Figure 7 shows the distribution of calls for service by their initial priority level in the five-year period between 2016 and 2020. Very few calls were assigned priority 0 over this period, compared with 29 percent of calls being assigned priority 1, 28 percent priority 2, and just under 10 percent priority 3. This finding suggests that calls from residents are about equally likely to be serious in nature as they are to be less volatile. Almost exactly one-third of calls were assigned priority 9, which includes policing activities that are generally simple or low risk (e.g., business checks and foot beats) but also those that could have moderate or serious risk depending on the circumstances (e.g., traffic stops, directed patrols, driving while intoxicated home visits, and predatory offender checks).

Figure 7. Calls for service by initial priority level (2016–2020)




Although the data in Figure 7 are based on the initial priority of calls, it is worth noting that an analysis of final priority levels indicates that many of the calls initially assigned priority 1 were reassigned to lower priority levels once officers arrived on scene and assessed the situation. In fact, although 450,431 calls were initially given a priority 1, only 342,882 calls had a final priority of 1. Subsequently, the final priority categories 2, 3, and 9 increased by 54,007 calls, 5,764 calls, and 47,515 calls, respectively.

Of further note, the initial priority levels of calls for service in 2020 differ from those in the previous years of data. Specifically, MPD officers engaged in much less self-initiated activity in 2020, resulting in proportionally fewer priority 9 calls (14.4 percent) than in previous years. As a result, a higher

percentage of 2020 calls were priority 1 (37.8 percent), 2 (34 percent), or 3 (13.7 percent) than in the full five-year data.


Figure 8 shows the distribution of priority levels across MPD precincts. There are notable differences across precincts. For instance, the 3rd and 4th precincts experienced more high-priority calls during this period (i.e., many more priority 1 and 2 calls) than other precincts. Of note, although the 3rd and 4th precincts also had the highest volume of total calls for service (Figure 1 above), they also experienced a larger *percentage* of high-priority calls relative to the other districts. For instance, more than 34 percent of the calls in both precincts were priority 1, whereas only 19.7 to 31.1 percent of the calls in other precincts received that level of priority.

Figure 8. Calls for service, by initial priority level and precinct (2016–2020)



Task three: review the time used for calls for service

Next, CNA estimated the average length of time MPD officers take responding to and handling calls for service, calculated as the total number of minutes between the time the first unit was assigned to respond to a call and the time the call was closed. This calculation provides a better understanding of how much time officers likely spend on calls for service during their shift. Figure 9 provides the average time used for calls for service by initial priority.


Figure 9. Average time per call in minutes by initial priority (2016–2020)

Overall, officers spent an average of 36 minutes on each call between 2016 and 2020.⁴ Priority 0 calls took the most time, more than 95 minutes on average to complete. This finding makes sense because these are the highest priority calls and the most likely to require substantial resources and engagement on scene. Priority 1, 2, and 3 calls required much less time to complete. Priority 9 calls required fewer than 20 minutes to complete, on average. This time is lower than calls of other priority levels, perhaps partially because the dispatcher enters the call into the system at the same time as the officer arrives on scene.

Figure 10 breaks out the average times spent on calls by MPD precinct. These estimates exhibit similar trends across precinct. The overall average time to complete calls for service was similar across precincts, ranging from 33.7 minutes (2nd precinct) to 38.7 minutes (4th precinct). The 2nd and 5th precincts took longer on average to complete priority 0 calls than the other precincts, but, as indicated in Figure 8, these calls make up a very small percentage of all calls for service.

⁴ The average presented here is the mean, which has a standard deviation of 58.6 minutes. Thus, some calls took substantially longer to address than other calls, which is typical in police response data. Half the calls took officers fewer than 17 minutes to complete (the median is 16.9 minutes), and 75 percent of calls required fewer than 40 minutes to complete. CNA chose to use the mean for this analysis because it is the only measure that accounts for this distribution. If we had used the median, the staffing estimates presented below would underestimate the levels of staffing required to handle calls for service in the City.


Figure 10. Average time per call in minutes by initial priority and precinct (2016–2020)



PNC subgroups

Using the categories described in task two above, CNA also examined the time spent on calls for the four PNC subgroups (police officer statute PNCs, behavioral health PNCs, theft-reporting PNCs, and other alternative response PNCs). Figure 11 provides the average time spent on calls across these subgroups. On average, MPD officers spend less time on calls that require a police response by state law than on those that could be handled by nonpolice entities, except for calls that fall into the other alternative response PNC subgroup. In particular, calls that involve taking reports for theft and other property crimes take nearly twice as long for officers to complete than those they are statutorily required to handle (69.2 minutes versus 33.9 minutes).⁵

⁵ We further explore the time spent on calls, only considering the primary responding vehicle, in Section 3.

Figure 11. Average time per call in minutes by PNC subgroup (2016–2020)

Task four: calculate the shift-relief factor

CNA's next task was to calculate the shift-relief factor. The shift-relief factor is an estimate of the number of officers that must be assigned to each shift to ensure it is adequately covered. It estimates how much time officers will actually spend on shifts by accounting for the number of hours officers take in paid or unpaid time away from patrol. That is, when a person who is regularly assigned to a shift is unavailable because they are occupied elsewhere (on leave, attending training, injured, etc.), additional staff must be allocated to that shift to ensure enough officers are available to respond to calls for service. The shift-relief factor accounts for these factors to produce an updated staffing estimate.

As noted above, CNA used MPD timesheet data from calendar year 2020 for this calculation. However, given that much of 2020 occurred after the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, which could have affected the amount of time officers took off for sick leave or vacation, we replicated the analysis with 2019 data. Overall, the results from the 2019 and 2020 analysis were very similar;⁶ thus, this section focuses on results from the 2020 data.

The first step in calculating the shift-relief factor is to estimate the amount of benefit time off used by MPD line officers. Benefit time off includes administrative leave, sick leave, family leave, parental leave, vacation, holidays, compensatory time, training, military leave, and other paid or unpaid activities that take officers away from their regular patrol duties. In keeping with standard staffing analysis practices, benefit time off does not include time spent working specialty assignments, since those hours could be increased or decreased through a variety of policy and procedural levers. Within

⁶ As shown later in this section, the shift-relief factor estimates for 2020 are 2.39 for the 4-day, 10-hour shift assignment; 1.91 for the 5-day, 8-hour shift assignment; and 3.30 for the 3-day, 12-hour shift assignment. The 2019 shift-relief factor estimates for the same shift assignments are 2.34, 1.88, and 3.24, respectively.

the MPD, 633 personnel with the rank of “police officer” were reported in the MPD timesheet data at any point in 2020. The benefit time for these individuals is shown in Table 2. On average, officers spent a little over 566 hours during 2020 engaging in one of these benefit time activities.

Table 2. Summary of benefit time for MPD police officers (2020)

Benefit Time Off	Hours	Average per Officer
Vacation	75,264.8	118.9
Holiday	70,667.0	111.6
Family and personal leave	56,915.0	89.9
Sick/medical leave	49,561.5	78.3
Training	34,836.8	55.0
Administrative leave	21,157.0	33.4
Military	17,510.0	27.7
Comp time	15,074.6	23.8
Special duty	10,375.3	16.4
Injury	7,312.0	11.6
Total	358,673.9	566.6

The next step is to calculate the total number of regular hours MPD officers had off during this period. Because most MPD officers work a 4-day, 10-hour shift assignment, they are expected to receive 1,560 “regular” off hours per year (i.e., 10 hours × 3 days off × 52 weeks = 1,560 hours). Thus, the total time off for officers is 2,126.6 hours (i.e., 566.6 benefit hours off + 1,560 regular hours off = 2,126.6 hours).

Shift-relief factor calculations

Using these inputs, the shift-relief factor calculation is as follows:

$$366 \times \text{shift length} / (366 \times \text{shift length} - \text{total time off})$$

where 366 is the number of days in 2020 and the shift length is the number of assigned hours per shift. Thus, the MPD had a 2020 shift-relief factor of

$$3,660 / (3,660 - 2,126.6) \text{ or}$$

$$3,660 / 1,533.4 \text{ or}$$

2.39

This number estimates how many officers MPD supervisors would need to assign to a shift to ensure that enough officers would be available to work. For example, if MPD supervisors wanted 10 officers to be on duty during a particular shift, they would need to assign 24 officers to the shift (i.e., $10 \times 2.4 = 24$).

Note that the shift-relief factor is specific to the 4-day, 10-hour shift assignment; it would be different if the MPD had opted to use an alternative approach. For example, the shift-relief factor for a 5-day, 8-hour shift assignment is as follows:

$$366 \times 8 / (366 \times 8 - [566.6 + 832]) \text{ or}$$

$$2,928 / (2,928 - 1,398.6) \text{ or}$$

$$2,928 / 1,529.4 \text{ or}$$

1.91

And the shift-relief factor for a 3-day, 12-hour shift assignment is as follows:

$$366 \times 12 / (366 \times 12 - [566.6 + 2,496]) \text{ or}$$

$$4,392 / (4,392 - 3,062.6) \text{ or}$$

$$4,392 / 1,329.4 \text{ or}$$

3.30

Based on these calculations, the shift-relief factor for 8-hour shifts is much lower than that for the 10-hour shifts currently used by the MPD or the hypothetical 12-hour shifts. However, a department would need to consider many factors before deciding to implement different shift assignments. For instance, the department would need to staff only two shifts a day under a 12-hour model instead of the three needed for an 8-hour model. The shift-relief factor calculations above suggest that the MPD would need 6.6 officers to ensure at least one can be scheduled for both shifts in a day under the 12-hour model (i.e., 2 shifts \times 3.3 = 6.6), whereas the MPD would require only 5.72 officers to ensure at least one can be scheduled under the 8-hour model (i.e., 3 shifts \times 1.91 = 5.72).⁷ Twelve-hour shifts can also lead to more officer fatigue than 10-hour or 8-hour shifts, which is compounded when officers remain on their shifts longer to complete calls or work overtime.

Task five: identify performance objectives

The fifth task was to identify possible performance objectives regarding the fraction of an officer's shift that should be devoted to calls for service and the fraction that should be spent on other activities. No standardized approaches exist for establishing this metric. As outlined by Wilson and Weiss (2012), the International Association of Chiefs of Police introduced one of the earliest workload-based models more than three decades ago, which suggested that patrol officers should spend approximately one-third of their time responding to calls for service, with the other two-thirds split between proactive activities and administrative duties.

More recently, the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) outlined the "rule of 60" in their review of staffing allocation and deployment in 62 police agencies (McCabe, 2013). This rule suggests that departments should not dedicate more than 60 percent of their resources toward workload (which includes not only calls for service but also proactive and officer-initiated activities, directed patrol time, and administrative duties), with the remaining 40 percent used primarily for

⁷ It is difficult to create an apples-to-apples comparison of how many officers are needed to cover shifts under a 4-day, 10-hour model such as the one currently used in Minneapolis because 10-hour shifts overlap with one another throughout the day.

undirected patrol as well as training, time between calls, and other non-workload activities. McCabe (2013) found that, on average, departments committed less than one-third of their patrol resources to community-initiated calls for service. In other workload-based staffing analyses, performance objectives have been established at one-fourth, one-third, or one-half of officers' time dedicated to calls for service (see Weiss, 2015; Wilson & Weiss, 2012). Based on this variation, the assessment team used both the one-third and one-half metrics to produce the staffing recommendations in the following task.

Task six: estimate staffing levels

Staffing estimate for current 4-day, 10-hour shift assignment

Task six involved creating an estimate of MPD staffing levels in the five police precincts. This work was completed using the MPD's current 4-day, 10-hour shift assignment model as well as two alternate shift assignment models (5-day, 8-hour shift assignments and 3-day, 12-hour shift assignments).

The MPD's current shift assignment has shifts including daywatch (0600 to 1600), middlewatch (1600 to 0200), and dogwatch (2000 to 0600). Because of the overlap between shifts, it is impossible to break out the number of calls for service within each shift without duplication. Still, using the findings generated in the five previous tasks, CNA created an estimate for the staffing levels based on the 4-day, 10-hour shift assignment (Table 3).

Table 3. Patrol staffing estimates based on current 4-day, 10-hour shift assignments

	Calls for Service ^a	Adjusted (×1.6)	Hours on Calls	Officers Needed	Staffing Estimate (50% Objective)		Staffing Estimate (33% Objective)	
					×2	×2.39	×3	×2.39
1st Precinct	39,209	62,734.4	38,058.9	10.4	20.8	50	31.2	75
2nd Precinct	33,021	52,833.6	32,052.4	8.8	17.5	42	26.3	63
3rd Precinct	51,040	81,664.0	49,542.8	13.5	27.1	65	40.6	98
4th Precinct	55,539	88,862.4	53,909.9	14.7	29.5	71	44.2	106
5th Precinct	38,805	62,088.0	37,666.7	10.3	20.6	50	30.9	74
Total						278		416

^a Calls-for-service data from 2020 only.

The first column in Table 3 shows the total calls for service that occurred in each of the five MPD precincts in 2020. The second column adjusts this number to account for calls for which more than one officer was dispatched. As indicated in Figure 6 above, the MPD deploys two-officer squad cars for nearly half of all calls. In addition, many calls involve the dispatch of multiple squad cars to a single scene. Because CAD data have limited ability to determine how many calls involve the dispatch of more than one squad car, common practice is to add a multiplier (such as 25 percent, see Wilson & Weiss, 2012) to the total number of calls. Given the high percentage of MPD calls that already involve two-officer squad car responses, CNA decided to apply a multiplier of 1.6 to the total calls for service to get the adjusted calls for service in the second column.

The third column estimates the amount of time required to complete the calls by multiplying the adjusted number of calls by the average time spent on calls calculated above in task three, which was 36.4 minutes or 0.607 hours (see Figure 9 above). The fourth column estimates the number of officers required to handle the 2020 calls for service. To calculate this estimate, CNA divided the expected number of hours to complete the calls (column four) by the available hours an individual officer could potentially work over the year. In other words, based on the 10-hour shift assignment, an officer working 10 hours a day every day in 2020 would have worked a total of 3,660 hours (366×10 hours).

The value in the fourth column is the number of officers needed in each precinct to answer calls, assuming that the officers only answered calls for their entire shift and worked every day. Thus, the final four columns make further adjustments to provide more-realistic estimates of the number of officers needed to handle the calls for service in each precinct, using the two different performance objectives established in the previous task (i.e., 50 percent of officers' time spent on calls for service versus 33 percent of their time). Under the 50 percent performance objective, the estimates in column four are multiplied by 2 and then multiplied by the previously calculated shift-relief factor for the 4-day, 10-hour shift assignment (2.39; see task four above). Under the 33 percent performance objective, column four estimates are first multiplied by 3 and then by the shift-relief factor.

Based on the model presented in Table 3, the MPD would require 278 police officers assigned to patrol duties in its five precincts under the 50 percent performance objective and 416 officers under the 33 percent performance objective. Based on the varying volume of calls across precincts, the 3rd and 4th precincts would need significantly more patrol officers than the other three precincts.

Note that, based on staffing numbers provided by the MPD to CNA in December 2021, the department currently has 289 patrol officers assigned to one of the three patrol watches across the five precincts (as well as another 10 assigned to critical response team shifts, 69 assigned to other nonpatrol duties, and 30 on leave). This number is closely aligned to the staffing estimates produced under the 50 percent performance objective model but is 138 officers short of the estimate produced under the 33 percent performance objective model.

Staffing estimates for alternate shift assignments

Next, CNA created patrol staffing estimates for the two alternative shift assignments. Table 4 presents patrol staffing estimates for a hypothetical 5-day, 8-hour shift assignment model. Under this model, the MPD could schedule officers for one of three shifts: 0700 to 1500, 1500 to 2300, and 2300 to 0700. The inputs across the columns in this model follow the same logic as the previous model: calls for service are adjusted by 60 percent to account for multiofficer dispatches, multiplied by 0.607 hours to estimate the time on call, divided by the available hours an individual officer could potentially work over the year (in this case, 366×8 hours = 2,928), multiplied by the corresponding performance objective multiplier, and multiplied by the appropriate shift-relief factor (in this case 1.91).

Results from this model are similar to those presented in Table 3. Under a 5-day, 8-hour shift assignment model, the MPD would require either 281 or 420 patrol officers, depending on the chosen performance objective.

Table 4. Patrol staffing estimates based on projected 5-day, 8-hour shift assignments

	Calls for Service ^a	Adjusted (×1.6)	Hours on Calls	Officers Needed	Staffing Estimate (50% Objective)		Staffing Estimate (33% Objective)	
					×2	×1.91	×3	×1.91
1st Precinct								
0700–1500	14,055	22,488.0	13,642.7	4.7	9.3	18	14.0	27
1500–2300	15,762	25,219.2	15,299.6	5.2	10.5	20	15.7	30
2300–0700	9,392	15,027.2	9,116.5	3.1	6.2	12	9.3	18
2nd Precinct								
0700–1500	9,431	15,089.6	9,154.4	3.1	6.3	12	9.4	18
1500–2300	14,267	22,827.2	13,848.5	4.7	9.5	19	14.2	28
2300–0700	9,323	14,916.8	9,049.5	3.1	6.2	12	9.3	18
3rd Precinct								
0700–1500	18,094	28,950.4	17,563.2	6.0	12.0	23	18.0	35
1500–2300	21,696	34,713.6	21,059.6	7.2	14.4	28	21.6	42
2300–0700	11,250	18,000.0	10,920.0	3.7	7.5	15	11.2	22
4th Precinct								
0700–1500	17,736	28,377.6	17,215.7	5.9	11.8	23	17.6	34
1500–2300	24,933	39,892.8	24,201.6	8.3	16.5	32	24.8	48
2300–0700	12,870	20,592.0	12,492.5	4.3	8.5	17	12.8	25
5th Precinct								
0700–1500	14,670	23,472.0	14,239.7	4.9	9.7	19	14.6	28
1500–2300	14,984	23,974.4	14,544.5	5.0	9.9	19	14.9	29
2300–0700	9,151	14,641.6	8,882.6	3.0	6.1	12	9.1	18
Total						281		420

^a Calls-for-service data from 2020 only.

The patrol staffing estimates based on the proposed 3-day, 12-hour shift assignment model are presented in Table 5. This model would require only two shifts per day, such as 0600 to 1800 and 1800 to 0600. The inputs of this model again follow the logic of the previous two models. Results indicate that to implement this model, the MPD would need to employ either 323 or 482 officers to meet the patrol needs of its five precincts, which is less efficient than the current staffing model.

Table 5. Staffing estimates based on projected 3-day, 12-hour shift assignments

	Calls for Service ^a	Adjusted (×1.6)	Hours on Calls	Officers Needed	Staffing Estimate (50% Objective)		Staffing Estimate (33% Objective)	
					×2	×3.3	×3	×3.3
1st Precinct								
0600–1800	20,756	33,209.6	20,147.2	4.6	9.2	31	13.8	46

1800–0600	18,453	29,524.8	17,911.7	4.1	8.2	27	12.2	41
2nd Precinct								
0600–1800	14,216	22,745.6	13,799.0	3.1	6.3	21	9.4	32
1800–0600	18,805	30,088.0	18,253.4	4.2	8.3	28	12.5	42
3rd Precinct								
0600–1800	27,636	44,217.6	26,825.3	6.1	12.2	41	18.3	61
1800–0600	23,404	37,446.4	22,717.5	5.2	10.3	35	15.5	52
4th Precinct								
0600–1800	27,697	44,315.2	26,884.6	6.1	12.2	41	18.4	61
1800–0600	27,842	44,547.2	27,025.3	6.2	12.3	41	18.5	61
5th Precinct								
0600–1800	20,678	33,084.8	20,071.4	4.6	9.1	31	13.7	46
1800–0600	18,127	29,003.2	17,595.3	4.0	8.0	27	12.0	40
Total						323		482

^a Calls-for-service data from 2020 only.

Staffing estimates for PNC subgroups

Finally, CNA created similar staffing estimates for the four PNC subgroups described above. Because the 4-day, 10-hour shift assignment model currently used by the MPD was most efficient, CNA used that as the basis for the subgroup analysis. Therefore, the inputs in the subgroup model are the same as those presented in Table 3 above except that column three (“hours on calls”) in the subgroup model uses the average time spent on calls within each PNC subgroup rather than the overall average. That is, the “police officer statute PNCs” multiplier was 33.9 minutes, the “behavioral health PNCs” multiplier was 37.9 minutes, the “theft-reporting PNCs” multiplier was 69.2 minutes, and the “other alternative response PNCs” multiplier was 23.4 minutes (see Figure 11 above).

The results of the subgroup staffing estimates are presented in Table 6. Under the 50 percent performance objective, the MPD would require 172 police patrol officers just to respond to the calls that explicitly require a police response by state law. Under the 33 percent performance objective, the MPD would need at least 255 patrol officers for these calls.⁸ These models also indicate that the MPD could free up 73 or 106 patrol positions if the City strictly allocated calls in the other three PNC subgroups to nonpolice groups or agencies. This allocation could potentially free up patrol officers to focus more attention on responding to calls for service that require a police presence.

Table 6. Patrol staffing estimates for PNC subgroups based on 4-day, 10-hour shift assignments

	Calls for Service ^a	Adjusted (×1.6)	Hours on Calls	Officers Needed	Staffing Estimate (50% Objective)	Staffing Estimate (33% Objective)
					×2	×2.39
1st Precinct						×3
						×2.39

⁸ Note that not all calls for service fit in these four categories, so the sum of police and nonpolice estimates in Table 6 does not equal the estimates for the full department presented in Table 3. Some calls do not require a police response by statute but are not well suited for an alternative response model. In the current dataset, these PNCs include unwanted persons, the recovery of property or vehicles, and the reporting of assaults, among others.

Police statute	24,133	38,612.8	21,816.2	6.0	11.9	29	17.9	43
Behav. health	3,663	5,860.8	3,702.1	1.0	2.0	5	3.0	8
Theft report.	1,826	2,921.6	3,369.6	0.9	1.8	5	2.8	7
Other alternat.	3,071	4,913.6	1,916.3	0.5	1.0	3	1.6	4
2nd Precinct								
Police statute	22,908	36,652.8	20,708.8	5.7	11.3	28	17.0	41
Behav. health	2,128	3,404.8	2,150.7	0.6	1.2	3	1.8	5
Theft report.	1,842	2,947.2	3,399.1	0.9	1.9	5	2.8	7
Other alternat.	2,788	4,460.8	1,739.7	0.5	1.0	3	1.4	4
3rd Precinct								
Police statute	32,192	51,507.2	29,101.6	8.0	15.9	39	23.9	58
Behav. health	3,963	6,340.8	4,005.3	1.1	2.2	6	3.3	8
Theft report.	3,347	5,355.2	6,176.3	1.7	3.4	9	5.1	13
Other alternat.	4,262	6,819.2	2,659.5	0.7	1.5	4	2.2	6
4th Precinct								
Police statute	38,395	61,432.0	34,709.1	9.5	19.0	46	28.5	68
Behav. health	3,232	5,171.2	3,266.5	0.9	1.8	5	2.7	7
Theft report.	2,292	3,667.2	4,229.5	1.2	2.3	6	3.5	9
Other alternat.	5,403	8,644.8	3,371.5	0.9	1.8	5	2.8	7
5th Precinct								
Police statute	25,260	40,416.0	22,835.0	6.2	12.5	30	18.7	45
Behav. health	2,905	4,648.0	2,936.0	0.8	1.6	4	2.4	6
Theft report.	2,498	3,996.8	4,609.6	1.3	2.5	7	3.8	10
Other alternat.	3,386	5,417.6	2,112.9	0.6	1.2	3	1.7	5
Total police						172		255
Total non-police						73		106

^a Calls-for-service data from 2020 only.

The above analysis reflects data from a particular time period, as noted. For the MPD to predict future staffing needs, which depend on the considerations (performance objectives, use of two-person cars, etc.) used in each task above as well as the volume of calls-for-service data overall, the assessment team will provide a spreadsheet-based tool that can be used to reproduce this analysis under different future scenarios. This tool will be more useful to the agency than our team positing possible hypotheticals because it can be used at any point based on real-world data.

Limitations

When considering the patrol staffing analysis, the precise number of officers needed depends on several policy decision points, primarily the desired percentage of discretionary time for patrol officers and the use of one- versus two-person patrol car staffing, as noted above. Adjusting these factors in various combinations leads to the conclusion that the MPD's patrol division is either appropriately staffed or substantially understaffed. Determining the ideal values for these inputs is

grounded in local context, community expectations, and operational goals and goes beyond the scope of this assessment, although we do discuss these issues further in the next section to provide context to inform those decisions.

The primary limitation to our staffing analysis lies outside the patrol function. The assessment team had planned to perform similar analyses for the Investigations Bureau, Forensic Division, investigations staff within the Patrol Bureau, and Professional Standards Bureau. However, none of these divisions record personnel “deployment” information in a manner that allows for a workload-based staffing analysis. This is not atypical; most law enforcement agencies collate information in those divisions to track the process and progress of tasks, as the MPD does. However, to conduct a staffing analysis, knowing the time spent per task and the time spent within a task on subtasks is critical to developing workload-based personnel requirement estimates. We provide a recommendation below on the type of data the MPD would need to begin collecting to facilitate such an analysis in the future.

In addition, the assessment team had expected to conduct a related analysis of the current use of overtime in the Patrol Bureau as well as the aforementioned units. Unfortunately, the data available on overtime use were not sufficient to produce defensible analysis or recommendations.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1: The MPD and the City should identify a performance objective for the percentage of time officers spend responding to calls for service. As depicted in the analyses above, applying common metrics such as one-third or one-half results in very different recommendations for staffing levels. To that end, the City should consider how much time it would like MPD officers to engage in other typical police functions, such as patrolling the streets in their precincts or engaging in community policing activities. Although these activities may not be as critical as responding to calls for service, they are considered core functions in many police departments.

Recommendation 2: After identifying this objective, the MPD should consider the staffing levels for its patrol precincts. The staffing analyses revealed that, under the current 4-day, 10-hour shift assignment, the MPD’s current staffing levels are appropriate if patrol officers are expected to spend one-half of their time responding to calls for service (i.e., the 50 percent performance objective). However, if the MPD or the City expects these officers to spend more of their time on undirected patrol, community engagement, or other activities, the MPD would need to consider increasing its patrol staff or otherwise reallocating personnel to best meet the demand for service in each precinct and the City at large.

Recommendation 3: If further efficiencies are needed in the short term, the MPD could consider reducing the number of two-officer squad cars dispatched to calls in favor of one-officer squad cars. As noted in Figure 6, nearly half of all calls that occurred during the study period involved a two-officer response. Research has generally shown that one-officer squads are not less safe for officers than two-officer squads, whereas one-officer squads can improve

overall staffing efficiency (e.g., Anderson & Dossetor, 2012). However, the ability for the department to make this change may vary across shifts and precincts. For example, shifts that put officers at greater risk might require more two-person patrols than other shifts. Likewise, the necessity for two-person patrols may vary across the department's precincts.

Recommendation 4: The City should examine the feasibility of implementing nonpolice response options for the PNC subgroups described above or expanding existing programs that serve this purpose (such as the behavioral health response teams). As noted in Table 6, the department could free up between 73 and 106 patrol positions if all these calls for service were handled by community groups or other nonpolice agencies.

Likewise, the MPD could examine how it uses its own personnel to respond to some nonemergency calls for service. As noted in Figure 7, most calls for service were lower priority calls for which no immediate threat of harm existed. Some of these calls could possibly have been handled without a patrol officer responding to the scene. For instance, in some police departments, patrol officers who are unable to participate in patrol duties (e.g., those on limited duty or other administrative assignments) address these calls by phone, thereby reducing the need for an officer to be dispatched on scene. MPD has implemented such a system, but its staffing levels have been inconsistent.

Recommendation 5: The current analyses focused on developing staffing estimates specifically for patrol officers, but CNA was unable to produce similar estimates for the department's other divisions (e.g., investigations). If the MPD would like to create similar staffing estimates for these divisions, it would need to collect additional data, specifically detailed information on how much time investigators spend on relevant activities throughout their day, such as driving to crime scenes, interviewing suspects or witnesses, analyzing evidence, and so forth. Note that this data collection would be a complex undertaking; these data are not commonly collected by other police departments, so there are no standard approaches for creating staffing estimates outside of patrol.

Recommendation 6: When developing a patrol performance metric to guide the deployment of uniformed officers, this model cannot factor in the several units staffed by uniformed officers that have been greatly reduced or eliminated because of staffing constraints. These include Community Response Teams, the Community Engagement Team, the Crisis Intervention Team, the Police Activities League, school resource officers, bicycle patrols, and foot beats. All at one time had strong support from segments of the community and had a role in crime prevention, mental health-related calls, community outreach, and fear reduction. We strongly recommend that, in the aftermath of the recent referendum, the City inventory these programs for their prior effectiveness and level of community support and determine whether the recommended number of call-response officers is sufficient to reproduce some of these services and activities or whether these units could potentially be staffed by civilian personnel (see Section 2 for more discussion of civilianization).

Recommendation 7: The reintroduction or reactivation of any special unit, or, for that matter, foot and bicycle beats, depends on the development of appropriate metrics and the ability to

assess the effectiveness and support of these units. Business districts, for example, may highly value foot and bicycle beats for their fear reduction and order maintenance capabilities. This information could be ascertained through targeted community surveys. Separate metrics (and the ability to extract relevant data from information systems) must be applied to units such as Community Response Teams, the Community Engagement Team, and the Police Activities League. Their effectiveness and support should be measured to inform current and future staffing needs.

Section 2: Operations Analysis

Methods

CNA conducted 23 semi-structured interviews with relevant personnel, including representatives from the three MPD bureaus and the MECC, to develop an understanding of formal policies and procedures as well as to gain insights into the agency culture and community relations. MPD interviewees included individuals from the Deputy Chief to line officer levels, and MECC interviewees included individuals at the manager and dispatcher levels. The interviews provided qualitative data for our assessment of business processes, policing practices, communication structure, culture, and leadership, expanding our understanding of the agency's current capacity and unique dynamics. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, our team conducted all interviews virtually, in accordance with national public safety guidelines. In line with best practices, we ensured the anonymity of those who participated in our interviews.

In addition, for each topic, assessment team analysts reviewed the literature to provide background information on the subject, summarize the evidence base, and gather lessons learned and best practices. These literature reviews were produced using standard methods such as keyword searches and iterative referencing (i.e., reviewing reference lists and "cited by" lists to identify additional sources). The literature reviews included both academic peer-reviewed literature as well as "grey" literature (i.e., reports published outside of peer-reviewed journals). The inclusion of grey literature is particularly important in criminal justice because an extremely robust set of publications is produced directly by agencies and by analysts working in nonacademic research organizations as well as by entities such as the Bureau of Justice Assistance and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office).

Findings in this section have implications for the staffing and business process analyses, and we note these when appropriate. These summaries are not directly informed by those analyses.

Civilianization

Findings from the field and research

Over the last several decades, civilians have become increasingly important to law enforcement operations. Historically, civilians performed relatively unsophisticated tasks, including record keeping and janitorial functions, and comprised a very small portion of employees. More recently, however, civilian roles have expanded into areas that had been primarily assigned to sworn officers. This process, known as *civilianization*, is defined as "a law enforcement agency's hiring of nonsworn personnel to replace or augment its corps of sworn officers, typically with the aims of reducing costs and improving service" (Forst, 2000). Civilianization in policing first began to increase in the 1930s (Davis et al., 2013) and increased again in the 1950s. By 1950, civilian staff comprised an estimated

8 percent of police employees. The 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice identified civilianization as a primary method to increase community confidence in police. As a result, civilian representation in large law enforcement agencies grew 259 percent from 1955 to 1995 (Davis et al., 2013, p. 4). Civilianization continued to increase modestly from 1995 to 2008, when it leveled off at around 31 percent (Davis et al., 2013, p. 4). The increase was most substantial in sheriff's departments from 1987 to 2003; civilian representation in sheriff's offices increased 158 percent during that time (Davis et al., 2013). Davis et al. (2013) attribute the rise of civilian employees in law enforcement to three distinct time periods in which American policing underwent significant transformations: 1840 to 1955, 1955 to 1995, and 1995 to 2008.

Civilianization in policing has several possible causes. Generally, an increase in civilian staff has been attributed to budget cuts and an insufficient number of sworn staff to perform a variety of functions (Cox, 2012; Davis et al., 2013). In some jurisdictions, rapid population growth increased the demand for law enforcement personnel, and agencies struggled to keep up with that demand. Departments responded in several ways, one of which included hiring more civilians to conduct nonenforcement-related tasks (Cox, 2012). The 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement concluded that specific tasks would be better performed by civilians, including communications, planning, and forensic work (Kiedrowski et al., 2019). The Commission also recommended that law enforcement agencies create a community service officer (CSO) position to be filled by civilian staff (Davis et al., 2013). As the community policing movement grew in the 1970s, many departments began implementing CSO positions and associated programs. Civilianization was supported by the federal government through grant programs that required the employment of civilian staff, such as the Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act and COPS Office grants (Davis et al., 2013).

As civilian roles in law enforcement grew, so too did civilian expertise in certain functions. According to Quattlebaum and Tyler (2020), civilians were increasingly hired by law enforcement to perform specific functions related to their expertise rather than as generalists. Forst (2000) argues that sworn officers are hired as generalists who are trained and rotated from one assignment to the next, whereas civilians are hired to perform specialized functions. Civilians are not only occupying roles with greater frequency than in the past but also increasingly being hired to fill traditionally sworn positions, including high-level leader, public information officer, crime and intelligence analyst, grant writer, information technology specialist, trainer or coordinator in training academies, traffic and motor vehicle crash investigator, forensic technician, investigator, and budgeting and fiscal manager (Davis et al., 2013). Here, we focus primarily on the role of civilians in investigations, forensics, and community engagement. Few best practices or lessons learned have emerged about civilianization in other roles, mainly because some are obvious and noncontroversial fits for civilian staffing (e.g., grant writers), some are relatively minor in terms of overall police operations and have received little attention (e.g., crash investigators), and some have only recently and very infrequently been staffed by civilians (e.g., leadership roles), so little research and few best practices have been documented.

Civilians in investigations

Civilians have come to occupy various roles in investigations, including cybercrime investigations, property crime investigations, and crime scene investigations (Davis et al., 2013; Kiedrowski et al.,

2019). In Canada, investigative positions were created specifically for civilians to assist detectives with major cases and serve as informational liaisons to the Crown (Kiedrowski et al., 2019). In the United States, the recession in 2008 and resulting budget cuts forced agencies to reconsider their staffing operations, and police organizations began using civilians to conduct property crime and fraud investigations (Davis et al., 2013). This practice allowed sworn personnel to focus their efforts primarily on patrol and the crime problems in their communities. In England and Wales, civilian investigators were introduced into policing in 2002 by the Police Reform Act in order to enhance the police's investigative capacity (Rice, 2019). Rice's 2019 study is the only one of its kind to examine the role of civilian "junior partners" as investigators and found that civilian investigators engaged in the coproduction of investigative functions as equal partners more often than as junior partners or assistants. Despite the placement of civilian employees into investigative roles, little research has examined the effectiveness of civilians in these positions across a range of outcomes (Davis et al., 2013).

Civilians in forensics

Crime scene and forensic analysis functions are increasingly being civilianized to allow detectives to focus on investigative work. This shift toward civilianization is most evident in large American police departments like those in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego. Crime scene investigative tasks are being conducted more often by civilians under the Criminalist civilian classification. The San Jose Office of the City Auditor (2010) estimated that one department could save approximately \$15,000 per forensic technician to civilianize the forensic investigator role.

In the Knoxville, Tennessee, Police Department, civilian forensic technicians process all crime scenes (Kiedrowski et al., 2015). Sworn personnel are responsible for securing the location and interviewing witnesses while forensic technicians collect physical evidence and document the crime scene. Once these processes are complete, the sworn investigators and civilian forensic technicians work together to assess the evidence. Other forensic roles filled by civilians include forensic electronic/audio/video analyst, forensic administrative assistant, fingerprint examiner, and image analyst (Kiedrowski et al., 2015).

Civilians in community engagement

The civilian role in community engagement policing programs is based on the idea that civilians are better able to relate to the communities in which they live and therefore better equipped to reduce crime in those communities (Cordner, 1997; Davis et al., 2013; Hennessy, 1976). Others, such as Skolnick and Bayley (1986), view civilianization as a process in which the community and police can work together to increase community policing and reduce crime. Hiring civilians to engage in community outreach strategies is thought to be the most effective when civilians reside in the communities in which they are "policing," providing them with linguistic cues and a nuanced understanding of the cultural perspectives present in neighborhoods (Davis et al., 2013). Civilians serving in positions such as CSO may facilitate connections between the police and community groups that are traditionally isolated from police services because of language and cultural barriers (Maguire & King, 2004). Civilianization of community outreach programs has the potential to

increase police legitimacy and enhance the perspectives of citizens about police work in those neighborhoods (Davis et al., 2013).

Benefits of civilianization

Civilian staff are beneficial to law enforcement agencies in several ways. First, hiring more civilian personnel allows sworn police officers to deploy to field assignments (Davis et al., 2013). Civilian personnel are more often specialists than generalists, which allows them to leverage their skills and talents more effectively. One of the most cited benefits of civilian employees relates to cost (Cox, 2012; Davis et al., 2013; Forst, 2000; Kiedrowski et al., 2019; Quattlebaum & Tyler, 2020). Despite having a relatively comparable salary to sworn personnel, civilian employees do not require an intense training program or an academy and have cheaper fringe benefits, have lower insurance costs, have fewer equipment costs, have lower overhead costs, and are easier to replace than sworn personnel (Davis et al., 2013; Quattlebaum & Tyler, 2020). According to Davis et al. (2013), a police officer in California costs about twice as much as a civilian employee. In the Houston, Texas, Police Department, hiring civilian personnel instead of sworn officers saves the department an estimated \$50,000 per officer (Quattlebaum & Tyler, 2020). The Chicago Inspector General suggested that the department saves between 16 and 41 percent per position through civilianization (Quattlebaum & Tyler, 2020). Civilian personnel are also easier to hire, whereas recruiting for sworn positions has become increasingly challenging in recent years. The applicant pool for civilian employees is larger because there are fewer disqualifying screening factors, less training is required, and there are no licensing requirements (Cox, 2012). Finally, civilian employees can make contributions almost immediately upon hire as opposed to nearly a year later, as is the case with most sworn personnel (Cox, 2012).

Drawbacks of civilianization

Despite the cited benefits of employing civilians in traditionally sworn positions, civilianization is not without limitations. Kiedrowski et al. (2019) cited several limitations related to the hiring and retention of civilian personnel. Because of the nature of the jobs (i.e., specialization), civilian staff have limited career mobility and lower reported job satisfaction and morale than sworn officers. Sworn personnel are likewise not as receptive to civilian staff as they are to other sworn personnel and may not accept them as true partners. Although not inherently a drawback of civilianization, this divide between civilian and sworn staff does present particular challenges that agencies must address in order to expand civilianization, particularly beyond traditionally civilian roles. Some researchers suggest that this divide contributes to tension and may result in turnover among civilian staff (Kiedrowski et al., 2019). In a 2006 study conducted in Britain, civilian employees were surveyed to assess satisfaction with their job functions (Alderden & Skogan, 2014). The survey found that civilians faced widespread bullying by sworn personnel, they expected unequal status to continue, and they felt undervalued relative to their sworn counterparts (Loveday, 2006). The Major Cities Chiefs Association (2009) suggests an increase in the recognition of teamwork and interdependence between civilian and sworn personnel roles to combat these negative perceptions.

Conclusion

Civilianization in policing has become an increasingly popular way for law enforcement leadership to address issues related to budget and personnel and to increase the efficiency of operations. Substituting civilian for sworn personnel occurs across several domains, including law enforcement leadership, crime and intelligence analysis, research and analytics, investigations, forensics, and community engagement. Although civilianization has numerous cited benefits, especially reduced costs, research on civilianization is dated. In addition, some research suggests that civilian employees face unique challenges in law enforcement positions, which can affect long-term retention rates of civilians. Ultimately, more research is needed to understand how civilians can benefit law enforcement operations and the extent to which specific roles could be effectively transitioned to civilian staff.

Findings from personnel interviews

A common theme described in the interviews with MPD personnel was challenges related to staffing. Across precincts and departments, the MPD is experiencing attrition in both sworn and civilian personnel. Interviewees have largely attributed the loss of employees to the stress associated with the death of George Floyd, treatment by the community, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Below, we describe some of the sentiments expressed by MPD personnel as they relate to civilian and sworn staffing changes in the department.

Across the five precincts, approximately 420 officers were assigned to patrol in 2021. In 2017, 576 employees were assigned to patrol, 560 of which were sworn. Similarly, the investigations bureau has experienced a loss of 61 investigators from 2017 to present day, bringing total staff in the bureau to 97 (of which 14 are civilian) in 2021. The precincts have tried to maintain programs and the resources they had available, which has become extremely challenging. As the number of sworn personnel decreases, the MPD has come to rely more heavily on civilian personnel. For example, with the disbandment of the Community Engagement Division, civilian staff have taken on some responsibilities related to community outreach. These “community navigators” are responsible for building community engagement and trust on behalf of the department. An additional position, the crime prevention specialist, is tasked with working with the community on implementing crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) strategies, preparing for crime stat meetings, and reaching out to community members. The City Council has since voted to move these positions outside of the police department, and MPD personnel expressed that they did not understand the reasoning for this decision.

In addition to patrol, the MPD uses civilian personnel in several other functions currently. We highlight these to describe the MPD’s current civilian personnel usage as well as to underscore some of the benefits and drawbacks of civilianization that MPD is currently experiencing. The Business Technology Unit (BTU) has experienced a loss in civilian staff. In 2017, the BTU comprised four sworn and six civilian personnel. The BTU has since lost two civilian staff, who operated as the body-worn camera and taser coordinators in the unit. They also have an open auditor position for a sworn staff

member. The unit is seeking to keep these open positions civilian and not fill them with sworn personnel.

Civilians fulfill several other department functions, including fleet management, evidence property management, crime lab tasking, and central records management. The current fleet manager is a civilian employee and works with the City garage for all department needs related to fleet maintenance. The evidence property room is open Monday through Friday and is run solely by 11 civilian staff. The crime lab has mostly civilian staff as well. In addition, 13 civilian staff comprise the central records division; the department is seeking more civilian personnel for clerical work because of their efficiency.

MECC roles typically filled by civilian staff, such as police dispatch, are also facing major staffing shortages. Police dispatch typically experiences quite a bit of turnover, but staff report that this turnover has increased of late. Dispatch currently has open positions for an interim director, operations manager, and quality assurance specialist. Dispatchers reported that the MECC is never fully staffed on the floor.

The MPD is currently experiencing challenges related to resources and staffing of both sworn and nonsworn personnel. In the face of these shortages, the department has continued its patrol operations in all five precincts, but through our interviews, we repeatedly heard concerns from personnel about understaffing and its effects. Staff report that several programs (including, notably, the Community Engagement and Outreach Bureau) have been disbanded or cut to meet demands for service elsewhere. Although some divisions have been able to use civilian staff to fulfill traditionally sworn positions, the department could potentially employ civilian staff more broadly to address the vacancies that currently exist departmentwide.

Recommendations

Recommendation 8: The MPD should continue to expand the use of civilian personnel to fulfill positions as appropriate within the agency, particularly in units such as community outreach, forensics, and information technology.

Recommendation 9: The MPD and the City should explore the possibility of implementing civilianization in additional roles outside the patrol function; however, the City and MPD should remain mindful that civilianization outside the roles listed in the previous recommendation is not (yet) widespread and little-to-no information is available about best practices or outcomes and effects. It would be beneficial to both the MPD and the broader field to carefully document such civilianization efforts and perform process and impact evaluations of them.

Recommendation 10: The MPD and MECC should develop recruitment strategies specific to civilian personnel and by role and focus area. These strategies should include mechanisms for reaching qualified applicants; considerations for diversity, equity, and inclusion in the hiring process; and proactive methods for promoting the MPD and MECC as progressive, fulfilling

workplaces with opportunities for career advancement. We recommend reviewing COPS Office publications for specific guidance on these topics.⁹

Recommendation 11: The MPD and MECC should collect data allowing for workload-based analysis of civilian roles within their organizations to ensure that these positions are staffed appropriately based on organizational priorities and activity levels. Please refer to Recommendation 5 for more details on the type of data required for this task.

Alternative response models

Findings from the field and research

Law enforcement responds to calls for service concerning a wide range of matters. They must be equipped to interact with community members in various physical, emotional, and psychological states. Researchers have studied multiple approaches to both address increasing calls-for-service volumes and ensure that the correct entities are responding to calls for service. Recently, there has been particular attention to the potential to implement alternative response models for law enforcement responses to low-level calls involving property crimes and calls involving individuals experiencing mental health crises in which responders must attempt to deescalate the situation and provide resources. The three most popular alternative response models are crisis intervention teams (CITs), mobile crisis teams (MCTs), and community service officers (CSOs).

The CIT model was developed in 1988 by Dr. Randolph Dupont and Major Sam Cochran of the University of Tennessee, Memphis, and the Memphis Police Department. It consists of officers who are trained in identifying signs and symptoms of mental health conditions and providing individuals with access to mental health services (Dupont & Cochran, 2000). More than 2,700 law enforcement agencies operate a CIT program in some capacity, and many of these provide all officers with basic CIT training (National Alliance on Mental Illness, n.d.). Researchers have shown that this model can lead to improved law enforcement attitudes toward those living with serious mental health conditions (Compton et al., 2006), earlier treatment for those individuals experiencing crisis (Strauss et al., 2005), and cost benefits (Cowell et al., 2004). Furthermore, there is evidence that CIT-trained officers are less likely to use force with individuals experiencing a mental health crisis (Compton et al., 2015).

MCTs are pairs or groups comprised of clinicians, social workers, and/or law enforcement officers who respond to calls involving individuals with mental health conditions. One such MCT model is the Crisis Assistance Helping Out On The Streets (CAHOOTS) program, which began in Eugene, Oregon. Paramedics and mental health crisis workers respond to nonviolent mental health-related calls to assist community members (White Bird Clinic, n.d.). In 2017, this team responded to 17 percent of the City's calls for service, saving it 8.5 million dollars (White Bird Clinic, 2020). Other models pair

⁹ The COPS Office resource page on recruitment, hiring, and retention can be found here: https://cops.usdoj.gov/recruitment_hiring_and_retention.

an officer and licensed mental health professional. These teams have been shown to be effective in addressing situations with higher potential for violence (Lamb et al., 1995).

CSOs are typically civilians employed by a law enforcement agency who complete tasks that do not require sworn personnel, such as traffic enforcement and report writing. Cities such as Akron, Ohio (Nethers, 2021), Fort Worth, Texas (Gordon, 2021), and Charlotte, North Carolina (Kuznitz & Zhou, 2020) are implementing programs to use civilians to respond to low-level calls for service, such as abandoned cars, burglaries, and noise complaints. Other cities, such as Birmingham, Alabama, also use CSOs to respond to calls involving individuals experiencing mental health crises. One study showed that this model, as compared to CITs and MCTs, has a higher likelihood of resolving situations on scene rather than transporting the individual to a hospital or psychiatric facility (Shapiro et al., 2015).

Recently, with increased scrutiny on law enforcement, other cities have chosen to implement programs that do not involve direct law enforcement engagement at all. For example, the County of Santa Clara Behavioral Health Services Department is currently funding an effort to implement a community mobile response program for individuals experiencing mental health crises. This program would be a completely community-led effort addressing groups with “historical trauma due to police brutality” and those who have been “historically unserved, underserved, and inappropriately served” by police (National Alliance on Mental Illness Santa Clara County, n.d.).

Findings from personnel interviews

All MPD officers are mandated to receive 40 hours of CIT training in the academy. Interviewees noted that, in the past, the MPD operated a co-responder model unit with Hennepin County’s Community Outreach for Psychiatric Emergencies (COPE) unit and Child Crisis unit. The COPE unit comprised two mental health specialists and one officer who followed up on EDP calls from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. The unit was later disbanded. MPD personnel perceived that it was disbanded because the involved organizations were wary of association with the MPD, although the MPD spokesperson cited insufficient staffing as the primary reason (Saint Louis, 2021).

More recently, new efforts have been made to incorporate alternative response models. Canopy Mental Health, a local organization comprised of civilians, began responding to EDP calls December 13, 2021. One interviewee expressed that, although they believed this effort is generally positive, a police response is still necessary in some situations. This sentiment reflects aspects of the national conversation about alternate response models.

Interviewees also expressed concerns about the availability of community-based resources for community members experiencing mental health crises. These concerns again mirror challenges identified across the nation in fully implementing alternate response models. Local organizations may not always have the capacity and resources to respond to the number of incidents occurring in a community. Another MPD member shared that surrounding suburbs in Hennepin County have begun embedding social workers into their police departments, a strategy the MPD is also interested in developing. As of mid-2021, the City has allocated funds to a provider, Canopy Mental Health, to respond to certain mental health emergencies. This strategy is currently underway and being evaluated (Jany, 2021).

Consistent with the recurrent theme of understaffing, most interviewees agreed that finding effective methods of diverting calls for which sworn law enforcement response is not necessary, such as calls involving quality-of-life issues and nonviolent mental health crises, would ameliorate burnout and morale issues.

Recommendations

Recommendation 12: Recognizing that MPD personnel may still be required to respond to some mental health crisis calls (those with threats of violence or those in which officers respond initially while mental health response teams are dispatched), the MPD should continue to maintain crisis intervention and other applicable training programs and ensure all officers have basic competency in these areas, as is the current practice in the department.

Recommendation 13: The City should commit resources to undertake an objective, rigorously designed evaluation of Canopy's mental health crisis team response model, including a process and impact evaluation as well as an analysis of costs and staffing implications.

Centralization of specific functions

Findings from the field and research

Research in policing has generally overlooked the effect of a police department's organizational structure on efficiency of operations. Research has focused on the issue of centralization vs. decentralization as a primary difference in structure. In centralized departments and units, all individuals working in a particular role are typically co-located and report to a single supervisor. For example, crime analysts who work together in the same room producing analytical reports under a single director. In decentralized structures, in contrast, individuals working in a specialized role are typically located in precincts or districts and while they may still report to a centralized supervisor, their day-to-day tasking is at least in part directed by the commander of that district or precinct. For example, crime analysts who work in a precinct, producing analyses specific to that precinct and in response to requests and needs identified by that precinct's command staff and officers.

A great deal of research in this area has focused on investigatory functions and whether centralization or decentralization result in superior outcomes. Thus far, it is unclear whether the centralization of any investigatory functions affects case outcomes, including clearance rates and crime levels (McCluskey et al., 2014). Early research in this field indicated that investigative structures have little effect on case clearance (Kenney et al., 2010). Despite this finding, various policing models support both centralization and decentralization of investigatory functions, and most agencies report employing a centralized model of investigatory functions (Horvath et al., 2001). Manning (1992) and Sanders (1977) recommended centralization of investigative functions because of the breadth of information processing conducted by detectives, whereas the community policing model supports decentralization to allow for stronger community ties and greater information flow. Benefits of centralizing personnel and resources for investigative purposes include enhancing

connections among detectives, increasing information sharing, and possibly improving some investigative outcomes (McCluskey et al., 2014). Although centralization is the norm in policing, an advantage of decentralization is the ability to strategically deploy investigators in the communities in which they operate (McCluskey et al., 2014). Separating investigators by division can also facilitate relationships between investigators, patrol officers, and the community, resulting in increased awareness of the division's crime problems. Although the empirical literature is sparse, a few studies have examined the effect of organizational structure across a range of outcomes.

One of the earliest studies to address centralization and decentralization was the 1975 RAND report on the criminal investigation process. The report was a large multisite study of police departments and their investigative processes. Since then, a handful of studies have examined the state of centralization in policing. Horvath et al. (2001) conducted a national survey of police departments and sought to build on the findings from the RAND report. Horvath et al. (2001, p. 26) found that 83 percent of all agencies had centralized investigative functions, regardless of department size, and that investigators were more centrally located than reported in past studies. Of the agencies that reported decentralization of investigatory functions, 48 percent of investigators were assigned to district stations, 20 percent were assigned to neighborhood substations, and 6 percent were assigned to mobile community substations (Horvath et al., 2001).

McCluskey et al. (2014) examined the restructuring of a decentralized robbery investigative unit to a centralized model in a single department. Specifically, they examined the effect on two outcome measures: case clearance rates and crime reduction, hypothesizing that centralizing robbery investigations would improve both outcome measures because of increased information flow. Following centralization, the researchers observed a statistically significant increase in case clearance rates as well as a reduction in robberies committed. Qualitative data support these findings; robbery investigators felt that centralizing their arrest processes and functions improved investigative efficiency.

Research on police investigations and outcomes is not well represented in the academic literature. Early studies determined that investigative practices have little effect on case outcomes, and later studies have suggested the opposite. One way in which investigations can affect case outcomes is through centralization, but more research is needed to support these findings beyond the study site.

Findings regarding decentralization of property crimes investigations in the MPD

Unlike the violent crime investigators in the MPD, property crimes investigators are not centralized. Each precinct houses its own property crimes unit as part of the patrol bureau. Property crimes investigators are considered detectives; all hold the rank of sergeant. Property crimes investigations encompass all property crimes, including missing persons and all nonviolent crime.

Like other areas in the MPD, property crime units are severely understaffed, and this understaffing is exacerbated by the low levels of patrol staffing. One interviewee noted that in their precinct, officers have received job offers for other police departments and that the precinct forecasts having

to close the property crimes unit altogether to be able to answer calls for service at the patrol level. Another precinct has just two property crimes investigators, down from 10 before the pandemic and protests. One interviewee suggested that property crimes are a major point of concern in their precinct, with automobile thefts increasing.

Interviewees provided some commentary on the way in which property crimes information is passed to patrol officers in their respective bureaus. If a property crimes investigator wants specific information relayed to patrol, they will send it to an intelligence analyst to be placed in the dib (daily information brief), which is located on the MPD homepage. Supervisors typically go through the dib each day and brief their officers in roll call if something is relevant to the precinct. This information is also accessible via the citywide homepage.

Finally, MPD personnel discussed some of the benefits of a decentralized property crimes unit. Namely, investigators housed in the patrol bureaus have the advantage of knowing their area and community. If an uptick in a property crime type, such as burglaries, occurred, the investigators in that precinct would benefit from knowing the “key players” in that area. Decentralization allows sergeants to become specialists in their communities, whereas a centralized property crimes unit may not afford the same benefits.

Recommendations

Recommendation 14: Based on personnel input, the current practice of decentralizing property crimes investigations at the precinct level seems to operate well and have no noted drawbacks. These personnel, as with others at the MPD, are currently challenged by workloads and understaffing. Because the assessment team was unable to conduct a formal staffing analysis for this role, we cannot recommend a specific staffing level quantitatively, but we recommend increasing staffing and continuing to gather feedback from personnel in this role.

Enterprise service usage

Findings from personnel interviews

During our personnel interviews, we inquired about information technology enterprise systems used within the MPD. These included specialized systems used almost exclusively by the MPD and MECC (such as CAD/records management systems) as well as general software deployed on computers and mobile devices. Interviewees shared that they did not struggle with an overlap in existing enterprise systems. An individual shared one example of redundancy (driver’s license information can be extracted from multiple systems) but could not identify others. The assessment team learned that the MPD technology support department has a favorable view of the information technology department within the City of Minneapolis and believes that they work effectively together.

Recommendation 15: At this time, it does not appear that changes are required regarding enterprise systems used by the MPD. We recommend continuing with current operations and developing a regular cadence for internal reviews of enterprise system use in the future.

One- versus two-person patrol car use

Findings from the field and research

Police department staffing has become a particularly complex challenge in recent years. A shrinking applicant pool, public sentiment toward the police, increasing law enforcement responsibilities, and retention issues have all contributed to this challenge. In addition, departments have struggled to identify the number of officers needed to serve their community and how those officers should be deployed (i.e., one- versus two-officer patrol units). Although staffing analyses can assist agencies with these important questions, many agencies do not have the funds or resources to hire external organizations to conduct them (Wilson & Weiss, 2012). In addition, multiple methods exist for determining department staffing. In the United States, law enforcement traditionally determines staffing models by one of four methods: a per capita approach, minimum-manning levels, authorized or budgeted levels, and workload-based models (McCabe, 2013; Wilson & Weiss, 2012). Per capita models are relatively simple to calculate, and the data are readily available; however, agencies using this method risk a biased determination of department and community needs. The minimum-manning approach requires the department to estimate a sufficient number of patrol officers to maintain officer safety and protect the public, but there are no objective standards for doing so, which could result in underdeployment of officers when workload is high or overdeployment when workload is low. An authorized level approach relies on budget allocations to identify a set number of patrol officers who can be deployed and is typically driven by resource availability. This method reflects a budgeting process rather than objective criteria related to policing operations. Finally, the workload-based approach is more comprehensive in determining staffing models because it relies on demand for service indicators, estimates of future staffing needs, and current levels of activity. Workload-based models can be conducted at every level of the police department and for all functions; however, no universally accepted standard exists for these types of assessments (Wilson & Weiss, 2012).

The debate over whether one- or two-officer patrol units are most beneficial has been a core concern of staffing strategies in policing (Long, 2014). Factors typically considered in this decision include officer safety, community and citizen safety, crime rates, efficiency, cost, and available resources. Studies on patrol staffing are dated; have typically focused on response times, officer perceptions, and staffing models; and have often produced inconsistent results. Carmen and Guevara (2003) examined officer perceptions of the effectiveness of one- versus two-officer patrol units. They found that officers felt that two-officer units should be used at night and in locations where levels of police mistrust are high but that two-officer units do not accomplish twice as much as one-officer units. Officers also expressed that two-officer patrol units are more likely to be injured because of potential distractions and did not agree that one-officer units would result in less backup. Perceived benefits

of two-person units included better on-scene observations and quicker response times. Officers also expressed that two-officer patrols offer greater visibility, are an effective deterrent to crime and disorder, increase police visibility to the community, and provide training opportunities for new officers (Carmen & Guevara, 2003). Additional cited benefits of two-officer cars included the cost-effectiveness of having half as many patrol vehicles and better quality service (Kaplan, 1979).

One-officer units have their own benefits and challenges. In a dated United States Department of Justice study, Kaplan (1979) determined that one-officer units decrease response time significantly because more units are available. Chelst (1981) examined response times between one- and two-officer units and found that one-officer units took 30 percent less time to respond to Type 1 calls and 40 percent less time to respond to Type 2 calls.¹⁰ Kaplan (1979) also found that in San Diego, the risk of injury to an officer was equal between the two patrol types. Regarding cost savings, the study concluded that switching from two- to one-officer units would cost an additional \$2.51 per hour per unit, and the author suggested that maximum use of one-officer units is the favored approach (Kaplan, 1979). Green and Kolesar (1984) conducted a study to estimate the number of one-officer cars required to achieve the same level of performance as two-officer vehicles. Although dated, the study demonstrated that the one-officer program requires 35 percent more patrol vehicles, resulting in 32 percent fewer police officers in patrol vehicles (Green & Kolesar, 1984, p. 977), arguably resulting in cost savings by requiring fewer officers (although the study did not include a formal cost analysis). Law enforcement agencies typically make intuitive deployment decisions, rather than basing deployment decisions on the specific evidence-based pros and cons of one- vs. two-person patrols (Wilson & Weiss, 2012).

Findings from personnel interviews

The MPD does not have a formal policy mandating one- or two-officer patrol units. Shift supervisors determine patrol car assignments on any given shift. An average shift has at least one two-officer unit on patrol, but the department typically gravitates toward two-officer cars for the night shifts. The department also deploys a two-officer response car that is primarily responsible for responding to officer help calls and assisting other precincts as required. Because of the current staffing limitations, the department is not well positioned to implement and evaluate an overarching policy on one-versus two-officer patrol deployment. Currently, the choice to deploy one- versus two-person patrol units is understandably driven in many cases by staffing levels rather than by procedural or policy-based decision-making. For example, one interviewee discussed how decreased staffing affects his ability to deploy two-officer units. During the week (Sunday through Thursday), the staffing minimum is seven, and on the weekend (Friday and Saturday), it is eight. With four sectors in the precinct and one officer needed at the desk, it is not feasible to send out two-officer units on weekdays. During the weekend, however, the interviewee can manage to deploy 3 two-person units with one officer at the desk.

¹⁰ In this study, Type 1 calls require only one officer to respond and Type 2 calls require two officers to respond.

Recommendations

Recommendation 16: The MPD should formalize policy and structure regarding the use of two-person patrol units. Committing entirely to one-person or two-person patrols is not a typical practice; instead, the MPD should weigh various factors to develop a policy for when two-person patrols will be used. Specific factors that should be considered are time of day, day of week, and time of year (and related volume and types of responses); location (and related volume and types of responses); community engagement priorities and strategies; officer safety; and special circumstances (such as preplanned events, disasters, and other crisis situations). Such a policy will allow for more predictable staffing requirements and ensure that supervisors and officers understand when they will and will not be assigned in two-person units.

Recommendation 17: Based on the determined policy, the MPD should review the staffing analysis and revise the required staffing if needed to adjust for the predicted rates of two-person patrol units. The MPD should ensure sufficient sworn positions are filled to adhere to policy.

Proactive time proportion

An agency's ability to maintain sufficient staffing levels is critical to its ability to promote public safety. Over the years, agencies have taken different approaches to identify staffing levels, and a critical part of that determination is understanding how officers' time is allocated. Many agencies refer to the time that officers are not using to respond to calls for service as "uncommitted" or "discretionary" time. This time is used for other important activities in law enforcement agencies' missions, most importantly informal nonenforcement interactions with the community that the officers serve. During this time, officers can meet community members, engage with business owners, and learn more about the neighborhoods in which they work. Officers can also use this time to engage in collaborative problem-solving with community members, a model called problem-oriented policing that is central to community engagement according to the COPS Office (2014). Officers also frequently use this time to complete paperwork, review internal memos and communications, and stay apprised of analysis about crime trends and other critical information. Research has found a wide range in the amount of uncommitted time an officer has on their shift by agency and by role. Literature from researchers and practitioners provides data to estimate the appropriate uncommitted time allocation for law enforcement officers.

Findings from the field and research

Researchers and law enforcement practitioners gather information about how much of officers' time is uncommitted to understand how much time officers have to conduct proactive activities. Research methods to examine the questions of how much time is uncommitted and how much should be uncommitted include examining police CAD data, observing officers, and reviewing police

operational procedures (Lum et al., 2020; McCabe, 2013). Studies have evaluated staff workload, officer deployment, and response times to calls for service.

Proactive policing activities include conducting traffic stops, patrolling high-crime areas, conducting radar checkpoints, and issuing parking violations (Koper et al., 2020; Lum et al., 2020). Note that many agencies define proactive activity differently, which can make it difficult for researchers to properly analyze. For example, some agencies define proactive time as time spent conducting self-initiated activities, and others define it as uncommitted time used to conduct administrative work or meet with other officers (Cordner, 1981; Wilson & Weiss, 2012).

The National Academies of Sciences Committee on Proactive Policing has also developed a definition for *proactivity*, defining it as “strategies that have as one of their goals the prevention or reduction of crime and disorder and that are not reactive in terms of focusing primarily on uncovering ongoing crime or on investigating or responding to crimes once they have occurred” (Weisburd et al., 2019). Researchers have found that many agencies have different guidance for officers on how they should be spending their proactive time, whereas other agencies provide no guidance at all (Koper et al., 2020).

Overall, a significant portion of officers’ shifts is spent on activities other than responding to calls for service or doing administrative tasks. Research has shown that on average, officers spend about 20 percent of their total shift time responding to calls for service (Famega et al., 2005; Koper et al., 2020). One study found that about 74 percent of an officer’s patrol shift is spent on activities other than responding to calls for service (Famega et al., 2005). Another study found that about 54 percent of officers’ patrol shifts did not involve responding to calls for service (Cordner, 1981).

Although studies find a wide range in the amount of officers’ uncommitted time during patrol, they do offer guidance as to how much of an officer’s time should be uncommitted. The ICMA published a report on police department staffing suggesting that no more than 60 percent of available patrol officer time be spent responding to calls for service, which includes the time responding to the call as well as associated activities (driving time, necessary paperwork), referred to as the Rule of 60.¹¹ We use this same definition in our staffing analysis, to the degree possible (if some officers make a practice of closing the call before completing paperwork, we are not able to discern that in the data). The report adds that the remaining 40 percent of the time should be discretionary time for officers to be available to address community problems and respond to major emergencies.

Other reports on officer staffing have suggested that about one-third of officers’ time be uncommitted time for proactive patrol activities (Koper et al., 2020; Wilson & Weiss, 2012). Another one-third of time would be obligated to administrative tasks, with the remainder available for responding to calls for service.

¹¹ ICMA’s analysis actually proposes two interrelated “Rules of 60”; the assertion that 60 percent of an officer’s time should be uncommitted is the one typically referred to in common parlance. The other suggests that 60 percent of department personnel should be assigned to patrol duties.

Having agencies, researchers, and practitioners understand the appropriate time allocation for officers will help organizations properly staff law enforcement personnel. During a time when many agencies struggle with staffing challenges, understanding the necessary time allocation is more critical than ever. Research has shown that officers often have a large amount of time that is uncommitted to responding to calls for service. Through interviews, and as we have noted throughout this report, officers reported having very little proactive time available currently, and we see this trend reflected in decreasing levels of self-initiated activity (see Section 3).

Recommendations

Recommendation 18: The MPD should determine an appropriate level of discretionary time, and ensure staffing levels sufficient to support patrol officers in having that level of discretionary time on most or all shifts. It may be the most appropriate to allow a relatively higher level of discretionary time for shifts covering late afternoon and early evening (when most community engagement activities take place) as opposed to overnight and early in the morning. In addition, the MPD may wish to prioritize additional discretionary time availability in the near term as the agency focuses on reprioritizing community engagement and relationship building.

Recommendation 19: As the MPD is able to return to higher levels of discretionary time and, in turn, increased levels of proactive officer activity, it is critical to document and assess the use of discretionary time. To that end, the MPD and MECC should collaboratively develop processes and procedures to assign a priority code to these activities and create protocols for dispositions, metrics for effectiveness, and protocols for supervisory oversight. These are necessary to verify that these activities occur and have the desired effects.

Section 3: Problem Nature Code Analysis

In this section, we present analysis and findings related to calls for service (including 9-1-1 calls), with specific attention to the use of PNCs to categorize calls for service. Using five years of calls-for-service data from 2016 through 2020, we used an exploratory descriptive approach to understand responses to incidents, MECC coding of PNCs, and the relationship between such variables of interest as response times, priority levels, incident lengths, and other incident characteristics. An exploratory descriptive approach explores summary and cross-tabulation data to uncover trends and associations that have practical and policy relevance, letting the data drive the analysis. Exploratory descriptive approaches are commonly used in situations in which describing complex data is of primary importance and comparative statistical analysis is not appropriate. They are also used to answer questions that are broader and more open ended than other quantitative research questions. They are also appropriate when the analysis will likely uncover more questions during the process of exploring the data. This in comparison to quantitative statistical analysis where an analysis plan is developed in advance and applied.

To complete the analysis, our assessment team performed several data cleaning tasks on the five years of data. Note that each individual incident could have multiple lines of data in the original dataset—we distinguish between “incidents” and “incident lines” to reflect these two different ideas. In the PNC analysis, we are interested in incidents because each incident has a single PNC that is subsequently duplicated across incident lines. Thus, retaining all incident lines would misrepresent the actual distribution of PNCs. Therefore, the numbers presented in this section largely do not align with those from the staffing analysis, in which incident lines were important to account for multiple officers arriving on scene in multiple vehicles. The following is a summary of the cleaning tasks performed on the initial 1,794,408 lines of data:

- We removed 915,146 incident lines in which the response was noted to be a secondary vehicle responding (because we are primarily interested in the first arriving patrol unit in our analyses) or for which no vehicle responded to the incident. In other words, we retained only one line per incident, the line including information about the first car to respond to the scene, and we did not retain lines in which no car ever responded.
- We removed an additional 1,733 incident lines that shared the same incident number with another line, retaining whichever line contained the first unit on scene based on the arrival time.
- We removed 18 incident lines that had no incident number identifier.
- We appended vehicle data (which contains on-scene arrival time and call cleared times) to the calls-for-service data; we note that 129,731 calls-for-service incidents do not have associated vehicle data. This lack of vehicle data may reflect data quality issues, including the possibility of misentered incident numbers (because that is the field we used to merge

these datasets). We were still able to analyze these lines in nearly all the below sections because the only major variable we use from the vehicle dataset is the call cleared time.

- We calculated variables to measure the time from initial incident identification (e.g., 9-1-1 call taken) until a unit arrived on scene and the time from a unit arriving on scene until the call was cleared. After performing these calculations, we replaced any negative calculated time with a missing value; there were 946 and 20,461 instances of negative calculated time, respectively. In our experience, these typically represent data entry errors.


Taken together, the rate of missing values and removed data because of inappropriate values (like negative times) is very low compared to the overall number of calls for service documented during the five-year period—less than 5 percent for each type of data irregularity except the vehicle data gaps (which, as noted above, do not affect all analyses). We have no reason to believe that the incidents completely removed from the dataset vary systematically from those included (the probability of a typo while entering an incident time seems unlikely to vary by PNC, for example). We have high confidence that the analysis on the cleaned data is accurate and representative of MECC incident data collection and response.

Basic characteristics and trends

Over the five-year period analyzed, the MECC cataloged information for approximately 1.79 million incidents.¹² Figure 12 shows the distribution of calls for service over time, broken out by those prompted by 9-1-1 calls and those that represent self-deployments. The trend in 9-1-1 calls shows the typical seasonal trend with higher call rates in the summer months, at steady average annual rates over the five-year period. Self-deployments trend downward over the five-year period, particularly from mid-2018 onward, and this trend is also reflected in the total calls-for-service trend. Over the entire period, 60 percent of calls for service were produced by 9-1-1 calls.


¹² We provide an approximate figure here because our data cleaning procedures to remove incidents with multiple lines of data (produced, for example, when multiple patrol units are dispatched to an incident) may have introduced minor errors in the complete count of incidents. These are so small in number that they do not affect the overall analysis and findings.

Figure 12. Calls for service over time



In Figure 13, we present calls for service by time of day, also broken out by call type. As in most agencies, calls for service are lowest in the early morning hours and peak in the late afternoon into the evening. (Note that this figure re-presents information from Figure 2 in a different format, broken out by type of call for service.)

Figure 13. Calls for service by time of day



For incidents in which a unit did arrive on scene (87 percent of incidents), the average (mean) time from the initial call intake until a unit arrived on scene is 15 and a half minutes; this time is 27.8 minutes for calls that originate from 9-1-1 calls. Figure 14 presents the breakout of response times for all calls, whereas Figure 15 displays average response times for calls originating from 9-1-1 only.

As expected, when considering all calls, the most common response time is less than 5 minutes, whereas when considering 9-1-1 calls only, the most common response time is between 5 and 10 minutes. The assessment team notes that some incidents have extremely long response times (ranging into months), and these outliers do influence the mean. Unfortunately, it is impossible to discern from the data whether these calls reflect data entry errors or legitimately lengthy response times, and we cannot determine an appropriate cutoff point beyond which to discard these data.

Figure 14. Time from intake to arrival on scene in minutes, all calls






Figure 15. Time from intake to arrival on scene in minutes, 9-1-1 response only



For incidents in which a unit did arrive on scene, the average time from arrival until the call was cleared is 30.9 minutes. Figure 16 presents the breakout of time to clear a call from arrival.

Figure 16. Time from arrival on scene until call cleared in minutes

Taken together, the analyses above present a compelling pattern, in that many calls are both arrived to and cleared relatively quickly but a substantial number require more than an hour for response time or clearing. This pattern suggests the need to disaggregate the data to understand which types of calls are driving the two ends of the data, which we proceed to next.

Problem nature codes

During the analyzed time period, the MECC used 167 PNCs as the final code associated with a call. In this section, we use both the initial codes and the final codes at different points (unlike the staffing analysis, which relies solely on initial codes). We are primarily interested in final codes because these reflect the most accurate assessment of the incident type (e.g., the assessment by officers after arriving at and assessing the scene). However, we also include analysis comparing initial to final codes.

By their nature, PNCs are extremely specific. This specificity is important because these codes help prepare officers for the situation they are responding to and help Minneapolis first responders understand what types of calls for service they encounter. Some codes are used quite rarely (e.g., Aircraft Crash in City) but are still important to classify separately. In addition, certain closely related PNCs, such as Stabbing and Stabbing Report Only, are important to categorize separately because they entail different response deployments—police only versus police and emergency medical services.

Least frequently used codes

Our assessment team reviewed the PNCs currently in use and did not identify any obvious duplication in codes. We did identify some low-use codes (50 or fewer uses in five years) that should be considered for elimination, summarized in Table 7. Not all low-use codes should be considered for

elimination; codes that are used for particularly severe or specific incidents should be retained, as we note in the table. We also acknowledge that we do not have intensive working knowledge of City operations, and there may be reasons to retain these codes despite their low overall use in incidents. The ultimate determination to remove codes should be made by City staff with this working knowledge.

Table 7. Low-use problem nature codes

Problem Nature Code ^a	Times Used	Suggested Action	Reasoning
Barge(s) Loose (PF)	1	Retain	Severity of incident
Shortness of Breath (FE)	1	Remove	Lack of use suggests these incidents are typically coded under another code
Aircraft Alert - Standby (PFE)	2	Retain	Part of a code series
Bicycle Violation (UM)	2	Combine	Several codes for university response are similar in nature and could be combined into fewer categories in MECC's data system
Aircraft Crash in City (PFE)	3	Retain	Severity of incident
Aircraft Alert - Notify (PFE)	4	Retain	Part of a code series
BDS Alert (Main PO) (PFE)	4	Retain	Severity of incident
ESP Activation (P)	4	Retain	Severity of incident
No Tag (UM)	4	Combine	Several codes for university response are similar in nature and could be combined into fewer categories in MECC's data system
Pedestrian Contact	5	Remove	Lack of use suggests these incidents are typically coded under another code
Skateboarder Violation (UM)	6	Combine	Several codes for university response are similar in nature and could be combined into fewer categories in MECC's data system
Explosion - Vehicle (PFE)	7	Retain	Severity of incident
Wires Down (F)	8	Retain	Severity of incident
Rescue - Bldg Collapse (PFE)	9	Retain	Severity of incident
Drowning (PFE)	10	Retain	Severity of incident and custom response requirements
Alcohol Violation (UM)	11	Combine	Several codes for university response are similar in nature

Problem Nature Code ^a	Times Used	Suggested Action	Reasoning
			and could be combined into fewer categories in MECC's data system
Explosion - Structure (PFE)	11	Retain	Severity of incident
Driving While Intoxicated (UM)	27	Combine	Several codes for university response are similar in nature and could be combined into fewer categories in MECC's data system
Overdose - Accidental (PE)	35	Retain	This code differentiates from overdoses requiring police response
Animal Fight (P)	39	Retain	Custom response requirements
Harassment (UM)	46	Combine	Several codes for university response are similar in nature and could be combined into fewer categories in MECC's data system
Robbery of Biz - Report (P)	46	Remove	Lack of use suggests these incidents are typically coded under another code
Non-Vehicular Accident (UM)	50	Combine	Several codes for university response are similar in nature and could be combined into fewer categories in MECC's data system
SAFE (P)	50	N/A	This code has already been removed

^a The abbreviations following each PNC refer to the default first responders for the PNC: P represents police, F represents fire, E represents emergency medical services, and UM references university response.

Most frequently used codes

Another consideration when implementing coding structures is whether some codes are used too frequently or lack sufficient specificity. Table 8 presents the most frequently used codes, those with more than 25,000 uses in the five-year analysis period. Most of these codes are at an appropriate level of specificity—they represent call types commonly used in many law enforcement agencies. We do suggest revising the Emotionally Disturbed Person code to reflect emerging preferred language. Although this term was once common parlance in law enforcement agencies, an increasing number are adjusting to use terms such as “individual in mental health crisis” instead. A working group

including MPD, Minneapolis Fire Department, EMS, and MECC personnel is currently working to address this issue.

Table 8. Frequently used problem nature codes

Problem Nature Code	Times Used
Directed Patrol (P)	229,511
Business Check (P)	125,032
Traffic Law Enforcement (P)	107,452
Disturbance (P)	77,314
Suspicious Person (P)	69,478
Check the Welfare (P)	69,384
Unwanted Person (P)	60,729
Suspicious Vehicle (P)	55,547
Foot Beat (P)	48,096
Miscellaneous (P)	47,569
Domestic (P)	45,139
Unknown Wireless/Cell Phone(P)	44,827
Property Damage Accident (P)	42,280
Unknown Trouble (P)	39,171
Theft - Report Only (P)	36,037
Audible Business Alarm (P)	29,695
Emotionally Disturb Person (P)	28,443
Down Outside-One (PE)	26,771
Property Damage/Hit & Run (P)	26,765
Assist EMS Personnel (P)	25,985

Use of the “Miscellaneous” code

We also note that the Miscellaneous PNC is used very frequently in the current coding structure. Although this frequent use is typical in many agencies, it hinders complete analysis of calls-for-service data. To better understand the use of this code, we cross-tabulated it against other characteristics of the incidents. Table 9 summarizes these tabulations. Of particular note is that most uses of the Miscellaneous PNC are for non-9-1-1 call incidents and that nearly a quarter of Miscellaneous PNC calls result in a call disposition of “Report,” with an additional 17 percent resulting in a call disposition of “Information.” We suggest that the City determine a method to capture, at a minimum, these two categories of responses into a separate problem nature code or codes to more accurately reflect the incident characteristics.

Table 9. Characteristics of the Miscellaneous problem nature code’s use

Characteristic	Percentage
Related to a 9-1-1 call	19%

Characteristic	Percentage
Unit arrived on scene	80%
Call cancelled	12%
Call disposition: Report	25%
Call disposition: Information	17%
Call disposition: All OK	14%
No call disposition	11%

In reviewing the frequency of code use, our main takeaway is that overall, the PNC list seems to be well crafted to capture incident characteristics, although we also understand that dispatchers find the number of different codes somewhat burdensome (see Section 4 for more information on this issue). For data quality reasons, we always encourage agencies to reduce use of “other” and “miscellaneous” categories, and we do here as well. This analysis informs several of our recommendations below.

Problem nature codes and other characteristics

The MECC codes both an initial PNC and a final PNC for each incident. The initial PNC and final PNC are the same 88 percent of the time. We consider here the 12 percent of incidents in which the PNC does change.

Of those incidents with a change in PNC, 70 percent are 9-1-1 call responses. This is somewhat higher than the overall ratio of 9-1-1 call incidents, which makes sense contextually. Officers are likely able to classify incidents more accurately on first sight than community members.

First, we consider which PNCs, when coded initially, are the most commonly changed.¹³ Nine PNCs are changed 50 percent of the time or more frequently, as shown in Table 10. Many of these codes are also infrequently used, with the exception being the code for Possible Personal Injury Accident. This code is deliberately included in the system for accidents in which the call taker cannot discern whether emergency medical response is required and a police unit is dispatched to make that determination. The code is then changed if necessary. The other most frequently used and changed code is Referral; this code is now deprecated (i.e., no longer in active use but retained in the CAD system for historical data). Although these codes are often changed, we do not recommend changes to the codes beyond those already noted above because the more commonly used are being used appropriately as temporary placeholders and the others are infrequently used.

¹³ There are 263 administrative use PNCs used only for initial coding that are changed 100 percent of the time to the more general form of that code. Here we omit those codes from analysis. We also omit the On Site PNC, which is a placeholder during initial police response for self-deployed calls and is updated once the officer discerns the nature of the situation.

Table 10. Frequently changed initial problem nature codes

Initial Problem Nature Code	Times Used	Percent Changed
Aircraft Crash in City (PFE)	10	80%
Driving While Intoxicated (UM)	10	80%
Alcohol Violation (UM)	20	75%
No Tag (UM)	13	69%
Drowning (PFE)	28	68%
Aircraft Alert - Standby (PFE)	5	60%
Poss Personal Injury Acc (P)	8,695	59%
Referral (P)	995	56%
Pedestrian Contact	10	50%

Next, we consider the most common combinations of initial and final PNCs. (A complete cross-tabulation is available upon request; here we feature just the most common combinations for the sake of space and readability.) In this analysis, we again omit the codes noted in footnote 13 as well as those in Table 10 because we have already explored these.

Table 11 summarizes the most common pairs among changed PNCs. Several notable patterns stand out in this table. First, the Miscellaneous code again appears frequently, with the final code being Directed Patrol. We suggest that the MECC and MPD review communication protocols associated with officers going on directed patrol to reduce or eliminate initial coding of that activity into the Miscellaneous PNC. Similarly, Foot Beat is commonly reclassified to Directed Patrol, suggesting the need for similar clarification.

The Domestic Abuse-In Progress code is often recoded to other PNCs in the final assessment. Most commonly it is recoded to Domestic, which presumably reflects that the incident is no longer in progress, and in other cases it is recoded to Unwanted Person or Disturbance. Similarly, Unknown Trouble is frequently recoded to Domestic, likely because the initial 9-1-1 caller is uncertain of the nature of a disturbance they are reporting and officers are able to clarify upon arrival.

Another frequently recoded code is Emotionally Disturbed Person being revised to Check the Welfare. The assessment team imagines that this change again reflects an initial report from a community member in which the situation is ultimately determined not to involve a mental health crisis by responding officers, who then recode the incident to the broader welfare check category.

Lastly, two incident types are commonly recoded to Disturbance: Assault in Progress and Fight. This finding seems to represent a problem being reclassified to a broader category from a more specific one, which is the reverse of what is typically expected. We encourage the MECC and MPD to ensure that these recodings are not resulting in loss of specificity because Disturbance is defined in the PNC index as for use when another more specific code is not available.

Table 11. Comparison of initial and final problem nature codes for most frequent combinations

Initial Problem Nature Code	Final Problem Nature Code	Count
Domestic Abuse-In Progress (P)	Domestic (P)	9,899
Assault in Progress (P)	Disturbance (P)	2,695
Miscellaneous (P)	Directed Patrol (P)	2,234
Property Damage Accident (P)	Property Damage/Hit & Run (P)	2,193
Domestic Abuse-In Progress (P)	Unwanted Person (P)	1,743
Domestic Abuse-In Progress (P)	Disturbance (P)	1,564
Unknown Trouble (P)	Domestic (P)	1,523
Emotionally Disturb Person (P)	Check the Welfare (P)	1,448
Foot Beat (P)	Directed Patrol (P)	1,284
Fight (P)	Disturbance (P)	1,261

Priority levels analysis

We also consider the priority levels assigned to calls. Each PNC has an associated priority level, documented in MECC policy. Priority 0 calls are the most urgent, and priority 3 calls are the least. A priority designation of 9 is used as a placeholder. We restrict this analysis to calls in which (1) the incident was initiated by a 9-1-1 call (because response times for self-initiated calls are substantively different), (2) a unit arrived on scene in response to the incident, and (3) the initial priority code was between 0 and 3. Here we define response time as the number of minutes from the initial call being received until a unit arrived on scene.

As expected, most responses are for priority levels 1 and 2, and the response time is slower for lower priority calls (Table 12).

Table 12. Priority level frequency and response times

Initial Priority Level	Count ^a	Average Response Time (minutes)
0	1,294	6
1	384,825	12
2	376,432	38
3	88,368	49

^a Note that counts in this section differ from other analyses because of the data restrictions listed above.

Response time analysis

We next consider whether there are particular PNCs for which response times are considerably greater or less than would be anticipated based on their priority level. For this analysis, we further limit our sample to PNCs that were used at least 1,000 times over the five-year period because it would be difficult to disentangle patterns when reviewing every PNC. We also limit to incidents in

which the PNC was the same in the initial and final designation because these incidents offer the simplest interpretation of any observed differences in response times.

After comparing averages by PNC to the overall average for the designated priority level that the PNC falls within, we found 13 PNCs with unusually shorter or longer response times, defined as response times that are either less than 50 percent or more than 150 percent of the average for their priority level. For example, our analysis captured PNCs designated as priority level 1 that had a unit on scene in less than 6 minutes or more than 18 minutes.

As seen in Table 13, most of the PNCs with substantively different response times have an initial priority level of 1. Most of these reflect shorter response times than the average, which is not concerning, particularly for level 1 calls. However, the Domestic PNC has an average response time that is more than twice the average for a priority level 1 call. We suggest that the MPD review this discrepancy, identify the underlying cause, and address it to ensure that these calls are responded to efficiently.

Among the other calls, the Burglary Business – Report PNC is noted as priority level 2 but typically takes more than an hour to respond to, considerably longer than the average response time of 38 minutes for priority level 2 calls. Based on the PNC description, this code is used to collect information about a burglary at a business that has already taken place. This PNC might be better aligned with priority level 3, given it is not a crime in progress and could be handled on a longer time frame.

Table 13. Problem nature codes with response times notably above or below the average for their assigned priority level

Initial Priority	Problem Nature Code	Average Response Time (minutes)	Count	Average Time for Priority Level	Difference	Direction
1	Assist EMS Personnel (P)	6.7	14,970	12	-5.3	Shorter
1	Assist Fire Personnel (P)	7.1	2,082	12	-4.9	Shorter
1	Domestic (P)	26.8	1,114	12	+14.8	Longer
1	Down Outside-One (PE)	7.5	15,640	12	-4.5	Shorter
1	Down Outside-One w/Fire (PFE)	7.2	4,229	12	-4.8	Shorter
1	Holdup Alarm (P)	5.9	1,906	12	-6.1	Shorter
1	Overdose-Accidental (E)	5.9	3,308	12	-6.1	Shorter
1	ShotSpotter Activation (P)	7.6	4,818	12	-4.4	Shorter
1	Slumper w/Fire (PFE)	7.7	1,174	12	-4.3	Shorter
2	Burglary Business - Report (P)	79.4	1,541	38	+41.4	Longer

Initial Priority	Problem Nature Code	Average Response Time (minutes)	Count	Average Time for Priority Level	Difference	Direction
2	Suspected Prostitute (P)	25.1	1,217	38	-12.9	Shorter
3	Drunk/Intoxicated Person (P)	29.8	2,128	49	-19.2	Shorter
3	Miscellaneous (P)	29.3	2,991	49	-19.7	Shorter

Call length analysis

Another topic of interest when considering PNCs is the time typically associated with clearing a call for different codes. Understanding this time can help agencies understand staffing requirements and identify call types that could most affect staffing needs. For this analysis, we consider the final PNC and restrict the analysis to those incidents in which a unit did arrive on scene and clear the call. We analyzed the time from arrival on scene until the call was cleared in minutes, on average, by PNC.¹⁴ As noted above, the average call clearance time is 30.9 minutes. When considering the time by PNC, the PNC with the longest average time to clear—1,020 minutes—is for structure explosions, of which only five occurred in the five-year period. The shortest average time to clear for a PNC that is not procedural or a university code is for firecrackers, averaging 9 minutes to clear the call across 1,256 incidents.

Table 14 summarizes the PNCs associated with the longest times to clear the call. We include the 17 PNCs that last more than two hours on average.

Calls for mental health response are of particular interest in terms of time spent on the call. Based on these data, the MPD spends, on average, 40 and a half minutes on calls under the Emotionally Disturbed Person PNC, which is longer than the average call length by about 10 minutes. Although this is not a dramatic difference from the average call, the MPD responded to more than 25,000 of these calls in the five-year period, representing more than 3,000 hours of officer time. We encourage the City to continue considering alternate response models, as described in Section 2, that could reduce officer time spent dispatched on these calls.

Table 14. Longest problem nature code times to clear call

Problem Nature Code	Average Time to Clear Call (minutes)	Count
Explosion-Structure (PFE)	1,020	5
Personal Injury w/ Trap (PFE)	308	100
Shooting (PFE)	280	1,196

¹⁴ Note that this time is definitionally different from the time spent on a call used in the staffing analysis, which also considered the time the officer spends in transit. Here we are concerned not with officer time spent in total but with the time spent actually responding to the call and not in transit to the call.

Problem Nature Code	Average Time to Clear Call (minutes)	Count
Police Event (P)	230	383
Motor Vehicle Chase (P)	195	670
Driving While Intoxicated (UM)	188	25
Dead Person (P)	169	2,532
Officer Needs Help (P)	146	700
Stabbing (PE)	135	1,019
Chase on Foot (P)	135	623
Crim Sex Conduct/Report (P)	134	2,266
Shooting Report Only (P)	132	483
Crim Sex Conduct (P)	132	859
High Risk Warrant Entry (P)	129	1,401
Robbery Dwell in Progress (P)	123	133
Stabbing Report Only (P)	123	259
Robbery of Biz in Progress (P)	122	549

Recommendations

Recommendation 20: The MECC should revise the Emotionally Disturbed Person PNC title and description to reflect recent changes in preferred language for describing these situations (e.g., “Individual Experiencing Mental Health Crisis”). These changes should be reflected throughout policy and practice in both MECC and MPD documents. A working group including MPD, Minneapolis Fire Department, EMS, and MECC personnel is currently working to address this issue.

Recommendation 21: The City should work to better classify incidents currently captured in the Miscellaneous PNC, particularly those incidents with dispositions of “Report” or “Information.” This practice would considerably reduce the use of the Miscellaneous code.

Recommendation 22: The MECC and MPD should review communication protocols associated with officers going on directed patrol to reduce or eliminate initial coding of that activity into the Miscellaneous PNC.

Recommendation 23: The MPD should review its response process for Domestic PNC calls, identify the underlying cause for the lengthy response time for these calls, and address it to ensure that these calls are responded to efficiently.

Recommendation 24: The City should consider recoding the Burglary Business – Report PNC to priority level 3.

Recommendation 25: Community members are generally satisfied, in nonemergencies, with a predictable response rather than a rapid response. Whenever possible, the MECC should

have protocol and a script to provide callers with an estimate of the response time given call prioritization. This practice can also work well in parallel with alternative response models (such as self-reporting of minor vehicle accidents and property crimes).

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Section 4: Business Process Analysis

Introduction

The success of the MPD Patrol Bureau relies on efficient and effective administrative and operational policies, especially when operating with a persistent reduction in staffing levels. These policies include the processes for responding to calls for service, assigning patrol officers across police precincts, using specialty units, and initiating investigations and gathering evidence at crime scenes. It is important to understand the context and workload of these administrative and operational policies. Understanding these processes, including “pain points” within them that lead to frustration or inefficiencies, is foundational to developing actionable and practical recommendations and improving the MPD’s effectiveness.


Approach

As described in Section 2, the assessment team conducted 23 semi-structured interviews in August 2021 with representatives from the MPD and MECC to develop an understanding of formal police and dispatch policies and practices. These interviewees included individuals at all levels, from the Deputy Chief to line officers, as well as MECC managers and dispatchers. We also conducted 10 follow-up semi-structured interviews in December 2021 with a similar range of staff. The follow-up interviews were specifically focused on business processes and pain points, supplementing the information procured during the original round of interviews. As noted above, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic forced the assessment team to conduct all original and follow-up interviews virtually, in accordance with national public safety guidelines. We used both Microsoft Teams and Zoom for the interviews.

CNA used qualitative thematic analysis principles to review the interview notes and identify themes specific to business processes and pain points. These themes coalesced around four primary groups of processes and pain points: MECC/dispatch, patrol, specialty units, and investigative functions. The pain points we identified make delivering services more challenging for MPD and MECC personnel. Some of the identified pain points also highlight the emotionally challenging aspects of their work.

CNA used a repeated approach to collect, validate, and analyze the processes used by MPD staff. We reviewed the documents provided by the MECC and MPD to create an initial business process diagram. We supplemented and augmented this diagram using information on these processes obtained from the interviews with those directly engaged in them. The resulting business process highlights the general flow of activities and information from an initial call through the completion and closeout of investigative functions, with the pain points identified at the applicable steps along the process. Figure 17 provides an overview of the steps involved in our approach.

Figure 17. Business process analysis approach



Findings


The pain points are aligned to where in the business process analysis they were originally identified. For each section, we present a high-level business process and the pain points identified from the interviews. It is worth emphasizing that staffing shortages were identified as an issue across the board. Every MECC and MPD interviewee noted the low levels of staff they are experiencing and explained that this understaffing is significantly affecting their ability to perform efficiently and effectively. However, CNA also identified other pain points from these interviews, which are described in the following sections.

MECC

Call taker

The role of call taker is relatively new in the MECC; this role used to be part of the general dispatcher duties. Figure 18 provides the high-level business process reviewed for call takers.

Figure 18. Business process flow for call takers



Summary of pain points

Collecting incident information from calls for service. As expected, the process for responding to calls can vary substantially based on the nature of the call and the needs of the caller. There are some specific challenges related to collecting incident information. As a result, individual call takers must make a lot of inferences to get the information necessary for assessing priority levels and transferring calls to dispatch. For example, call takers must determine whether the call requires a uniformed police response, while also addressing the caller's stated preferences for or against such a response. Also, call takers have perceived an increase in instances in which the caller includes nonfactual details to ensure a quicker response time (e.g., exaggerating elements of danger that would ensure a more rapid response). In addition, call takers are responsible for answering both emergency and nonemergency lines and determining what type of service or response is needed.


Number of PNCs during initial assessment. The relatively higher number of PNCs for police-related calls presents challenges to call takers during the initial information collection phase. A MECC dispatcher highlighted the disproportionate number of PNCs for fire (4) versus police (34) as well as the need for dispatchers to update PNCs based on the documented narratives as specific challenges related to the assignment of PNCs during call intake. However, the interviewee also acknowledged that a recent review of these PNCs indicated that these numbers make sense from a categorization perspective based on the types of calls.

Challenging and high-stress work environment. The emotionally challenging work environment presents challenges in retention of skills. Before the call taker role was separated from dispatch, interviewees noted that moving people from phone to dispatch was an additional source of stress. Furthermore, the MECC did not have permanent leadership at the time of CNA's interviews, which could serve as an additional source of strain among department personnel.

Dispatch

The dispatch role is particularly challenging because it requires continuous monitoring and tracking of information (both visual and audio) across multiple systems. Figure 19 provides the high-level business process reviewed for dispatch.

Figure 19. Business process flow for dispatch



Summary of pain points

Interpreting the narrative. The caller's desire, or lack thereof, to see an officer often affects the accuracy of the narrative. Dispatch relies heavily on the details contained in the narrative when assessing priority and assigning resources.

Continuous monitoring using multiple systems. Dispatchers need to keep track of a wide range of information and activities as part of their continuous monitoring and dissemination activities. This process involves tracking information across multiple systems, leading to challenges and inefficiencies in how information is presented. Having access to consolidated information presented in an easily digestible format would improve the ability to continuously monitor status.


Deactivating calls for service. A call can be deactivated when it is no longer relevant or when too much time has elapsed. However, no formal guidelines for deactivating a call currently exist, except the directive to not deactivate calls without approval from a sergeant in the field, which leads to inconsistencies in the process.

Patrol

Nearly every interviewee highlighted the amount of time spent on mental health-related calls and non-patrol-related activities. In late 2021, the City began a partnership with Canopy Mental Health and Consulting to deploy behavioral health response teams. These teams are dispatched to some of

the behavioral health PNCs in lieu of MPD officers. CNA was able to garner initial impressions about these teams during the follow-up interviews conducted in December 2021. Interviewees across the board had positive thoughts about this pilot program and noted its potential for taking some of the more time-consuming calls (see Section 1, task three) away from patrol officers. Still, this program has not fully alleviated the time commitment from patrol, and several main issues persist. Figure 20 provides the high-level business process reviewed for patrol.

Figure 20. Business process flow for patrol



Summary of pain points

Staffing priorities. All positions are understaffed, and there is general misalignment of guidance and the associated priorities. For example, interviewees noted that property crimes require more evidence and resources from the MPD to prosecute than they have in the past, resulting in fewer convictions for a relatively high amount of effort and attention. Another example from the interviews is the level of effort required from patrol officers to detain suspects, particularly juveniles, who are immediately released.

Time-consuming responses. The time spent on mental health-related calls is perceived as being very high compared to other call types. The behavioral health response teams specializing in mental health have been positively viewed after the initial rollout. However, interviewees voiced concerns that the behavioral health response teams cost more than patrols, which may affect their utilization. In addition, officers are still required to respond to EDP and mental health-related calls that are deemed too dangerous for civilians. These calls involve specific processes, such as waiting for an ambulance, that contribute to increased time spent. Similarly, the civilian unit will not transport an individual deemed violent or aggressive, which can tie up sworn personnel.


Non-patrol-related commitments. The time spent on non-patrol-related items, such as training, takes away from time spent in the community. One solution suggested during the interviews was to expand the use of role-playing by actors instead of uniformed officers during training.

Communicating with the public. The MPD has opportunities to develop general guidance and standards for communicating with the public. For example, explaining a situation when arriving on scene is often more effective than telling bystanders to mind their own business. MPD officers have also had to communicate staffing challenges to the public when explaining delays in responding to calls, and would benefit from specific language to use consistently in these circumstances.

Specialty units

The specialty units were not a primary focus of the interviews, but CNA was able to identify some specific pain points associated with a few of these functions, including strategic operations and crime analysis, “gangs and guns” investigations, mental health response teams, and auto theft specialists. Figure 21 provides the high-level business process reviewed for specialty units and functions.

Figure 21. Business process flow for specialty units



Summary of pain points


Lack of unified command. There is a lot of opportunity for using real-time data and analysis to support patrol and improve collaboration across teams. However, the lack of a unified command makes information sharing and collaboration more difficult. For example, it is unclear how the Strategic Information Center supports intelligence separate from the analysis performed in Operations Analysis.

Inability to leverage some units during high demand. Some units are available to help with patrol presence but not available to help respond to calls, which can add to challenges in keeping up with call volumes.

Investigative functions

The investigative functions are fairly well documented and tracked in MPD systems. Figure 22 provides the high-level business process reviewed for investigative functions.

Figure 22. Business process flow for assigning and managing investigative cases



Summary of pain points

Staffing shortages creating a backlog. Multiple instances of staffing shortages have created issues in the MPD's investigative functions. For example, there are not enough forensic staff to process evidence in a timely manner, with impounded cars often taking two to eight weeks to process and DNA taking as long as six to eight weeks.

Lack of standard process for processing crimes. The standards for prosecuting property crimes have been raised by the district attorney, leading to a general need to standardize the process for investigating these crimes. Additionally, no monetary value is set for burglaries, which has been a challenge for prioritizing investigative work because there is no set standard.

Other pain points

Precinct structure and associated resources. The 3rd precinct does not have a "home" from which it can manage its operations. The precinct is currently renting space in another building. Lack of dedicated space was cited as a general challenge for morale and ability to respond to calls for service. There may be an opportunity to combine precincts to combine resources.

Community relationships are strained. Relationships with the community are strained, leading to a decrease in trust on both sides. For example, callers are increasingly providing incorrect information during a call to accelerate police response, and police are no longer able to proactively engage with communities.

Recommendations

Recommendation 26: The MECC and MPD should review whether some of the automation processes used by Fire can be modified and applied to police calls for service. In the absence of automation, development of a decision tree outlining various scenarios could increase standardization.

Recommendation 27: The MECC should consider streamlining processes for emergency and nonemergency lines because the same people are answering both.

Recommendation 28: The MECC and MPD should define or develop standard processes or criteria for the deactivation of a call to ensure standardization across the unit.

Recommendation 29: The MECC should look for opportunities to simplify and consolidate information presented to dispatchers. This practice will help reduce the number of systems that need to be used and streamline the overall process.

Recommendation 30: Health and wellness are acute concerns in the dispatcher community. Dispatching is a sedentary yet highly stressful occupation, particularly during times of severe staffing shortages. Mental and physical health are key factors in retaining personnel. Accordingly, steps should be taken to address these issues. The MECC should consider offering time for short walks (outside or on a treadmill) and providing snacks with healthy options. The MECC should also make stress-related counseling regularly accessible to personnel. Given the lack of natural light in the current location, thought should be given to investing in lighting more conducive to a healthy environment.

Recommendation 31: The MPD, and particularly precinct leads, should clearly define response priority based on the staffing level available. This priority needs to be clearly defined and communicated both internally to the MPD and externally to callers and City leadership because general frustration is felt across the board.

Recommendation 32: The MECC should identify permanent leadership. At the time of CNA's interviews, the MECC did not have permanent leadership. Identifying permanent leadership positions can help create stability in the agency and serve as a basis for implementing additional improvements.

Recommendation 33: MECC and Command Center personnel have developed effective mechanisms for coordinating during regular operations as well as emergencies and crisis response, despite being located in different physical locations. These practices should be continued and regularly reviewed in case adjustments are necessary to continue to effectively operate collaboratively and under a unified command structure.

Conclusion

Many aspects of the MPD and MECC's policies, processes, and procedures are supportive of a community-oriented response model that produces efficient outcomes for the agency and the community it serves. At the same time, both entities could take steps that would bring them into closer alignment with 21st century policing practices and ideals. Some of these changes are relatively simple to implement, such as revising the use of particular language in datasets and policies. Other changes, such as implementation of alternate response models and restaffing units such as the Community Outreach Bureau to appropriate levels, will require additional investment of resources and personnel.

Although our patrol staffing analysis suggests that the MPD currently enlists sufficient patrol officers to respond to calls for service at a 50 percent performance objective rate (i.e., 50 percent of officer time spent on community-initiated calls for service), our analysis of calls for service suggests that officers are currently responding primarily to 9-1-1 calls and not engaging in self-initiated activity. This trend has developed over time, with steadily decreasing levels of self-initiated activity during the period analyzed and a particularly low level in 2020. If the MPD wishes officers to spend more time on self-initiated activity, it will need to address this through policy and practice, and potentially a higher staffing level than our analysis would initially suggest.

In addition, although our analysis could not provide estimates for other units in the MPD, we know at a minimum the Community Outreach Bureau is unstaffed. Restaffing this unit must be a priority to ensure that the MPD is able to successfully serve the community. We also heard consistently from individuals operating in specialized units that they struggle with the current workload and have reduced staffing numbers that affect efficiency. Some of these units would potentially benefit from increased use of civilian personnel to replace or supplement sworn personnel.

In all these efforts, the City should continue to explore alternate response models as appropriate to reduce the use of police response in scenarios not requiring law enforcement actions. In particular, we commend Minneapolis for enacting mental health crisis response teams in partnership with a community organization. As that effort continues to roll out and is evaluated, the City should prepare to adjust program parameters and implementation as needed for effectiveness. We also encourage the City to continue its exploration of reducing or eliminating patrol response to nonviolent property crimes, instead making these crimes self-reportable. Such changes will, however, also have implications for the patrol division investigative staff, who handle these crimes after the initial response.

PNCs in the MECC and in coordination with the MPD are largely functioning efficiently. The codes themselves are largely appropriate, although there is some room for improvement to reduce the use of the Miscellaneous code and potentially eliminate some underused codes that could be combined with other categories. Our analysis of recoding, response times, and priority levels suggests that calls are being handled appropriately in these regards.

Staffing shortages were identified as the single biggest challenge to business processes at the MPD, impacting both operations and the ability to repair relationships with the community. The staffing resources available are not sufficient to police the way that is as responsive as the interviewees would like. However, of positive note, interviewees were aware of investments in staff well-being as well as implemented organizational changes and were hopeful that these changes would improve day-to-day operations. There are opportunities to reevaluate priorities and overall organization to best support the MECC, MPD, and the community. CNA has provided recommendations to implement as a first step in improving overall business processes and reducing some of the challenges faced by staff.

It is our hope that this analysis will prove helpful to the City of Minneapolis, MPD, and MECC as they continue through the process of organizational change and evolution to embrace 21st century approaches to public safety.

Appendix A: Acronyms

Acronym	Definition
BTU	Business Technology Unit
CAD	computer-aided dispatch
CIT	crisis intervention team
COPE	Community Outreach for Psychiatric Emergencies
COPS Office	Office for Community Oriented Policing Services
CSO	community service officer
EDP	emotionally disturbed persons
ICMA	International City/County Management Association
MCT	mobile crisis team
MECC	Minneapolis Emergency Communications Center
MPD	Minneapolis Police Department
PNC	problem nature code

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Appendix C: PNC Subgroups Definitions

In this appendix, we list the specific PNCs associated with each of the subgroups analyzed in the staffing analysis.

Police Officer Statute PNCs

- Abandoned Child (P)
- Audible Alarm (P)
- Audible Business Alarm (P)
- Audible Residential Alarm (P)
- Holdup Alarm (P)
- Silent Alarm (P)
- Panic Alarm (P)
- Assist Other Agency (P)
- Assault in Progress (P)
- Assist EMS Personnel (P)
- Assist Fire Personnel (P)
- Assist an Officer (P)
- Attempt Pick-Up (P)
- Attempted Suicide (PE)
- Auto Theft (P)
- Auto Theft in Progress (P)
- Bait Vehicle Auto Theft (P)
- Business Check (P)
- Bomb Threat (P)
- Burglary Biz - In Progress (P)
- Burglary Business - Report (P)
- Burglary Dwling In Progress (P)
- Chase on Foot (P)
- Curfew Violations (P)
- Customer Trouble (P)
- Domestic Abuse Report Only (P)
- Domestic Abuse-In Progress (P)
- Domestic with Weapons (P)
- Damage Property-In Progress(P)
- Drunk/Intoxicated Person (P)
- Domestic (P)
- Directed Patrol (P)
- DWI Court-Home Visit (P)
- Paramedic Needs Help (PE)
- Police Event (P)
- Explosion (P)
- Explosion-Structure (PFE)
- Explosion-Vehicle (PFE)
- Firecrackers (P)
- Found Child (P)
- Firefighter Needs Help (PF)
- Fight (P)
- Motor Vehicle Chase (P)
- Foot Beat (P)
- Forgery in Progress (P)
- Officer Needs Help (P)
- Hotrodders (P)
- Receive Information (P)
- Person Threat to Jump (PF)
- Kidnapping/Abduction (P)
- Luring (P)
- Miscellaneous (P)
- Narcotics (Drug) Activity (P)
- Notification (P)
- Property Damage/Hit & Run (P)
- Person with a Gun (P)
- Person with a Weapon (P)
- Personal Inj Acc-Report (P)
- Personal Inj/Hit and Run (PFE)
- Personal Injury Accident (PFE)
- Personal Injury w/ Trap (PFE)
- Poss Personal Injury Acc (P)
- Sex Offender Comp Check (P)
- Prowler (P)
- Rescue - Bldg Collapse (PFE)
- Rescue-Technical (PFE)
- High Risk Warrant Entry (P)
- Robbery Dwell in Progress (P)
- Robbery Dwling/Person Rpt (P)
- Robbery of Biz In Progress (P)
- Robbery of Person (P)
- Shooting (PFE)
- Shooting Report Only (P)
- Sound of Shots Fired (P)
- Slumper (PE)
- Slumper w/Fire (PFE)
- ShotSpotter Activation (P)
- Stabbing (PE)
- Stabbing Report Only (P)
- Suspected Hazard (P)
- Suspected Hazard (PE)
- Suspicious Person (P)
- Suspicious Vehicle (P)
- Theft (P)
- Theft-Hold One Cooperative (P)
- Threats (P)
- Traffic Law Enforcement (P)
- Transportation (P)
- Trespass in Boarded Dwell (P)
- Unknown Trouble (P)
- Unknown Wireless/Cell Phone(P)
- Walk Through a Building (P)

- Crim Sex Conduct (P)
- Homeland-Terrorism Act (P)
- Robbery of Biz - Report (P)
- Water Emergency (PFE)

Behavioral Health PNCs

- Check the Welfare (P)
- Emotionally Disturb Person (P)

Theft Reporting PNCs

- Damage Property-Rpt Only (P)
- Forgery Report (P)
- Burglary Dwlng - Report (P)
- Mysterious Disappearance (P)
- Property Damage Accident (P)
- Theft - Report Only (P)

Other Alternative Response PNCs

- Lock-In-Police (P)
- Parking Problem (P)
- Road Hazard (P)
- Music-Loud (P)
- Disturbance (P)
- Check Hazard (P)
- Animal Bite (P)
- Animal Call (P)
- Animal Check The Welfare
- Animal Fight (P)
- Aggressive Dog (P)

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3003 Washington Blvd., Arlington Virginia 22201

**National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform
Oakland Police Department
Calls for Service Analysis
2018-2020**

Oakland Police Department Calls for Service Analysis 2018-2020

Introduction and Summary

The National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (NICJR) conducted an analysis of Calls for Service (CFS) received by the Oakland Police Department over the three years spanning 2018-2020 in compliance with a City Council directive. For this report, NICJR defines Calls for Service as 911 Calls, officer-initiated calls/activity, and calls to the OPD non-emergency line. OPD provided NICJR three years of data from its CAD (Computer Aided Dispatch) system in order to conduct this study.

The City Council directed OPD “to provide a detailed analysis and recommendations for operationalizing the removal of low-level, non-violent calls for service from the Police Department’s responsibilities and options for an alternative response. Low-level, non-violent calls for service include what the Police Department classifies as “Administrative, Animal-related, Homeless, Mental Health, Noise-related, Ambulance Requested, and Other.”

Over the three-year study period, OPD received nearly 1.3 million CFS. Of those calls, one or more officers responded to 56.7% (722,815). After discussion with OPD command staff it was determined another 96,900 CFS should be removed from the analysis due to having a disposition code of Cancel, Administrative, or Duplicate. The subsequent analysis is based on a review of the remaining 49.1% of CFS (625,915). One of the main objectives of this study was to determine which types of CFS could safely and responsibly be responded to by non-police alternatives, like community-based responders. Therefore, NICJR focused its assessment on those CFS where one or more officers arrived on scene.

Based on the California Penal Code and our own analysis, NICJR categorizes CFS in four different types:

- 1) Non-Criminal (calls for incidents or issues that are not a violation of the penal code, like noise complaints, but may be a violation of a local ordinance)
- 2) Misdemeanor (or Low Level, like a stolen bicycle)
- 3) Non-Violent Felony (like car theft)
- 4) Serious and violent felony (like an armed robbery)

NICJR assessed the type of calls for service, the time it took officers to respond to a call, the amount of time officers spent on a call, and how calls were initiated. The following report includes findings from the assessment with recommendations on how OPD could more effectively and efficiently use its limited resources given alternative response models. NICJR’s call categorization themselves are not recommendations for alternatives responses, for instance there are some call types in the non-criminal category that will still require an officer to respond.

The assessment of Calls for Service conducted by NICJR is based on data from OPD’s CAD system.

As noted in the report, the CAD system is archaic and is in need of improvements and upgrades. Due to the data limitations, some of the findings in the report need to be verified by reviewing the notes made by responding officers in association with calls for service. Due to the extremely large volume of calls, NICJR will review notes from a sample number of calls from each call category in OPD's Records Management System (RMS). This extended review will take another eight to twelve weeks to complete once initiated. Until then, the findings of this report should be considered preliminary.

OPD's Motorola Legacy system that serves as its CAD, does not contain some fields that other police agencies capture, and it is difficult to search for certain data in the system. This may have some impacts on this analysis. OPD is in the process of replacing CAD and its accompanying records management system; these improved systems may help with more accurate CFS assessments in the future.

Findings

A review of 625,915 CFS that had an on-scene arrival time, covering the period 2018-2020, found that nearly 60% of OPD calls were for Non-Criminal events. Approximately 18% of calls were associated with felonies of any kind, and 9% of calls over the three year period were for serious and violent felonies. Although serious and violent felonies comprised less than 10% of calls, the total number of such incidents was still extremely large for a city the size of Oakland. During the three-year period there were nearly 60,000 such incidents that officers responded to, an average of nearly 54 serious violent calls for service each day.

Officers may also self-initiate a CFS. For example, a self-initiated call can include an instance when a patrol officer notices something that requires a response, such as a crime in progress. These calls are very generally categorized in the CAD data as "On-View"¹ incidents. On-view incidents accounted for 9.9% of CFS over the review period. Details about what types of incidents make up the On-View CFS require an assessment of call details that NICJR will conduct when it receives additional information from the RMS. There are other officer initiated CFS that are detailed in CAD and categorized by the type of call.


For Serious Violent events, officers took an average of 1 hour and 5 minutes to respond and spent 2 hours and 15 minutes on-scene. But for Priority 1, Serious Violent Felony CFS which require an expedited response, over the three-year study period, OPD officers took an average of 18 minutes and 57 seconds to respond from the time of the call to an officer arriving on scene. Priority 1 Calls are usually crimes in progress.

For Non-Criminal CFS, officers spent an average of 1 hour and 4 minutes on scene handling these calls, which may also include follow up or report writing about the incident after the initial response to the call. The CAD data does not differentiate the time spent on scene of the

¹ On-View is the code used in the OPD CAD data for when an officer on patrol observes something that needs to be responded to and therefore NICJR categorizes it as Officer Initiated. One of the limitations of the CAD data is that the information on the reason or the purpose of the officer stopping is not included so NICJR is not able to categorize the call by non-criminal, misdemeanor, non-violent felony, or serious and violent felony. There are other Officer Initiated calls that information for the calls are included in the CAD data.

initial call and time spent following up on the call. But for non-criminal CFS, there is likely less time spent on following up on such low-level calls. Given OPD’s high call volume and attention paid to more serious calls, officers took an average of 1 hours and 39 minutes to respond to Non-Criminal events. It should be noted that according to data in CAD, some calls were not responded to for two or more days. OPD reports that this is likely inaccurate and an example of one of the data challenges in CAD. But there are some CFS that are not responded to for more than 24 hours due to the low level nature of the call. For Misdemeanor event types, officers took an average of 2 hours and 15 minutes to respond and spent an average of 1 hours and 11 minutes on-scene. For Non-Violent Felony event types, officers took an average of 2 hours and 55 minutes to respond and spent 1 hour and 30 minutes on-scene. These response times appear to be inaccurate and another illustration of the problems with the data, but these are correct calculations based on the information that is in the CAD system.

Figure 1. Calls for Service by Crime Category 2018-2020 (Officer Responded)



It is worth noting, that although serious and violent felonies only account for 9% of all calls responded to by OPD, that is 56,000 calls over three years, an average of 18,666 calls per year and 51 serious and violent felony calls every single day.

Figure 2. Calls for Service by Crime Category (All Calls)





Table 1. Top 10 Call Types Overall 2018-2020

Call Types	Total Events
ON VIEW	62,138
SECURITY CHECK	41,605
CAR STOP	21,544
STOLEN VEHICLE	19,540
ALARM-RINGER	16,533
MENTALLY ILL	12,485
911 HANG UP FROM ACC	12,275
415 UNKNOWN	10,083
DISTURBING THE PEACE	9,632
BURGLARY	7,262

Note: Only Includes Calls with On-Scene Arrival Time



Although the OPD utilized between 208 and 348 unique call types during the study period, just ten comprised more than 33% of all events.

An average of slightly more than 1 officer responded to each CFS, spending an average of 1.45 hours per event, as measured by arrival on-scene to call clearance.

Table 2. Time Spent Responding to Events 2018-2020

Crime Category	Total Hours Arrival to Close	Average Hours Per Event	Proportion of Total Officer Time
Non-Criminal	387,075	1.04	50.1%
Misdemeanor	96,512	1.18	12.5%
Non-Violent Felony	84,616	1.50	11.0%
Serious Violent Felony	126,294	2.26	16.4%
On View (officer initiated)	76,738	1.25	10.0%
Total	771,235	1.45	100%

Note: Only Includes Calls with On-Scene Arrival Time

NICJR has developed a tailored approach to the analysis of CAD calls for service data based on hands-on experience in multiple cities nationwide. NICJR CFS analyses use the following categorization of *call type incident description* of CAD events: Non-Criminal (NC), Misdemeanor (MISD), Non-Violent Felony (NV FEL), and Serious Violent Felony (SV FEL). NICJR crime categorization cross walked with OPD incident type descriptions can be found in [Appendix A](#). NICJR categories are aligned with state specific penal codes and their associated penalties. If a call type is not found in the penal code, it is placed into the Non-Criminal Category. NICJR uses this method of categorizing events because it affords the most linear correlation between the event and its associated criminal penalty. By categorizing events in this manner, NICJR can clearly identify the portion of CFS that are either non-criminal, low-level, non-violent, and serious violent offenses.

OPD provided NICJR with a comprehensive CFS data set for each of the three calendar years 2018-2020, representing a total of 1,274,154 unique calls for service. Each year's dataset included the call type descriptions for the respective reporting period. There were between 208 and 348 available call type descriptions for each year. The data did not include Racial Identity and Profiling Advisory (RIPA) Board disposition codes associated with vehicle, pedestrian, and bike stops as required by Assembly Bill 953, which requires law enforcement agencies to collect "perceived demographic and other detailed data regarding pedestrian and traffic stops." RIPA data is collected and reported through an OPD system outside of CAD.

Table 3. NICJR Crime Categories

Crime Category	Description
Non-Criminal (NC)	Any event not identified in the California State Penal Code
Misdemeanor (MISD)	Any event identified in the California State Penal Code as a Misdemeanor
Non-Violent Felony (NV FEL)	Any event identified in the California State Penal Code as a Non-Violent Felony
Serious Violent Felony (SV FEL)	Any event identified in the California State Penal Code as a Serious Violent Felony

Call type initiation source variables also allowed NICJR to determine CFS initiation source – officer-initiated activity or On-View, non-emergency line, 911 emergency line, or alarm.

In addition, CFS response time data was used to determine how long it takes OPD officers to respond to CFS and how much time officers spend on CFS by incident type once they arrive on-scene. There were five time variables provided in the data. To determine how long it took officers to respond to CFS, NICJR assessed the length of time between call dispatch and an officer arriving on-scene. To determine how long officers spent resolving events, NICJR analyzed the length of time between an officer arriving on-scene and clearing the call. NICJR was also able to use CAD data to determine the mean number of officers responding to each type of call by Crime Category. The time value for officers while enroute to an incident was not included.

Table 4. Oakland CAD Data Time Variable Descriptions

CAD Data Variable Label	CAD Translation
Transmit TimePrimaryUnit	Time call was transmitted over the radio to the primary unit
CreateTimeIncident	Time the call was created in the CAD system
DispatchTimePrimaryUnit	Time call was first dispatched to an officer
ArrivalTimePrimaryUnit	Time officer arrived on-scene
ClosedTimeIncident	Time officer is back in service to take new calls

Characteristics of Calls


Analysis of 625,915 events with on-scene arrival times from 2018-2020

NICJR analyzed the CFS data set across a number of metrics including overall call type frequency, call initiation source, and call NICJR Crime Category. Figures and tables in this section draw from a sample of 625,915 unique calls for service with an on-scene arrival time covering the period 2018-2020 within the CAD files NICJR obtained from OPD.

Event Initiation

Calls for service may be initiated in three primary ways: by calling 911, by calling the OPD non-emergency line, or by an officer initiating a call. Figure 2 shows the proportion of events by initiation source. Approximately 35% of all calls during the 2018-2020 period were initiated by an officer.

Figure 3. Events by Initiation Source 2018-2020



Top Ten Events

Table 5 provides the top ten events by Initiation Source. Together, these call types comprised 46% of all OPD events over the study period. Initiation source by year can be found in [Appendix B](#).

Table 5. Top 10 Calls by Initiation Source 2018-2020

Officer Initiated	911 Emergency	Non-Emergency Line
ON VIEW	911 HANG UP FROM ACC	ALARM-RINGER
SECURITY CHECK	415 UNKNOWN	STOLEN VEHICLE
CAR STOP	MENTALLY ILL	AUTO BLOCKING DRIVEWAY
ABANDONED AUTOMOBILE	BATTERY	415 SHOT SPOTTER GUN
TOW REQUESTED	415 FAMILY	MENTALLY ILL
THEFT	BATTERY ON CO-HABITANT	TRESPASS
WALKING STOP	STOLEN VEHICLE	DISTURBING THE PEACE
EMERGENCY TRAFFIC ON	DISTURBING THE PEACE	RECOVERED STOLEN VEH
CHECK VEHICLE	EVALUATION	BATTERY
BURGLARY	SUSPICIOUS PERSON	SUSPICIOUS PERSON


Note: Only includes call with on-scene arrival times

Events by Crime Category

Figure 4 shows the frequency of call types by Crime Category. OPD averaged 424,719 total events and 208,638 events with an on-scene arrival time per year during the analysis period. The majority of these CFS, 68.1% for all calls and 58.9% for calls with an on-scene arrival time, are

classified as Non-Criminal; as reflected in [Appendix C](#), Non-Criminal CFS consistently comprised a majority of events during the 2018 to 2020 period.

Figure 4. Call Types by Crime Category 2018-2020



During the three-year period reviewed, an average of 36.1% of Officer Initiated events were Non-Criminal and an average of 20.5% of 911 calls comprised Non-Criminal events. As traditionally expected, non-emergency line calls were the most likely to be Non-Criminal.


Table 6. Percent of Non-Criminal Events by Initiation Source

Event Initiation Source	Year		
	2018	2019	2020
911 Calls	16.2%	24.1%	21.3%
Non-Emergency Calls	39.2%	42.0%	42.0%
Officer-Initiated	37.6%	33.9%	36.7%

Note: Only Includes Calls with On-Scene Arrival Time

Figure 5 identifies the number of events by Crime Category over the review period. The total number of events in the aggregate declined between 2018 and 2020. When looking at non-violent and serious violent felonies alone, there was an observed increase of 28.1% and 32.1%.

Figure 5. Number of Events by Crime Category 2018-2020



Number of Responding Personnel

The number of personnel who responded to CFS varied depending on the event type. Table 7 shows the average number of personnel who responded to a CFS by Crime Category based on the data in CAD. As expected, when dealing with a call that is more serious in nature, the average number of responding officers was higher than for a less serious event. The average number of responding personnel across all event types was 1.4. NICJR will also further assess Priority 1 calls, which will very likely find many more officers respond to Priority 1, Serious and Violent CFS. It is very possible that many more officers respond to serious violent felony CFS that is not being accurately captured in CAD as the CAD system has a limitation on the number of officers than can be counted.

Table 7. Responding Personnel by Crime Category 2018-2020

	Non-Criminal	Misdemeanor	Non-Violent Felony	Serious Violent Felony	On View
2018	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.3
2019	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.3
2020	1.4	1.5	1.3	1.6	1.3

Note: Only Includes Calls with On-Scene Arrival Time

Response Time to Calls

Tables 8 through 11 note the average response time for the top five incident types from call creation to an officer arriving on-scene by crime category. More detailed information can be found by year in [Appendix D](#). It should be noted that a call describing someone with potential mental illness in need of service has an average response time more than an hour and a half. This is an example of how the use of MACRO can help improve responses to such calls.

Table 8. Average Response Time for Non-Criminal Calls

2018-2020: Top 5 Non-Criminal Calls			
Call Type Description	Count	Avg Time to Respond (Hrs,Mins,Sec)	% of Total
SECURITY CHECK	41,604	0:21:19	6.5%
CAR STOP	28,065	0:00:01	4.4%
ALARM-RINGER	25,788	2:43:27	4.0%
MENTALLY ILL	19,581	1:33:36	3.1%
ABANDONED AUTOMOBILE	16,912	N/A	2.7%

Note: Only Includes Calls with On-Scene Arrival Time

Table 9. Average Response Time for Misdemeanor Calls

2018-2020: Top 5 Misdemeanor Calls			
Call Type Description	Count	Avg Time to Respond (Hrs,Mins,Sec)	% of Total
BATTERY	15,045	1:06:13	2.4%
DISTURBING THE PEACE	9,951	1:56:27	1.6%
TRESPASS	8,270	2:52:00	1.3%
415 THREATS	7,195	4:38:47	1.1%
THEFT	3,911	2:33:57	1.0%

Note: Only Includes Calls with On-Scene Arrival Time

Table 10. Average Response Time for Non-Violent Felony Calls

2018-2020: Top 5 Non-Violent Felony Calls			
Call Type Description	Count	Avg Time to Respond (Hrs,Mins,Sec)	% of Total
STOLEN VEHICLE	19,439	2:55:38	3.1%
BURGLARY	9,657	2:23:02	1.5%
AUTO BURGLARY	3,943	2:46:12	1.0%
VIOLATION OF COURT ORDER	2,424	4:10:28	0.6%
HIT & RUN (PROPERTY) ²	2,284	2:16:07	0.4%

Note: Only Includes Calls with On-Scene Arrival Time

Table 11. Average Response Time for Serious Violent Felony Calls

2018-2020: Top 5 Serious Violent Felony Calls			
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² These are wobbler cases and can be charged as felonies or misdemeanors

Call Type Description	Count	Avg Time to Respond (Hrs,Mins,Sec)	% of Total
BATTERY ON CO-HABITANT W/ SERIOUS INJURY	10,796	0:46:43	1.7%
415 SHOT SPOTTER GUN	10,032	0:57:56	1.6%
ROBBERY	7,431	1:12:25	1.2%
415 GUNSHOTS	5,869	1:15:28	0.9%
ASSAULT W/DEADLY WEA	5,723	0:44:57	0.9%

Note: Only Includes Calls with On-Scene Arrival Time

Time Spent on Calls

Tables 12 and 13 outline the total amount of time spent on CFS by Crime Category. In determining the time spent on event response, NICJR analyzed two time periods. First, the time period beginning when an officer arrived on-scene to when the officer closed or “cleared” the call and was back “in-service” and able to take other calls and second, the period beginning when the call came in and when an officer arrived on-scene. There are a number of CFS that spanned more than two or three days. Due to the unreliability of the time values associated with these types of CFS, NICJR capped the maximum time a CFS could take was 24 hours. Using this methodology, NICJR was able to better identify how much time officers spent handling a specific call. An alternate and more comprehensive view of officer response time accounts for the time from event initiation to close.

Table 12. Time Spent Responding to Events, On-Scene to Close 2018-2020

Crime Category	Total Hours Arrival to Close	Average Hours Per Event	Proportion of Total Officer Time
Non-Criminal	387,075	1.04	50.1%
Misdemeanor	96,512	1.18	12.5%
Non-Violent Felony	84,616	1.50	11.0%
Serious Violent Felony	126,294	2.26	16.4%
On-View	76,738	1.25	10.0%
Grand Total	771,235	1.45	100%

Note: Excludes calls with missing on-scene arrival time values.

Table 13. Time Spent Responding to Events, Initiation to Close 2018-2020

Crime Category	Total Hours Initiation to Close	Average Hours Per Event	Proportion of Total Officer Time
Non-Criminal	964,481	2.9	57.8%
Misdemeanor	223,529	3.2	13.4%
Non-Violent Felony	240,412	4.2	14.4%
Serious Violent Felony	162,739	3.2	9.8%
On View	76,791	1.3	4.6%
Grand Total	1,667,952	3.0	100.0%

Note: Excludes calls with missing on-scene arrival time values.

Recommendations

Based on our analysis, NICJR developed the following recommendations:

1) Improve the OPD CAD system:

- OPD should include Final Call Type in the CAD data. The final call type, which reflects an officer's assessment from the scene, may differ from the initial call classification based on information from the caller. Unless CAD data includes the final call type, it will not accurately reflect the nature of crime-related calls and other problems that are phoned into the communications center.
- Need for linkages to other Systems: Linkages to other information systems could enhance the utility of the OPD's CAD system even further.³ For example, most CAD systems assign a complaint number to crimes and traffic accidents. Reports on serious incidents usually are entered into separate databases for analyzing the characteristics of these events.⁴ However, it is rare that linkages are established between these systems and the CAD data. The technical obstacles for making these linkages are not significant. The complaint number is usually the key between them. With most database applications, it is fairly simple to merge records together using the common complaint number as a key.

2) Increase utilization of alternative responders

With more than half of all Calls for Service responded to by OPD patrol officers being for low level, non-criminal activity, OPD can safely and responsibly reduce its use of sworn officers responding to those incidents, once alternative responders are up and running and effectively responding to some subset of CFS. Due to the challenges of the CAD system as pointed out several times in this report, further assessment is needed before certain call categories can be responsibly assigned to community based alternative response. Therefore, NICJR has the following recommendations on alternative calls for service:

- Include the following type of calls MARCO responds to:
 - Abandoned Automobile: Over the three-year study period, there were more than 13,000 such calls, of which a sworn officer responded to 2,000.
 - Loud Music: Over the three-year study period, there were just under 1,600 such calls, of which a sworn officer responded to more than 1,000.
- Increase use of OPD civilian crime technicians to respond to calls for service that are not crimes in progress, like burglaries that occurred several hours or even days earlier.

3) After a successful alternative response program is up and running and well staffed, OPD can re-examine deployment strategies to increase focus on serious crime and violence.

With the expansion of community responders, which may free time of patrol officers, OPD can examine priorities for patrol officers and increase the focus of every section of the

³ [Improving Information-Sharing Across Law Enforcement: Why Can't We Know? | RAND](#)

⁴ [Integrating Computer-Aided Dispatch Data with Traffic Management Centers - Chapter 4 - FHWA Operations \(dot.gov\)](#)

Draft Strategic Plan



Strategic Plan

2024-2025



Office of the Inspector General

A Message from the Inspector General

As the City of Oakland's newest department, it is with a great sense of responsibility and optimism that I present the Office of the Inspector General's 2024–2025 Strategic Plan. Over the past year, the Office of the Inspector General has made great headway in delivering on the public's mandate to provide effective independent civilian oversight of the Oakland Police Department. With 81% of Oakland voters approving the passage of Measure S1 in 2020, the office has a deep commitment to our mission. Which is to ensure accountability, enhance community trust, and increase transparency via fair and thorough assessments of the Oakland Police Department's compliance, with the law and departmental policies.

Oakland has a rich history of police accountability and oversight, that is deeply rooted in community activism. From the Black Panther Party to the social justice groups we see today, the Office of the Inspector General recognizes that this office is a culmination of decades of hard work and advocacy. It is for this reason that every work product, including the enclosed strategic plan, centers Oakland's incredible community members.

This Strategic Plan is organized by four high-level goals: build sustainable relationships, deliver excellence, enhance transparency, and improve innovation. Embedded within each of these goals are objectives that provide a more detailed account of how the Office of the Inspector General plans to achieve its desired impact. The office values that shape our delivery and approach are integrity, impartiality, proactivity, and objectivity.

At a time when our nation is tackling a growing call to hold police officers accountable, the Office of the Inspector General is dedicated to helping create an optimal public safety system for every Oaklander. One where community members trust that police misconduct will not be tolerated, and officers are held to the highest standards of local, state, and federal law.

I invite you to review the Strategic Plan and share your feedback, as we continue to build out the Office of the Inspector General from the ground up. Through your ongoing partnership and support, I am confident that this office will not only achieve its mission but also become a national model for civilian oversight.

Sincerely,



Inspector General Michelle N. Phillips
City of Oakland, Office of the Inspector General



Introduction to the Office of the Inspector General

In 2016, 83.19% of Oakland voters were in favor of Measure LL. Measure LL established the Oakland Police Commission and charged it with overseeing the Oakland Police Department's policies and procedures as they relate to constitutional policing, procedural justice, equity, and accountability. Measure LL also established the Community Police Review Agency as the independent oversight body tasked with investigating complaints of police misconduct.

In 2020, Oakland residents also voted in favor of Measure S1, with an 81.27% approval rate. Measure S1 amended Measure LL to strengthen Oakland's police reform efforts by expanding the independence, authority, and staffing of the Police Commission and Community Police Review Agency. Measure S1 also created the Office of the Inspector General as an independent, non-partisan, civilian oversight agency to ensure accountability in the Oakland Police Department and increase community trust.

The OIG's primary charge is overseeing the city's compliance with the Negotiated Settlement Agreement. Additionally, after the conclusion of federal oversight, the Office of the Inspector General will continue to monitor the Oakland Police Department's compliance with policies, procedures, and the law. The presence of the Office of the Inspector General is intended to further strengthen the City's ability to identify systemic issues within the Oakland Police Department and decrease instances of police misconduct, through effective civilian oversight. The OIG's jurisdiction also includes auditing and reviewing the Community Police Review Agency's processes, procedures, and work products for compliance with the City of Oakland Charter, Municipal Code, laws, and national best practices.

The Office of the Inspector General will drive best practices by recommending improvements to policies and training as well as engaging in collaborative initiatives that promote systemic advancements. The Office of the Inspector General will provide reports and recommendations to the Police Commission, City Council, and other action holders such as the Mayor or City Administrator when deemed necessary. Action holders have the authority to accept or reject recommendations and are responsible for ensuring the implementation of any accepted recommendation. The Office of the Inspector General will provide reports to the public, in accordance with laws, policies, and applicable memorandums of understanding.

Lastly, the Office of the Inspector General executes its responsibilities in a neutral, apolitical environment free from interference from any person, group, or organization. The Office of the Inspector General is administratively, physically, and operationally independent from the Oakland Police Department. The Inspector General, the agency head for the Office of the Inspector General, is overseen by the Oakland Police Commission.

Mission, Vision, Values, and Purpose

The mission of the Office of the Inspector General is to be an independent, non-partisan oversight agency that will assist with increasing community trust and ensuring accountability in the Oakland Police Department. In its administration of duties, the Office of the Inspector General will implement a fair, thorough, and autonomous system of civilian oversight of law enforcement.

Vision

The Office of the Inspector General's vision is to build trust in civilian oversight of policing through encouraging, implementing, and preserving a culture of impartiality, transparency, and accountability.

Values



Purpose

The purpose of the Strategic Plan is to articulate the Office of the Inspector General's long-term goals, which are organized around the office's mission, values, operations, and community stakeholders. The plan also articulates several objectives for each of these areas, strategies for achieving these objectives, and associated performance measures. The detailed performance measures are published in the Office of the Inspector General Annual Performance Report.

Strategic Goals

The Office of the Inspector General identified four goals that align with its mission, values, and desired service outcomes. These goals will be used as a guide to create a solid and sustainable oversight foundation for the office, over the next two years.



Audits, Inspections, Evaluations and Review: Goals, Objectives, and Measures

Aligned with its core values of transparency and accountability, the Office of the Inspector General provided a brief overview of each function of the office identified to achieve its Charter mandates. Listed below are also the OIG's objectives, with specific measurement tools.



Differences between Audits and Inspections, Evaluations, and Reviews

Inspections, Evaluations, and Reviews	Audits
Provide reports and recommendations to stakeholders that may provide justification for procedural changes or enhanced internal controls	Provide audit reports and recommendations to stakeholders that may provide justification for policy reform or the need for more internal controls
Strive to be compliant with Charter and Municipal Code mandates	Utilize data analytics to examine large data sets during audits and pinpoint trends, anomalies, and potential risks.
Provides outcomes in a more timely manner than audits	Make recommendations to stakeholders that leverage existing resources, tools, and technology



Audits

As a primary function of the Office of the Inspector General, auditing is a crucial component in ensuring transparency, and accountability. The office's audits can cover a wide range of areas, such as the internal affairs process, risk management, training, and recruitment. In conducting regular audits of the Oakland Police Department and Community Police Review Agency, we can help to ensure compliance, identify areas of improvement, and make recommendations where necessary.

The audit team can also perform special reviews for high-profile or immediate matters, as needed. The Office of Inspector General will align with its mission and values by providing comprehensive coverage and ongoing compliance audits.

Goals	Objectives	Measures
Deliver Excellence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide audit reports and recommendations to stakeholders that may provide justification for policy reform or the need for more internal controls • Abide the OIG mission, vision and values 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of audits conducted • Number of recommendations submitted • Number of recommendations accepted • Number of recommendations implemented • Establish a quality assurance process for reviews of all deliverables
Enhance Transparency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Keep stakeholders and community members informed about Office of the Inspector General completed audits • Inform the public and stakeholders of audits in progress 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Track number of reports made public vs. the total number of reports completed in a FY. • Make audit status public on the Office of the Inspector General website
Improve Innovation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Utilize data analytics to examine large data sets during audits and pinpoint trends, anomalies, and potential risks. • Make recommendations to stakeholders that leverage existing resources, tools, and technology 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Track audit trends • Track risk assessments • Track audit follow-up metrics • Create data visualizations and dashboards to reinforce audit data.

Inspection, Evaluations, and Reviews

The Office of the Inspector General's inspections, evaluations and reviews are critical to the success of the Oakland Police Department and the Community Police Review Agency programs. By identifying areas for improvement and monitoring compliance with legal and ethical standards, the Office of the Inspector General helps to ensure that these programs are effective and efficient in serving the public.

Goals	Objectives	Measures
Deliver Excellence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide reports and recommendations to stakeholders that may provide justification for procedural changes or enhanced internal controls • Strive to be compliant with Charter and Municipal Code mandates • Provide outcomes in a timely manner 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of inspections, evaluations or reviews conducted • Number of recommendations accepted • Number of recommendations implemented • Assessment of Charter and Municipal Code compliance
Enhance Transparency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Keep stakeholders and community members informed about Office of the Inspector General completed audits • Educate members of the public and action holders in progress 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Track the number of reports made public vs. the total number of reports completed in a FY • Make audit statuses public on the Office of the Inspector General website

	Definition
Evaluations	Evaluations are formal assessments of the operation of a police program or process.
Reviews	Reviews of allegations, completed investigations, and other means help to identify high-risk areas and determine where internal controls should be strengthened.
Inspections	Inspections focus on fact-finding and analyses concerning specific issues and topics.

Commitment to the Community

The Office of the Inspector General is committed to expanding its community through building strong partnerships. By working alongside stakeholders, the Office of the Inspector General hopes to improve external communication and encourage community engagement. Via the Office of the Inspector General's social media and website platforms, community outreach, and special projects, the office intends to increase resident's awareness of its mission and vision.

Goals	Objectives	Measures
Build Sustainable Relationships	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create pathways to engage with the community in a two-way dialogue • Engage OIG staff on outreach strategies and best practices to drive better outcomes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of Community Outreach attended • Increased awareness of the OIG
Enhance Transparency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build a diverse portfolio of communication channels, including web-based and in-person events, press releases, social media, and printed material • Develop data analytics to communicate the work of the Office of the Inspector General, community insights and stakeholder trends • Continue using strategies such as social and newsletters to keep stockholders and community members informed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of Community Outreach attended • Increased awareness of the OIG

The Office of the Inspector General is committed to strengthening community awareness and trust. During FY2023, the Office of the Inspector General established a social media presence to actively engage Oakland community members. The Office of the Inspector General has an established social media presence on the following platforms:

CONTACT INFORMATION

Social Media

FACEBOOK & LINKEDIN: City of Oakland Office of the Inspector General

TWITTER & INSTAGRAM: @OaklandOIG

Office of the Inspector General

150 Frank H Ogawa Plaza, Suite 4213 Oakland, CA 94612

510-238-2916

www.oaklandca.gov/departments/inspector-general

oig@oaklandca.gov



Community Forums for Strategic Plan Flyer



2024-2025 STRATEGIC PLANNING SESSIONS

Help us build out effective police oversight in Oakland!

MAY

18

Fruitvale Senior Center
3301 E 12th St., Suite 201
6:00PM – 7:30PM

Co-Host: The Unity Council

The Unity Council will also share more about their ongoing activities, services and resources. Spanish translation will be available.

MAY

20

Allen Temple Baptist Church
8501 International Blvd.
12:00PM – 1:30PM

Co-Host: Allen Temple Baptist Church's Public Ministry

Come learn more about Allen Temple Public Ministry's upcoming discussions and service ventures.

MAY

23

Bay Area Urban League Office
1221 Broadway, Lower Level #48
5:30PM – 7:00PM

Co-Host: Urban League of the Greater San Francisco Bay Area

Urban League President Ken Maxey will also provide opening remarks and an overview of the organization's upcoming initiatives.

Register now at <https://tinyurl.com/OIGPlanningSessions>
Questions? Email OIG@oaklandca.gov



Youth Safety Town Hall Flyer

YOUTH SAFETY CONFERENCE



DISCUSSION & INSIGHT

- Current safety conditions in Oakland
- Police accountability & oversight
- Intergenerational wisdom & knowledge gaps
- Summer employment opportunities



SATURDAY, MAY 13 | 10AM-1PM



YOUTH UPRISING
8711 MACARTHUR BLVD, OAKLAND CA



REGISTER NOW (SPACE IS LIMITED)
[HTTPS://TINYURL.COM/OAKYOUTHSAFETY](https://tinyurl.com/oakyouthsafety)

OUR PANELISTS



Salena Wilson
Executive Director,
EOYDC



John Jones III
Director of Reentry,
BOSS



Lailah Taylor
Graduating Senior,
Oakland Tech



Selina Villesanor
Graduating Senior,
Oakland High




Alyce Karim
Rising Senior,
Skyline



Michelle N. Phillips
Inspector General,
City of Oakland



Treva Reid
District 7 Councilmember,
City of Oakland



REGISTER NOW!



CONFERENCIA DE SEGURIDAD JUVENIL



DISCUSIÓN Y CONOCIMIENTO

- Condiciones de seguridad en Oakland
- Responsabilidad & supervisión de la policía
- Sabiduría intergeneracional & brechas de conocimiento
- Oportunidades de empleo de verano



SÁBADO 13 DE MAYO | 10AM-1PM



YOUTH UPRISING

8711 MACARTHUR BLVD, OAKLAND CA



REGÍSTRESE AHORA (CUPO LIMITADO)

[HTTPS://TINYURL.COM/OAKYOUTHSAFETY](https://tinyurl.com/oakyouthsafety)

NUESTRO PANELISTA



Salena Wilson
Directora Ejecutiva,
EOYDC



John Jones III
Director de Reingreso,
BOSS



Lailah Taylor
Estudiante,
Oakland Tech



Selina Villesanor
Estudiante,
Oakland High




Alyce Karim
Estudiante,
Skyline



Michelle N. Phillips
Inspectora General,
Ciudad de Oakland



Treva Reid
Concejal del Distrito 7,
Ciudad de Oakland



REGÍSTRASE
AHORA!



City of Oakland

Oakland Police Department



Annual Military Equipment Report

2022

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Links to laws and policy:

https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202120220AB481

Oakland Municipal Code 9.65: [Chapter 9.65 - REGULATIONS ON CITY'S ACQUISITION AND USE OF MILITARY AND MILITARISTIC EQUIPMENT](#)

Attached Oakland Police Department Policy related to the use of Military Equipment:

1. TB III-G: OPD Crowd Control and Crowd Management Policy
2. TB III-P.04: Armored Vehicles
3. TB V F.02 Chemical Agents
4. TB III-H: Specialty Impact Munitions
5. DGO I-25: Unmanned Aerial Systems
6. DGO K-3: Use of Force
7. DGO K-4: Reporting and Investigating the Use of Force
8. DGO K-5: Tactical Operations Team
9. DGO K-6: Patrol Rifle Program

Preface

The Oakland Police Department is committed to maintaining public safety by providing the highest quality of police services to the communities in the City of Oakland.

The equipment listed in this annual report are essential tools that may be required from time to time to aid in deescalating intense situations or bringing critical incidents to a safe resolution.

The mere possession of this equipment does not warrant its use in every circumstance. However, having this equipment and adequate resources available if needed, makes our Department capable of bringing possible hostile critical conflicts to safe and peaceful resolutions.

Being transparent with our communities regarding all equipment used by the Oakland Police Department not only helps with transparency but helps build trust within the communities we serve.

Executive Summary:

On September 30, 2021, Governor Newsom signed **Assembly Bill AB 481** into law, which established protocols for law enforcement agencies regarding the funding, acquisition, use, and reporting of specified law enforcement equipment items. The bill added **Government Code Section 7070** that designated numerous vehicles, weapon systems and munitions used by the Oakland Police Department as “military equipment.”

AB-481, Section 7072 states the following:

(a) A law enforcement agency that receives approval for a military equipment use policy pursuant to Section 7071 shall submit to the governing body an annual military equipment report for each type of military equipment approved by the governing body within one year of approval, and annually thereafter for as long as the military equipment is available for use. The law enforcement agency shall also make each annual military equipment report required by this section publicly available on its internet website for as long as the military equipment is available for use. The annual military equipment report shall, at a minimum, include the following information for the immediately preceding calendar year for each type of military equipment:

- (1) A summary of how the military equipment was used and the purpose of its use.
- (2) A summary of any complaints or concerns received concerning the military equipment.
- (3) The results of any internal audits, any information about violations of the military equipment use policy, and any actions taken in response.
- (4) The total annual cost for each type of military equipment, including acquisition, personnel, training, transportation, maintenance, storage, upgrade, and other ongoing costs, and from what source funds will be provided for the military equipment in the calendar year following submission of the annual military equipment report.
- (5) The quantity possessed for each type of military equipment.
- (6) If the law enforcement agency intends to acquire additional military equipment in the next year, the quantity sought for each type of military equipment.

(b) Within 30 days of submitting and publicly releasing an annual military equipment report pursuant to this section, the law enforcement agency shall hold at least one well-publicized and conveniently located community engagement meeting, at which the general public may discuss and ask questions regarding the annual military equipment report and the law enforcement agency’s funding, acquisition, or use of military equipment.

The Oakland City Council previously passed Oakland **Municipal Code 9.65** Regulations on City’s Acquisition and Use of Military and Militaristic equipment. The code mirrors the Government Code 7070 except for #12: *Crowd-control equipment, such as riot batons, riot helmets, and riot shields, but excluding service-issued telescopic or fixed-length straight batons. The Council directed the Department to go through the Oakland Police Commission for any acquisitions and use of controlled equipment.*

9.65.010 States the following:

"Annual Controlled Equipment Report" means a publicly released written document that includes, at a minimum, all of the following information for the immediately preceding calendar year:

1. Production descriptions and specifications for controlled equipment and inventory numbers of each type of controlled equipment in the Police Department's possession. The Police Commission may waive the remaining obligations for annual reporting for a specific type of equipment if the Police Department certifies, in advance of issuing the Annual Controlled Equipment Report, that the equipment was not used or purchased in the immediately preceding calendar year.
2. A summary of how controlled equipment was used.
3. If applicable, a breakdown of where controlled equipment was used geographically by police area. For each police area, the Police Department shall report the number of days-controlled equipment was used and what percentage of those daily reported uses were authorized by warrant and by non-warrant forms of court authorization.
4. A summary of any complaints or concerns received concerning controlled equipment.
5. The results of any internal audits, any information about violations of controlled equipment use policies to the extent permitted by law, and any actions taken in response.
6. The estimated annual cost for each type of controlled equipment, including acquisition, personnel, training, transportation, maintenance, storage, upgrade, and other ongoing costs, and from what source funds will be provided for controlled equipment in the calendar year following submission of the annual report.
7. Impact: An updated assessment specifically identifying any potential impacts that the use of the controlled equipment might have on the welfare, safety, civil rights, and civil liberties of the public, and what specific affirmative measures will be implemented to safeguard the public from potential adverse impacts.
8. Mitigations: Specific, affirmative technical and procedural measures that have been implemented to safeguard the public from such impacts.
9. Alternatives: An updated summary of all alternative method or methods the Police Department considered to accomplish the purposes for which the controlled equipment is proposed to be used, the annual costs of alternative method or methods, and the potential impacts of alternative method or methods on the welfare, safety, civil rights, and civil liberties of the public.

The Oakland Police Department is committed to maintaining public safety by providing the highest quality police services to our communities we serve. We will continue to work with our Police Commission on the mission of transparency and good governance in the realm of law enforcement and public safety. Only with a good partnership can we address challenges facing our community while continuing to provide professional, just, and constitutional policing. In accordance with reporting requirements established in AB-481 and OMC 9.65, the Department has generated the following 2022 Annual Military Equipment Report.

Definitions:

Pursuant to AB-481, the following definitions are applicable only to the Department's current military equipment inventory and potential future military equipment acquisitions for operational needs. (For a more detailed list, refer to Government Code section 7070, for "military equipment" as defined within the Assembly Bill.)

"Governing body" means the elected body that oversees a law enforcement agency or, if there is no elected body that directly oversees the law enforcement agency, the appointed body that oversees a law enforcement agency. In the case of a law enforcement agency of a county, including a sheriff's department or a district attorney's office, "governing body" means the board of supervisors of the county. [Government Code § 7070(a)]. As it pertains to the City of Oakland, the Oakland City Council is the Governing body, but OPD must go through the Oakland Police Commission for requests or submitting reports pertaining to military equipment.

"Military equipment" means the following listed in Government Code § 7070(c)(1)-(15) and Oakland Municipal Code 9.65:

- Unmanned, remotely piloted, powered aerial or ground vehicles [Government Code § 7070].
- Mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles or armored personnel carriers. However, police versions of standard consumer vehicles are specifically excluded from this subdivision [Government Code § 7070].
- Wheeled vehicles that are built or modified to provide ballistic protection to their occupants, such as mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles or armored personnel carriers. Police versions of standard consumer vehicles are specifically excluded from this section [OMC 9.65]
- High mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV), commonly referred to as Humvees, two-and-one-half-ton trucks, five-ton trucks, or wheeled vehicles that have a breaching or entry apparatus attached. However, unarmored all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and motorized dirt bikes are specifically excluded from this subdivision [Government Code § 7070].
- Wheeled vehicles that are built to operate both on-road and off-road, such as a high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), commonly referred to as a Humvee, a two and one-half (2½)-ton truck, or a five (5)-ton truck, or vehicles built or modified to use a breaching or entry apparatus as an attachment. Unarmored all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and motorized dirt bikes are specifically excluded from this section [OMC 9.65].
- Tracked armored vehicles that provide ballistic protection to their occupants and utilize a tracked system instead of wheels for forward motion [Government Code § 7070].
- Tracked vehicles that are built or modified to provide ballistic protection to their occupants and utilize a tracked system instead of wheels for forward motion [OMC 9.65].
- Command and control vehicles that are either built or modified to facilitate the operational control and direction of public safety units [Government Code § 7070].
- Weaponized aircraft, vessels, or vehicles of any kind [Government Code § 7070].
- Weapon-bearing aircraft, vessels, or vehicles of any kind, whether manned or unmanned [OMC 9.65].

- Battering rams, slugs, and breaching apparatuses that are explosive in nature. However, items designed to remove a lock, such as bolt cutters, or a handheld ram designed to be operated by one person, are specifically excluded from this subdivision [Government Code § 7070].
- Breaching apparatus designed to provide rapid entry into a building or through a secured doorway, including equipment that is mechanical, such as a battering ram, equipment that is ballistic, such as a slug, or equipment that is explosive in nature, but excluding handheld battering rams that can be operated by one person [OMC 9.65].
- Firearms of .50 caliber or greater. However, standard issue shotguns are specifically excluded from this subdivision [Government Code § 7070] and [OMC 9.65].
- Ammunition of .50 caliber or greater. However, standard issue shotgun ammunition is specifically excluded from this subdivision [Government Code § 7070] and [OMC 9.65].
- Specialized firearms and ammunition of less than .50 caliber, including assault weapons as defined in § 30510 and §30515 of the Penal Code, with the exception of standard issue service weapons and ammunition of less than .50 caliber that are issued to officers, agents, or employees of a law enforcement agency or state agency [Government Code § 7070] and [OMC 9.65].
- Any firearm or firearm accessory that is designed to launch explosive projectiles [Government Code § 7070].
- Active area denial weapons, such as the taser shockwave, microwave weapons, water cannons, and the long-range acoustic device (LRAD). [Government Code § 7070]. [OMC 9.65].
- The following projectile launch platforms and their associated munitions: 40mm projectile launchers, "bean bag," rubber bullet, and specialty impact munition (SIM) weapons, and "riot guns" used to disperse chemical agents [OMC 9.65]. [Government Code § 7070].
- Any weapon designed for hand-to-hand combat, including any knife designed to be attached to the muzzle of a rifle, shotgun, or long gun for purposes of hand-to-hand combat, but excluding service-issued telescopic or fixed-length straight batons [OMC 9.65].
- Explosives and pyrotechnics, such as "flashbang" grenades and explosive breaching tools, and chemical weapons such as "teargas" and "pepper balls" but excluding standard, service-issued handheld pepper spray [OMC 9.65] [Government Code § 7070].
- Crowd-control equipment, such as riot batons, riot helmets, and riot shields, but excluding service-issued telescopic or fixed-length straight batons [OMC 9.65].
- Military surplus equipment [OMC 9.65].
- Any other equipment as determined by a governing body (City Council) or a state agency to require additional oversight [Government Code § 7070] and [OMC 9.65].

Military Equipment Summary

Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS): Unmanned, remotely piloted, powered aerial system. An unmanned aircraft of any type that is capable of sustaining directed flight, whether pre-programmed or remotely controlled, and all of the supporting or attached systems designed for gathering information through imaging, recording or by any other means.

Capabilities: Remotely piloted aerial vehicle capable of providing live and recorded video images captured from aerial positions, including images enhanced by Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR), thermal, and optical zoom lenses.

Purpose/Authorized Uses: Unmanned aerial systems may be utilized to enhance the department's mission of protecting lives and property when other means and resources are not available or are less effective. Any use of a UAS will be in strict accordance with constitutional and privacy rights and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations. Only an Incident Commander or Lieutenant and above can authorize its use.

Training Requirements: The ESU Unit Supervisor, or other designated OPD personnel, shall ensure that all authorized operators and required observers have completed all required FAA and department-approved training in the operation, applicable laws, policies and procedures regarding use of the UAS.

Lifespan: No lifespan indicated by Manufacturer

The Oakland Police Department currently possesses the following types of UAS:

DJI Mavic Enterprise 2 Advanced



Manufacturer: DJI

Manufacturer Description:

The Mavic 2 Enterprise Advanced features a 35 mm format camera with a 48 MP visual camera and high resolution 640 x 512 Thermal Resolution. The cameras can capture up to UHD 4K resolution video at 30 fps, or thermal imaging images and temperature data. The Mavic 2 Enterprise can achieve speeds of up to 44.7 mph, and the four-cell LiPo battery provides up to 31 minutes of flight time. Additionally, there are three modular accessories to include a spotlight, speaker, and beacon. The Mavic 2 Enterprise also has omnidirectional obstacle sensing.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.dji.com/search?q=mavic%20enterprise%20%20advanced>

DJI Mavic Mini



Manufacturer: DJI

Manufacturer Description:

The Mavic Mini from DJI is a compact drone weighing in at under 9 oz. The Mavic Mini has 3-axis gimbal and sophisticated flight modes that can achieve up to 12MP images, 2.7K Quad HD videos, and complex cinematic shots with access to the DJI Fly app. The Mini drone features up to 30 minutes of flight time on a full battery charge.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.dji.com/search?q=mini>

DJI Matrice 300 RTK



Manufacturer: DJI

Manufacturer Description:

The Matrice 300 RTK is a commercial drone features a 1080p video, which provides a live HD view from the aircraft's camera at distances of up to 9.3 miles (15 km). OcuSync Enterprise features the ability to transmit three channels of 1080p video simultaneously and AES-256 encryption ensures secure data transmission. DJI Matrice 300 RTK offers up to 55 minutes of high-performance flight time with TB60 Batteries combined with unrivaled reliability. The advanced flight control system, 6 Directional Sensing and Positioning system, AI spot-checking, Smart Track, PinPoint, Location Sharing, and an all-new Primary Flight Display.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.dji.com/search?q=matrice%20300%20rtk>

Unmanned Tracked Robots

Small Unmanned Tracked Robots: An unmanned tracked robot of any type that is capable of being remotely controlled as well as supporting or attached systems designed for gathering information through imaging, recording or by any other means.

Capabilities: Designed for rapid tactical missions, the robot is simple to operate and quick to deploy for searching rooms, hallways, stairwells, and confined spaces. With rubber tracks and articulating front and rear flippers, the Mini-CALIBER effortlessly climbs stairs. It also includes an extendible rotating claw arm that simplifies opening door handles.

Purpose/Authorized Uses: Used to assist the Oakland Police Department Operators with clearing residences and/or businesses during tactical operations, assisting officers and the community by clearing potentially dangerous building during tactical situations. Authorized by a Watch Commander or Lieutenant or above.

Training Requirements: The SOD Commander will ensure that only those team members properly trained and certified in the use of the special equipment will utilize the equipment.

Lifespan: No lifespan indicated by Manufacturer

The Oakland Police Department currently possesses the following Unmanned Tracked Robots:



Mini-CALIBER

Manufacturer: ICOR Technology

Manufacturer Description:

Designed for rapid tactical missions, the robot is simple to operate and quick to deploy for searching rooms, hallways, stairwells, and confined spaces. 5 axis Claw Arm on Rotating Turret, 10X optical zoom Pan-Tilt-Zoom (PTZ) Color Camera, Front and Rear Drive Color IR Camera, Drive System (Speeds up to 2.5 mph, Wireless RF Communications, and 2-Way Audio (talk/listen).

(Description and photo source) <https://icortechnology.com/robots/mini-caliber/>



Robotex - Avatar Tactical Robot

Manufacturer: ACORN

Manufacturer Description:

The AVATAR Robots are regarded by tactical teams as a standard operational tool, like a firearm, vehicle, or piece of body armor. It is quick and easily deployable. Navigates various terrain including stairs, sand, clothing, grass, etc. Two-way audio and recording capability.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.acornpd.com/robotex-avatar-tactical-robot>



Remotec Andros Mark 5A-1

Manufacturer: Northrop Grumman

Manufacturer Description:

The Remotec ANDROS Mark V-AI is a highly stable, tough-as-nails partner for hazardous duty operations. First responders world-wide rely on this larger-than-life robot to help assure safe, successful outcome for their most challenging missions. All terrain – climbs stairs. Reliable, affordable, environmentally sealed, Color Surveillance camera with light, 72:1 zoom, pan/tilt, low light switching capability, Gripper with continuous rotate - Many accessories can be added to work with the gripper. Quick disconnect camera mount, 24-inch camera extender, Manipulator arm that can reach up to 8 feet in the air, 2-way audio system with weatherproof speaker and microphone mounted on the robot. Powered by 24VDC - Two 65 amp-hr. 12VDC spiral-cell batteries.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.azorobotics.com/equipment-details.aspx?EquipID=412>

Armored Personnel Carriers/Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAP)

APCs and MRAPs: Are light tactical vehicles are designed specifically to withstand improvised explosive device attacks and ambushes.

Capabilities: An armored vehicle is a piece of law enforcement equipment that may allow officers to use non-force options to safely resolve incidents involving actual, threatened, or reasonably suspected violence using firearms or explosives. The protective capabilities of an armored vehicle greatly exceed those of a patrol vehicle and proper deployment of armored vehicles may increase the safety of the public, law enforcement officers, and other first responders. Armored vehicles provide improved cover for officers, are stocked with tools that might be needed during a critical incident and increase the options for a safe resolution.

Purpose/Authorized Uses: Commanders (Lieutenants and above) shall only authorize the deployment of armored vehicles when the specific capabilities of the ERV or Armored Suburban are necessary to bring an incident to a safe conclusion. Any authorized departure from an armored vehicle's place of storage shall be considered a deployment.

Training Requirements: Armored vehicles shall only be operated by officers certified by the Tactical Operations Team commander. This includes, but is not limited to, all members of the Entry Team and Sniper Team elements. It also includes all Patrol Rifle Officers (PRO's).

Lifespan: Approximately 15 years

The Oakland Police Department currently possesses the following Armored Personnel Carriers:



BearCat G3

Manufacturer: Lenco

Manufacturer Description:

The 2008 **BearCat** is equipped with emergency lights/sirens, rotating roof hatch, electric winches, running boards, protection against chemical agents, back-up camera, battering ram attachment, CS (tear gas) deployment nozzle, Thermographic cameras, and spot/flood lights. The vehicle is armored with a 0.5 – 1.5" thick steel and ballistic windows rated to stop a 0.50 BMG round.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.lencoarmor.com/model/ERV-g3-police-government/>



Armored Suburban – SUV

Manufacturer: The Armored Group

Manufacturer Description:

The 2015 Chevrolet 1500 Armored Suburban #1697 is equipped with emergency lights/sirens, steel front bumper, seating capacity for 9 personnel and backup camera. The vehicle is armored with B6 level armor capable of stopping 7.62X51mm rifle round.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.armoredcars.com/vehicles/armored-chevy-suburban-1500/>

Mobile Command Vehicles

Mobile Command Vehicles: Completely self-contained command vehicles that are designed to provide the Incident Commander with a mobile base of operation, facilitate operational control and direction of public safety units. (*Mobile Command Vehicles, Community Resource Vehicles, and Hostage Negotiation Vehicles*).

Capabilities: The vehicle provides mobile, remote access to radio, internet planning and operational resources to assist with the command and control of major incidents and other planned operations. The vehicle also has the capability to dispatch officers and firefighters, as well as receive 9-1-1 calls.

Purpose/Authorized Uses: Traffic Commander (Lieutenants and above) shall only authorize the deployment of a MCV for any incidents which it would be deemed beneficial to do so.

Training Requirements: There are 2 members of OPD, who are assigned to patrol have their Class B license and can operate the OFD/OPD Command Vehicle. The new OPD Command Vehicle can be operated with a Class C license. Members of the HNT are eligible to drive the vehicle.

Lifespan: Approximately 15 years (MCVs & CRVs). None listed by manufacturer for HNT.

The Oakland Police Department currently possesses the following Mobile Command Vehicles:

OFD/OPD Mobile Command Vehicle - (MCV)

Manufacturer: Lynch Diversified Vehicles



Manufacturer Description:

2010 Mobile Command Vehicle #002 was built in conjunction with the Oakland Fire and Oakland Police Departments as a unified command vehicle but can also alternate between fire specific and police specific missions. The vehicle was custom built by Lynch Diversified Vehicles (LDV, Inc.), LDV Model #MCC301181-07 (*Requires Class B License*). The MCV is not a tactical vehicle but rather a multi-purpose vehicle to help facilitate command and control during field incidents by both the Oakland Fire Department as well as the Oakland Police Department by providing intelligence assets. The vehicle does not have any armor nor is it deployed in such a manner as it to be used in such a way. The vehicle is to be deployed at the periphery of a tactical incident if one such arises. The Traffic Commander is the coordinator of the command vehicles.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.ldvusa.com/truck/oakland-police-department-ca-mobile-command-center/>

Community Resource Vehicle - CRV



Manufacturer: Lynch Diversified Vehicles

Manufacturer Description:

Custom Build for OPD on Ford F59 gas chassis, 7.3L V8 engine, 6-speed TorqShift automatic transmission, All aluminum body construction, Extreme duty body storage compartments, LED scene lighting, Emergency lighting and siren package, Flip down step on the rear bumper, Front conference room fixed table, Magnetic surface dry erase white boards, Exterior monitor compartment, High resolution display monitors, Multi-function printer/copier, Custom aluminum cabinetry, (4) Interior workstations, Spider base task chairs, 15kW gasoline generator, Full vehicle surge suppression system, Prewired for future rear mast, Prewired for communications radios, CAT6 network wiring and jacks.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.ldvusa.com/truck/oakland-police-department-ca-mobile-command-centers-2/>

OPD Weed & Seed MCP Mobile Community Outreach Police Station: (1998) Vehicle was obtained through grant from United States Department of Justice (JAG) Justice Assistance Program. Vehicle used to assist in providing information on mental health counseling, drug treatment and other wellness services in the community. Vehicle also used to visit schools, churches, and merchants in community. Due to age of vehicle and the procurement of newer updated vehicles in the fleet, MCP #4878 is retired – **NO LONGER IN USE**.

Hostage Negotiation Vehicle - HNV



Manufacturer: Farber Specialty Vehicles

Manufacturer Description:

Farber Vehicle 25' Chassis Designed for communication, negotiator and ECM. CINT Commander (Negotiations Recording and Control System). This system also includes software that allows it to be used as a pretext phone call device with digital recording, data logging, and control features. The system includes the following items: 1. COMMBox 2. Software with free software updates online 3. All required cables 4. One headset and four headphones with adapters 5. External room monitor speaker 6. Pelican carrying case 7. Integrated 836 Bluetooth 8. 12-volt cell phone charger adapter 9. Technical Support 10. Five-year limited warranty (refer to warranty information).

In any response to a terrorist or CBRNE incident, specialty vehicles, especially those that provide force protection or include communications and Electronic Counter Measures are critical to a successful resolution to the incident.

(Description and photo source) <https://farberspecialty.com/new-vehicles/emergency-response/hnt-crisis-response-vehicles/>

Explosive Breaching Equipment

Breaching Shotguns and Breaching Ammunition: During crisis situations, it may become necessary for DAT, SWAT, and Tactical teams to facilitate an entry into a target location. It is critical the point of entry is breached quickly and as safely as possible.

A quick and effective breach is one key to a successful tactical mission. In some instances, an explosive breach may be required to provide an added degree of safety and tactical advantage in order to accomplish a mission. A variety of specialized breaching equipment consisting of explosive materials are possessed by the Department. Explosive Breaching Equipment can only be used exclusively by the SWAT Unit's dedicated breaching personnel.

Capabilities: Explosive breaching, the use of explosive materials to affect a breach, can be an effective tactics option. An explosive breach should be viewed as a cutting tool. An effective breach is a design where the least amount of explosive material is used and still accomplishes its goal. An effective Explosive Breach can defeat fortified doors and walls. Effective breaching techniques allow tactical officers immediate entry with minimal risk to victims, officers, and suspects.

Purpose/Authorized Uses: Used as an option for breaching locked doors with specified frangible breaching ammunition. All applicable State, Federal and Local laws governing police use of force. Various Oakland Police Department Policies on Use of Force and Firearms (K-3, K-4 and TB III-G).

Training Requirements: *Global Assets Integrated* Ballistic Breaching Course is required.

Lifespan: Remington 870 Police Magnum – Limited lifetime warranty. Lifespan varies on operational usage and wear.

Breaching Shotgun Ammunition – Five (5) year limited warranty. Five (5) year shelf life.

The Department currently possesses the following types of breaching shotguns and shotgun ammunition:

Remington 870 Police Magnum with Royal Arms 14" 12-point Breaching Barrel

Manufacturer: Remington Arms Company

Manufacturer Description:

The Remington 870 Police pump-action shotgun is a rugged 12-gauge with a short, tactical 18" barrel backed by a stout 3" chamber. The all-matte black gun is Parkerized for generalized durability and rust-resistance. Both the pump action forend and stock are robust and tough synthetic.

Royal Arms Breaching Barrel: For Remington 870/1187 Shotguns; We use only high-Quality Factory replacement Barrels. All Barrels we use for the Remington 870 are cylinder smooth bore Police Model. Parkerized. The breacher is locked onto the external threads of the Barrel making it permanently affixed and part of the O.A.L. Specified by ATF. Made from 4140 Mil Spec Chromoly Steel Heat Treated to 56 RC to with stand years of abuse. The 12 Point allows a positive grip on all surfaces since the Serrated teeth are spread across the entire contact area of the breacher standoff.



Remington 870 Police Magnum (pictured above)

(Description and photo source) <https://royalarms.com/shop/royal-remington-870-express-breaching-shotgun/>

Royal Arms 12 GA Breaching Rounds Tesar

Manufacturer: Royal Arms International

Manufacturer Description:

Orange Cap 2-3/4" 275 Grain Compressed Copper Frangible 12 Ga Shotgun Slug.

- Slug Material: Copper Powder
- Velocity: 1,750 Ft p/sec -18" Barrel
- Use: For Wood Doors, Solid & Hollow
- Defeats: Solid Wood Doors, Locks & Hinges

(Description and photo source) <https://royalarms.com/shop/orange-cap-275-gr-copper-frangible-12-round-box/>



Royal Arms 12 GA Breaching Rounds Tesar-2

Manufacturer: Royal Arms International

Manufacturer Description:

Black Cap 2-3/4" 425 Grain Compressed Copper Frangible 12 Ga Shotgun Slug.

- Slug Material: Copper Powder
- Velocity: 1,525 Ft p/sec -18" Barrel
- Use: For Metal Doors, Locks & Hinges
- Defeats: Heavy Locks, Dead-bolts and Hinges (Solid Oak – Steel Doors)

(Description and photo source) <https://royalarms.com/shop/black-cap-425-gr-copper-frangible-12ga/>





TESAR-SF GREEN CAP 400 GRAIN FRANGIBLE

Royal Arms 12 GA Breaching Rounds Tesar-3

Manufacturer: Royal Arms International

Manufacturer Description:

Green Cap 2-3/4" 375 Grain Clayvon® Frangible 12 Ga Shotgun Slug

- Slug Material: Clay with S-70 Steel Shot
- Velocity: 1,650 Ft p/sec -18" Barrel
- Use: All Doors, Locks & Hinges
- Defeats: All Locks, Cross-bolts and Hinges. (Hollow Core Doors – Light Steel doors)

(Description and photo source) <https://royalarms.com/product-tag/tesar-3/>

Primacord 21



Manufacturer: Dyno Nobel

Manufacturer Description:

PRIMACORD detonating cords are flexible linear explosives with a core of PETN explosive encased in a textile outer jacket. PRIMACORD detonating cords are designed for use as trunklines and/or downlines in various mining, quarrying and construction applications.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.ebad.com/primacord-detonating-cord/>

Primacord 10



Manufacturer: Dyno Nobel

Manufacturer Description:

PRIMACORD detonating cords are flexible linear explosives with a core of PETN explosive encased in a textile outer jacket. PRIMACORD detonating cords are designed for use as trunklines and/or downlines in various mining, quarrying and construction applications.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.ebad.com/primacord-detonating-cord/>

Primacord 5



Manufacturer: Dyno Nobel

Manufacturer Description:

PRIMACORD detonating cords are flexible linear explosives with a core of PETN explosive encased in a textile outer jacket. PRIMACORD detonating cords are designed for use as trunklines and/or downlines in various mining, quarrying and construction applications.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.ebad.com/primacord-detonating-cord/>



Primacord 4y

Manufacturer: Dyno Nobel

Manufacturer Description:

PRIMACORD detonating cords are flexible linear explosives with a core of PETN explosive encased in a textile outer jacket. PRIMACORD detonating cords are designed for use as trunklines and/or downlines in various mining, quarrying and construction applications.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.ebad.com/primacord-detonating-cord/>

PRIMASHEET

Manufacturer: Dyno Nobel

Manufacturer Description:

PRIMASHEET 1000 Flexible Sheet Explosive (DETASHEET Flexible Explosive) is a waterproof PETN based (63% nominal) flexible sheet explosive. It is manufactured as a continuous roll of varying lengths and thicknesses for a wide range of applications.



(Description and photo source) <https://www.ebad.com/primasheet-sheet-explosive/>

NONEL MS 1.4B

Manufacturer: Dyno Nobel

Manufacturer Description:

NONEL® nonelectric delay detonator MS 1.4B units consist of a length of orange shock tube, with a Standard (#8) detonator attached to one end and the other end sealed. A white J-hook is affixed near the sealed end, providing easy means of connection to detonating cord. Easy-to-read, color-coded delay tags display the delay number and nominal firing time prominently. Designed to provide in-hole delay time for underground (non-coal) and surface blast applications in the mining, quarry and construction industries, the NONEL MS can be used in combination with a detonating cord trunkline, NONEL EZTL, NONEL EZ DET and/or NONEL TD detonators for maximum timing flexibility.



(Description <https://www.dynonobel.com/~media/Files/Dyno/ResourceHub/Technical%20Information/North%20America/Initiation%20Systems/NONEL/MS14B.pdf>)

Specialized Firearms of Less Than .50 Caliber

Equipment Capabilities: A semi-automatic shoulder-fired long gun that fires a rifle caliber cartridge. The Department-approved AR15 style weapon system is designed to fire a .223/5.56 caliber projectile. These weapons provide the capability to pierce hard armor, multiple layers of mild steel, or substantial brick, concrete and other materials that may give hard cover to potential suspects.

Purpose/Authorized Uses: Recognizing that officers are not normally equipped to safely address threats from persons wearing body armor and/or who are at distances beyond the effective range of standard issue police pistols and shotguns, the PRP has been implemented to address such threats and enhance police officer and public safety.

Oakland Police policy DGO K-6: Only members certified as PROs shall be authorized to deploy Departmental patrol rifles.

Training Requirements: Officers must successfully complete a CA POST certified 80-hour patrol rifle course as well as regular department firearms training and qualifications as required by law and policy.

Lifespan: Colt LE6920 (AR15) - Barrel life approximately 15k rounds

Noveske N4 - Barrel life approximately 15k rounds

BCM CQB MCMR 11 - Barrel life approximately 15k rounds

GA Precision Bolt Action .308 Win Rifle - No Lifespan indicated by Manufacturer

The Department currently possesses the following types of Specialized Firearms of Less than .50 Caliber:

Colt LE6920 (AR15)

Manufacturer: Colt

Manufacturer Description:

Colt's reliability, performance, and accuracy provide our Armed Forces the confidence required to accomplish any mission. Colt's LE6920 series shares many features of its combat proven brother, the Colt M4.



Colt LE6920 (Pictured above)

(Description and photo source) <https://www.colt.com/detail-page/colt-le6920-carbine-223556-161-301-pmag-mbus-4-pos-stk-blk>

Noveske N4

Manufacturer: Noveske

Manufacturer Description: Action:

Gas Operated Semi-Auto_Air cooled Magazine feed_Barrel Length: 10.5", stainless steel_Chambered in 5.56_
Capacity: 30+1



Noveske N4 (pictured above)

(Description and photo source) <https://noveske.com/products/10-5-gen-4-shorty-rifle/>

(BCM CQB MCMR 11)

Manufacturer: Bravo Company Manufacturing

Manufacturer Description:

Action: Gas Operated Semi-Auto, Air cooled, Magazine feed, Barrel Length: 11.5”, Chambered in 5.56, Capacity: 30+1.



BCM CQB MCMR 11 (pictured above)

(Description and photo source) https://www.bravocompanymfg.com/specification/bcm_cqb11_mcmr.php

GA Precision Bolt Action .308 Win Rifle

Manufacturer: GA Precision

Manufacturer Description:

The rifle is a custom GA Precision product built for Oakland PD, based on their Crusader model. It is built off of the Remington 700 short-action receiver platform, but manufactured and outfit by GA Precision, using a variety of components from different manufacturers. The barrel is manufactured by Broughton; it is 22” long, fluted, and has a 1/11.25” twist. The rifle stock is manufactured by Manner. The trigger group is a custom build by GA Precision. The

scopes are manufactured by Nightforce (NX8), with Badger Ordnance scope rings and bases. The bipods are manufactured by Harris. The rifles were built from different components but serialized under GA Precision.



GA Precision Bolt Action .308 Win Rifle – base model (pictured above)

(Description and Photo source) <https://www.gaprecision.net/custom-precision-rifles/custom-tactical-rifles/the-crusader.html>

Ammunition for Specialized Firearms

Speer LE Gold Dot .223 75 grain



Manufacturer: Speer Ammo

Manufacturer Description:

SPEER LE Gold Dot Duty Rifle brings proven bullet technology to rifle platform. The Gold Dot bullet was the first high performance, bonded-core bullet available in handgun ammunition, and has since set the bar for duty ammunition. The nation's number one law enforcement option is now available in rifle ammunition for agencies everywhere. Gold Dot rifle bullets are optimized to ensure expansion out of barrels down to 10" at a wide variety of velocities out to 200 yards.

(Description and photo source) https://www.speer.com/ammunition/gold_dot/rifle/gold_dot_rifle_personal_protection/19-24469.html

Winchester RA556B 64 grain



Manufacturer: Winchester Ammunition

Manufacture Description: Designed specifically for delivering exceptional penetration, Ranger Bonded's proprietary core/jacket bonding process is enhanced with a special hollow cavity that aids in controlled expansion.

(Description and phone source) <https://winchesterle.com/Ammunition/Products/Rifle/Ranger/RA556B>

Federal .223 55 grain

Manufacturer: Federal

Manufacture Description:

American Eagle® rifle ammunition offers consistent, accurate performance at a price that's perfect for high-volume shooting. The loads feature quality bullets, reloadable brass cases and dependable primers.

- Ideal for target practice
- Accurate and reliable
- Consistent primers and brass

(Description and photo source) <https://www.federalpremium.com/rifle/american-eagle/american-eagle-rifle/11-AE223.html>

Federal Tactical Bonded 308 Win 165 grain LE308T1

Manufacturer: Federal

Manufacture Description:

The Tactical Bonded line is a trusted partner for some of the most intense conditions. Made exclusively for law enforcement, it achieves accuracy and terminal performance that defeats tough barriers with minimal deviation.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.gtdist.com/federal-308win-20-bx-boded-sp-165gr.html>

Hornady 308 Win Tap 168 grain ELD Match Tap AR

Manufacturer: Hornady Law Enforcement & Military

Manufacture Description:

The Tactical Bonded line is a trusted partner for some of the most intense conditions. Made exclusively for law enforcement, it achieves accuracy and terminal performance that defeats tough barriers with minimal deviation.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.hornadyle.com/rifle-ammunition/168-gr-eld-match-tap-ar#!/>

Light Sound incendiary Device, aka “Flashbang Grenades”, Smoke, and Explosive Breaching Tools

Diversionsary Devices aka Flashbangs: Canisters that emit a loud noise and bright light.

Equipment Capabilities: Diversionsary Devices are capable of releasing large amounts of stored energy in the form of heat, light, pressure, and noise. They are intended to temporarily distract, confuse, and disorient subjects. They can also be used as “attention-getting” devices.

Purpose/Authorized Uses: Diversionary Devices can be used in high risk tactical operations as an attention getting device. They can also be used during high risk warrants, hostage rescue incidents, and some mobile field force incidents to provide an added degree of officer safety by disorienting subjects.

All applicable State, Federal and Local laws governing police use of force. Various Oakland Police Department Policies on Use of Force (K-3, K-4, K-5, TB III-G, and TB V F.02).

Training Requirements: Each operator completes a 10-hour training on Chemical Agents/SIMS Munitions Deployments.

Lifespan: 1082 – 5-year limited manufacturer warranty. No lifespan listed.

5-year shelf life

The Department currently possesses the following types of chemical and/or incendiary devices:




Riot Control 1082

Manufacturer: Defense Technology

Manufacture Description:

The Riot Control CS Grenade is designed specifically for outdoor use in crowd control situations with a high-volume continuous burn that expels its payload in approximately 20-40 seconds through four gas ports located on the top of the canister. This grenade can be used to conceal tactical movement or to route a crowd. The volume of smoke and agent is vast and obtrusive. This launchable grenade is 6.0 in. by 2.35 in. and holds approximately 2.7 oz. of active agent.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.defense-technology.com/?s=riot+control+1082>



Triple Chaser 1026

Manufacturer: Defense Technology

Manufacture Description:

The Triple-Chaser® CS consists of three separate canisters pressed together with separating charges between each. When deployed, the canisters separate and land approximately 20 feet apart allowing increased area coverage in a short period of time. This grenade can be hand thrown or launched from a fired delivery system. The grenade is 6.5 in. by 2.7 in. and holds an approximately 3.2 oz. of active agent payload. It has an approximate burn time of 20-30 seconds.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.defense-technology.com/?s=1026>

Triple Phaser 5231



Manufacturer: Combined Tactical Systems

Manufacture Description:

Manufacture Product Description: Type* Irritant & Smoke Pyrotechnic Grenades, Diameter 2.60" (66 mm) Length 6.20" (157 mm), Fuse Type Model 201, Fuse Delay 1.5 +/- 0.3 sec. Average, Launchable Yes, Overall, Weight 610 gm, Discharge Time 25-45 Seconds, Emission Ports 15.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.combinedsystems.com/product/5231-triple-phaser-cs-smoke-grenade/>

CS Han-Ball 1092



Manufacturer: Defense Technology

Manufacture Description: The Han-Ball™ CS Grenade is an outdoor use grenade expelling its payload in approximately 15-20 seconds. The rubber ball round has an overall size of 4.8 in. tall, including the fuse head, and 3.1 in. diameter. This launchable grenade holds approximately 1.6 oz. of active agent which is expelled through three ports around the equator of the ball. Due to the intense heat generated by this grenade, it should not be used inside a building or near flammable material.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.defense-technology.com/?s=CS+Han-Ball+1092>

CS Blast 1097



Manufacturer: Defense Technology

Manufacturer Description: The Rubber Ball CS Blast Grenade is a maximum effect device that delivers three stimuli for psychological and physiological effects: light, sound, and CS. The Rubber Ball CS Blast is most widely used as a crowd management tool by Law Enforcement and Corrections. The Rubber Ball CS Blast has an initial 1.5 second delay that initiates fuse assembly separation, followed by another .5 second delay. The Rubber Ball CS Blast Grenade combines loud report and flash with effects of chemical agents.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.defense-technology.com/?s=CS+Blast+1097>

9430 Tear Ball CS



Manufacturer: Combined Tactical Systems

Manufacture Description: Tear Ball Grenades are explosive "rubber-ball" style grenades that upon initiation eject a powder payload of CS, CN, OC or talc into a radius surrounding the device. Tear Balls are primarily used for crowd control in indoor and outdoor situations.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.combinedsystems.com/product/9430-tear-ball-grenade/>



Inert Blast 1098

Manufacturer: Defense Technology

Manufacturer Description: The Rubber Ball CS Blast Grenade is a maximum effect device that delivers three stimuli for psychological and physiological effects: light, sound, and CS. The Rubber Ball CS Blast is most widely used as a crowd management tool by Law Enforcement and Corrections. The Rubber Ball CS Blast has an initial 1.5 second delay that initiates fuse assembly separation, followed by another .5 second delay. The Rubber Ball CS Blast Grenade combines loud report and flash with effects of chemical agents.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.defense-technology.com/?s=inert+blast+1098>



Stinger 1087

Manufacturer: Defense Technology

Manufacturer Description: The Stinger® Grenade with safety clip is a maximum effect device that delivers three stimuli for psychological and physiological effects: rubber pellets, light, and sound. The Stinger® Grenade is most widely used as a crowd management tool.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.defense-technology.com/?s=1087>

CS 1032

Manufacturer: Defense Technology

Manufacturer Description: The design of the Tri-Chamber Flameless CS Grenade allows the contents to burn within an internal can and disperse the agent safely with reduced risk of fire. The grenade is designed primarily for indoor tactical situations to detect and/or dislodge a barricaded subject. This grenade will deliver approximately .70 oz. of agent during its 20-25 seconds burn time. The Tri-Chamber Flameless Grenade can be used in crowd control as well as tactical deployment situations by Law Enforcement and Corrections but was designed with the barricade situation in mind. Its applications in tactical situations are primarily to detect and/or dislodge barricaded subjects. The purpose of the Tri-Chamber Flameless Grenade is to minimize the risks to all.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.defense-technology.com/?s=1032>



CS 1016

Manufacturer: Defense Technology

Manufacturer Description: The Pocket Tactical CS Grenade is small, and lightweight. The 0.9 oz. of active agent will burn approximately 20-40 seconds. At 4.75 in. by 1.4 inches in size, it easily fits in most tactical pouches. This is a launchable grenade; however, it is normally used as a signaling or covering device. Though this device is slightly over four inches in length, it produces a smoke cloud so fast it appears to be an enveloping screen produced by a full-size tactical grenade.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.defense-technology.com/?s=CS+1016>





CS 5230B

Manufacturer: Combined Tactical Systems

Manufacture Description: Pyrotechnic grenade designed for indoor use delivering a maximum amount of irritant smoke throughout multiple rooms with minimal risk of fire.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.combinedsystems.com/product/5230b-cs-baffled-canister-grenade-pyro-low-flame-potential-2>

CS Muzzle Blast 2262



Manufacturer: Defense Technology

Manufacturer Description: The Ferret® 40 mm Barricade Penetrating Round is filled with a CS liquid chemical agent. It is a frangible projectile that is spin stabilized utilizing barrel rifling. It is non-burning and designed to penetrate barriers. Primarily used to dislodge barricaded subjects, it can also be used for area denial. Primarily used by tactical teams, it is designed to penetrate barriers, such as windows, hollow core doors, wallboard, and thin plywood. Upon impact the nose ruptures and instantaneously delivers the agent payload inside a structure or vehicle.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.defense-technology.com/?s=cs+2262>

CTS 7290m



Manufacturer: Combined Tactical Systems

Manufacture Description: Type: Noise/Flash Diversion Device, Body Material: Steel - Black Chromate Diameter 1.50" (38 mm) Length 5.40" (137 mm), Weight: 430 gm, Blast Ports: 10 on top, 10 on bottom, Fuze Type: Model 201, Fuze Delay: 1.5 +/- 0.3 sec., Average Sound Output: 165-180 Db, Light Output: 2 million Candela, Single Use Only

(Description and photo source) <https://www.combinedsystems.com/product/7290m-mini-bang-steel-body-priced-individually-must-order-in-quantities-of-12/>

CTS 4233 40mm CS Multi 3 Smoke



Manufacturer: Combined Tactical Systems

Manufacture Description: This 40MM aluminum cartridge launches 3 sub-munitions that emit CS via rapid burning. The munition is used from a stand-off distance, and it is effective to disperse unruly crowds or deny areas during riots and civil disorder.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.combinedsystems.com/product/4233-40mm-cs-multi-3-smoke-4-8-long/>



CTS 9410 Inert Rubber Ball Tear Grenade

Manufacturer: Combined Tactical Systems

Manufacture Description: The 9410 Inert Tear Ball Grenades produce a loud blast, emit bright light, and subsequently dispersing a cloud of inert powder. The primary application of this device is for riot control. Tear Balls are primarily used for crowd control in indoor and outdoor situations.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.combinedsystems.com/product/9410-inert-tear-ball-grenade/>



CTS 1901A Mk9 Hose and Wand OC

Manufacturer: Combined Tactical Systems

Manufacture Description: MK-9 offers higher pressure for wider fields of spray and larger capacity for multiple target engagements. It is the go-to alternative to large extinguisher OC Aerosol dispensers.

(Description and photo source) https://www.marksupply.com/CTS-MK-9-Vapor-Delivery-System-optional-Hose-Wand_p_380.html



CTS 1337 OC Aerosol Fogger 2oz

Manufacturer: Combined Tactical Systems

Manufacture Description: MK-9 offers higher pressure for wider fields of spray and larger capacity for multiple target engagements. It is the go-to alternative to large extinguisher OC Aerosol dispensers.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.combinedsystems.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CSI.LessLethalProducSource-Catalog-revised-1.pdf>



CTS 9230 CS Smoke Jet Lite Rubber Ball, Pyro

Manufacturer: Combined Tactical Systems

Manufacture Description: The 9230 CS Jet-Lite Rubber Ball Grenade is one of the smaller diameter burning grenades that discharges a high volume of chemical agents through multiple emission ports. Specifically for outdoor use and should not be deployed from rooftops, in crawl spaces or indoors due to fire producing capability. Can be hand thrown or launched.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.combinedsystems.com/product/9230-cs-jet-lite-rubber-ball-grenade-pyro/>

Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD)

Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD): The LRAD is a type of loudspeaker system that emits a focused and directional beam of sound.

Equipment Capabilities: The sound levels of this device are controllable and range from a mild public address type speaker sound level, for giving directions, to a high intensity, high pitch sound designed to deter or move subjects from an area.

Purpose/Usage: The LRAD can be used as a PA to issue Emergency Evacuation Orders, communicate with a subject during a law enforcement operation where direct communication is not possible, or to relay directions to a crowd in a noisy environment (unlawful assembly announcements).

All applicable State, Federal and Local laws governing police use of force. Various Oakland Police Department Policies on Use of Force and Firearms (K-3, K-4, K-5, and TB III-G). Command Approval required to use this device.

Training Requirements: Each operator must be trained and be a part of the HNT.

Lifespan: **LRAD – Model 100X** – One (1) year limited warranty. No lifespan indicated by manufacturer. Lifespan varies on operational usage and wear.

LRAD – Model 450XL - One (1) year limited warranty. No lifespan indicated by manufacturer. Lifespan varies on operational usage and wear.

The Department currently possesses the following types of LRAD's:

LRAD 100X

Manufacturer: Genasys



Manufacture Description: The LRAD 100X is a self-contained, portable communication system for on-scene and tactical communication. With unparalleled vocal clarity and up to 30db louder than bullhorns, megaphones, and vehicle P.A. systems, the LRAD 100X is also four to six times louder than other acoustic hailers of comparable size and weight. LRAD's optimized driver and waveguide technology ensures every message is clearly broadcast, heard and understood, even above engine, crowd, siren, and background noise. The LRAD warning tone commands attention to the voice messages that follow and provides a safer alternative to non-lethal and kinetic measures for changing behavior.

(Description and photo source) https://genasys.com/wp-content/uploads/Datasheet_LRAD_100X_2021_QR.pdf

LRAD 450XL

Manufacturer: Genasys

Manufacture Description: The LRAD 450XL utilizes technology developed and patented* by LRAD Corporation to provide the audio output of larger acoustic hailers almost twice its size and weight, while delivering the same outstanding vocal clarity consistent with all LRAD systems. The LRAD 450XL broadcasts powerful warning tones to command attention to the highly intelligible voice messages that follow enabling operators to change behavior and enhance response capabilities with safe, scalable escalation of force. Lightweight and designed for use on tripods or mounted on vessels, vehicles and Remote Weapon Stations (RWS), the LRAD 450XL is a highly effective, long-range communication and deterrent system in use around the world for public safety, law enforcement, maritime and defense applications.

(Description and photo source) https://genasys.com/wp-content/uploads/LRAD-450XL_D00101-Rev.-B_3-4.pdf

40mm Projectile Launchers & Specialty Impact Munition (SIM) weapons

40mm Launchers (Projectile Launch Platforms): A single shot or multi-shot Extended Range Impact Weapon (ERIW) launcher capable for firing a variety of 40mm rounds. The Oakland Police Department also has a small inventory of 37mm launchers that share the same characteristics as 40mm launchers but are chambered for 37mm munitions. (40mm launchers and 37mm launchers are considered “Projectile Launch Platforms” under AB-481).

Equipment Capabilities: 40mm launchers are capable of firing a variety of munitions with a maximum effective range of one hundred twenty (120) feet and deliver 40mm munitions in the form of chemical agents, sponge baton rounds, or combined use sponge baton OC chemical agent rounds.

Purpose/Usage: The Tactical Operations Team may be activated at the discretion of the Patrol Division Watch Commander, or an Area Commander who is on scene and assumes Incident Command. This is covered in Oakland Police Policy DGO K-5 and TB III-G.

Training Requirements: Each operator completes a 10-hour training on Chemical Agents/SIMS Munitions Deployments.

Lifespan: Defense Technology (37mm single launcher) - No lifespan indicated by the manufacturer.

Defense Technology 40mm Launchers – No lifespan indicated by manufacturer.

Penn Arms 40mm Launchers – No lifespan indicated by manufacturer.

Wilson Combat - No lifespan indicated by the manufacturer.

The Department currently possesses the following types of 40mm launchers (37 mm no longer in use).

Defense Technology (37mm single launcher)

Manufacturer: Defense Technology

Manufacturer Description: Smooth Bore, Breech fed, Double action/single action, 37mm



37mm Single Launcher (pictured above)

(Description and photo source) <https://www.defense-technology.com/product/37mm-lmt-tactical-single-launcher-expandable-stock/>

Defense Technology (40mm single launcher)

Manufacturer: Defense Technology

Manufacturer Description: Rifled barrel, Breech fed, Double action/single action, Picatinny rail.



40mm Single Launcher (pictured above)

(Description and photo source) <https://www.defense-technology.com/product/40mm-lmt-tactical-single-launcher-expandable-stock/>

Penn Arms (PGL 65-40)

Manufacturer: Combined Tactical Systems

Manufacturer Description: A 40mm pump-action advance magazine drum launcher with a fixed stock and combo rail. It has a six-shot capacity and rifled barrel. Previously labeled the PGL-65, the features include: Double-action trigger, trigger lock push button and hammer lock safeties.



Penn Arms PGL 65-40 (pictured above)

(Description and photo source) <https://www.combinedsystems.com/product/p540-1-pump-multi-launcher-5-cyl-fixed-stock-w-combo-rail-pgl-65-40/>

Wilson Combat

Manufacturer: Combined Tactical Systems

Manufacturer Description: The Remington 870 Police pump-action shotgun is a rugged 12-gauge with a short, tactical 18" barrel backed by a stout 3" chamber. The all-matte black gun is Parkerized for generalized durability and rust-resistance. Both the pump action forend and stock are robust and tough synthetic.



Remington Shotgun 12 gauge (pictured above)

(Description and photo source) <https://www.wilsoncombat.com/less-lethal/>

Specialty Impact Munition (SIM)

Specialty Impact Munitions (SIM): A non-lethal training ammunition used by law enforcement agencies and militaries worldwide to deliver more realistic close-range firearms training. They consist of low energy, non-lethal cartridges, typically manufactured with a water-soluble color marking compound. These rounds allow for shooters to obtain a visual assessment of round placement in live person training environments.

Equipment Capabilities: When utilized with a training munition bolt carrier group in a 5.56mm rifle platform, SIM's have an effective range of approximately 27 yards. When utilized in a pistol caliber barrel training platform (9mm), SIMs have an effective range of 25 feet.

Purpose/Usage: The Tactical Operations Team may be activated at the discretion of the Patrol Division Watch Commander, or an Area Commander who is on scene and assumes Incident Command. This is covered in Oakland Police Policy DGO K-5 and TB III-G.

Training Requirements: Each operator completes a 10-hour training on Chemical Agents/SIMS Munitions Deployments.

Lifespan:



CS SKAT Shell 6172

Manufacturer: Defense Technology

Manufacturer Description:

Launchable 40mm, Burning CS / Outdoor, Risk of fire, Max range 80-100 yards, Discharge time 20-30 seconds, 0.90 oz active agent, 4 separate sub-munitions (40mm- 4).

(Description and photo source) <https://www.defense-technology.com/?s=6172>



CS Muzzle Blast 6042

Manufacturer: Defense Technology

Manufacturer Description: The 40 mm Muzzle Blast CS Round is widely used as a crowd management tool for the immediate and close deployment. It can also be employed in tactical operations such as barricaded subjects, room clearing, area denial, and for small space contamination, and a means of contaminating crawl spaces and attics. As a pain compliance round,

(Description and photo source) <https://www.defense-technology.com/?s=CS+Muzzle+Blast+6042>



Foam Baton 6099

Manufacturer: Defense Technology

Manufacturer Description: The 40 mm Multiple Foam Baton Round is most widely used as a crowd management tool where stand-off distances are limited. It may also prove valuable in riot situations where police lines and protestors are in close proximity. The round contains three foam projectiles. It utilizes smokeless powder and has more consistent velocities and tighter patterns compared to its 37 mm counterpart. The foam projectile allows for closer deployment, while minimizing injury.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.defense-technology.com/?s=Foam+Baton+6099>



Direct Impact Marking 6326

Manufacturer: Defense Technology

Manufacturer Description: The 40mm Direct Impact® munition is a point-of-aim, point-of-impact direct-fire round. An excellent solution whether you need to incapacitate a single subject or control a crowd. When loaded with a green marking agent, the Direct Impact can be used to indicate the aggressor in a crowd or riot situation to the team on the ground.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.defense-technology.com/?s=Direct+Impact+Marking+6326>



Frangible Impact 4550 Orange Marking Powder

Manufacturer: Combined Tactical Systems

Manufacture Description: The 40mm Direct Impact® munition is a point-of-aim, point-of-impact direct-fire round. An excellent solution whether you need to incapacitate a single subject or control a crowd. When loaded with a green marking agent, the Direct Impact can be used to indicate the aggressor in a crowd or riot situation to the team on the ground.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.combinedsystems.com/product/4550-40mm-frangible-impact-orange-marking-powder/>



CTS 4431 40mm CS Powder No Flame Barricade Indoor

Manufacturer: Combined Tactical Systems

Manufacture Description: CS powder filled projectile penetrates intermediate barriers and delivers irritant agents into an adjacent room.

(Description and photo source) [CSI.LessLethalProducSource-Catalog-revised-1.pdf \(combinedsystems.com\)](#)

12GA 2581 Super Sock



Manufacturer: Combined Tactical Systems

Manufacture Description: The Model 2581 Super-Sock® is in its deployed state immediately upon exiting the barrel. It does not require a minimum range to “unfold” or “stabilize.” The Super-Sock® is an aerodynamic projectile and its accuracy is relative to the shotgun, barrel length, environmental conditions, and the operator. The Super-Sock® is first in its class providing the point control accuracy and consistent energy to momentarily incapacitate violent, non-compliant subjects. Effective range is 75ft.

(Description and photo source) <https://www.combinedsystems.com/product/2581-12ga-super-sock-bean-bag-priced-individually-per-cartridge-must-order-in-quantities-of-5/>

Crowd Control Equipment

Crowd control is defined as those techniques used to address unlawful public assemblies, including a display of formidable numbers of police officers, crowd containment, dispersal tactics, and arrest procedures.

Crowd Control **Helmets** should only be used during a protest or demonstration to protect members’ head and eyes from thrown objects.

Crowd Control helmets shall not be used unless there is an articulable reason to wear them in public view.

Riot Shields may not be deployed or used until approved in accordance with OMC 9.65.

Equipment Capabilities: See product description

Purpose/Usage: Crowd control helmets should be used at the authorization of a commander or supervisor. Members do not have to wait for objects to be thrown before authorizing/donning helmets. In the event of exigent circumstances, officers can don crowd control helmets to protect themselves. There is no Oakland Police Department Policy that governs the use of shields during Crowd Control situations.

Training Requirements: Each member takes an 8-hour Crowd Control class in the Academy. There is also 2-hours in CPT. There are no training requirements for Shields.

Lifespan: **Helmets** - No lifespan indicated by the manufacturer.

Riot Shields - No lifespan indicated by the manufacturer.

Helmet-Non Ballistic (906 Series)

Manufacturer: Atlantic Tactical

Manufacturer Description:



- TacElite EPR polycarbonate alloy helmet shell
- Expanded polystyrene liner with padded, sweat-wicking inner liner
- Permanently mounted neck protector with Kydex penetration shield and shock absorbent foam pad
- Detachable 0.150" (3.8mm) thick face shield with liquid seal prevents liquids from seeping into officer's eyes
- Molded lip on top edge of face shield prevents shield from closing over integral visor and striking the face
- Double D-ring fastener provides maximum strength and slip resistance. NIJ compliant quick release buckle also included (user installation required).
- Snap-on nape pad with Kydex penetration shield, shock-absorbent foam pads and chemical-resistant black Cordura cover
- Plastic chin cup for added comfort when harness is tightened. Optional chin pad available.
- Face guard: Steel wire with black nylon coating and welded joints for maximum strength and safety. Wire guard is form fitted to match radius of face shield and is attached by four heavy-duty nylon clips. Viewing area: 2 3/4" x 8 1/2" (7.0cm x 21.6cm) (Model 906C only)
- Weight Model 906: 3.2 lbs. (1.5 Kg)
- Weight Model 906FS6: 3.2 lbs. (1.5 Kg)
- Weight Model 906C: 4 lbs. (1.8 Kg)

Meets or exceeds NIJ Standard for Riot Helmets, NIJ 0104.02* (Model 906 only)

(Description and photo source) [Premier Crown 906 Series TacElite EPR Polycarbonate Alloy Riot Helmet - Atlantic Tactical Inc](#)



Riot Shields

Manufacturer: No manufacturer identified

Manufacturer Description:

- Riot shields have no governing department policy and therefore have not been deployed. The department does not anticipate the development of a riot shield policy, and these will be considered for removal from our inventory in calendar year 2023.




Military Equipment Use Summary 2022

While the Oakland Police Department's inventory of military equipment is varied, the mere possession of the equipment does not warrant its use for every incident. The Oakland Police Department recognizes that critical incidents are unpredictable and can vary in nature. A variety of military equipment options can greatly assist incident commanders, officers, and specific units in bringing those incidents to a swift resolution in a safe manner. The use of military equipment is restricted for use only in certain instances and in some cases only by certain units. This section outlines the military equipment usage for 2022. Certain items of military equipment, particularly consumables (ammunition, diversionary devices, chemical agents, etc.) are used throughout the year on a regular basis for training to maintain proficiency. Training usage is not captured. This section only provides data for the operational use of military equipment listed within this Annual Equipment Report.

Geographic Reference

The City of Oakland is divided into two Bureau of Field Operations, six Areas, and thirty-five policing beats. Reference map below.



Military Equipment Usage Summary 2022

The following is *approximate* data for military equipment deployment/usage by Department area and category for 2022. (1 July 22 – 31 December 22)

Unmanned Aircraft Systems Usage

The Unmanned Aircrafts Systems were deployed a total of **56** times. **15** of those deployments were for warrants. The breakdown is as follows: Mavic (**37**), Mini (**18**), and Matrice (**1**).

The usage were under the following categories.

- Use of force
- Deployment
- Fleeing subjects & perimeter searches

DJI Mavic Enterprise 2 Advanced			
Number Deployed	37		
Number of Deployment for warrants	10		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	6	1	0
AREA 2	1	0	0
AREA 3	7	1	0
AREA 4	7	3	0
AREA 5	10	1	0
AREA 6	12	3	0
OUTSIDE OF AREA	6	1	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	37	10	0

The DJI Mavic Enterprise 2 Advanced was deployed in the last year. Any adverse impacts fell within the previously identified impacts in the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

DJI Mavic Mini			
Number Deployed	18		
Number of Deployment for warrants	5		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	1	0	0
AREA 2	0	1	0
AREA 3	3	0	0
AREA 4	1	0	0
AREA 5	2	2	0
AREA 6	4	1	0
OUTSIDE OF AREA	6	1	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	18	5	0

The DJI Mavic Mini was deployed in the last year. Any adverse impacts fell within the previously identified impacts in the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

DJI Matrice 300 RTK			
Number Deployed	1		
Number of Deployment for warrants	0		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	1	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	1	0	0

The DJI Matrice 300RTK was deployed in the last year. Any adverse impacts fell within the previously identified impacts in the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Unmanned Robots Usage

The Unmanned Robots: Icor Mini (9), Avatar (7) were deployed a total of 16 times. 3 of those deployments were for warrants. Multiple robots were on scene per incident. The usage was under the following categories.

- Use of force
- Deployment
- Fleeing subjects & perimeter searches
- DAT, TACTICAL, & SWAT protection

ICOR Mini Caliber			
Number Deployed	9		
Number of Deployment for warrants	4		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	1	0	0
AREA 2	1	0	0
AREA 3	4	1	0
AREA 4	1	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	2	2	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	5	3	0

The ICOR Mini Caliber was deployed in the last year. Any adverse impacts fell within the previously identified impacts in the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Avatar Tactical Robot			
Number of Deployments	7		
Number of Deployment for warrants	1		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	1	0	0
AREA 3	2	0	0
AREA 4	1	1	0
AREA 5	1	0	0
AREA 6	2	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	7	1	0

The Avatar Tactical Robot was not deployed in the last year. Any adverse impacts fell within the previously identified impacts in the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Andros Mark 5A			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	0		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Andros Mark 5A was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

BearCat & Armored Suburban (Armored Personnel Carrier) Usage

The BearCat (54) and Armored Suburban (63) were deployed a total of 117 times. 27 of the deployments were for warrants. The usage was under the following categories.

- Use of force
- Deployment
- Fleeing subjects & perimeter searches
- DAT, TACTICAL, & SWAT protection
- De-escalation

BearCat/ERV			
Number Deployed	54		
Number of Deployment for warrants	12		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	3	0	0
AREA 2	1	0	0
AREA 3	5	2	0
AREA 4	12	2	0
AREA 5	15	4	0
AREA 6	17	3	0
OUTSIDE OF AREA	3	1	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	54	12	0

The BearCat was deployed in the last year. Any adverse impacts fell within the previously identified impacts in the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Armored Suburban			
Number Deployed	63		
Number of Deployment for warrants	15		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	17	3	0
AREA 2	8	2	0
AREA 3	13	1	0
AREA 4	7	2	0
AREA 5	10	1	0
AREA 6	6	4	0
OUTSIDE AREA	2	2	
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	63	15	0

The Armored Suburban was deployed in the last year. Any adverse impacts fell within the previously identified impacts in the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Mobile Command Vehicle Usage

Mobile Command Vehicles were utilized a total of **(23)** times. For some of the Mobile Command Vehicles, the deployments lasted multiple days depending on the scope and duration of the mission. The usage breakdown is as follows:

- Fourth of July Holiday Traffic Shut Down – Officer Command Post
- Halloween Trunk or Treat
- High Visibility Crime Prevention Details
- Community Events
- Protection for DAT – Designated Arrest Team
- Traffic Control

Mobile Command Vehicle - MCV #0222			
Number Deployed	16		
Number of Deployment for warrants	4		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	6	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	3	0	0
AREA 4	4	2	0
AREA 5	1	1	0
AREA 6	2	1	0

Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	16	4	0
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The Mobile Command Vehicle was deployed in the last year. Any adverse impacts fell within the previously identified impacts in the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Community Resource Vehicle - CRV: #1102/#1103/#1104			
Number Deployed	9		
Number of Deployment for warrants	0		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	2	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	2	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	1	0	0
AREA 6	2	0	0
OUTSIDE OF AREA	2	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	9	0	0

The Community Resource Vehicle was deployed in the last year. Any adverse impacts fell within the previously identified impacts in the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

OPD WEED & SEED MCP			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The OPD Weed & Seed MCP was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

HNT Vehicle (Hostage Negotiation Vehicle) #1197 - QTY 1			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Hostage Negotiation Vehicle was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Breaching Shotgun & Breaching Ammunition Usage

Breaching Shotguns and Breaching Ammunition were utilized zero (0) times operationally in 2022.

Remington Breaching Shotgun			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Remington Breaching Shotgun was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Royal Arms 12 GA Breaching Rounds Tesar			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Royal Arms 12 GA Breaching Rounds Tesar was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Royal Arms 12 GA Breaching Rounds Tesar-2			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Royal Arms 12 GA Breaching Rounds Tesar-2 was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Royal Arms 12 GA Breaching Rounds Tescr-3			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Royal Arms 12 GA Breaching Rounds Tesar-3 was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Dyno Nobel / Primacord 21			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Dyno Nobel Primacord 21 was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Dyno Nobel / Primacord 10			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Dyno Nobel Primacord 10 was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Dyno Nobel / Primacord 4y			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Dyno Nobel Primacord 4y was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Ensign-Bickford / PRIMASHEET			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Ensign-Bickford Primasheet was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Dyno Nobel / Nonel MS 1.4B			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Dyno Nobel Nonel MS 1.4B was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Specialized Firearms & Ammunition Usage

Specialized rifles were deployed on **98** incidents. **26** were for warrants. Multiple rifles were on scene per incident. The breakdown is as follows: AR-15 rifle (**337**), .308 Win Rifle (**12**), and BCM Rifle (**15**). The usage was under the following categories.

- Use of Force
- Deployment
- Officer Involved Shootings
- Active shooter at King Estates School

Colt LE6920 (AR15)			
Number Deployed	337		
Number of Deployment for warrants	26		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	19	3	0
AREA 2	8	3	0
AREA 3	13	3	0
AREA 4	14	4	0
AREA 5	17	4	0
AREA 6	21	6	0
Outside Area	3	3	
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	95	26	0

The Colt LE6920 AR15 was deployed in the last year. Any adverse impacts fell within the previously identified impacts in the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Noveske N4			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Noveske N4 was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Bravo Company Manufacturing (BCM CQB MCMR 11)			
Number Deployed	15		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	1	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	1	0	0

The BCM CQB MCMR 11 was deployed in the last year. Any adverse impacts fell within the previously identified impacts in the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

GA Precision Bolt Action .308 Win Rifle			
Number Deployed	12		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	1	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	1	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	2	0	0

The GA Bolt Action .308 Win Rifle was deployed in the last year. Any adverse impacts fell within the previously identified impacts in the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Speer LE Gold Dot .223 75 grain			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Speer LE Gold Dot .223 75 grain was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Winchester (RA 556B 64 grain)			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Winchester RA 556B 64 grain was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Federal .223 55 grain			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Federal .223 55 grain was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Federal Tactical Bonded 308 Win 165 grain LE308T1			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Federal Tactical Bonded 308 Win 165 grain LE308T1 was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Hornady 308 Win Tap 168 grain ELD Match Tap AR			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Hornady 308 Win Tap 168 grain ELD Match Tap AR was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

[Light Sound incendiary Device, aka “Flashbang Grenades” & Explosive Breaching Equipment Usage:](#)

Explosive Breaching Equipment was utilized (2) times operationally. Multiple devices were on scene per incident CTS 4233 (1) and CTS 9230 (3). They were deployed at Sideshow scenes.

Defense Technology / Riot Control 1082			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Defense Technology Riot Control 1082 was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Defense Technology / Triple Chaser 1026			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Defense Technology Triple Chaser 1026 was not deployed in the last year. Any adverse impacts fell within the previously identified impacts in the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Combined Tactical Systems/ Triple Phaser 5231			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The CTS Triple Phaser 5231 was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Defense Technology/ CS Han-Ball 1092			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Defense Technology CS Han-Ball 1092 was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Defense Technology/ CS Blast 1097			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Defense Technology CS Blast 1097 was not deployed in the last year. Any adverse impacts fell within the previously identified impacts in the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Combined Tactical System/ 9430 Tear Ball CS			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The CTS 9430 Tear Ball CS was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Defense Technology/ Inert Blast 1098			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Defense Technology Inert Blast 1098 was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Defense Technology/ Stinger 1087			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Defense Technology Stinger 1087 was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Defense Technology/ 1032			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Defense Technology 1032 was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Defense Technology/ CS 1016			
Number Deployed	0		
Number Deployed	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Defense Technology CS 1016 was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Combined Tactical Systems/ 5230B			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The CTS 5230B was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Defense Technology/ CS 2262			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The Defense Technology CS 2262 was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Combined Tactical System/ CTS 7290M			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The CTS 7290M was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

CTS 4233 40mm CS Multi 3 Smoke			
Number Deployed	1		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	1	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	1	0	0

The CTS 4233 40mm CS Multi 3 Smoke was deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

CTS 9410 Inert Rubber Ball Tear Grenade			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The CTS 9410 Inert Rubber Ball Tear Grenade was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

CTS 1901A Mk9 Hose and Wand OC			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The CTS 1901A MK9 Hose and Wand OC was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

CTS 1337 OC Aerosol Fogger 2oz			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The CTS 1337 OC Aerosol Fogger 2oz was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

CTS 9230 CS Smoke Jet Lite Rubber Ball, Pyro			
Number Deployed	3		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	3	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	3	0	0

The CTS 9230 Smoke Jet Lite Rubber Ball Pyro was deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) Usage

The LRAD's were utilized once (1) time operationally.

- Announcement – Violent Armed Robbery Suspect

LRAD - 100X			
Number Deployed	1		
Number of Deployment for warrants	1		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	1	1	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	1	1	0

The LRAD 100X was deployed in the last year. Any adverse impacts fell within the previously identified impacts in the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

LRAD - 450X			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The LRAD 450X was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

[Projectile Launchers & Specialty Impact Munition \(SIM\) weapons Usage](#)

- Projectile Launchers & Specialty Impact Munition (SIM) Equipment was utilized (0) times operationally.

Defense Technology (37mm single launcher)			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The equipment, Defense Technology (37mm single launcher), was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Defense Technology (40mm single launcher)			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The equipment, Defense Technology (40mm single launcher), was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Penn Arms (PGL 65-40)			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The equipment, Penn Arms (PGL 65-40), was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Wilson Combat			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The equipment, Wilson Combat, was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Defense Technology/ CS SKAT Shell 6172			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The equipment, Defense Technology/ CS SKAT Shell 6172, was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Defense Technology/ CS Muzzle Blast 6042			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The equipment, Defense Technology/ CS Muzzle Blast 6042, was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Defense Technology/ Foam Baton 6099			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The equipment, Defense Technology/ Foam Baton 6099, was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Defense Technology/ Direct Impact Marking 6326			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The equipment, Defense Technology/ Direct Impact Marking 6326, was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Combined Tactical System/ Frangible Impact 4550 Orange Marking Powder			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The equipment, Combined Tactical System/ Frangible Impact 4550 Orange Marking Powder, was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

CTS 4431 40mm CS Powder No Flame Barricade Indoor			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The equipment, CTS 4431 40mm CS Powder No Flame Barricade Indoor, was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Combined Tactical System/ 12GA 2581 Super Sock			
Number Deployed	2		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	2	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	2	0	0

The equipment, Combined Tactical System/ 12GA 2581 Super Sock, was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Crowd-Control Equipment Usage

- Crowd Control Equipment was utilized (6) times operationally.

Helmet - Non-Ballistic			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The equipment, **Helmet - Non-Ballistic**, was not deployed in the last year, and the Department has not identified additional impacts from the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Riot Shields			
Number Deployed	0		
Number of Deployment for warrants	N/A		
Geographical Location of Deployment	Total number of days-controlled equipment was used	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by warrant	Number of those daily reported uses authorized by non-warrant forms of court authorization
AREA 1	0	0	0
AREA 2	0	0	0
AREA 3	0	0	0
AREA 4	0	0	0
AREA 5	0	0	0
AREA 6	0	0	0
Total number of Days Controlled Equipment was used	0	0	0

The equipment, **Riot Shields**, was not deployed in the last year. Any adverse impacts fell within the previously identified impacts in the previously released Impact Statement (See attachment).

Search Warrant Usage

- Military Equipment was utilized in approximately (31) warrant apprehensions.

WARRANTS	OCCURANCES	AREA
Juvenile runaway	0	N/A
Carjacking suspect	2	5, 6
Shooting suspect	5	1,5, 6, Outside Area
Robbery suspect	2	2
Armed robbery suspect	3	4, 6
Firearm possession suspect	9	4, 5, 6, Outside Area
Illegal gambling facilities	4	3, 4
Weapons search	1	4
Murder suspect	5	1,6,3, Outside Area

Complaints Summary and Internal Audits Regarding Military Equipment Usage

- There were no known IAD or CPRA complaints for the direct deployment of militarized equipment.

Impact: An updated assessment specifically identifying any potential impacts that the use of the controlled equipment might have on the welfare, safety, civil rights, and civil liberties of the public, and what specific affirmative measures will be implemented to safeguard the public from potential adverse impacts.

- The Department's Public Information Office (PIO) indicated there were no known adverse impacts from the use of controlled equipment.

Military Equipment Inventory

Department Inventory of Military Equipment – Calendar Year 2022 (July 2022 – Dec 2022)

(*NOTE: The inventory of certain items of consumable military equipment (i.e. ammunition, diversionary devices, chemical agents, etc.) can fluctuate throughout the year. This can be due to operational usage, training usage, operational wear, and/or manufacturer recommended replacement guidelines. While the Department strives to provide accuracy in its inventory reporting as prescribed by law, this appendix reflects approximations of certain consumable items of military equipment at the time of this report's publication.)

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS)			
DRONES	QTY	IN USE/RETIRED	QTY SOUGHT IN NEXT YEAR
MAVIC Enterprise 2 Advanced - DJI	7	In Use	Unknown
MAVIC MINI - DJI	8	In Use	Unknown
MATRICE 300 RTK - DJI	1	In Use	Unknown

UNMANNED TRACKED ROBOTS			
ROBOTS	QTY	IN USE/RETIRED	QTY SOUGHT IN NEXT YEAR
MINI CALIBER - ICOR TECHNOLOGY	1	In Use	Unknown
AVATAR TACTICAL ROBOT - ROBOTEX	2	In Use	Unknown
ANDROS MARK 5A-1 - NORTHROP GRUMMAN	1	In Use	Unknown

ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS	QTY	IN USE/RETIRED	QTY SOUGHT IN NEXT YEAR
BEARCAT - LENCO	1	In Use	unk-dependent on authorization to replace
ARMORED SUBURBAN - THE ARMORED GROUP	1	In Use	unk-dependent on authorization to replace

COMMAND POST VEHICLES	QTY	IN USE/RETIRED	QTY SOUGHT IN NEXT YEAR
OFD/OPD MOBILE COMMAND VEHICLES #0222 - LYNCH DIVERSIFIED VEHICLES	1	In Use	Unknown
OPD COMMUNITY RESOURCE VEHICLES #1102/1103/1104 - LYNCH DIVERSIFIED VEHICLES	3	In Use	Unknown
OPD WEEDJ & SEED MCP - UNKNOWN	-	RETIRED	Unknown
HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION TEAM #1197 - FARBER SPECIALTY VEHICLES	1	In Use	Unknown

BREACHING APPARATUSES	QTY	IN USE/RETIRED	QTY SOUGHT IN NEXT YEAR
Remington Breaching Shotgun - REMINGTON ARMS COMPANY	3	In use	0
Royal Arms 12 GA Breaching Rounds Tesar - ROYAL ARMS INTERNATIONAL	25	In use	50rds
Royal Arms 12 GA Breaching Rounds Tesar-2 - ROYAL ARMS INTERNATIONAL	25	In use	50rds
Royal Arms 12 GA Breaching Rounds Tesar-3 - ROYAL ARMS INTERNATIONAL	25	In use	50rds
Dyno Nobel / Primacord 21	2324.5ft	In use	Unknown
Dyno Nobel / Primacord 10	2013.84ft	In use	Unknown
Dyno Nobel / Primacord 5	2971.84ft	In use	Unknown
Dyno Nobel / Primacord 4y	2012.51ft	In use	Unknown
Ensign-Bickford / PRIMASHEET	8lbs	In use	0 phasing out
Dyno Nobel / Nonel MS 1.4B	315	In use	10

SPECIALIZED FIREARM RIFLES & AMMUNITION			
ASSAULT RIFLES	QTY	IN USE/RETIRED	QTY SOUGHT IN NEXT YEAR
Colt LE6920 (AR15)	72	In use	0
Noveske N4	25	In use	0
Bravo Company Manufacturing (BCM CQB MCMR 11)	30	In use	0
GA Precision Bolt Action .308 Win Rifle	12	In use	0
Speer LE Gold Dot .223 75 grain	10 cases	In use	10 cases
Winchester (RA 556B 64 grain)	10 cases	In use	0 phasing out
Federal .223 55 grain	30 cases	In use	320 cases (training)
Federal Tactical Bonded 308 Win	12 cases	In use	0
Hornady 308 Win	33 cases	In use	0

FLASHBAND GRENADES & EXPLOSIVE BREACHING TOOLS			
BREACHING TOOLS	QTY	IN USE/RETIRED	QTY SOUGHT IN NEXT YEAR
Defense Technology / Riot Control 1082	104	In use	10
Defense Technology / Triple Chaser 1026	300	In use	10
Combined Tactical Systems/ Triple Phaser 5231	30	In use	5
Defense Technology/ CS Han-Ball 1092	150	In use	20
Defense Technology/ CS Blast 1097	100	In use	75
Combined Tactical System/ 9430 Tear Ball CS	100	In use	75
Defense Technology/ Inert Blast 1098	10	In use	10
Defense Technology/ Stinger 1087	10	In use	5
Defense Technology/ 1032	15	In use	0
Defense Technology/ CS 1016	30	In use	50
Combined Tactical Systems/ 5230B	50	In use	100
Defense Technology/ CS 2262	30	In use	100

Combined Tactical System/ CTS 7290M	54	In use	40
COMBINED TACTICAL SYSTEMS 4233 40mm CS Multi 3 Smoke	100	In use	50
COMBINED TACTICAL SYSTEMS - 9410 Inert Rubber Ball Tear Grenade	48	In use	5
COMBINED TACTICAL SYSTEMS 1901A Mk9 Hose and Wand OC	5	In use	0
COMBINED TACTICAL SYSTEMS 1337 OC Aerosol Fogger 2oz	45	In use	0
COMBINED TACTICAL SYSTEMS 9230 CS Smoke Jet Lite Rubber Ball, Pyro	50	In use	50

40MM LAUNCHERS			
AGENTS/SMOKE/SIMS	QTY	IN USE/RETIRED	QTY SOUGHT IN NEXT YEAR
Defense Technology (37mm single launcher)	8	RETIRED	Unknown
Defense Technology (40mm single launcher)	8	In use	Unknown
Penn Arms (PGL 65-40)	9	In use	Unknown
Wilson Combat (orange stock) - COMBINED TACTICAL SYSTEMS	40	In use	Unknown
Defense Technology/ CS SKAT Shell 6172	105	In use	Unknown
Defense Technology/ CS Muzzle Blast 6042	40	retired	0 – phased out
Defense Technology/ Foam Baton 6099	60	In use	0 – phased out
Defense Technology/ Direct Impact Marking 6326	200	In use	Unknown
Combined Tactical System/ Frangible Impact 4550 Orange Marking Powder	50	In use	Unknown
COMBINED TACTICAL SYSTEMS 4431 40mm CS Powder No Flame Barricade Indoor	100	In use	Unknown
Combined Tactical System/ 12GA 2581 Super Sock	2000	In use	Unknown

LONG RANGE ACOUSTIC DEVICES			
LRAD	QTY	IN USE/RETIRED	QTY SOUGHT IN NEXT YEAR
100X	1	In Use	0
450XL	1	In Use	0

CROWD CONTROL	QTY	IN USE/RETIRED	QTY SOUGHT IN NEXT YEAR
Helmets - ATLANTIC TACTICAL	703	In Use	Unknown
Riot Shields - UNKNOWN	20	RETIRED	0

Fiscal Impact by Equipment Type – Fiscal Year 2022 (July 2022 – June 2022).

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS – (UAS)			
EQUIPMENT NAME & MANUFACTURER	INITIAL COST & FUNDING SOURCE	ONGOING ANNUAL COST	PROJECTED ANNUAL COST – FY 23
DJI MAVIC E2A	\$7,800	\$1,000-\$5000	Unknown
DJI MAVIC MINI	\$900	\$1,000-\$5000	Unknown
DJI MATRICE 300 RTK	\$35,000	\$1,000-\$5000	Unknown

UNMANNED TRACKED ROBOTS			
EQUIPMENT NAME & MANUFACTURER	INITIAL COST & FUNDING SOURCE	ONGOING ANNUAL COST	PROJECTED ANNUAL COST
ICOR MINI CALIBER	\$116,000	5,000-\$10,000	Unknown
AVATAR TACTICAL ROBOT	\$40,000	\$3,000	Unknown
ANDROS MARK 5A-1	\$280000/UASI Homeland Security Grant	\$0.00	Unknown

ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS			
EQUIPMENT NAME & MANUFACTURER	INITIAL COST & FUNDING SOURCE	ONGOING ANNUAL COST	PROJECTED ANNUAL COST
ERV	\$323726/UASI Homeland Security Grant	\$1,418	Unknown
ARMORED SUBURBAN	\$140000/UASI Homeland Security Grant	\$1,418	Unknown

COMMAND AND CONTROL VEHICLES			
EQUIPMENT NAME & MANUFACTURER	INITIAL COST & FUNDING SOURCE	ONGOING ANNUAL COST	PROJECTED ANNUAL COST
OFD/OPD MOBILE COMMAND VEHICLES	\$627,058	\$1,791- \$2,449	Unknown
OPD COMMUNITY RESOURCE	\$325,049.25.	\$1,791- \$2,449	Unknown
OPD WEED & SEED MCP	\$173,889	\$1,791- \$2,449	Unknown
HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION TEAM – HNT	\$226611.07/UASI Homeland Security Grant	\$1,418	Unknown

EXPLOSIVE BREACHING EQUIPMENT			
EQUIPMENT NAME & MANUFACTURER	INITIAL COST & FUNDING SOURCE	ONGOING ANNUAL COST	PROJECTED ANNUAL COST
Remington Breaching Shotgun with Royal Arms 14" 12-point Breaching Barrel	\$1,475	zero cost	\$0.00
Royal Arms 12 GA Breaching Rounds Tesar	\$4.50 per unit	zero cost	\$225.00
Royal Arms 12 GA Breaching Rounds Tesar-2	\$4.50 per unit	zero cost	\$225.00
Royal Arms 12 GA Breaching Rounds Tesar-3	\$4.50 per unit	zero cost	\$225.00
Dyno Nobel / Primacord 21	\$1,700 per 1600 feet	zero cost	Unknown
Dyno Nobel / Primacord 10	\$965.96	zero cost	Unknown
Dyno Nobel / Primacord 5	\$1,002.39	zero cost	Unknown
Dyno Nobel / Primacord 4y	\$586.50	zero cost	Unknown
Ensign-Bickford / PRIMASHEET	\$162 per lbs	zero cost	Zero Cost Phasing Out
Dyno Nobel / Nonel MS 1.4B	\$429 per 30 units	zero cost	\$429

SPECIALIZED FIREARM RIFLES & AMMUNITION			
EQUIPMENT NAME & MANUFACTURER	INITIAL COST & FUNDING SOURCE	ONGOING ANNUAL COST	PROJECTED ANNUAL COST
Colt LE6920 (AR15)	\$1099 per unit	zero cost	\$0.00
Noveske N4	\$1,500 per unit	zero cost	\$0.00
Bravo Company Manufacturing (BCM CQB MCMR 11)	\$1,400 per unit	zero cost	\$0.00
GA Precision Bolt Action .308 Win Rifle	\$9,000 per a rifle	zero cost	Unknown
Speer LE Gold Dot .223 75 grain	\$315 per case	\$15,795	\$15,795
Winchester (RA 556B 64 grain)	\$300 per case	No longer ordered	\$0.00
Federal .223 55 grain	\$182 per case	\$18,200	\$18,200
Federal Tactical Bonded 308 Win	\$499 per case	\$2,495	Unknown
Hornady 308 Win	\$215 per case	\$17,200	Unknown

Flashbang Grenades & Explosive Breaching Tools			
EQUIPMENT NAME & MANUFACTURER	INITIAL COST & FUNDING SOURCE	ONGOING ANNUAL COST	PROJECTED ANNUAL COST
Defense Technology / Riot Control 1082	\$17,200	Zero Cost	10 needed Cost Unknown
Defense Technology / Triple Chaser 1026	Unknown	Zero Cost	10 needed Cost Unknown
Combined Tactical Systems/ Triple Phaser 5231	Unknown	Zero Cost	5 needed Cost Unknown
Defense Technology/ CS Han-Ball 1092	Unknown	Zero Cost	20 needed Cost Unknown
Defense Technology/ CS Blast 1097	Unknown	Zero Cost	Unknown
Combined Tactical System/ 9430 Tear Ball CS	Unknown	Zero Cost	Unknown
Defense Technology/ Inert Blast 1098	Unknown	Zero Cost	10 needed Cost Unknown
Defense Technology/ Stinger 1087	Unknown	Zero Cost	5 needed Cost Unknown
Defense Technology/ 1032	Unknown	Zero Cost	Unknown
Defense Technology/ CS 1016	Unknown	Zero Cost	Unknown
Combined Tactical Systems/ 5230B	Unknown	Zero Cost	Unknown
Defense Technology/ CS SKAT Shell 6172	Unknown	Zero Cost	Unknown
Defense Technology/ CS 2262	Unknown	Zero Cost	Unknown
Defense Technology/ CS Muzzle Blast 6042	Unknown	Zero Cost	\$0.00 Phasing Out
Defense Technology/ Foam Baton 6099	Unknown	Zero Cost	\$0.00 Phasing Out
Defense Technology/ Direct Impact Marking 6326	\$25 per unit	Zero Cost	Unknown
Combined Tactical System/ Frangible Impact 4550 Orange Marking Powder	\$25 per unit	Zero Cost	Unknown
Combined Tactical System/ 12GA 2581 Super Sock	\$5 per unit	Zero Cost	Unknown
Combined Tactical System/ CTS 7290M	\$40 per a unit	\$1,000	\$1600
CTS 4233 40mm CS Multi 3 Smoke	\$23.59 per unit	Zero Cost	Unknown
CTS 9410 Inert Rubber Ball Tear Grenade	\$35.93 per unit	Zero Cost	Unknown

CTS 1901A Mk9 Hose and Wand OC	\$33.85 per unit	Zero Cost	Unknown
CTS 1337 OC Aerosol Fogger 2oz	\$11.97 per unit	Zero Cost	Unknown
CTS 9230 CS Smoke Jet Lite Rubber Ball, Pyro	\$25.52 per unit	Zero Cost	Unknown
CTS 4431 40mm CS Powder No Flame Barricade Indoor	\$19.47 per unit	Zero Cost	Unknown

LONG RANGE ACOUSTIC DEVICES

EQUIPMENT NAME & MANUFACTURER	INITIAL COST & FUNDING SOURCE	ONGOING ANNUAL COST	PROJECTED ANNUAL COST
100X	\$14,232/UASI Homeland Security Grant	Zero Cost	\$0.00
450X	\$41,359.62/UASI Homeland Security Grant	Zero Cost	\$0.00

40MM PROJECTILE LAUNCHERS

EQUIPMENT NAME & MANUFACTURER	INITIAL COST & FUNDING SOURCE	ONGOING ANNUAL COST	PROJECTED ANNUAL COST
Defense Technology (37mm single launcher)	\$500 per unit	Zero Cost	\$0.00 Phasing Out
Defense Technology (40mm single launcher)	\$500 per unit	Zero Cost	\$0.00
Penn Arms (PGL 65-40)	\$1600 per unit	Zero Cost	\$0.00
Wilson Combat	\$1200 per unit	Zero Cost	\$0.00

CROWD CONTROL

EQUIPMENT NAME & MANUFACTURER	INITIAL COST & FUNDING SOURCE	ONGOING ANNUAL COST	PROJECTED ANNUAL COST
Helmets	Approximately \$152.48 per unit	Zero Cost	\$0.00
Riot Shields	Unknown	No longer in use	N/A

Estimated Projected Cost Fiscal Year 2023

There are numerous associated financial next calendar year costs associated with each piece of militarized equipment to include acquisition cost, transportation cost, maintenance cost, training costs, storage costs, upgrade costs, and general ongoing costs. The below tables capture those estimated costs.

Estimated Training Costs were calculated based on the salaries of academy recruits, top step officers, and sergeant 2022 salaries:

Academy trainee rate: \$39.42 an hour.

Top step officer rate: \$64.98 an hour.

Sergeant rate: \$74.97 an hour.

On going training is imperative to ensure department personnel are proficient in the use of authorized equipment and tools in accordance with best practices, the law, and department policy. Training programs are developed for numerous ancillary support teams to ensure their adherence to department policies and the law.

The Entry Team consists of eighteen officers and five sergeants. These members train for approximately 240 hours per calendar year. At the 2022 salary rate the estimated ongoing calendar year training budget for that team is \$370,677.00.

The Patrol Rifle program consists of approximately fifty officer members and four sergeant members. Each member trains about 40 hours per calendar year. At the 2022 salary rate the estimated ongoing calendar year training budget for that team is \$132,738.00.

The Sniper Team consists of six officers and four sergeants. Each member trains for approximately 240 hours per calendar year. At the 2022 salary rate the estimated ongoing calendar year training budget for that team is \$165,542.00.

The Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) consists of nine officers and one sergeant. Each member trains about 240 hours per calendar year. At the 2022 salary rate the estimated ongoing calendar year training budget for that team is \$158,327.

Academy recruits engage in about fifty hours of shotgun firearm related training per academy at an estimated cost of \$49,275.00. This is a one-time cost. They also engage in training requiring the use of the riot helmet for approximately twelve hours per academy at a one-time cost estimate of \$11,826.00.

When referencing the below chart and the estimated training cost for the next calendar year, for listed item, it must be noted that the expenditures listed have already been calculated into the above listed annual training costs for their respective team.

For example, for chemical munitions, all patrol rifle program and entry team members engage in at least five hours of annual training to ensure proficiency with use, the law, and department policy. At the 2022 salary rate the estimated ongoing calendar year training budget for chemical munitions is \$27,465.00.

The \$27,465.00 costs for this training has already been taken into account in each team's overall annual budget and does not add any additional expense.

There are no estimated storage costs for the next calendar year for any pieces of militarized equipment.

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS)						
EQUIPMENT NAME & MANUFACTURER	Estimated Acquisition Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Transportation Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Maintenance Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Training Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Upgrade Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Other Ongoing Cost for Next Calendar Year
DJI MAVIC E2A	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$1418	\$158,327	\$0.00	\$1000 - \$5000
DJI MAVIC MINI	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$1418	\$158,327	\$0.00	\$1000 - \$5000
DJI MATRICE 300 RTK	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$1418	\$158,327	\$0.00	\$1000 - \$5000

UNMANNED TRACKED ROBOTS						
EQUIPMENT NAME & MANUFACTURER	Estimated Acquisition Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Transportation Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Maintenance Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Training Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Upgrade Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Other Ongoing Cost for Next Calendar Year
ICOR MINI CALIBER	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$158,327	\$0.00	\$5000 - \$10000
AVATAR TACTICAL ROBOT	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$158,327	\$0.00	\$3000
ANDROS MARK 5A-1	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$158,327	\$0.00	\$0.00

ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS						
EQUIPMENT NAME & MANUFACTURER	Estimated Acquisition & Training Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Transportation Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Maintenance Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Training Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Upgrade Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Other Ongoing Cost for Next Calendar Year
BEARCAT	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$1,791- \$2,449	\$0.00	\$0.00	Unknown
ARMORED SUBURBAN	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$1,791- \$2,449	\$0.00	\$0.00	Unknown

For additional tracking records prior to this 2022 annual report, please visit the following link:

<https://www.oaklandca.gov/resources/ad-hoc-committee-on-militarized-equipment#opd-bearcat-armored-vehicle-deployments>

COMMAND POST VEHICLES						
EQUIPMENT NAME & MANUFACTURER	Estimated Acquisition & Training Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Transportation Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Maintenance Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Training Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Upgrade Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Other Ongoing Cost for Next Calendar Year
OFD/OPD MOBILE COMMAND VEHICLES	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	Unknown
OPD COMMUNITY RESOURCE	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	Unknown
OPD WEEDJ & SEED MCP	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	Unknown

HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION TEAM – HNT	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	Unknown
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BREACHING APPARATUSES						
EQUIPMENT NAME & MANUFACTURER	Estimated Acquisition Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Transportation Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Maintenance Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Training Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Upgrade Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Other Ongoing Cost for Next Calendar Year
Remington Breaching Shotgun with Royal Arms 14” 12-point Breaching Barrel	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$30,886	\$0.00	Unknown
Royal Arms 12 GA Breaching Rounds Tesar	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$30,886	\$0.00	Unknown
Royal Arms 12 GA Breaching Rounds Tesar-2	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$30,886	\$0.00	Unknown
Royal Arms 12 GA Breaching Rounds Tesar-3	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$30,886	\$0.00	Unknown
Dyno Nobel / Primacord 21	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$30,886	\$0.00	Unknown
Dyno Nobel / Primacord 10	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$30,886	\$0.00	Unknown
Dyno Nobel / Primacord 5	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$30,886	\$0.00	Unknown
Dyno Nobel / Primacord 4y	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$30,886	\$0.00	Unknown
Ensign-Bickford / PRIMASHEET	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$30,886	\$0.00	Unknown
Dyno Nobel / Nonel MS 1.4B	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$30,886	\$0.00	Unknown

SPECIALIZED FIREARM RIFLES & AMMUNITION						
EQUIPMENT NAME & MANUFACTURER	Estimated Acquisition Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Transportation Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Maintenance Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Training Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Upgrade Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Other Ongoing Cost for Next Calendar Year
Colt LE6920 (AR15)	\$32,161	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$32,161	\$0.00	Unknown
Noveske N4	\$32,161	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$32,161	\$0.00	Unknown
Bravo Company Manufacturing (BCM CQB MCMR 11)	\$32,161	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$32,161	\$0.00	Unknown
GA Precision Bolt Action .308 Win Rifle	\$13,794	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$13,794	\$0.00	Unknown
Speer LE Gold Dot .223 75 grain	\$32,161	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$32,161	\$0.00	Unknown
Winchester (RA 556B 64 grain)	\$32,161	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$32,161	\$0.00	Unknown
Federal .223 55 grain	\$32,161	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$32,161	\$0.00	Unknown

Federal Tactical Bonded 308 Win	\$32,161	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$32,161	\$0.00	Unknown
Hornady 308 Win	\$32,161	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$32,161	\$0.00	Unknown
FLASHBANG GRENADES & EXPLOSIVE BREACHING TOOLS						
EQUIPMENT NAME & MANUFACTURER	Estimated Acquisition Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Transportation Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Maintenance Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Training Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Upgrade Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Other Ongoing Cost for Next Calendar Year
Defense Technology / Riot Control 1082	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
Defense Technology / Triple Chaser 1026	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
Combined Tactical Systems/ Triple Phaser 5231	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
Defense Technology/ CS Han-Ball 1092	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
Defense Technology/ CS Blast 1097	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
Combined Tactical System/ 9430 Tear Ball CS	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
Defense Technology/ Inert Blast 1098	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
Defense Technology/ Stinger 1087	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
Defense Technology/ 1032	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
Defense Technology/ CS 1016	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
Combined Tactical Systems/ 5230B	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
Defense Technology/ CS 2262	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
Combined Tactical System/ CTS 7290M	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
COMBINED TACTICAL SYSTEMS 4233 40mm CS Multi 3 Smoke	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
CT Systems - 9410 Inert Rubber Ball Tear Grenade	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
CT SYSTEMS 1901A Mk9 Hose and Wand OC	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
CT SYSTEMS 1337 OC Aerosol Fogger 2oz	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown

CT SYSTEMS 9230 CS Smoke Jet Lite Rubber Ball, Pyro	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
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LONG RANGE ACOUSTIC DEVICES						
EQUIPMENT NAME & MANUFACTURER	Estimated Acquisition Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Transportation Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Maintenance Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Training Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Upgrade Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Other Ongoing Cost for Next Calendar Year
100X	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	Unknown
450X	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	Unknown

PROJECTILE LAUNCHERS & SPECIALTY IMPACT MUNITION						
EQUIPMENT NAME & MANUFACTURER	Estimated Acquisition Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Transportation Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Maintenance Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Training Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Upgrade Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Other Ongoing Cost for Next Calendar Year
Defense Technology (37mm single launcher)	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	Unknown
Defense Technology (40mm single launcher)	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	Unknown
Penn Arms (PGL 65-40)	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
Wilson Combat	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
Defense Technology/ CS SKAT Shell 6172	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
Defense Technology/ CS Muzzle Blast 6042	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
Defense Technology/ Foam Baton 6099	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
Defense Technology/ Direct Impact Marking 6326	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
Combined Tactical System/ Frangible Impact 4550 Orange Marking Powder	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
COMBINED TACTICAL SYSTEMS 4431 40mm CS Powder No Flame Barricade Indoor	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown
Combined Tactical System/	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$27,465	\$0.00	Unknown

12GA 2581 Super Sock						
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CROWD CONTROL						
EQUIPMENT NAME & MANUFACTURER	Estimated Acquisition Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Transportation Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Maintenance Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Training Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Upgrade Cost for Next Calendar Year	Estimated Other Ongoing Cost for Next Calendar Year
Helmets	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$35,348	\$0.00	\$11,826
Riot Shields	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	Phasing Out


Conclusion

This Annual Military Equipment Report affirms the Oakland Police Department's commitment to providing transparency and information to our communities and elected officials and ensuring compliance with the law and local ordinance.

The equipment, resources, and training outlined in this report enable Oakland Police Officers to better protect our communities, enhance the safety of the public and officers, and bring critical incidents to a safe resolution.

Public safety is a shared responsibility. The strength of OPD lies not solely within the actions of the individual officer but within the resilience and willingness of our communities to work in partnership with our officers to address crime in their neighborhoods.

City of Oakland
Community Police
Review Agency
(CPRA)



Standard Operating Procedures

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The History of The Community Police Review Agency

The Citizens' Police Review Board (CPRB) was established by the Oakland City Council on April 15, 1980. The purpose of the nine-member Board was to review certain complaints of misconduct by Oakland police officers and park rangers, conduct fact-finding investigations, and make advisory reports to the City Administrator. In July 1996, the CPRB's jurisdiction was expanded to include complaints involving excessive use of force or bias based on a legally protected class. In July 2002, the CPRB's powers were again expanded to provide jurisdiction over all complaints against Oakland police officers and park rangers, increase the number of Board members from nine to twelve, including three alternates, and expand other operational authority.

The mission of the CPRB was to ensure that Oakland had a professional police department whose members behaved with integrity and justice, improve police services to the community by increasing understanding between the community and police officers, to ensure police accountability, and provide the community with a forum to air its concerns on policy matters and individual cases alleging police misconduct.

In March 2003, as a result of a Negotiated Settlement Agreement (NSA) in *Delphine Allen v. City of Oakland*, a civil rights lawsuit alleging police misconduct, the Oakland Police Department was placed under federal oversight. The NSA required police reforms in several areas, including internal affairs investigations, supervision of officers, police use of force, training, personnel practices, community policing, racial disparities in discipline, and the department's recalcitrance to implement reforms that hold officers accountable.

In November 2016, in an effort to ensure constitutional policing and foster a police force trusted by the community, Measure LL was passed which replaced the CPRB with the newly created Oakland Police Commission ("Commission" or "OPC") and the Community Police Review Agency ("Agency" or "CPRA"). Measure LL provided the Commission with significant powers to oversee OPD policies, practices, and customs and ensure adherence to constitutional policing practices. The Commission was also empowered to oversee the CPRA, including hiring the Agency's Executive Director. The CPRA is an independent investigative body charged with investigating specific complaints of misconduct made against OPD police officers. In July 2018, the City Council enabled the implementation of this City Charter amendment by adding Chapters 2.45 and 2.46 to the Oakland Municipal Code (Municipal Code).

In November 2020, Measure S1 was passed by Oakland voters which expanded on the independence, authority, and staffing of the Commission and the CPRA. The Measure also increased the accountability and transparency of the CPRA through its creation of the Office of the Inspector General, which is charged with ensuring thorough police misconduct investigations and identifying systemic issues in the CPRA practices and policies.

The historical implementation and expansion of the powers of the former CPRB, the Commission, and the CPRA show how strong the Oakland community is in its resolve for effective and independent police oversight.


Mission

The mission of the Community Police Review Agency is to ensure constitutional and respectful policing for members of the Oakland community, to increase police accountability, and to improve public confidence in the police. The Community Police Review Agency carries out its mission by receiving and investigating complaints against sworn officers of the Oakland Police Department in a fair, objective, and timely manner and recommending discipline based on just findings.

Jurisdiction

The authority of the Community Police Review Agency is derived from the Charter of the City of Oakland, Article VI, Section 604, and the Oakland Municipal Code Chapters 2.45 and 2.46. The Charter establishes that the Community Police Review Agency has jurisdiction to investigate public complaints of alleged misconduct or failure to act of all Oakland Police Department sworn employees, including complaints filed by non-sworn employees of the Oakland Police Department.

City of Oakland Police Oversight Structure



CPRA adopts the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE) Code of Ethics as national best practices of conduct in civilian police oversight:

NACOLE is a non-profit organization that works to enhance accountability and transparency in policing and build community trust through civilian oversight. NACOLE seeks to establish a community of civilian oversight entities by identifying effective practices, serving as an information and training resource, and encouraging networking and information sharing. Their Code of Ethics promotes:

PERSONAL INTEGRITY: Demonstrate the highest standards of personal integrity, commitment, truthfulness, and fortitude in order to inspire trust among your stakeholders, and to set an example for others. Avoid conflicts of interest. Conduct yourself in a fair and impartial manner and recuse yourself or personnel within your agency when a significant conflict of interest arises. Do not accept gifts, gratuities or favors that could compromise your impartiality and independence.

INDEPENDENT AND THOROUGH OVERSIGHT: Conduct investigations, audits, evaluations and reviews with diligence, an open and questioning mind, integrity, objectivity and fairness, in a timely manner. Rigorously test the accuracy and reliability of information from all sources. Present the facts and findings without regard to personal beliefs or concern for personal, professional, or political consequences.

TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENTIALITY: Conduct oversight activities openly and transparently, providing regular reports and analysis of your activities, and explanations of your procedures and practices to as wide an audience as possible. Maintain the confidentiality of information that cannot be disclosed and protect the security of confidential records.

RESPECTFUL AND UNBIASED TREATMENT: Treat all individuals with dignity and respect, and without preference or discrimination including, but not limited to: age, ethnicity, citizenship, color, culture, race, disability, gender, gender identity, gender expression, housing status, marriage, mental health, nationality, religion, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, or political beliefs, and all other protected classes.

OUTREACH AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH STAKEHOLDERS: Disseminate information and conduct outreach activity in the communities that you serve. Pursue open, candid, and non-defensive dialogue with your stakeholders. Educate and learn from the community.

AGENCY SELF-EXAMINATION AND COMMITMENT TO POLICY REVIEW: Seek continuous improvement in the effectiveness of your oversight agency, the law enforcement agency it works with, and their relations with the communities they serve. Gauge your effectiveness through evaluation and analysis of your work product. Emphasize policy review aimed at substantive organizational reforms that advance law enforcement accountability and performance.

PROFESSIONAL EXCELLENCE: Seek professional development to ensure competence. Acquire the necessary knowledge and understanding of the policies, procedures, and practices of the law enforcement agency you oversee. Keep informed of current legal, professional and social issues that affect the community, the law enforcement agency, and your oversight agency.

PRIMARY OBLIGATION TO THE COMMUNITY: At all times, place your obligation to the community, duty to uphold the law and to the goals and objectives of your agency above your personal self-interest.

Definitions and Acronyms

These definitions are not exhaustive, but list terms and acronyms most commonly used by CPRA in the investigative process¹

Allegation – A charge, claim, or accusation made by a complainant of a violation of OPD policy, procedure, or law.

Body-Worn Camera (BWC) – The actual body-worn camera device or the video derived from the body-worn camera worn by the OPD sworn employee.

Chief of Police (Chief) – The Commanding Officer of the Oakland Police Department.

Community Police Review Agency – “Agency” or “CPRA”. An independent civilian police oversight agency that investigates complaints against sworn employees of the Oakland Police Department

Complainant – The person making a complaint or allegation, or the person whom the complaint or allegation is on behalf of.

Complaint – A report, case, or allegation of a violation of OPD policy, procedure, or governing law.

Complaint Investigator II (CI II) – A CPRA investigator.

Complaint Investigator III (CI III) – A CPRA supervising investigator

Division Level Investigations (DLI) – The Oakland Police Department command level investigations, usually conducted by the subject officers’ supervisor.

Exonerated – Investigative finding meaning based on a preponderance of the evidence, the act(s) alleged by the complainant occurred. However, the act(s) were justified, lawful, or proper.

First Amendment Assemblies – Constitutionally protected rights of individuals to assemble and convey their ideas.

In Custody Death – The death of a person caused by or occurring while in the custody or control of the OPD.

Internal Affairs Division (IAD) – The Oakland Police Department’s unit that investigates allegations of police misconduct.

Misconduct – Both a sworn employee’s affirmative act or a failure to act that violates the Department’s policies, procedures, directives, or governing law.

No Jurisdiction – Administrative finding meaning the subject of the allegation is not currently a sworn employee of the OPD, or was not a sworn employee of the OPD at the time of the incident.

¹ Additional abbreviations and definitions are maintained in the CRPA training folder.

Not Mandated – Administrative finding meaning the allegation was not one that CPRA is mandated to investigate under the Charter.

Not Sustained – Investigative finding meaning the available evidence can neither prove nor disprove the act(s) alleged by the complainant.

Oakland Police Commission (Commission) – The Oakland Police Commission is comprised of seven (7) members and two (2) alternates; its purpose is to oversee the Oakland Police Department to ensure its policies, practices, and customs conform to national standards of constitutional policing and to oversee the Office of the Inspector General and CPRA.

Oakland Police Department (OPD) – All sworn and non-sworn employees of the Oakland Police Department.

Office of the Inspector General (OIG) – The Office of the Inspector General is an independent, non-partisan oversight agency that conducts audits, reviews, and evaluations of the Oakland Police Department and CPRA, recommending improvements to policies, training, and systemic advancements.

Preponderance of Evidence – The burden of proof standard applicable to the analysis and finding of CPRA investigations.

Profiling – The improper selective police enforcement or engagement based on protected characteristics identified by federal, state or local law, also referred to as “biased based policing”.

Report of Investigation (ROI) – The compiled investigative report completed by the CI II.

Reporting Party (RP) – A person reporting a complaint or allegation about, for or on behalf of a complainant.

Subject Officer – The OPD sworn employee who is the subject of the complaint of alleged misconduct.

Sustained – Investigative finding meaning based on a preponderance of the evidence, the act(s) alleged by the complainant occurred and constituted misconduct.

Unfounded – Investigative finding meaning the act(s) alleged by the complainant did not occur.

Untruthfulness – An allegation from a complainant that an OPD officer intentionally lied or provided false information.

Use of Force – The use or threatened use of force, as described in OPD policy and law, against an individual.

Witness – A person observing or having relevant information about an incident, including civilians or sworn employees.

CPRA Mandated Duties and Responsibilities

What does CPRA do:

- A. CPRA receives, reviews, and prioritizes all public complaints concerning the alleged misconduct or failure to act of all Department sworn employees, including complaints from Department non-sworn employees.
- B. CPRA is not required to investigate each public complaint it receives, beyond the initial intake procedure, but is required to investigate public complaints involving:
 1. Uses of force
 2. In-custody deaths
 3. Profiling based on any of the protected characteristics identified by federal, state, or local law
 4. Untruthfulness
 5. First Amendment assemblies
- C. CPRA also investigates any other possible misconduct or failure to act of a sworn Department employee, whether or not the subject of a public complaint, as directed by the Commission.
- D. CPRA proposes discipline for sworn employees with sustained findings of misconduct. CPRA submits the proposed discipline to the Chief of Police and the Chair of the Commission. If the Chief agrees with the discipline, it is imposed by OPD. If the Chief does not agree, the Commission convenes a Discipline Committee to determine the final resolution.

CPRA Staff:²


Executive Director: The department head of CPRA. The Executive Director is responsible for the management and direction of the CPRA, including directing, planning, developing, and implementing all functions and activities thereof. Responsive directly to the Oakland Police Commission, the Executive Director is responsible for implementing the goals and objectives of the CPRA to promptly, impartially, and fairly conduct investigations of public complaints of police misconduct.

- A. **Chief of Staff:** Responsive directly to the Executive Director, the Chief of Staff performs a full range of professional and supervisory level skills to organize, manage and direct the work of CPRA in consultation with the Executive Director. The Chief of Staff prepares short and long-range plans; trains and supervises assigned staff; and performs related duties as assigned.
- B. **CPRA Attorney:** Responsive directly to the Executive Director or their designee, the CPRA attorney provides general training and case-specific advice to CPRA investigators as needed in their investigations of police officer misconduct; litigates a portion of the arbitration proceedings that stem from those investigations; and advises on other matters as assigned.

² See attached CPRA Organizational Chart

- C. Complaint Investigator III (CI III):** Responsive directly to the Executive Director or their designee, the Complaint Investigator III serves as the first line supervisor for intake and investigations with the CPRA. The Complaint Investigator III supervises and trains assigned staff and performs related duties as assigned.
- D. Complainant Investigator II (CI II):** Responsive directly to the CI III, the CI II investigates community members’ complaints of alleged police misconduct; compiles and analyzes facts and data for cases; prepares investigative reports; and performs other related duties as assigned.
- E. Administrative Analyst II:** Responsive directly to the Executive Director or their designee, the Administrative Analyst II performs professional project management; handles personnel matters and administrative work in support of CPRA operations; and performs other related duties as assigned.
- F. Intake Technician:** Responsive directly to the CI III, the Intake Technician performs intake and examination of allegations of misconduct and/or community members’ complaints; compiles and organizes facts and data for cases; coordinates with civilian staff and the general public; accesses and maintains complex internal automated records systems; and performs related duties as assigned.

CPRA Organizational Chart



I. Complaint Receipt and Intake Process

The purpose of the Intake Process is to ensure that any person who wishes to file a complaint of police misconduct has an available mechanism to do so, and ensures the CPRA can receive, document and be properly responsive to every complaint.

A. Complaints can be filed by:

1. The subject of the police action
2. Any third party (parent or guardian, spouse, firm or organization, etc.)
3. An agent representing the subject (lawyer, doctor, etc.)
4. Any witness or bystander
5. An anonymous person
6. Any non-sworn member of the Oakland Police Department

B. Complaints can be filed against:

1. Any current sworn employee of the Oakland Police Department, who was a sworn employee on the date of the incident complained of

C. Complaints can be filed by the following methods:

1. Orally or in writing
2. In person or by mail
3. By telephone (or TDD), facsimile, or electronic mail
4. By CPRA online complaint form

D. Complaints can be filed at the following locations:

1. Any specified OPD location
2. In the field with a Sergeant or OPD Supervising Officer
3. Inside the CPRA office
4. Through CPRA online complaint process

E. Complaint types that can be filed:

The CPRA will receive and accept any complaint of police misconduct. Although the CPRA will receive all complaints of misconduct, CPRA is mandated to investigate only allegations of Use of Force, In Custody Deaths, Profiling/Discrimination, Truthfulness, and First Amendment Public Assemblies. All complaints, however, are forwarded to OPD for investigation. CPRA also investigates any other possible misconduct or failure to act of a sworn Department employee, whether or not the subject of a public complaint, as directed by the Commission.

F. Complaints made through CPRA or OPD:

1. If a complaint is made directly with OPD that complaint is captured on a Complaint Investigation Report (CIR) form. OPD is required to forward the CIR to CPRA within one (1) business day of receipt, Charter Section 604(f). The CIR shall contain the case number that will be utilized by both OPD and CRPA. OPD should forward the CIR via email to the CI III or their designee.
 - a. To ensure compliance with this requirement, if by the end of each business day OPD has not forwarded a CIR to CPRA, on the next business day, the CI III, or their designee, will submit an emailed request to the OPD intake designee requesting the previous day's CIRs.
 - b. The CI III or their designee will properly document in the database and on the New Intakes Summary Log all CIRs received from OPD that day, but no later than the next business day.
2. If a complaint is made directly with CPRA that complaint is captured in the database on the Complaint Form. The Complaint Form shall contain the complainant's name and contact information, the date, time, and location of the incident, a brief narrative description of the incident, information on involved officers, and any other relevant information available at the time.
 - a. **Complaints made by voice mail:** If the complaint is made with CPRA by voice mail message, the intake technician assigned to receive voice messages that day will document receipt of the voice message in the Voice Mail Log with all information provided by the caller indicated on the log. That intake technician will follow up with a return call to the caller that day or no later than the next business day³ to obtain a recorded statement if possible. At least two callback attempts shall be made with voice messages detailing the reason for the call and

³ All references to the "next business day" refers to the next business day that the responsible staff member is on duty. This does not include days that the staff member is on leave. If a staff member is unable to complete a task on the next business day that they are on duty, they will advise their direct supervisor via email.

providing the CPRA contact number. Attempts and the results of the attempts should be logged in the Voice Mail Log.

- i. If the caller was unable to be contacted, and the initial voice message left by the caller contains insufficient information to file a complaint (ie, unclear allegations, no date or time, unknown location...), the intake technician will document next to the caller's information "No Complaint Taken" in the Voice Mail Log.
 - ii. If the caller was unable to be contacted, but the voice message contained sufficient information to file a complaint (ie, clearly indicates the allegation, date, time, location...), the intake technician will enter the complaint information on a Complaint Form, document in the database Timeline / Chronological Log and forwarded to the CI III.
 - iii. If the caller is contacted through a return call, but declines to file a formal complaint or refuses to provide information sufficient to pursue an investigation, that contact and "No Complaint Taken" will be logged in the Voice Mail Log.
 - iv. If the caller is contacted through a return call and agrees to provide complaint information, the intake technician will take an audio-recorded statement, complete the complaint form, document the database and forward the complaint to the CI III.
- b. Complaint made online:** If the complaint is made with CPRA by an online complaint form, the intake technician assigned to review online complaints that day will document receipt of the online complaint in the database. That intake technician will make a return call/email to the person who completed the form, that day or no later than the next business day to obtain a recorded statement if possible. At least two follow up attempts will be made, with voice messages or emails detailing the reason for the follow up and providing the CPRA contact number.
- i. If the person who completed the form was unable to be contacted and the online complaint form contains insufficient information to pursue an investigation (ie, unclear allegations, no date or time, unknown location...) Attempts and the results of the attempts shall be logged in the database Timeline / Chronological Log indicating "No Complaint Taken".
 - ii. If the person who completed the form was unable to be contacted, but, the online complaint form contained sufficient information to file a complaint (ie, clearly indicates the allegation, date, time, location...), the complaint information will be entered on a Complaint Form, logged in the database Timeline / Chronological Log and forwarded to the CI III.

- iii. If the person who completed the form is contacted through a return call, but declines to file a formal complaint or refuses to provide information sufficient to pursue an investigation, that contact will be logged in the database Timeline / Chronological Log indicating “No Complaint Taken”.
 - iv. If the person who completed the form is contacted through a return call and provides complaint information, the Complaint Form will be completed, logged in the database Timeline / Chronological Log and forwarded to the CI III.
 - c. **Complaints made In Person at CPRA:** If the complaint is made with CPRA by a walk-in person, the intake technician assigned to in-office intake that day will log the contact on a Walk-in Complaint Log, and take an audio recorded statement from the person if possible. The intake technician will document the complaint in the database on a Complaint Form and on the Timeline / Chronological Log, and forward the complaint to the CI III.
 - i. If the walk-in person comes into the office, but decides not to file a formal complaint, that encounter, including as much contact information as is available about the walk-in, will be logged in a Walk-In Complaint Log indicating, “No Complaint Taken”.
- 3. The CI III or their designee shall ensure that the Complaint Form is accurately completed and forwarded via email to IAD intake designee within one (1) business day of preparation.
 - a. Upon receipt of the CPRA complaint form, the IAD will prepare a CIR based on the complaint information and assign a case number. The prepared CIR with case number shall be forwarded to CPRA within one (1) business day.
 - b. If the CIR with case number is not received by the next business day, the CI III or their designee shall contact the IAD intake designee via email to request the CIR with case number.
 - c. The CI III or their designee will properly document in the database and on the New Intakes Summary Log all CIRs received from IAD that day, but no later than the next business day.

G. Intake Technician Interviews of Complainant

If the intake technician interviews the complainant, they will ensure that the interview is voluntary and thorough. The intake technician shall:

- 1. Ask the complainant if they will provide an audio recorded statement.
 - a. If the complainant does not want to be recorded, alternative methods (i.e., written statement, online forms) should be offered.

2. If proceeding with a recorded statement, indicate the intake technician's name, the date and time, and whether the interview is occurring over the phone or in person.
3. Ask the complainant if the interview is occurring at a time and place that is convenient for the complainant.
 - a. If the time and place are not convenient, alternative locations (ie, in person at OPD or in the CPRA office) and available office hours should be offered.
4. Ask for the complainant's name, DOB, race/ethnicity, gender identity, pronoun preference, email address, street address and phone number. Advise that they can choose not to provide any of the requested information.
5. The complainant will be asked to describe their complaint, including in detail what occurred, when, where and the identity of all accused officers if known. If the identity of the officers is not known, descriptions of the accused officers. If injury is alleged the type and location of the injury. The complainant will be asked for any witness information and for any supporting evidence they have. The allegations will be clarified and repeated to the complainant.

H. Complaint Intake Review

1. CI III Case Assignment

- a. When the CI III or their designee, receives a CIR from IAD, or receives a Complaint Form made directly to CPRA, the Intake CI III shall review and assign that case to an Intake Technician by forwarding, via email, the CIR and/or Complaint Form within three (3) business days of receipt.
 - i. The CI III shall use certain criteria to determine to which intake technician to assign the case; such as the rotating schedule, the potential complexity of the case, caseloads and similar criteria. The CI III will not assign a case to any intake staff on extended leave.
 - ii. The CI III will document in the CPRA database Timeline / Chronological Log and the New Intakes Summary Log: date complaint received, date assigned to intake technician, and the name or initials of assigned intake technician.

⁴ Any reference to required deadlines does not include weekends, holidays or times that the assigned staff member is on leave. Staff members will advise their direct supervisor of any extended leave that might significantly affect their ability to complete their intake duties in a timely manner.

2. Intake Initial Review of Complaint

- a. When the intake technician receives the assigned case from the CI III, the intake technician will document receipt of the case in the database Timeline Event / Chronological log on the same day, but no later than the next business day.
- b. The intake technician will create a physical folder with the assigned case number and complainant's name. The intake technician will print a copy of the CIR and put it in the folder. The case folder will be maintained in a case file cabinet.
- c. If the complainant filed the complaint with CPRA, and the complainant's statement has not been recorded, within three (3) business days of receiving the case, the intake technician will attempt to contact the complainant via phone or email to request a recorded statement. At least two follow up attempts should be made, with voice messages detailing the reason for the call and providing the CPRA contact number.
 - i. All attempted contacts with the complainant will be logged in the database Timeline / Chronological Log.
 - ii. If the intake technician has not received a response from the complainant within three (3) business days, the intake technician will send a letter to the complainant, if address provided, requesting a return call to provide a statement. (Complainant Contact Template # 1)
 - iii. If the intake technician has not received a response to the letter from the complainant within five (5) business days, the intake technician will document the database Timeline / Chronological Log, complete the Complainant Statement Summary form indicating "No recorded complainant statement unavailable" and forward the form to the CI III.
- d. If the complainant filed the complaint with IAD, within three (3) business days of receiving the case, the intake technician will contact IAD intake **via email** and request: the information required to view the BWC complaint recording on Axon, specifically the name of the IAD member that took the complaint, and the date and time of the interview; and/or the IAD intake audio-recorded statement of the complainant. *(If IAD has already forwarded this information to the CI III, no request is necessary.)
 - i. All email requests to IAD for interview information will be logged in the database Timeline / Chronological Log.
 - ii. If the intake technician has not received the requested information and/or interviews from IAD after three (3) business days, the intake technician will send a follow-up email request to the IAD intake, copying (cc) the Intake

CI III on the email.

- iii. If after three (3) more business days, the intake technician has still not received the requested information and/or interviews, the CI III will intervene and contact IAD supervision directly via email.
- e. When the intake technician receives the audio or video recording of the complainant's statement, either from the complainant or from IAD, the intake technician will within five (5) business days of receipt, listen to the recording and prepare a clear, concise summary of the complainant's statement in relevant detail on the Complainant Summary Statement form, and forward the form to the CI III via email.
 - i. The intake technician shall log in the Timeline / Chronological Log the date the Complainant Summary Statement form was forwarded to the CI III.

3. Supervisory Initial Review of Complaint

- a. When the CI III receives the Complainant Summary Statement form from the intake technician, within three (3) business days they will review and assess the information on the form, including listening to the complainant's statement if necessary, to determine whether the complainant has made an allegation that is encompassed in a Charter mandated category requiring investigation ("mandated"), specifically: use of force, in custody deaths, profiling based on a protected characteristic, First Amendment assemblies and untruthfulness. While "sexual misconduct" is not a mandated category, based on the serious nature of the allegation and the explicit references to such conduct in the Charter, an allegation of "sexual misconduct" will be treated as mandated by CPRA for purposes of investigation.
 - i. If the CI III determines that an allegation on the Complainant Summary Statement form is "mandated", they will document that determination as "mandated" in the database Timeline / Chronological Log and on the bottom of the Complainant Summary Statement form and will return the form to the assigned intake technician.
 - ii. If the CI III determines that there is no allegation on the Complainant Summary Statement form that is mandated, they will document that determination as "not mandated" in the database Timeline / Chronological Log and on the bottom of the Complainant Summary Statement form and will return the form to the assigned intake technician.
 - iii. If the CI III determines that the allegations are not against any member of the OPD, they will document that determination as "No Jurisdiction" in the database Timeline / Chronological Log and on the bottom of the Complainant Summary Statement form and will return the form to the assigned intake technician.

- iv. If the CI III determines that there is no allegation on the Complainant Summary Statement form that is “mandated”, however, they have determined, based on criteria established by and/or at the discretion of the Executive Director or at the direction of the Police Commission, that the particular case will be investigated, they will document that determination as “not mandated with investigation” in the database Timeline / Chronological Log and on the bottom of the Complainant Summary Statement form and will return the form to the assigned intake technician.
- v. If the CI III cannot determine by the Complainant Summary Statement form, if there is a “mandated” allegation or not, (e.g., no complainant’s statement, insufficient complaint information provided) the CI III will document “Insufficient information to make a determination” in the Timeline / Chronological Log and on the bottom of the Complainant Summary statement form and will return the form to the assigned intake technician.

4. Intake Processing of Complaint after Determination

- a. When the intake technician receives the Complainant Summary Statement form from the CI III with a determination, the intake technician shall process the complaint as follows:
 - i. The intake technician will print a copy of the Complainant Summary statement form and put it in the physical case folder.
 - ii. If the Complainant Summary Statement form indicates an CI III determination of “mandated”, within ten (10) business days, the intake technician will take the following steps:
 - a) The intake technician will within three (3) business days send a letter or email the complainant to inform that CPRA has received and will be investigating the complaint. (Complainant Contact Template #2). The intake technician will document the database Timeline / Chronological Log regarding the letter or email.
 - b) The intake technician will email IAD and request the name of the DLI or IAD investigator assigned to the case.
 - c) The intake technician will, **by email only**, submit requests to the relevant source of information indicating on the Requesting Evidence from OPD Sources documents in the CPRA common drive, requesting the following evidence:
 - i) RD# and Incident # associated with the incident
 - ii) All police reports, supplemental reports, and/or field contacts related the incident (specifically requesting all three)

- iii)** CAD purge (or CAD printout) for the incident
 - iv)** Stop data for non-dispatched stops
 - v)** Traffic collision reports
 - vi)** The Consolidated Arrest Report (CAR), (only if there is a false arrest allegation)
 - vii)** The Probable Cause Declaration, (only if there is a false arrest allegation)
 - viii)** Documentary evidence identified by the CI III
- d)** The intake technician will search Axon for all BWC footage labeled with the related RD# and/or Incident #, and will also conduct a search for related unlabeled videos based on the officers / date / time of the incident.
 - e)** The intake technician will document all compiled evidence on the Intake Checklist, complete the Summary Intake form including the name of the assigned DLI or IAD investigator, forward it to the CI III and document the database Timeline / Chronological Log.
 - f)** The intake technician will make a copy of the Summary Intake form and put it in the physical case folder.
- iii.** If the Complainant Summary Statement form indicates a CI III determination of “not mandated” or ‘No Jurisdiction”, within three (3) business days the intake technician will send a letter of closure to the complainant (See Complainant Contact Template #3) and will document the database Timeline / Chronological Log. The intake technician will not complete a Summary Intake form.
 - iv.** If the Complainant Summary Statement form indicates a CI III determination of “not mandated with investigation”, the intake technician will within three (3) business days send a letter to the complainant (See Complainant Contact Template #2) and within ten (10) business days the intake technician will continue with the evidence gathering and documentation steps that are identified in Section 4 a.
 - v.** If the Complainant Summary Statement form indicates an CI III determination of “Insufficient Information to make a Determination” within three (3) business days the intake technician will send a letter of closure to the complainant (See Complainant Contact Template #3) and will document the database Timeline / Chronological Log. The intake technician will not complete a Summary Intake form.

- b. The CI III will close out the cases with Not Mandated, No Jurisdiction and Insufficient information, that will not be investigated by CPRA in database.

5. CI III Processing of Complaints for Investigation

- a. When the CI III receives the Intake Summary form from the intake technician, within three (3) business days, the CI III shall review the information to ensure the form has been completed thoroughly, and that the indicated evidence is attached.
 - i. If the CI III determines that additional information and/or evidence should be gathered by the intake technician, the CI III will return the Intake Summary form to the assigned intake technician for additional information or evidence gathering.
 - ii. If the Intake Summary form is returned to the intake technician for follow-up, the intake technician will gather the requested information and return the updated information that day or no later than the next business day.
- b. If the CI III determines that the Intake Summary form and attached evidence are complete, the CI III will indicate “approved” on the Intake Summary form and forward the form to the CI III over investigations via email.
- c. The CI III shall document the transfer of the case to the CI III over investigations in the database Timeline / Chronological Log.
- d. Once the CI III receives notification from the CI III over investigations, of the assigned investigator on a case, the CI III will have the assigned intake technician send the Notice to HR/Employee Relations form and the Notice to IAD form.
- e. No complaint should remain in the intake process stage for more than forty-five (45) days in total. If there are extenuating circumstances causing a delay in the intake process, the intake technician shall notify the CI III via email at least five (5) days prior to the forty-five (45) days and the explanation shall be included in the database Timeline / Chronological Log.
- f. The CI III shall monitor the timelines for submission by the intake technicians to ensure compliance by conducting periodic reviews of the database Timeline / Chronological entries, and/or maintaining a separate log of the intake technician’s case information.

- g. The CI III shall maintain quality control of all intake work by periodically (at least twice monthly) conducting audit reviews of complainant's statements, and BWC videos along with the submitted summaries by the intake technicians.

II. Complaint Investigations Process

A. Investigation Assignment

1. Once the Investigations CI III receives a Summary Intake form from the Intake CI III, the Investigations CI III shall review the form and within three (3) business days assess and assign the case to a CI II for investigation.
 - a. The CI III shall make the determination as to which CI II to assign the case based on factors such as current caseload, complexity of case balanced against the experience of the CI II, and next CI II in the rotation to be assigned an investigation.
 - b. Once the CI III has determined which investigator will be assigned a case, they will email the Intake CI III with that information, and will also email that information to the administrative assistant so that the case information and assigned investigator can be added to the Pending Case List.
 - c. The CI III shall complete a Case Management form noting the assigned date.
 - i. The Case Management form will also indicate the dates that are 90, 150, 180, 220, 250, and 365 days from the date the complaint was filed.
 - ii. The Case Management form will provide guidance to the CI II regarding prioritization factors, to assist the CI II in determining how to prioritize the case.
 - iii. The Case Management form will indicate any other relevant information or guidance about the case the CI III determines might be beneficial for the investigation.
 - d. The CI III shall forward the case to the assigned CI II via email with the Summary Intake form and Case Management form attached. The CI III shall document the database Timeline / Chronological Log with the date assigned.
 - e. The CI III shall maintain a copy of all Case Management forms in a file, including updates made to the form while the case remains open.

B. Investigator Initial Assessment

1. Once the CI II receives an assigned case, via the emailed Summary Intake form and Case Management form, the CI II will document the database Timeline / Chronological Log with the date the case was received.

2. The CI II will create a digital folder titled with the case number (first) and complainant's name, and maintain the folder in the Staff drive in their named file folder.
 - Inside each case folder the CI II will maintain the Intake Summary, Case Management form, and all evidence received going forward in the investigation including all documents, statements and related video.
 - The CI II will make sure that all information in the case folder is clearly marked and organized in an accessible manner.
3. The CI II will conduct a preliminary assessment and review the forms and associated evidence and shall within fifteen (15) business days complete an Investigation Plan form and submit it to the investigative CI III for approval.
 - The investigation plan must be thorough and will contain information necessary to complete all relevant areas of the Investigation Plan form.
 - The investigation plan should focus on identifying witnesses (both civilian and officers), identifying issues, identifying relevant OPD policies/law, reviewing the evidence you have and determining what you still need, planning out next steps for the investigation, and set out expectations of when each of the investigative steps will be completed.
 - If the CI II is unsure of the best way to proceed on an investigation, they should seek guidance from the CI III on developing the investigation plan.
 - a. The CI III will review and assess the investigation plan and will document any additional directions or investigative guidance on the form and return it approved to the CI II within three (3) business days.
4. Once the CI II receives the approved investigation plan, the CI II will begin the investigative steps.

C. Investigative Steps

The investigative steps are mutable in that they are often case and fact specific, so they cannot always be determined in advance of every case. The CI II must determine the most efficient and effective investigative strategy based on both the nature of the complaint and the evidence gathered thus far. Below is a list of common steps that are not necessarily chronological and are not exhaustive.

1. Identify and Evaluate Allegations, Involved Sworn Employees and Relevant Policies, Procedures and Law
 - Review the complainant's and RP's recorded statement to develop a precise description of the actions, words and behaviors alleged, to understand the nature of the allegations. If there is ambiguous or incomplete information in the statements, conduct a follow up recorded interview with the complainant or RP whenever possible.

- If unable to follow up directly with the complainant or RP, identify and conduct recorded interviews of any witnesses present at the time the allegations were made (family members, friends, co-workers...) to attempt to obtain clarification about the allegations.
 - i. If there is no recorded statement from the complainant or RP, review the written statement, online form, letter or other document submitted with information about the allegations to identify the involved issues.
 - ii. If unable to clearly establish the allegations, consult with the CI III for additional guidance.
- a. Identify the sworn employee(s) that are the subject of the allegations. This identification can be derived from direct identification by the complainant or RP, through descriptive identification, BWC or other video footage, witness identification, self-identification by the sworn employee, reports, or other written documentation.
- All reasonable efforts must be made to correctly identify each subject sworn employee, even with limited information from the complainant or RP. If attempts at identification have been unsuccessful, consult with the CI III for additional guidance.
- b. Identify the sworn employee(s) that are witnesses or have secondary involvement in the case. This identification can be derived from direct identification by the complainant or RP, through descriptive identification, BWC or other video footage, witness identification, self-identification by the sworn employee, reports, or other written documentation.
- c. Identify any civilian witnesses, including those involved and/or not involved in the incident (bystanders) when possible. This identification can be derived from direct identification by the complainant or RP, through descriptive identification, BWC or other video footage, self-identification from the witness, identification by the sworn employee, reports, or other written documentation.
- If no recorded statement has been taken, the CI II will make reasonable attempts to conduct a recorded interview of any civilian witnesses that are identified to obtain a precise description of the incident that they observed.
- d. Identify and review the specific violations, applicable OPD MOR sections, DGOs, OPD directives, and other related statutes to determine the elements that would need to be established to prove or disprove each allegation.
- The CI II will ensure that they are taking into consideration the OPD MOR, DGO, directive or statute that was in effect at the time the incident occurred.
- e. Assess the totality of the facts and information available to ensure that the allegations, witnesses and involved sworn employees have been properly

identified. If allegations or named sworn employees need to be changed, the CI II should make necessary amendments.

2. Obtain and Assess Documentary and Physical Evidence

- Documentary Evidence
- Including but not limited to: police reports, CAD records, tow records, incident and arrest reports, medical records (with signed medical release), training protocols or records, stop data, patrol unit logs, staffing logs, medic run sheets, traffic collision reports, call logs, dispatcher staffing logs, taser logs, citations, property or evidence reports, warrants and affidavits, scheduling rosters
- Before requesting any documentary evidence not explicitly listed above, the CI II will get prior approval from the CI III to ensure there is no restricted analytical information being accessed from IAD.
- a) Intake technicians will attempt to gather relevant documentary evidence at the intake stage. However, the CI II should not assume that the documentary evidence gathered at the intake stage is comprehensive, and should identify and gather any additional available documentary evidence that might be necessary for the investigation.

a. Physical Evidence

- Including but not limited to: BWC video footage, videos from holding cells, witnesses, cell phones at the scene, or security systems from nearby businesses, social media posts, 911 and dispatch communications, photographs, texts, maps, phone records and other related physical evidence.
- Intake technicians will attempt to gather relevant physical evidence at the intake stage, including compiling a file of BWC video footage in the Axon system. However, the CI II should not assume that the physical evidence gathered at the intake stage is comprehensive and should identify and gather any additional available physical evidence necessary for the investigation.

3. Communication with IAD

- Once the CI II has reviewed and assessed the allegations, applicable OPD MOR, DGO, directives, and statutes, and has determined the elements of the alleged violation, the CI II will contact the assigned DLI or IAD investigator (identified on the Summary Intake form) *via email only* with a cc to the Investigative CI III. The email communication is strictly limited to:
- Introducing the CPRA CI II assigned to the investigation

- i. Providing a list of identified allegations in the investigation, both alleged by the complainant or RP, and discovered by CPRA; and requesting the same from IAD
- ii. Providing a list of MORs, DGOs, directives and/or statutes determined applicable to the investigation; and requesting the same from IAD
- iii. Providing a list of documentary and physical evidence CPRA currently has related to the case; and requesting any additional objective evidence IAD has related to the case
- iv. Requesting the status of a parallel criminal investigation (if any) for purposes of tolling
- v. Deciding / agreeing on content of combined notices to OPD sworn employees for interviews
- vi. Deciding / agreeing on scheduling for joint interviews of OPD sworn employees
- viii. Scheduling interviews of IAD Subject Matter Experts

4. Conducting Interviews of Sworn Employees

- a. The CI II will prepare for interviews of primary and witness officers by reviewing and assessing the allegations, assessing documentary and physical evidence, reviewing elements of the applicable policies, procedures and laws and reviewing their investigation plans.
 - The CI II should prepare an outline of topics to be covered to serve as an interview guide.
- b. The CI II will conduct or participate in all interviews related to their investigation, including of subject and witness officers, unless they receive prior approval from the CI III that participation is not required.
- c. Interviews of officers regarding Level 1 (as defined by OPD) offenses will be video recorded. All other interviews of sworn employees will be video or audio recorded.
- d. The purpose of the interview is to obtain all relevant information possible from the interviewee to aid in the determination of whether there was police misconduct. The questions are case specific but should be aimed at determining:
 - The who, when, where, what, how and why of the incident at issue. Determining the manner to ask these questions depends on whether the sworn employee is the subject or witness, the allegations, strategy, and the related policy, directive or statute.

- i. The CI II must keep in mind that the sworn employee being interviewed can be both the subject and witness in the case; and so should direct questions to the interviewee about actions taken and also about other actions witnessed.
- ii. The CI II is not prohibited from conducting follow-up interviews, if necessary, but should make every effort to fully address all issues during the initial interviews.
- iii. The CI II will maintain the audio-recordings for all interviews in the related case folder.
- e. The CI II will utilize the best practices interview techniques taught by the CPRA or other certified training.

5. Investigative Analysis

- f. Objective, insightful analysis is critical in the investigative report as it provides the investigator's rationale and support for the finding. The analysis requires that the CI II assess and evaluate the allegations, statements, documentary, and physical evidence, in relation to the relevant policies, procedures and law, taking into consideration both the nuances and the totality of the circumstances from a reasonable standard.
 - The CI II will carefully evaluate the evidence for relevance and credibility, while being mindful of the role their own personal biases play
 - i. The CI II will be careful to not give any greater or lesser weight or credence to any individual's testimony because of that person's position, race or ethnicity, gender identity, economic status, sexual orientation, housing status or membership in any protected class.
 - ii. The CI II will consider and assess both circumstantial and direct evidence in the analysis of the investigation.
 - iii. The CI II will summarize salient portions and organize those portions to create a clear narrative.
- g. The CI II will utilize the best practices in evidence analysis as taught by the CPRA and/or certified training.

6. Findings

- h. Based on the analysis in the investigation, the CI II can reach one of several findings: Exonerated, Unfounded, Sustained, Not Sustained, No MOR, No Jurisdiction and Not Mandated. (see Glossary for definitions)
 - The findings are based on a Preponderance of the Evidence standard of proof. Preponderance of the evidence means, "evidence which is of

more weight or more convincing than the evidence which is in opposition to it”.

Black’s Law Dictionary; plain language understanding of “more likely than not” or 51%.

- i. The findings should accurately correspond to the wording of the allegation and the evaluation presented in the analysis.

7. Report of Investigation (ROI)

- i. The CI II will prepare an objective, thorough and comprehensive investigative report, in a clear and concise manner on the CPRA Investigation Report template.
 - In addition to a summary of the incident and the statements, the ROI primarily consists of an I.R.A.C. format:
 - a) What are the Issues or allegations in the case
 - b) Which Rules, directives or laws apply
 - c) What is the appropriate and lawful Analysis of the evidence
 - d) What is the consistent, objective Conclusion based on the analysis
 - i. Where applicable, all sections of the ROI template should be populated with information.
 - ii. The CI II should proofread their ROIs for substantive, grammatical, formatting, and typographical errors.
- j. If the investigation has revealed only findings of Not Sustained, Exonerated or Unfounded, No MOR or No Jurisdiction, and the evidence and analysis are direct and succinct, the CI II may utilize a short form Report of Investigation. The CI II must receive prior approval from the CI III to use the short form ROI.
- k. The CI II will utilize best practices in investigative report preparation as taught by the CPRA and/or certified trainer.

4. Discipline

- If the CI II makes a finding of Sustained in the case, in addition to the ROI, the CI II will submit proposed discipline, including information sufficient to complete all areas on the Pre-Discipline Memo form, to the investigative CI III.
 - The CI II will determine the proposed discipline considering the aggravating and mitigating factors, along with other considerations as are listed on the Pre-Discipline Memo form.
- i. If the CI II does not reach a finding of Sustained on any allegation, a Pre-

Discipline Memo is not necessary.

5. Non-disciplinary and policy recommendations

- CPRA can make recommendations to OPD for non-disciplinary measures to be taken with an officer such as Supervisory Note to File (SNF), re-training, or for policy changes as a result of recognizing issues during the investigation. Those recommendations are not binding on the OPD

D. Investigation Timeline and Review

1. The CI II shall attempt to complete a thorough and complete investigation of any assigned case as soon as is practicable, even prior to the 90-interval if possible.
2. On or about the 90-day interval for the case, the Investigative CI II and the CI III will communicate about the status of the case, either in a meeting or email, to discuss any issues the CI II might be having with the case, and the projected time of completion. At this time the CI II should indicate whether there is a request for an administrative tolling and discussion of completion of the 3304 Tolling form with the attorney and the CI III for approval by the Executive Director. The CI III shall attempt to resolve any issues and provide additional assistance if possible. The CI III shall document the communication in the database Timeline / Chronological Log.
 - At this interval, if the case is still open, the CI II will send an update letter or email to the complainant, if the contact information is available, advising that the case is still open and being investigated. (See template 5)
3. On or about the 150-day interval for the case, the CI II shall make every effort to complete and submit the draft Report of Investigation (ROI) to the Investigative CI III. Submission at this interval allows time for review, comments, and edits of the ROI as needed between the CI III and the CI II prior to the 180 days.
 - Along with draft ROI, if there is a finding of Sustained, the CI II will submit the Pre-Discipline Memo with proposed discipline.
 - a. The CI III will review and return the ROI to the CI II within ten (10) business days of receipt, with any questions, comment or edits. The CI II will address and/or correct any questions, comments or edits within five (5) business days of the returned ROI.
 - b. If the draft ROI is approved at this interval, the CI III will submit the ROI and Pre-Discipline Memo to the Executive Director or their designee for final review. The CI III will document the database Timeline / Chronological Log.
 - c. If the draft ROI is not completed at this interval, the CI II and CI III will communicate, either in a meeting or email about the status of the case and the projected time of completion. The CI III will attempt to provide guidance to assist the CI II in completing the case prior to the 180 days.

- If at this interval it is expected that the case will not be completed by the 180-day interval, the CI III shall notify the Executive Director or their designee by email and shall document the communication in the database Timeline / Chronological Log.
- i. If the case remains open at this interval, the CI II will send another update letter/email to the complainant advising that the case is still open and being investigated.
4. On or before the 180-day interval for the case, the CI II shall make every effort to complete and submit the draft ROI to the CI III. If the case has not been submitted in sufficient time for review, comments or edits, the CI III shall notify the Executive Director by email, and shall document the communication in the database Timeline / Chronological Log.
 - The CI III will review and return the ROI to the CI II within ten (10) business days of receipt with any questions, comments or edits. The CI II will address and/or correct any questions, comments or edits within five (5) business days of the returned ROI.
 - a. If the draft ROI is approved at this interval, the CI III will submit the ROI and Pre-Discipline Memo to the Executive Director or their designee for final review. The CI III will document the database Timeline / Chronological Log.
 - b. If the draft ROI is not completed at this interval, the CI II and CI III will communicate, either in a meeting or email about the status of the case and the projected time of completion. The CI III shall notify the Executive Director or their designee by email, and shall document the communication in the database Timeline / Chronological Log.
 5. On or about the 220-day interval for the case, the CI II shall make every effort to complete and submit the draft Report of Investigation (ROI) to the Investigative CI III. Submission at this interval allows time for review, comments, and edits of the ROI as needed between the CI III and the CI II prior to the 250 days.
 - The CI III will review and return the ROI to the CI II within ten (10) business days of receipt if there are any questions, comment or edits. The CI II will address and/or correct any questions, comments or edits within five (5) business days of the returned ROI.
 - a. If the draft ROI is approved at this interval, the CI III will submit the ROI and Pre-Discipline Memo to the Executive Director or their designee for final review. The CI III will document the database Timeline / Chronological Log.
 - b. If the draft ROI is not completed at this interval, the CI II and CI III will communicate, either in a meeting or email about the status of the case and the projected time of completion. The CI III will attempt to provide guidance to assist the CI II in completing the case prior to the 250 days, both keeping in mind the Charter mandate to complete investigations within 250 days, except

in exceptional circumstances.

- If at this interval it is expected that the case will not be completed by the 250-day interval, the CI III shall notify the Executive Director by email, and shall document the communication in the database Timeline / Chronological Log.
 - i. If the case remains open at this interval, the CI II will send another update letter to the complainant advising that the case is still open and being investigated.
6. On or before the 250-day interval for the case, the CI II shall complete and submit the ROI to the CI III. If the case has not been submitted in sufficient time for review, comments or edits, the CI III shall notify the Executive Director⁵ by email and shall document the communication in the database Timeline / Chronological Log.
- The CI III will review and return the ROI to the CI II within ten (10) business days of receipt. The CI II will address and/or correct any identified issues by the CI III within five (5) business days of the returned ROI.
 - a. If the ROI is not completed by the 250-day mark, the CI II will prepare a memo describing the allegations, explaining the reason the investigation is not completed and providing a projected date for completion. The memo will be sent to the investigative CI III via email.
 - b. The CI III will review the memo and forward it to the Executive Director along with any explanations, recommendations regarding training, and/or recommendations of disciplinary action.
 - c. If the allegations are a Level 1 Use of Force, sexual misconduct or untruthfulness, the Executive Director shall notify the Chair of the Commission that the investigation has not been completed by 250 days.⁶
7. The CI II shall make every determined effort to complete their investigation at least one month before the one-year mark. While the one year deadline is not a Charter required mandate for CPRA, due to the language of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights, Section 3304(d) requiring, “any discipline of a sworn officer be finalized within one year of a public agency’s discovery... of the allegation”, CPRA will make every determined effort ensure that if there is discipline to be meted it can be done within the one year parameter.

⁵ The Executive Director will decide in their discretion whether to issue a written finding that there were exceptional circumstances in that case beyond CPRA’s control to warrant more than 250 days. Charter Section 604 (f)3

⁶ Charter, Section 604 (g)5 allows the Commission, on it’s own motion, to convene a Discipline Committee for those listed allegations if the case is not completed within 250 days, if the finding is not based on BWC footage or if there is no BWC footage available.

- If the CI II has not submitted the ROI at one month prior to the one-year mark, the CI II shall prepare a memo explaining the reason the investigation is not completed, including providing a projected date for completion and send it to the investigative CI III via email.
- a. The CI III will review the memo and forward it to the Executive Director along with any recommendations regarding training and/or disciplinary action.
8. Once the CI III has reviewed and approved the ROI, the CI III shall forward the ROI and Pre-Discipline Memo (if necessary) to the Executive Director or their designee for final review. The CI III shall document the database Timeline / Chronological Log.
 9. The Executive Director or their designee shall conduct a final review of the ROI and Pre-Discipline Memo. If there are questions, comments or edits, the Executive Director will document those and will return those to the CI II with a copy to the CI III, as soon as is practicable.
 - The CI II will address any questions, comments or edits within three (3) business days and return the ROI and/or Pre-Discipline Memo to the Executive Director or their designee.
 10. Once the Executive Director or their designee has approved the submitted ROI and Pre-Discipline Memo, they will notify the CI II with a copy to the CI III. The CI II finalize and sign the ROI (and Pre-Discipline Memo if necessary) and document the database Timeline / Chronological Log.

E. Disposition of Cases

During the investigative process, the CI II should determine based on review and assessment, and in consultation with the CI III, whether the case will result in a full investigation, a Summary investigation or an Administrative Closure.

1. Full Investigation

A full investigation of a case, requires all necessary investigative steps as described in Section C above, including that all involved and witness officers be interviewed.

A full investigation is completed on a long form ROI template.

2. Summary Investigation

A Summary Investigation is an investigation that allows that the requirement for interviews of involved and witness officers may be waived.

A Summary investigation is only appropriate when the existing evidence lends itself to a definitive conclusion.

A Summary Investigation is completed on a short form ROI template

3. Administrative Closure

An Administrative Closure is appropriate when during the course of the investigation, it is determined that the investigation cannot proceed to a normal investigative conclusion due to circumstances including, but not limited to:

Duplicates: Complainant in which the allegations were made in prior or current complaint to avoid duplication of investigations.

Complaints against subjects that were not sworn OPD officers at time of incident;

Complaints against former OPD sworn officers; or

Complaints that lack sufficient detail as to the officers involved, lack sufficient detail as to the facts surrounding the incident and the complainant is unwilling or unable to provide further clarification necessary to investigate the complaint.

An administrative closure must be approved by the CI III.

An administrative closure can be completed on a short form memo, with the justification for the closure in the body of the memo.

F. Investigation Findings, Notifications, and Discipline

The Executive Director or their designee shall make notifications regarding findings and proposed discipline to IAD, the Chief of Police and the Commission.

1. If the investigation is of any Level 1 Use of Force⁷, sexual misconduct or truthfulness allegation, the Executive Director shall issue written findings and proposed discipline to the Chair of the Commission and the Chief of Police within 48 hours of the completion of the investigation⁸.
2. If the investigation is of any other allegation of police misconduct, the Executive Director shall issue written findings and proposed discipline to the Chair of the Commission and the Chief of Police within 30 days of the completion of the investigation.⁹
3. If the Chief of Police (or their designee) agrees with CPRA's findings and proposed discipline, they shall notify the Executive Director who shall notify the Chair of the Commission of the agreed-upon findings and proposed discipline.¹⁰
 - If there is agreement, the Executive Director will notify the CI II and the CI III. The CI II will send a letter or email to the complainant indicating the findings

⁷ As defined by OPD, Charter Section 604(f)3

⁸ Charter Section 604(f)3

⁹ Charter Section 604(f)3

¹⁰ Charter Section 604(g)2

(not discipline) in the case (Template # 8) and will document the database Timeline / Chronological Log.

- a. If there is no discipline, or discipline that does not trigger the right to a Skelly Hearing, the CI III will document the database Timeline / Chronological Log and close the case out in the database.
 - b. If there is discipline giving rise to the right to a *Skelly* Hearing¹¹, the CI III will not close out the case in the database until receiving direction from the Executive Director or their designee that the entire case has been resolved.
4. If the Chief of Police (or their designee) disagrees with CPRA's findings and/or proposed discipline, the Chief of Police shall notify the Executive Director of his or her own findings and/or proposed discipline.¹²
 5. If there is continued disagreement / no concurrence between the Chief of Police and the Executive Director, on the findings or proposed discipline, the Executive Director shall submit the findings and discipline information to the Chair of the Commission for the convening of a Discipline Committee.¹³
 6. Evidence shall be submitted to the Discipline Committee in accordance with the language of the Charter Section 604(g)2, and City Ordinance 2.45.080, and the finding of the Committee shall be binding on CPRA.
 - Once the finding is made by the Discipline Committee, the Executive Director will notify the CI II and the CI III as soon as is practicable. The CI II will send a letter or email to the complainant indicating the findings (not discipline) within five (5) business days and will document the database Timeline / Chronological Log. The CI III will close the case out in the database.

III. Training

A. Required training for Intake Technicians

1. Newly hired Intake Technicians will be trained by the Intake CI III or their designee with a directed training program designed to ensure it aligns with the intake individual duties, organizational priorities and CPRA mission. Training areas include but are not limited to:
 - a. CPRA required intake responsibilities
 - b. Complaint classifications
 - c. Communication with complainants and employees

¹¹ California Code of Regulations, Section 3392.7

¹² Charter Section 604(g)2

¹³ Charter Section 604(g)2

- d. Preparing statement summaries
 - e. Documentary evidence collection
 - f. Physical evidence collection
 - g. Case management, tracking and documentation
 - h. Database and other systems
 - i. Summary intake preparation
 - j. Any other training as required by the Executive Director
2. Intake Technicians will continue to receive directed training by CPRA supervisory staff and/or certified training on changes and updates including those in techniques, processes, systems and relevant laws, among other intake related areas for continued professional growth.
 - a. Intake Technicians will be required to complete no less than twenty (20) hours of related directed training per year.
 3. Intake Technicians will attend at minimum 2 police commission meetings per year.

B. Required training for Complaint Investigator II

1. Newly hired CI IIs will be trained by the CI III or their designee with a directed training program designed to ensure it aligns with the individual duties, organizational priorities, and CPRA mission. The CI III shall ensure that the CI II is proficient in investigative areas including but not limited to:
 - a. CPRA required CI II responsibilities
 - b. Investigation planning and strategies
 - c. Interviewing techniques for civilians and sworn employees
 - d. Documentary evidence gathering and assessment
 - e. Physical evidence gathering and assessment
 - f. OPD Manual of Rules, directives and training
 - g. Laws and statues related to investigations
 - h. Assessment and Analysis of evidence
 - i. Use of Force
 - j. Profiling and biased based policing

- k. Database and other systems
 - l. Case Management and tracking
 - m. Writing Report of Investigations
 - n. Determining discipline
 - o. Best practices in administrative investigations
 - p. Any additional training as required by the Executive Director
2. CI IIs will continue to receive directed training by CPRA supervisory staff and/or certified training on changes and updates including those in techniques, processes, systems and relevant laws, among other investigative related areas for continued professional growth.
 - a. CI IIs will be required to complete no less than forty (40) hours of related directed training per year.
 3. CI IIs will attend at minimum 2 police commission meetings per year.

C. Required training for Complaint Investigator III

1. Newly hired CI IIIs will be trained by the Executive Director or their designee with a directed training program designed to ensure it aligns with the individual duties, organizational priorities and CPRA mission. The Executive Director or their designee shall ensure the CI III is proficient in the intake and investigative areas required of the Intake Technician and CI II, and additional supervisory training including but not limited to:
 - a. Supervisory techniques of assessment
 - b. Supervisor techniques of communication
 - c. Monitoring and documentation
 - d. Any other training as required by the Executive Director
2. CI IIIs will continue to receive directed training by CPRA supervisor staff and/or certified training on changes and updates including those in techniques, processes, systems, and relevant laws, among other intake, investigative, and supervisory areas for continued professional growth.
3. The CI IIIs will be required to complete no less than forty (40) hours of related directed training per year.
4. CI IIIs will attend at minimum 2 police commission meetings per year.

D. Training Documentation

4. The Executive Director or their designee will monitor and maintain documentation of the successfully completed trainings of the Intake Technician, CI II and CI III to ensure compliance with the CPRA training requirements.
5. Digital and/or physical copies of the training presentations and/or training materials will be maintained in a commonly accessible “Trainings” folder for continued reference by the CPRA staff.

IV. Conflicts of Interest

The Community Police Review Agency staff are expected to conduct themselves in a fair and impartial manner and must exercise discretion in favor of recusing themselves from any process that might reasonably be expected to create a conflict or the appearance of a conflict of interest. CPRA staff cannot accept gifts, gratuities or favors that could compromise their impartiality and independence or that have a substantial and improper influence upon the performance of their duties. Any actual or apparent conflict of interest with the parties or subject matter involved should immediately be brought to the attention of the staff member’s direct supervisor.

Additionally, all public employees are required upon hiring to complete Form 700 Statement of Economic Interests that requires declaration of any financial conflicts.

V. Confidentiality

The Community Police Review Agency staff must maintain the highest degree of confidentiality concerning matters related to CPRA complaints and investigations. A public servant shall not willingly and knowingly disclose for pecuniary gain, personal advantage or private interest, to any other person, confidential information acquired by him or her, in the course of his or her official duties.¹⁴

VI. Community Outreach and Engagement

The Community Police Review Agency is committed to community outreach and engagement, specifically by reaching out to the community and stakeholders in various ways to offer information and provide equitable access to CPRA as a resource to address allegations of police misconduct within the Oakland community. The CPRA will continue to identify methods and participate in opportunities that allow for exposure and access.

VII. Operational Information

A. Contact Information

250 Frank H. Ogawa Plaza, Suite 6302

Oakland, California 94612

(510) 238-3159

Email: CPRA@oaklandca.gov; Website: Oaklandca.gov/CPRA

Hours of Operation: Monday – Friday, 8:00 am to 4:00 pm

B. Language Accommodations


To ensure equitable access and minimize language barriers, CPRA will provide for accommodation of non-English speaking community members, including translation of non-English language complaints and statements through appropriate certified language speakers on CPRA staff or provided by the City of Oakland.

C. Record Keeping

CPRA documentary, physical and digital records will be maintained at the CPRA office in accordance with the City of Oakland, state and federal record keeping requirements.

¹⁴ Oakland Ordinances, Title II, Chapter 2.25.040 D

COMPLAINT PROCESS



* Supervisor may skip this step and assign a complaint directly to Investigator, without having an Intake Tech perform a preliminary investigation. This is uncommon.

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Intake Tech conducts **preliminary investigation**. This typically happens within 60 days after Intake Tech receives the case. Preliminary investigations can require different types and amounts of evidence, depending on the issues involved. Intake Techs often complete the following tasks during the preliminary investigation:

- review the complaint
- contact Complainant for additional information
- identify allegations
- identify OPD Rules that apply to the allegations
- identify the incident at issue
- collect evidence
- watch video footage related to allegations
- read police reports related to allegations

Intake Tech writes a **memo summarizing** the allegations and results of preliminary investigation.

Supervisor **reviews** the summary. Supervisor may also discuss the case with Intake Tech, send the case back to Intake Tech to do more investigation, or send the summary back to Intake Tech for more work.

Supervisor **closes case** if:

- preliminary investigation determined that the alleged conduct didn't happen (**unfounded** finding)
- OR -
- preliminary investigation determined that the alleged conduct didn't violate the rules/law (**exonerated** finding).

Supervisor may also close case if:

- CPRA is not required to investigate the allegations
- AND -
- preliminary investigation determined that there isn't enough evidence to decide whether the alleged conduct happened (**not sustained** finding).

Either way, this is the end of CPRA's investigation.

Otherwise, Supervisor **assigns case** to Investigator for **full investigation**.

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Supervisor **assigns case** to Investigator.

Investigator does **preliminary case review**. This typically happens within 10 days after the case is assigned. Common tasks include:

- listening to complaint
- watching video from the incident
- reviewing the police report
- contacting the IAD investigator

Investigator uses the information from the preliminary case review to create a **plan for further investigation**. This is submitted to Supervisor for approval. Its purpose is to ensure investigation quality, timeliness, and allocation of necessary resources. Some things the investigation plan commonly discusses:

- Complainant's allegations
- additional allegations discovered by CPRA staff or IAD staff
- evidence that CPRA already has or still needs – videos, documents, interviews, etc.
- policies, procedures, and laws
- whether the Investigator needs legal advice
- preliminary analysis of the evidence
- case deadlines
- schedule for completing investigation

Investigator completes a **full investigation**. Investigations can require different types and amounts of evidence, depending on the issues involved. Investigators commonly develop or review the following types of evidence during the investigation:

- video footage (body worn cameras, surveillance footage, or footage from community members)
- interviews of Complainant, community members, police officers, and experts
- police reports
- police radio recordings
- information from police dispatch
- documents that explain the plans for a large police operation, or document the operation afterward
- policies, procedures, and laws
- medical records
- photos
- officer's history

Investigator regularly updates Supervisor about the investigation, and may adjust investigation plan based on new evidence or issues. Investigator communicates with IAD staff: sharing CPRA's analysis, discussing evidence, and coordinating interviews and evidence collection. Investigator may also discuss the investigation with Executive Director, CPRA's Attorney, or City Attorney.

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Investigator writes a **report** and **recommends findings**. Reports summarize evidence, set forth facts, explain findings, and sometimes discuss changes to training or policy.

Supervisor **reviews** the report. Then Executive Director reviews the report. Both of them can tell the Investigator to investigate more, or to work on the report more. CPRA's Attorney or City Attorney may provide legal advice. Executive Director eventually **approves** the report.

If Investigator found officer misconduct (a **sustained** finding), Investigator also writes a **pre-discipline memo**. These memos recommend how an officer should be disciplined. Memos go through the same review / approval process as reports.

Executive Director **sends the report** (and pre-discipline memo) **to the Chief** of Police.

If IAD agrees with CPRA's findings

-AND-

CPRA found no misconduct,

then IAD sends an email **concurring** with CPRA's findings. **This is**

the end of CPRA's investigation.

If IAD disagrees with CPRA's findings

-OR-

CPRA found misconduct (a sustained finding), then Executive Director **meets with the Chief to discuss findings**. This meeting typically includes:


- Chief of Police
- High-ranking OPD personnel
- IAD Supervisors
- IAD Investigator
- City Attorney's Office
- CPRA Executive Director
- CPRA Supervisor
- CPRA Investigator
- CPRA Attorney

At a typical meeting: CPRA Investigator presents CPRA's findings. IAD Investigator presents IAD's findings. There's an open discussion of the findings and evidence.

If Executive Director and Chief **disagree** about findings, the case goes to the **Police Commission's Discipline Committee** and they resolve the issue. **This is the end of CPRA's investigation.**


If Executive Director and Chief **agree** about findings, the next step depends on what the findings are.

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Oakland Police Commission

2022 Annual Report



OAKLAND
POLICE COMMISSION

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I. Executive Summary

The City of Oakland's Police Commission (Commission) is a Charter-created civilian oversight body established to provide community input and oversee the Oakland Police Department (OPD) in order to ensure its policies, practices, and customs conform to national standards of constitutional policing. The Commission is also responsible for overseeing the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), which monitors and audits OPD compliance with policies and procedures, as well as the Community Police Review Agency (CPRA), which investigates police misconduct and recommends discipline.

Among its Charter-mandated responsibilities, is the Commission's authority to approve or reject the Department's proposed changes to all policies, procedures, customs, and General Orders of the Department which govern use of force, use of force review boards, profiling based on any of the protected characteristics identified by federal, state, or local law, or First Amendment assemblies, or which contains elements expressly listed in federal court orders or federal court settlements which pertain to the Department.

The Commission is composed of seven Commissioners and two non-voting Alternate Commissioners appointed by either the Mayor or a nine-member Police Commission Selection Panel. Although the legislation passed in November 2016, the Commission was not officially seated until December 2017. All commissioners are Oakland residents and serve in a volunteer capacity. Since the Commission's inception through Measure LL in 2016 and expansion of authority through Measure S1 in 2020, its impact through policies and programs have rapidly accelerated.

II. Legislative History

Oakland City Charter Section 604 vests the Police Commission with overseeing the OPD and holding the Department accountable to its compliance obligation and its duties to Oakland's communities.

On November 8, 2016, the voters of Oakland approved Measure LL with 83.19% (137,032 votes) in favor. Measure LL established the Commission to oversee OPD policies and procedures, as well as the CPRA to investigate police misconduct and recommend discipline. On June 22, 2018, the Oakland City Council approved an ordinance to support and implement Measure LL.

On November 3, 2020, Oakland voters approved Measure S1 with 81.27% in favor. Measure S1 expanded the independence, authority, and staffing of the Police Commission and CPRA, and provided that the OIG reports to the Police Commission. Under Measure S1, the OIG is responsible for auditing OPD's compliance with the 52 Tasks described in the negotiated settlement agreement in *Delphine Allen, et al., v. City of Oakland, et al.* These audits would address improvements in policing standards, community access to the complaint process, reporting and investigations of police misconduct, training and supervision, and identifying at-risk behaviors by police officers.

Milestone

For the first time in 20 years in the Negotiated Settlement Agreement (NSA), OPD entered Sustainability under Chief LeRonne Armstrong. In an Order issued by Judge Orrick on May 12, 2022, he determined that the City of Oakland would enter into Sustainability for one year starting June 1, 2022.

III. Police Commission Structure

Police Commission Leadership

During the first six weeks of 2022, the Commission was led by Chair Regina Jackson and Vice Chair Tyfahra Milele. On February 10, 2022, Commission Chair Dr. Tyfahra Milele and Vice Chair Marsha Peterson were elected to serve in their leadership positions. Dr. Milele is the Commission's first Selection Panel appointee to serve as Chair, marking a special moment in community-led police oversight for the City of Oakland.



Chair

Tyfahra Milele
Selection Panel, Oct 2023



Vice Chair

Marsha Peterson
Mayoral, Oct 2023



Brenda Harbin-Forte
(Commissioner)
Mayoral, Oct 2022



Rudolph Howell
(Commissioner)
Selection Panel, Oct 2024



Jesse Hsieh
(Commissioner)
Selection Panel, Oct 2025



Regina Jackson
(Chair Emeritus)
Mayoral, Oct 2024



David Jordan
(Commissioner)
Selection Panel, Oct 2023



Angela Jackson-Castain
(Alternate Commissioner)
Selection panel, Oct 2025



Karely Ordaz
(Alternate Commissioner)
Mayoral, Oct 2023

Commission Changes in 2022

The Commission welcomed two Alternate Commissioners, Angela Jackson-Castain (Selection Panel) and Karely Ordaz (Mayoral). Alternate Commissioner Jesse Hsieh was appointed to complete Commissioner Henry Gage III's (Selection Panel) unexpired term upon his resignation. We also congratulated Chair Emeritus Regina Jackson (Mayoral) and Commissioner Jesse Hsieh (Selection Panel) on their reappointments by City Council to continued service on the Police Commission.

List of All Oakland Police Commissioners to Date

Commissioner Name	Start - End Dates	Appointing Body	Regular or Alternate	Titles Held
Mubarak Ahmad	10/17 - 10/19	Selection Panel	Regular	
Tara Anderson	10/17 - 10/20	Selection Panel	Regular	
Maureen Benson	10/17 - 10/19	Selection Panel	Both	
Chris Brown	10/17 - 10/20	Mayor	Alternate	
Andrea Dooley	10/17 - 10/20	Mayor	Alternate	
José Dorado	10/17 - 10/21	Selection Panel	Regular	Vice Chair
Henry Gage, III	10/19 - 10/22	Selection Panel	Regular	Vice Chair
Sergio Garcia	10/20 - 10/23	Selection Panel	Regular	
Brenda Harbin-Forte	7/20 - 10/22 *	Mayor	Regular	
Ginale Harris	10/17 - 10/20	Selection Panel	Regular	Vice Chair
Rudy Howell	10/21 -10/24	Selection Panel	Regular	
Jesse Hsieh	5/21 - 10/25	Selection Panel	Both	
James Jackson	10/21 - 10/21 †	Mayor	Regular	
Regina Jackson	10/17 - 10/24	Mayor	Regular	Chair
Angela Jackson-Castain	10/22 - 10/25	Selection Panel	Alternate	
David Jordan	10/19 - 10/23	Selection Panel	Both	Vice Chair
Tyfahra Milele	10/20 - 10/23	Selection Panel	Regular	Chair
Mike Nisperos	10/17 - 10/20	Selection Panel	Regular	
Karely Ordaz	6/22 - 10/23	Mayor	Alternate	
Marsha Peterson	2/21 - 10/23	Mayor	Both	Vice Chair
Edwin Prather	10/17 - 10/19	Mayor	Regular	
Thomas Lloyd Smith	10/17 - 10/20	Mayor	Regular	Chair


*Still serving as of date of this annual report

† Resigned before attending his first meeting

IV. Staffing Updates in 2022

The Commission officially welcomed its first Inspector General, Michelle Phillips, in January. In August, the Commission welcomed Kelly Yun to the Chief of Staff position as an Exempt Limited Duration Employee (ELDE). The Police Commission bid farewell to John Alden (CPRA Executive Director), Rania Adwan (Chief of Staff), and Aaron Zisser (CPRA Chief of Staff who assumed the Interim CPRA Executive Director position before transitioning). Charlotte Jones was appointed Interim CPRA Executive Director in December.

Police Commission and Departmental Agencies Organizational Structure



V. Committee Work

Establishing Ad Hoc Committees in groups of three or fewer Commissioners allows for special focus on additional projects and initiatives between full Commission meetings without violating the Brown Act. In October, the Commission Chair reorganized the committee assignments to move work forward with intentionality, prioritizing mission alignment and maximizing the participation of Commissioners as much as possible.

(As of December 31, 2022)

Ad Hoc Committee	Commissioners Committee Chair (c)
Budget	Milele (c), Jordan, Jackson-Castain
Body Worn Camera Policy	Harbin-Forte (c), Peterson, Hsieh
Community Outreach	Howell (c), Hsieh, Jordan
Contracts	Peterson (c), Howell, Ordaz
OIG Policies	Peterson (c), Harbin-Forte, Jackson
CPRA Policies	Harbin-Forte (c), Jackson-Castain, Ordaz
Militarized Equipment Policy	Hsieh (c), Jackson-Castain, Jordan
Racial Profiling Policy	Committee of the Whole
Rules of Procedure	Hsieh (c), Howell, Jackson-Castain
*Staff Searches (CPRA, CoS)	Milele (c), Jordan, Howell
*Staff Evaluations (CPRA, IG, CoP, CoS)	Milele (c), Peterson, Ordaz
OBOA Association	Harbin-Forte (c), Jackson, Ordaz

***Committee Name Changes**

- Staff Searches (CPRA, CoS) Ad Hoc Committee was formerly separated into two CPRA Executive Director Search Ad Hoc and Chief of Staff Search Ad Hoc Committees (Commissioner Jackson removed).
- The Staff Evaluations (CPRA, IG, CoP, CoS) Ad Hoc Committee was formerly the CPRA Director and IG Performance Evaluation Ad Hoc Committee (Commissioner Peterson removed).

(Completed/Paused/Dormant Ad Hoc Committees)

Ad Hoc Committee	Commissioners
Annual Report	Milele, Jackson
Anti-Discrimination Policy	Harbin-Forte, Hsieh, Jackson
Electronic Communication Devices	Howell, Harbin-Forte, Peterson
Police Chief Goals and Evaluation	Milele, Peterson, Jackson
Risk Management Policy	Peterson, Harbin-Forte, Howell
Social Media Policy	Milele, Hsieh, Jackson
White Supremacists and Other Extremist Groups	Harbin-Forte, Jackson
Community Policing (15-01)	Harbin-Forte, Howell, Hsieh

VI. Police Commission Meetings

Police Commission meetings regularly take place on the second and fourth Thursday evening of each month, with additional meetings scheduled as needed. Representatives from OPD, CPRA, and OIG typically attend to provide reports and updates to Commissioners and to listen to feedback from the community. Special guests and subject matter experts are also invited to present on topics relating to the work of the Commission.

The purpose of these Regular and Special Thursday evening meetings is to convene the Commission to conduct business as a body of the whole and to invite public comment in an open forum where ideas, concerns, and input are exchanged. Public feedback is highly encouraged and may also be submitted electronically. Post-meeting video recordings and meeting minutes are also made available on the Commission website for full transparency.

In light of the ongoing COVID-19 global pandemic, Commission and Ad Hoc Committee meetings have continued to take place virtually via Zoom. This online format ensures adherence to public health guidelines and offers expanded accessibility for engagement with members of the community who may be immunocompromised or experience greater difficulty with access.

VII. Presentations and Speakers

- Public Safety Youth Leadership Council
- Restorative Justice for Oakland Youth (RJOY)
- Mobile Assistance Community Responders of Oakland (MACRO)
- Dr. Samuel Sinyangywe
- Dr. Omowale Satterwhite
- Office of the City Attorney (OCA) Biannual Report Out
- Special Joint Meeting of the Community Police Advisory Board (CPAB), Public Safety and Services Oversight Commission (SSOC), and Oakland Police Commission (represented by Vice Chair Peterson)

VIII. OPD Policies, Orders, and Resolutions

- DGO 15-01 (Community Policing)
- DGO D-18 (Social Media)
- DGO I-25 (*Unmanned Aerial Systems)
- DGO I-26 (*Ground Robots)
- DGO I-27 (*Long-Range Acoustic Devices)
- DGO I-28 (*Mobile Command Vehicles)
- DGO K-6 (*Department Rifles)
- DGO O-6 (Missing & Abducted Persons)
- DGO R-01 (Risk Management)
- K-7 (*Militarized Equipment)
- TB III-G (*Crowd Control and Crowd Management)
- TB III-P.04 (*Armored Vehicles)
- TB III-P.05 (*Noise-Flash Diversion)
- TB V-F.02 (*Chemical Agents)
- TB-III-H (*Specialty Impact Munitions)
- Revised Policy for Electronic Communication Devices (DGO I-19)
- Revised Special Order 9208
- Revised Resolution Calling for Reform of Government Code Section
- Resolution Endorsing Assembly Bill 2557

Milestone

The Oakland Police Commission had a landmark year by approving nineteen policies. The Commission recognized the Militarized Equipment Ad Hoc Committee for its tremendous work with *militarized equipment policies. Learn more about any of the policies above at: oaklandca.gov/resources/opd-policies.

IX. Training, Development, and Conferences

- SB 1421 and SB 16 (Police Transparency Laws) Training
- Oakland Police Department Trainings
- Office of the City Attorney Trainings
- National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE) 2022 Annual Conference — Attended by: Commissioners Jackson and Peterson, Inspector General Michelle Phillips, Chief of Staff Charlotte Jones, Interim Chief of Staff Kelly Yun

X. Acknowledgements

The Oakland Police Commission would like to thank and acknowledge stakeholders and community members for continuing to engage during meetings and adding their incredible contributions to ad hoc committee work. The impact of this Commission is strengthened by the voices and perspectives of our community thought partners. Thank you!



RESOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF CREATION OF AN INDEPENDENT SHERIFF OVERSIGHT BOARD & OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL BY SUPERVISOR RESOLUTION

WHEREAS, other counties in the state as well as cities within Alameda County, including the City of Oakland, have already created civilian oversight of law enforcement and independent police inspector positions to address transparency, accountability, and compliance issues as well as to advance community trust, civic participation, and holistic public safety;

WHEREAS, the California State Legislature passed Assembly Bill 1185 (effective Jan 1, 2021) that authorizes a county such as Alameda County to create a Sheriff Oversight Board, either by action of the Board of Supervisors or through a vote of county residents, comprised of civilians to assist the Board of Supervisors and an office of inspector general, with the chair of the oversight board and the inspector general having the ability to issue subpoena or subpoena duces tecum when deemed necessary to investigate a matter within their jurisdiction;

WHEREAS, the Alameda County Sheriff's Office reports the highest number of inmate deaths in jails and jails-related lawsuits in the region and suffers many other recent issues including: the US Department of Justice - Civil Rights Division confirmed the Sheriff's failure to provide adequate custodial mental health services, the Office recently revealed to the public that 47 deputy sheriffs were employed for years while failing to meet the required mental competency, and ongoing lack of transparency in the Sheriff's budget and operations;

WHEREAS, the majority of people who are detained in Santa Rita Jail are residents of Oakland;

WHEREAS, the jurisdiction of the Alameda County Sheriff's Office includes the city of Oakland; Oakland voters strongly support civilian oversight of law enforcement;

WHEREAS, the Community Police Review Agency routinely receives complaints about Oaklander interactions with sheriff's deputies;

WHEREAS, the Alameda County Sheriff's Office has played a role in the Oakland Police Department's ability to implement First Amendment assembly policymaking, with the Oakland City Charter 604(b)(4) puts Oakland Police Department policy regarding first amendment assemblies squarely in the Commission's authority.

BE IT RESOLVED that the Oakland Police Commission urges the Alameda County Board of Supervisors to take action and vote on the creation of an oversight body of the Sheriff's Office;

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Oakland Police Commission urges the passage of strong, independent oversight of the Sheriff's Office including:

- a full-time inspector general with subpoena power,
- adequate funding,
- independent legal counsel,
- a community selection panel to recommend for appointment to the Board of Supervisors residents from diverse backgrounds who do not represent county or law enforcement interests.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Oakland Police Commission requests that the Oakland City Council pass a resolution in support of strong, independent, community oversight of the sheriff's department.



OAKLAND POLICE COMMISSION REGULAR MEETING MINUTES

March 23, 2023

5:30 P.M.

I. Call to Order, Welcome, Roll Call and Determination of Quorum

Chair Tyfahra Milele called the meeting to order at approximately 5:41 p.m. and took roll.

Roll Call:

Present: Chair Tyfahra Milele; Commissioner Brenda Harbin-Forte; Commissioner Rudolph Howell; Commissioner Jesse Hsieh; Commissioner Regina Jackson; Commissioner Marsha Peterson; Alternate Commissioner Karely Ordaz; Alternate Commissioner Angela Jackson-Castain

Excused: Vice Chair David Jordan

II. Consider and Approve Expanded Request to OPD and City of Oakland for Investigation Files and Records (Charter § 604(f)(2))

Commission Counsel Nguyen spoke to the purpose of this item. The Commission discussed approving the expanded request to OPD and the City for access to documents and confidential information relating to investigation reports on IAD case #23-0034.

Commissioner Peterson made a motion, seconded by Commissioner Harbin-Forte, to request access to documents and confidential information relating to investigation reports on IAD case #23-0034. No public comment was made, and the motion carried by the following vote:

Ayes: 6 - Harbin-Forte, Howell, Hsieh, Jackson, Peterson, Milele

Nays: 0

Absent: 1 - Jordan

III. Closed Session

PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE/DISMISSAL/RELEASE (Government Code Section 54957(b))

CONFERENCE WITH LEGAL COUNSEL – EXISTING LITIGATION (Government Code Section 54956.9(d)(1)) *Delphine Allen et al., v. City of Oakland, et al. N.D.Cal No, 00-cv-4599-WHO*

There was no public comment made. In closed session, the Commission voted for CPRA Director Jones to explore whether CPRA should conduct a parallel investigation by gathering information on the previous 604(f)(2) request IAD 23-0034 on a motion made by Commissioner Jackson and seconded by Commissioner Hsieh. The motion carried by the following vote:

Ayes: 7 - Harbin-Forte, Howell, Hsieh, Jackson, Peterson, Milele, Jordan

Nays: 0

Absent: 0

The Commission then voted to direct Commission Counsel to submit an addendum to the Parties filing in the NSA Allen v. Oakland matter on April 4, 2023, on a motion made by Commissioner Peterson and seconded by Commissioner Hsieh. The motion carried by the following vote:

Ayes: 7 - Harbin-Forte, Howell, Hsieh, Jackson, Peterson, Milele, Jordan

Nays: 0

Absent: 0

After closed session Chair Milele reestablished quorum.

Present: Chair Tyfahra Milele; Vice Chair David Jordan; Commissioner Brenda Harbin-Forte; Commissioner Rudolph Howell; Commissioner Regina Jackson; Commissioner Jesse Hsieh; Commissioner Marsha Peterson; Alternate Commissioner Karely Ordaz; Alternate Commissioner Angela Jackson-Castain

IV. Open Forum Part 1

Public comments were made by two persons (Olugbala, Farmer).

V. Public Forum for Community Input on NSA Task 5 (Investigations) and Task 45 (Discipline Disparity) & Approval of Reform Plan to Bring the City of Oakland Into Sustained NSA Compliance

Commissioner Harbin-Forte, Chair of the NSA Ad Hoc Committee, led a Public Forum aimed at receiving public input on OPD compliance with the NSA, specifically Task 5 and Task 45.

Public comments were made by 4 persons (Contreras; Farmer; Olugbala; Janks).

An additional Public Forum was scheduled by Chair Milele for March 30th. Comment was also provided by IG Phillips.

VI. Update from Oakland Police Department (OPD)

Chief Allison provided an update on crime and staffing statistics. Included in the update were figures on MACRO criteria and call referral statistics, CARES referrals, police and professional staff vacancies, and a brief update on the ransomware attack's impact on OPD systems. An update was also provided by Dr. Leigh Grossman from OPD's Risk Analysis Unit on IAD data trends.

Questions were taken from Commissioners Ordaz, Jackson, Howell, Hsieh, Jackson-Castain, and Jordan.

Public comments were made by 2 persons (Olugbala; Contreras).

VII. Update from Community Police Review Agency (CPRA)

Interim CPRA Director Charlotte Jones provided a brief update on CPRA systems and data affected by the ransomware attack. Director Jones informed the Commission that IT has been unable to provide a date for the full restoration of data and systems. Also provided in the update was information on triage processes and the resignation of an investigator last month.

Questions were taken from Commissioners Jackson-Castain, Peterson, Ordaz, Howell, and Jackson.

Public comment was made by 1 person (Contreras).

VIII. Presentation and Possible Approval of DGO I-15 Body Worn Camera Policy

Officer Felicia Cervantes presented on DGO I-15, Body Work Camera Policy. Included in the presentation was an overview of the policy and its sections.

Comments and questions were raised by Commissioners Harbin-Forte, Hsieh, Peterson, Jordan and Jackson-Castain.

No public comments were made.

Commissioner Hsieh made a motion, seconded by Commissioner Jackson, to recommend to City Council the approval of DGO I-15. The motion carried by the following vote:

Ayes: 7 - Milele, Peterson, Harbin-Forte, Howell, Hsieh, Jordan, Jackson

Nays: 0

Absent: 0

Commissioner Harbin-Forte made a motion, seconded by Commissioner Hsieh, to extend the meeting one hour. The motion carried by the following vote:

Ayes: 7 - Milele, Peterson, Harbin-Forte, Howell, Hsieh, Jordan, Jackson

Nays: 0

Absent: 0

IX. Presentation and Possible Approval of Police Commission Biennial 2023-25 Budget Proposal

Chair Milele and Chief of Staff Yun presented on the Police Commission Biennial 2023-25 Budget Proposal, including staffing needs and organizational adjustment aimed at achieving the goals of the OPC.

Public comment was made by 1 person (Contreras).

A discussion was had by the Commission, leading to this item being tabled until next week's meeting.

X. Committee Reports**Militarized Equipment (Commissioners Hsieh, Jordan, Jackson-Castain)**

Commissioner Hsieh provided an update on the Militarized Equipment Ad Hoc Committee. Included in the update was information on the ad hoc's current policy work on explosive breaching.

Staff Searches: CPRA Director, Chief of Staff, Police Chief (Commissioners Milele, Jordan, Howell)

Chair Milele provided an update on the Staff Searches ad hoc, including the completion of the second round of interviews for the CPRA Director search. Also provided were updates on the Chief of Staff search currently underway, and the upcoming Chief of Police search.

Questions were taken by Commissioners Ordaz, Jackson, and Peterson.

Annual Report (Commissioners Jackson, Peterson)

Commissioner Jackson provided a report on the newly created Annual Report ad hoc, which will hold its first meeting March 29th.

No public comment was made.

XI. Upcoming/Future Agenda Items

Commissioner Jackson requested that quarterly budget reviews be provided.

Alternate Commissioner Jackson-Castain request for an OPD presentation on misconduct data, specifically how OPD evaluates and addresses misconduct allegations.

No public comment was made.

XII. Open Forum Part 2

No public comment was made.

XIII. Adjournment

Chair Milele adjourned the meeting at approximately 11:15 p.m.



OAKLAND POLICE COMMISSION REGULAR MEETING MINUTES

April 27, 2023
5:30 P.M.

I. Call to Order, Welcome, Roll Call and Determination of Quorum

Chair Tyfahra Milele called the meeting to order at approximately 5:38 p.m. and took roll.

Roll Call:

Present: Chair Tyfahra Milele; Commissioner Brenda Harbin-Forte; Commissioner Rudolph Howell; Commissioner Jesse Hsieh; Commissioner Regina Jackson; Commissioner Marsha Peterson

Excused: Alternate Commissioner Angela Jackson-Castain, Alternate Commissioner Karely Ordaz

Late: Vice Chair David Jordan

II. Closed Session

PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE/DISMISSAL/RELEASE (Government Code Section 54957(b))

Prior to closed session, public comment was made by 1 person (Bey).

In closed session, on a motion made by Commissioner Peterson and seconded by Commissioner Harbin-Forte, the Commission voted unanimously to direct CPRA to conduct 2 investigations into officer misconduct complaints, IAD cases #22-1102 and #23-0459.

III. Open Forum Part 1

Public comment was made by 1 person (Olugbala).

IV. Office of the City Attorney (OCA) Semiannual Report

This item was postponed until the next Commission meeting on May 11th at the request of the Office of the City Attorney.

No public comment was made.

V. Update from Oakland Police Department (OPD)

Interim Chief Allison provided an update on crime and arrest statistics, the extension of the sustainability period to September, follow-up on status of systems impacted by the ransomware incident, MACRO, and CARES. Chief Allison also shared information on OPD's recently launched community survey "Blockwise", a Zencity survey aimed at bridging the relationship between OPD and the community.

Dr. Leigh Grossman presented on findings of Task 45 – Consistency of Discipline 2022 Report, which can be found on OPD's website.

Questions were raised by Commissioners Jackson, Jordan, Howell, Peterson, Harbin-Forte and Chair Milele.

Public comments were made by 1 person (Olugbala).

VI. Update from Community Police Review Agency (CPRA)

Director Jones shared the CPRA monthly report on its database, cases, RFQ for commission counsel, RFP for a CRPA/IAD consultant, trainings, mediation considerations, and community outreach.

Questions and comments were shared by Commissioners Peterson, Harbin-Forte, and Chair Milele.

Public comment was made by 1 person (Olugbala).

VII. 2022 Police Commission Annual Report for Review and Discussion

Commissioners Jackson and Peterson presented on the work done on the Annual Report and its current status, welcoming review and suggestion from the Commission and public.

Questions and suggestions were shared by Commissioners Harbin-Forte and Jordan.

Public comment was made by 1 person (Olugbala).

VIII. Approval of Meeting Minutes

Commissioner Hsieh requested additional review of March 23rd meeting minutes to ensure appropriate language was used in reference to a motion on DGO 15 - Body Worn Camera Policy.

Commissioner Harbin-Forte made a motion to approve the meeting minutes for March 9; March 30; and April 13. This motion was seconded by Vice Chair Jordan and carried by the following vote:

Ayes: 7 – Jordan, Harbin-Forte, Howell, Hsieh, Jackson, Peterson, Milele

Nays: 0

No public comment was made.

IX. Committee Reports

Staff Searches: CPRA Director, Chief of Staff, Police Chief (Commissioners Milele, Jordan, Howell)

Chair Milele provided an update on the Staff Searches Ad Hoc, which will be holding a forum for the CPRA Executive Director search on May 4 at 6:30 p.m. The ad hoc continues to welcome public feedback on suggested questions via email. Flyers can be found on the Commission website and Twitter in multiple languages.

The ad hoc has met with Mayor Thao for preliminary discussion on the Chief of Police search and will provide regular updates to the Commission as the process continues.

Militarized Equipment (Commissioners Hsieh, Jordan, Jackson-Castain)

Commissioner Hsieh provided an update on the Militarized Equipment Ad Hoc Committee. The ad hoc is currently working on the Militarized Equipment Annual Report, an extensive report that will be shared at the next Commission meeting. Commissioner Hsieh also shared information on the community engagement meeting the ad hoc is planning, tentatively set for May 25th.

CPRA Policies (Commissioners Harbin-Forte, Jackson-Castain, Ordaz)

Commissioner Harbin-Forte, Chair of the CPRA Policies Ad Hoc, shared the committee's plan to present its amended proposed policies manual to the Commission at the next May 11th meeting.

Rules of Procedure Ad Hoc Committee (Commissioners Hsieh, Howell, Jackson-Castain)

Commissioner Hsieh provided an update on the Rules of Procedure Ad Hoc, which holds its next meeting on May 9th. The ad hoc is currently working on the Commission Code of Conduct and receiving assistance from former Commissioner Jose Dorado and former Police Commission Chief of Staff Rania Adwan.

Public comments were made by 2 persons (Kramer; Olugbala).

X. Upcoming/Future Agenda Items

Commissioner Jackson requested an update on the budget and an NSA update.

No public comment was made.

XI. Open Forum Part 2

No public comment was made.

XII. Adjournment

Prior to adjournment, Commissioner Peterson shared that a virtual town hall will take place at Allen Temple Baptist Church, April 29 at 12:00-1:30 p.m. The town hall will feature a panel including Commissioner Peterson, Chair Milele, Commissioner Jackson, DA Pamela Price, and others.

Commissioner Jackson also shared that an Oakland Youth Safety Conference will be held May 13, 10:30-1:00 p.m. at Youth Uprising. Presenting will be OIG Phillips, Councilperson Treva Reid, and others.

Chair Milele adjourned the meeting at approximately 9:06 p.m.



CITY OF OAKLAND | POLICE COMMISSION
250 FRANK H. OGAWA PLAZA, SUITE 6302 • OAKLAND, CA 94612

Current Committees

Ad Hoc Committee	Commissioners
Budget	Milele, Jordan, Jackson-Castain
*Body Worn Camera Policy	Harbin-Forte, Peterson, Hsieh
Community Outreach	Howell, Jordan, Ordaz
*CPRA Policies	Harbin-Forte, Jackson-Castain, Ordaz
*Militarized Equipment Policy	Hsieh, Jackson-Castain, Jordan
Negotiated Settlement Agreement	Harbin-Forte, Hsieh, Milele
Racial Profiling Policy	Committee of the Whole Chair: Peterson
Rules of Procedure	Hsieh, Howell, Jackson-Castain
Staff Searches (CPRA, CoS, Chief)	Milele, Jordan, Howell
Staff Evaluations (IG, CPRA)	Harbin-Forte, Jordan, Howell
OBOA Allegations	Harbin-Forte, Jackson, Ordaz
Annual Report	Jackson, Peterson

** Estimated to sunset in 2023*

Recently Completed/Paused/Dormant

Ad Hoc Committee	Commissioners
Antidiscrimination Policy	Harbin-Forte, Hsieh, Jackson
Electronic Communication Devices	Howell, Harbin-Forte, Peterson
Police Chief Goals and Evaluation	Milele, Peterson, Jackson
Risk Management Policy	Peterson, Harbin-Forte, Howell
Social Media Policy	Milele, Hsieh, Jackson
White Supremacists and Other Extremist Groups	Harbin-Forte, Jackson
Community Policing (15-01)	Harbin-Forte, Howell, Hsieh
OIG Policies	Peterson, Harbin-Forte, Jackson
Contracts	Peterson, Howell, Ordaz

For a roster of current Commissioners and their emails, visit:
<https://www.oaklandca.gov/teams/police-commission>

Agenda Matter	Duties/Deliverables	Additional Information/Details	Timeline for 2022-23	Annual vs. Incident-Based vs. Continuous Functions	Measure LL ("Charter") and Enabling Ordinance ("Ord.") Sections
Annual evaluation of Chief of Police	Conduct performance reviews of the Agency Directors and the Chief	The Commission shall determine the performance criteria for periodically evaluating the Chief and the Agency Director, and communicate those criteria to the Chief and the Agency Director one full year before conducting the evaluation.	Postponed	Annual	Ord. Section 2.45.070(G)
Annual evaluation of Inspector General	Conduct performance reviews of the Agency Directors and the Chief	The Commission shall determine the performance criteria for periodically evaluating the Chief and the Agency Director, and communicate those criteria to the Chief and the Agency Director one full year before conducting the evaluation.	Postponed	Annual	Ord. Section 2.45.070(G)
Hiring CPRA Director including public forum	Staff Searches Ad Hoc	Commission responsible for hiring of Agency Director	Anticipated Hire in Q2	Incident-based	Charter - 604(e)(4)
Annual evaluation of CPRA Director	Conduct performance reviews of the Agency Director and the Chief	The Commission shall determine the performance criteria for periodically evaluating the Chief and the Agency Director, and communicate those criteria to the Chief and the Agency Director one full year before conducting the evaluation.	Mar/Apr 2024	Annual	Ord. Section 2.45.070(G)
Annual report to the Mayor/City Council/the public	Complete Annual Report		2022 Annual Report to Commission for first review in Q2	Annual	
Hiring of Police Chief	Complete search for new Chief of Police and recommend candidates to Mayor	The Commission, with the assistance of the City Administrator, shall prepare and distribute a job announcement, and prepare a list of at least three (3) candidates and transmit the names and relevant background materials to the Mayor. The Mayor shall appoint one person from this list, or reject the list in its entirety and request a new list from the Commission.	Initiated	Incident-based	Charter - 604(b)(10)
MEETINGS					
Public Hearing on OPD Policies	Commission may shall determine which Department policies are subject of the hearing	Possible topic: racial disparity in policing	June 2023 meeting - coupled with community roundtable and public hearing requirement	Annual	Charter Section 604(b)(2)
Two meetings per year outside City Hall - "Community Roundtables"	Agendized ten days in advance	Commission shall consider inviting to each roundtable individuals and groups familiar with the issues involved in building and maintaining trust between the Department and the community, including but not limited to representatives from the Department, members of faith-based groups, youth groups, advocacy groups, residents of neighborhoods that experience the most frequent contact with the Department and formerly incarcerated members of the community	May (Budget) and June (Racial Disparities) 2023 meeting - combine with community roundtable and public hearing requirements	Annual	Charter § 604(d)(1) and Ord. § 2.45.090

Agenda Matter	Duties/Deliverables	Additional Information/Details	Timeline for 2022-23	Annual vs. Incident-Based vs. Continuous Functions	Measure LL ("Charter") and Enabling Ordinance ("Ord.") Sections
BUDGET					
Public hearing on OPD Budget	Purpose of hearing is to "determine whether budgetary allocations for the Department are aligned with the Department's policies". Develop and Approve Recommendations to City Council re Mayor's Budget	May 2023 -- Tentative release date of Mayor's proposed budget is May 1st of each year.	May 2023 meeting - coupled with community roundtable and budget public hearing	Annual	Charter Section 604(b)(7)
Propose a Commission Budget, in general	Propose staff position submission to City Administrator necessary to permit the Commission and the CPRA to fulfill its functions and duties.	Update requested by Comm. Peterson (4.13.23)	Approved March 2023 - Revisit May 2023 after release of Mayor's budget	Annual	Ord. Section 2.45.180
Review and Comment on Proposed Budget for Education and Training re: job-related stress, PTSD Signs and Symptoms, and Other Jobrelated Mental Health/Emotional Issues		Possibly include in general budget or OPD budget	April/May 2023	Annual	Charter § 604(d)(1) and Ord § 2.45.090
Propose a Budget for Education and Training re: job-related stress, PTSD Signs and Symptoms, and Other Job-related Mental Health/Emotional Issues		Possibly include in general budget or OPD budget	April/May 2023	Annual	Ord. § 2.45.070(C) & (D) (C) Review and comment on the education and training the Department provides its sworn employees regarding the management of job-related stress, and regarding the signs and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, drug and alcohol abuse, and other job-related mental and emotional health issues. The Commission shall provide any recommendations for more or different education and training to the Chief who shall respond in writing consistent with section 604(b)(6) of the Oakland City Charter. (D) Prepare and deliver to the Mayor, the City Administrator and the Chief by April 15 of each year, or such other date as set by the Mayor, a proposed budget for providing the education and training identified in subsection C., above.
Quarterly budget review and regular updates on the agenda		Requested by Comm. Jackson (12.8.23; 2.9.23; 2.23.23; 3.23.23)		Continuous	
OTHER ITEMS: for CPRA					
Solicit/Consider Public Input re Quality of Interactions with CPRA and Commission			Public Forum for CPRA Director Search	Continuous	Ord. § 2.45.070(Q)
Establish Rules/Procedures re Mediation/Resolution of Complaints of Misconduct		Requested update by Comm. Harbin-Forte (4.13.23)	In Progress with CPRA	Continuous	Ord. § 2.45.070(N)
RFP for IAD transition to CPRA		Requested by CPRA	In Progress with CPRA	Incident-Based	
Review the Agency's dismissal and/or administrative closure of all complaints of misconduct involving Class I offenses			August 2023 - maybe 6 mos. into new Director's time with OPC	Continuous	Ord. Section 2.45.070(M)

Agenda Matter	Duties/Deliverables	Additional Information/Details	Timeline for 2022-23	Annual vs. Incident-Based vs. Continuous Functions	Measure LL ("Charter") and Enabling Ordinance ("Ord.") Sections
Provide policy guidelines to CPRA Director for determining case prioritization		Requested by Comm. Jackson (11.10.22; 4.13.23) re: Charlotte Jones' August 2022 email; Chair has asked Charlotte when she can report on it	In Progress with CPRA Policies Ad Hoc	Continuous	
Determine the number of existing CPRA staff who would work at a "street-level or ground-floor, visible office that is accessible by public transportation."			In Progress with CPRA	Incident-Based	Ord. Section 2.46.020
OTHER ITEMS: for OPD					
Notify Chief of required contents of Chief annual report	See enumerated list of topics		Completed	Annual	Ord. Section 2.45.070(F)
Review And Comment On Department's Practices/Policies Re: Reporting And Publishing Data On Its Activities				Continuous	Ord. § 2.45.070(P)
Revisit OPD's Grooming & Presentation policy		Requested by Comm. Gage (1.13.22)			
Report on intentions regarding Militarized Equipment			May-23		
Report on claims regarding bail and increase in crime		Requested by Comm. Hsieh & Harbin-Forte respectively (4.14.22)			
Update on OPD's Parole & Probation policy plus impact.		Requested by Comm. Jackson (2.10.22; 1.12.23)			
Approve/Modify/Revoke OPD Use of "Military Equipment" via Annual Report Process			August 2023		Ord. Section 9.65.030
Report from Chief regarding OPD's homelessness policy		Requested by Comm. Harbin-Forte (2.10.22)			
OPD annual update on impact of the missing person's policy		Requested by Comm. Jackson (8.25.22)			
Receive reports from Department via City Administrator on issues identified by the Commission				Continuous / Incident-Based	Ord. Section 2.45.070(R)
Informational report of data from MACRO, OPD, and CARES	(1) how many intakes CARES has received from OPD and MACRO; (2) a report from MACRO on their OPD referrals and the outcomes of those referrals for tracking purposes; (3) and finally, from OPD to see; the numbers of arrests that are eligible for CARES, the dispatches to MACRO and the types of cases involved, and the juvenile cases that are appropriate for juvenile pre-filing diversion and the outcomes of those cases	Requested by Comm. Hsieh (2.23.23)	July 2023	Annual	
OPD presentation on police misconduct data and how OPD evaluates/addresses misconduct allegations		Requested by Jackson-Castain (3.23.23)		Continuous	
OTHER ITEMS: for OIG					
OIG Annual Report	Provide Commission OIG Annual Report		Sep-23	Annual	Ord. Section 2.45.120
Monitor/evaluate # of officers receiving training on profiling, implicit bias, de-escalation, and other key topics			In Discussion	Continuous	Ord. Section 2.45.120
Develop and present a plan to the Commission to measure the performance of each element of the Department's discipline process for sworn officers			In Discussion	Continuous	Ord. Section 2.45.120
Complete all audits/reviews requested by the Mayor, City Administrator, City Council			In Discussion	Continuous	Ord. Section 2.45.120
Monitor/evaluate/make recommendations re: Recruiting and hiring sworn personnel			In Discussion	Continuous	Ord. Section 2.45.120
Monitor/evaluate/make recommendations re: OPD Policies the Commission seeks to create or modify			In Discussion	Continuous	Ord. Section 2.45.120
Monitor/evaluate/make recommendations re: OPD's risk mgmt. practices			In process	Continuous	Ord. Section 2.45.120
Advise OIG of priorities for the 52 NSA Tasks		Part of Post-NSA Standing Committee	TBD	Continuous	Ord. Section 2.45.120; Charter 604(f)(5)

Agenda Matter	Duties/Deliverables	Additional Information/Details	Timeline for 2022-23	Annual vs. Incident-Based vs. Continuous Functions	Measure LL ("Charter") and Enabling Ordinance ("Ord.") Sections
OTHER ITEMS: for Commission					
Community Policing presentation/training		Requested by Comm. Hsieh/Commission Ad Hoc (5.26.22)			Ord. Section 2.45.070(O)
Maintain/update bylaws		Rules of Procedure Ad Hoc - in progress	Summer 2023	Continuous	Ord. Section 2.45.040
Request that the City Attorney submit semi-annual reports to the Commission and to City Council which shall include a listing and summary of litigation			April 27, 2023 (next October 2023)	Continuous	Ord. Section 2.45.070(I)
Mayor's Youth Commission		Requested by Comm. Jackson (8.25.22)			
Bay Area Youth EMT		Requested by Comm Harbin-Forte (8.25.22)			
Presentation by Ian Appleyard on new HR process		Requested by Comm. Jackson (11.10.22)			
Presentation on Ceasefire		Requested by Comm. Jackson (1.12.23)			
Half-day strategic planning session		Requested by Comm. Jackson-Castain (1.12.23)			
Discussion on content of future OPD reports		Requested by Comm. Jackson-Castain (1.26.23)		Continuous	
Audit compliance update		Requested by Comm. Jackson (2.9.23)			
Juvenile Miranda Policy and juvenile detention program update		Requested by Comm. Hsieh (2.9.23)			