

Newcomb, Melanie,

From: Scott & Kathy Law <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, July 10, 2024 3:20 PM
To: Heidorn, Nicolas
Cc: Micik, Ryan; Lara-Franco, Ana; Ethics Commission; Dan Lindheim
Subject: (Small) Money Talks: Strategies to Implement the Democracy Dollars Program in the City of Oakland part 1
Attachments: To the Oakland PEC and staff.docx

Group,

NOTE: There TWO emails on this topic since I cannot figure out how to fit both files on one email in this tool.

(Note Professor Lindheim is cc'ed since he is noted as a key advisor on the report. He has great experience in Oakland on these issues, and any insights he may have are appreciated...)

This email is in reaction to the analysis attached in the July 10 meeting. The analysis is dedicated to how the rollout of the Democracy Dollars could work - but it gives me the opportunity to comment once again on the faulty premise and serious resource drain of a program that will not solve a controversy that does not exist in Oakland, while ignoring the deep rooted issues in Oakland's election that really impact citizen participation.

Unfortunately I cannot find a way to copy the author, Trishia Claudine Lim, on this email, so would appreciate if the staff could forward this to her for comment/reaction.

Below is a summary of my issues with Democracy Dollars, sent earlier to Mr Heidorn, which is repetitive but still relevant. Attached is the detailed letter and point by point analysis of the original study that was used as a justification for Democracy Dollars.

The commission will have its hands full for the next 2 years without the implementation of Democracy Dollars. You will note that one of the issues in the original critical analysis is the complexity of implementation of this idea, which will draw resources from investigations, training preparation, and political processes, for example, moving processes from the city clerk office to the PEC, ongoing corruption studies of the Mayor's office and city administration. Also, this effort is now in the shadow of the city's frightening budget crisis which will impact all city initiatives in the coming years.

Hopefully this email will be regarded as an honest attempt to inform the PEC on this issue from someone has lived in Oakland for over 30 years, and worked in both Oakland political campaigns and complex system implementations.

regards

Scott Law [REDACTED]

Reaction to Small money talks...

The fundamental problems with the analysis and the Democracy Dollars are twofold and completely ignored in report, since it assumes Democracy Dollars and its origin are a good thing.

1) The original analysis has NO facts or evidence that back up the assertion that political donations concentrated from richer groups and areas in the city has ANY bearing on policies or outcomes from Oakland's political processes. In fact, the concentration of city council members and elected officials produces the OPPOSITE results - ie policies that ignore the communities of District 4 and District 1, while concentrating resources in Districts 3, 6, 7 and sometimes 5.

2) The Democracy Dollars Program also does nothing to address the real problem of monetary influence on Oakland elections and politicians - city employee unions and associated union pacs. The PEC staff and members merely have to examine the form 460 for Sheng Thao for Major campaign to understand the impact of the overwhelming amount of money from unions in Oakland politics.

There are a few items I would like to note in the small money talks paper

1) The report notes the example of a mayor candidate Alyssa Victory as person that would benefit from Democracy Dollars, although it should be noted that the "increased" amount is still microscopic compare to

the millions spent in the mayors race, the majority from city labor unions and their members. But the real problem is the candidate is COMPLETELY unqualified to be the chief executive of 430k person city. She had no city administrative experience, no elected political experience, no education or experience in economics, administration ,etc, From her linkedin... "Civil Rights and Labor Attorney, union member, educator, racial justice author, community organizer". Is this a candidate for Mayor that should be receiving taxpayer resources in Oakland ?

2) The author cites unions as a resource for a rollout effort... page 23"

"Engage the Union Workforce

Scholarship on political participation has increasingly emphasized the role of mobilizing institutions to voter turnout. Most notably, labor unions have a positive impact on turning out members in presidential and congressional elections (compared to non-union members),.....Therefore, unions are well-situated to facilitate the participation of Democracy Dollars because they already serve as central venues for socialization. " Again, really ? Has the author examined the 460 reports for candidates, especially Mayor, in the last election or prior elections ? There is NOT ENOUGH labor union influence in campaign spending that we need to fund their rollout efforts to funnel funds to their favorite candidates?

3) In a ironic section, the author cites Oakland DOT demographic equity tool for driving equity/participation page 31. "

"OakDOT Geographic Equity tool The Oakland Department of Transportation (OakDOT) Geographic Equity Toolbox was created as a way for the City of Oakland to prioritize neighborhoods based on concentrations of people with demographic factors determined to have experienced historic and current disparities⁷⁵. Identified "priority neighborhoods" are suggested to receive more in-depth community outreach in order to consider their specific needs for policies, programs, projects, and funding based on seven demographic factors. " What she does not mention is that this equity tool was driven by the city council to allocate DOT spending according to equity, etc - this very city council

is the one that is supposedly controlled by rich area spending. It is actually a good example of how the government spending of Oakland is actually driven AWAY from rich areas such as D4 and D1 and TOWARD the poorer areas. Again, despite the supposed influence of rich spending limiting access.

4) Appendix C. This is a list of groups in Oakland that should be included in a database to conduct outreach for Democracy Dollars. Except the League of Women Voters, every one of these groups either directly receives tax dollars or is teamed with groups that receive tax money. To include these groups as supported rollout resources for an effort to distribute vouchers that funnel to political candidates, who will govern how much money they receive, is an invitation to corruption and self dealing. To say the least, Oakland in the current environment, does not need any opportunities for questionable practices in its elections.

thanks for reading and listening....

Scott Law 

Introduction to public financing proposal

To the Oakland PEC and staff.

I write this analysis with these background qualifications. As a 34 year resident of Oakland, I have donated and participated in numerous political campaigns. I have served as Treasurer of a Mayoral campaign and served on his advisory staff. Also, I as a member and group manager of the Alameda County Grand Jury for two years, participating in the construction of numerous investigations and reports. Currently, am president of the Alameda County Grand Jury Association, a Chapter of the California State Grand Jury Association. We support the Grand Jury in recruiting and investigative report follow up as private citizens.

All these opinions are my own and have no involvement from the ACGJA.

Also, I have included a spreadsheet of the population by zip code in Oakland to provide arithmetic check to the report.

The Oakland PEC does an outstanding job and is a great service to the people of Oakland. We are lucky to have this group, and I look forward to following its activities in the years to come. I hope this report write up is taken in the spirit of helpful suggestions.

Summary of comments with the Race for Power Draft.

Inserted in the draft report attached are my comments on this proposal. **The comments inserted in the attached draft pages are in bold 14, for easy visibility (not shouting!)**

Issues

There is no evidence in this report that the disparity in funding for political races creates or perpetuates economic or racial disparities in Oakland. There is much analysis of areas with high levels of donations vs low levels and how certain zip codes in Oakland are poor, middle class or rich, white vs non-white. There is documentation of effects on voter participation in Oakland and negative impact of money in politics nationally. Also the responses of survey participants of feeling left out of the political process. Also the role of consultants perpetuating the “pay to play” system. But what has actually happened to poor and minority people in Oakland in the past ten years resulting from the funding disparity ? Has poverty increased ? is violent or property crime worse ? Is unemployment higher ? Are educational outcomes in public schools worse ? Are infrastructure projects only done in rich areas and not poor areas? Are any of these issues linked to processes approved by the candidates with the most donations ?

What has been documented is the fact that candidates with more contributions are much more likely to win. However, there is no analysis of the impact of incumbency on these races – incumbents in city council and city wide races won 82% of the races since 2010. Is this due to contributions or the classical advantages of incumbency in US politics ? Also where are the advantages of the rich zip codes from the political process – more police ?, better road repairs ? Enrichment from political processes that accrue to people in those zip codes ?

Approval of buildings, abridgement of zoning ordinances to favor their projects ? I see none of these problems in the report.

The most glaring omission of the report is the impact from public and private employee union donations in to the election process. Although there is no analysis except for the listing of union controlled PACs in the appendix, the impact of employee compensation and underfunded pensions will be exacerbated by the forecasted Covid pandemic on tax revenue/state/federal funding. This is by far the most impactful issue facing poor and minority groups in Oakland. Why isn't the campaign funding from these groups examined in the report ?

Solutions

The report's conclusion is that the best solution to address the financing issue is to institute a voucher system similar to Seattle. It documents better participation from groups that were not as well funded in the old system, which seems good. However there are several drawbacks to this proposal. One, the cost in Oakland would be approximately 4.7 million adding the PEC estimates for staff and cost of system implementation. There is little chance that an Oakland city council faced with tens of millions of deficits would fund that level of spending in order to buoy their opponents. Two, the staff has preliminary plans for an extensive education, outreach and administrative burden to pass an initiative and make the Seattle system successful – how will an Oakland voter population that still struggles to understand ranked choice voting be able to absorb this massive change ?

A better solution is to institute term limits for all elected officials in Oakland. The mayor's office already has this limit. Also, the cost will be minimal compared to voucher system. Term limits will eliminate the issue of incumbency advantage, and enable fresh crops of challengers for city council, school board, city attorney, city auditor. Since it follows the same policy as State of California and numerous cities, it is easy to understand. Note that through 2018, 3 city council members had a total of 52 years of service. Seriously ? Let's freshen the roster a little bit.

Newcomb, Melanie,

From: Scott & Kathy Law [REDACTED] >
Sent: Wednesday, July 10, 2024 3:30 PM
To: Heidorn, Nicolas
Cc: Micik, Ryan; Lara-Franco, Ana; Ethics Commission; Dan Lindheim
Subject: Re: (Small) Money Talks: Strategies to Implement the Democracy Dollars Program in the City of Oakland part 2
Attachments: MoneyinPoliticsLAWdraftedited.docx

second attachment

Group,

NOTE: There TWO emails on this topic since I cannot figure out how to fit both files on one email in this tool.

full regards again

City of Oakland Public Ethics Commission



Race for Power: How Money in Oakland Politics Creates and Perpetuates Disparities Across Income and Race

Public Ethics Commission
1 Frank Ogawa Plaza (City Hall), Room 104
Oakland, CA 94612
www.oaklandca.gov/pec
ethicscommission@oaklandca.gov
(510) 238-3593



DRAFT

Summary of comments with the Race for Power Draft.

Inserted in the draft pages below are my comments on this proposal. **The comments inserted in the following draft pages are in bold 14, for easy visibility (not shouting!)**

Issues

There is no evidence in this report that the disparity in funding for political races creates or perpetuates economic or racial disparities in Oakland. There is much analysis of areas with high levels of donations vs low levels and how certain zip codes in Oakland are poor, middle class or rich, white vs non-white. There is documentation of effects on voter participation in Oakland and negative impact of money in politics nationally. Also the responses of survey participants of feeling left out of the political process. Also the role of consultants perpetuating the “pay to play” system. But what has actually happened to poor and minority people in Oakland in the past ten years resulting from the funding disparity ? Has poverty increased ? is violent or property crime worse ? Is unemployment higher ? Are educational outcomes in public schools worse ? Are infrastructure projects only done in rich areas and not poor areas? Are any of these issues linked to processes approved by the candidates with the most donations ?

What has been documented is the fact that candidates with more contributions are much more likely to win. However, there is no analysis of the impact of incumbency on these races – incumbents in city council and city wide races won 82% of the races since 2010. Is this due to contributions or the classical advantages of incumbency in US politics ? Also where are the advantages of the rich zip codes from the political process – more police ?, better road repairs ? Enrichment from political processes that accrue to people in those zip codes ? Approval of buildings, abridgement of zoning ordinances to favor their projects ? I see none of these problems in the report.

The most glaring omission of the report is the impact from public and private employee union donations in to the election process. Although there is no analysis except for the listing of union controlled PACs in the appendix, the impact of employee compensation and underfunded pensions will be exacerbated by the forecasted Covid pandemic on tax revenue/state/federal funding. This is by far the most impactful issue facing poor and minority groups in Oakland. Why isn't the campaign funding from these groups examined in the report ?

Solutions

The report's conclusion is that the best solution to address the financing issue is to institute a voucher system similar to Seattle. It documents better participation from groups that were not as well funded in the old system, which seems good. However there are several drawbacks to this proposal. One, the cost in Oakland would be over \$ 7 million assuming the same \$100 per voter as Seattle with approximated 60% of the population. There is little chance that an Oakland city council faced with tens of millions of deficits would fund that level of spending in order to buoy their opponents. Two, there is an extensive education, outreach and administrative burden to pass an initiative and make the Seattle system successful – who will do this ? and how will an Oakland voter population that cannot understand ranked choice voting be able to absorb this massive change ?

A better solution is to institute term limits for all elected officials in Oakland. The mayor's office already has this limit. Also, the cost will be minimal compared to voucher system. Term limits will eliminate the issue of incumbency advantage, and enable fresh crops of challengers for city council, school board, city attorney, city auditor. Since it follows the same policy as State of California and numerous cities, it is easy to understand. Note that through 2018, 3 city council members had a total of 52 years of service. Seriously ? Let's freshen the roster a little bit.

DRAFT

Race for Power:
How Money in Oakland Politics
Creates and Perpetuates
Disparities Across Income and Race

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


As a leader in social justice and civic involvement, Oakland is, in many ways, rich in dialogue and action when it comes to authentic democracy. Yet the City lacks an effective approach to ensuring the campaign process is equally robust in providing Oaklanders with meaningful opportunities to participate in the process of selecting its City leadership. Big money is essentially a prerequisite for winning office; local candidates who have the most financial support typically win and must rely on donors to provide financial resources needed to run an effective campaign. This reliance on money as the driving force means winners are selected and policy is shaped by those who can contribute to political campaigns. **This is the central thesis of this analysis and proposal. Yet there is not ONE example of a policy decision by the Oakland City Council, Mayor's Office or School Board of a policy decision that is the result of political donations. Where is the evidence of these policy decisions?** Campaign data shows that less than half of campaign funds come from Oakland residents, only a tiny fraction of Oaklanders make contributions to candidates for political office, and that fraction is more concentrated in the whitest and wealthiest neighborhoods within the City. This system results in clear inequities for people of color and low-income communities.

In 1999, Oakland created a then-new system of providing funds to candidates seeking elective office with the goal of reducing the influence of money in politics and diversifying the pool of candidates running for office, among other aims. At that time, public funding of elections, combined with contribution limits and other restrictions, was the go-to solution to the concern that contributions can have a corrupting influence on candidates and officeholders.

More recently, with advances in civic engagement practices, heightened attention to user-centered design, and expansion of racial and socio-economic equity work, innovative Cities are adopting creative solutions to involve more of their residents in City government. In the campaign finance world, these new

approaches to civic engagement and equity provide opportunities to engage and empower voices that historically have been left out of the political process and, ultimately, to diversify and equitably expand participation in campaign and civic life.

This report evaluates outcomes from Oakland's existing public financing program and overall campaign finance system, articulates the ways in which some Oaklanders lack political power, explores current trends and best practices across jurisdictions and subject-matter fields, and recommends a new approach for Oakland to expand and diversify participation and influence in the campaign process. Oakland must intentionally disassemble its existing campaign finance system that results in disproportionate participation, leaving out people of color and low-income communities, and instead



DRAFT

build a civic-engagement infrastructure and political leadership evaluation, recruitment, and selection process that facilitates broad, inclusive, meaningful, and equitable engagement by all Oaklanders.

OAKLAND CAMPAIGN FINANCE OUTCOMES

The Oakland Public Ethics Commission (PEC or Commission) is charged with, among other things, implementing and enforcing campaign finance, ethics, and transparency laws, and conducting reviews of these laws to determine whether changes to City ordinances are necessary. The Commission makes recommendations to City Council regarding changes in policy and law to ensure effective implementation and successful outcomes.

State and local campaign finance laws were designed to reduce the influence of money in politics by placing limits on contributions, requiring the disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures on campaign forms, and ensuring that campaign materials include disclosure statements that identify who provided significant funding to pay for those materials, among other provisions. Oakland's existing system of public financing further provides limited financing to candidates running for City Council district seats, with the aim of achieving the goals listed in the sidebar on this page. These local laws, when passed, attempted to address the problem of money in politics:

1. First, the **Oakland Campaign Reform Act**, adopted in 1999, limits the amount of spending on City campaigns by allowing candidates to raise donations in substantially larger amounts if they agree to limit their overall campaign spending. It also imposes contribution limits on persons giving money to candidates running for local elective office and requires electronic filing of campaign contributions and expenditures to illuminate the flow of money through political campaigns.
2. Second, the **Limited Public Financing Act**, adopted in 2001, aims to lessen the fundraising burden on candidates and enhance competition by giving candidates some public funds for their campaigns in the form of reimbursements for campaign spending, so long as they meet certain criteria.

OAKLAND'S CAMPAIGN FINANCE POLICY GOALS

The stated purposes of the Oakland Campaign Reform Act and Limited Public Financing Act are as follows:

- A. Ensure that all individuals and interest groups in our City have a fair and equal opportunity to participate in elective and governmental processes;
- B. Reduce the influence of large contributors with a specific financial stake in matters under consideration by the City, and to counter the perception that decisions are influenced more by the size of contributions than by the best interests of the people of Oakland;
- C. Limit overall expenditures in campaigns, thereby reducing the pressure on candidates to raise large campaign war chests for defensive purposes, beyond the amount necessary to communicate reasonably with voters.
- D. Reduce the advantage of incumbents and thus encourage competition for elective office;
- E. Allow candidates and elected City officials to spend a smaller proportion of their time on fundraising and a greater proportion of their time dealing with issues of importance to their constituents and the community;
- F. Ensure that serious candidates are able to raise enough money to communicate their views and positions adequately to the public, thereby promoting public discussion of the important issues involved in political campaigns; and
- G. Help restore public trust in governmental and electoral institutions.

Oakland Campaign Reform Act, OMC Section 3.12.030; Limited Public Financing Act, OMC Section 3.13.030.

DRAFT

The general framework for these laws was forward-thinking at the time they were passed; however, with advancements in laws and practices in cities and states across the nation, the Commission now reviews outcomes produced by the current system to assess whether changes are necessary to better meet Oakland's goals.

Existing Laws Produced Some Benefits

A PEC-initiated review of Oakland's Limited Public Financing (LPF) program conducted in coordination with the UC Berkeley Goldman School of Public Policy in 2013 concluded that, as of that time, the LPF program had not reduced the influence of large contributors in local elections. The program also had not reduced the pressure faced by candidates to fundraise, nor led to an increase in the number of candidates pursuing local office. It had, however, resulted in more competitive races – both in the number of contested races and incumbent margin of victory – and led to non-incumbent candidates who received public funds performing better across the board than non-incumbent candidates who did not receive public funds. The review further noted that Oakland's LPF program did not increase the number and power of small donors after it became a reimbursement program in 2010.¹ Lastly, the LPF program does not – and cannot – decrease the influence of large donors in local elections, due to the United States Supreme Court decision in *Citizens United*, which restricts government from limiting independent expenditures made by persons or committees not coordinating with a candidate.²

While the 2013 review evaluated whether the LPF program was meeting its stated goals, more recent reviews look at the other side of the power scale. Rather than focusing on reducing the influence of money in politics, these later assessments – to be discussed below – aim to understand how the system can increase power for all people to engage meaningfully in the process of selecting City leaders to enhance equity, expand civic participation, and create a more authentic democracy.

Campaigns Need Money, Seek out Wealthy Donors

Unfortunately, the current system requires candidates to raise a significant amount of money to pay for campaign costs such as campaign materials, signs, mailers, postage for mailings, campaign staff and consultants. As a result, campaigns seek out contributions from wealthy donors since those are the individuals who can afford to give money. This issue was explored in a second PEC-initiated review conducted in coordination with the UC Berkeley Goldman School of Public Policy in 2018 to evaluate the LPF program through an equity lens. The review sought to explore the demographics of those who participate in campaigns and identify barriers to political participation in the selection of City leaders.³

The 2018 review highlighted the source of contributions made to candidate campaigns (wealthier donors) as well as the target of candidates' campaign outreach (prior/high propensity voters), and it concluded that the result is a system that leaves out low-income communities and communities of color who donate and vote at lower rates than wealthier, whiter communities. This system is self-perpetuating, such that candidates are incentivized to continue to focus on engaging wealthier donors

¹ *Evaluating Oakland's Limited Public Financing Act*, Greg Gonzales, Goldman School of Public Policy, UC Berkeley, Spring 2013. Up until 2010, the LPF program was a matching fund program in which the City matched, dollar-for-dollar, the first \$100 of every Oakland-based contribution.

² See *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission*, 558 U.S. 310 2010.

³ *Enhancing Political Engagement in Oakland: Barriers and Solutions*, Dyana Mardon, Goldman School of Public Policy, UC Berkeley, Spring 2018.

DRAFT

– who are already engaged in the political process and who have money to give – over communities with less access and lower engagement in the City’s political process.⁴

The problem is that this need for money does not naturally “incentivize candidates to listen to their potential constituents; rather, it incentivizes candidates to seek out wealthy donors.”⁵ This is reflected in the advice that campaign consultants often provide to candidates to raise money in the hills of Oakland to pay for sending advertisements to residents in the flatlands.⁶

This is only partially true at best. In every campaign that I know of there are three major factors in Oakland are 1) money, 2) endorsements (especially by unions, Democratic party of Alameda or other politicians) 3) Community group meetings, especially Black churches, neighborhood improvement councils. The campaigns I am familiar with spend just as much time with items 2 and 3, although of course fundraising is also omnipresent. The writer should check campaign literature as an example.

Not only is the system set up to prefer wealthy and high propensity voters, but the people who lead and manage campaigns also naturally play a role in deciding how to conduct campaign fundraising or marketing. Local candidates and campaign workers have voiced concern about campaign consultants who guide campaigns to spend the vast majority of energy and resources on high propensity voters – people who vote in every election every time – because, consultants say, that is how you win an election.⁷

FEEDBACK FROM CANDIDATES AND CAMPAIGN WORKERS IN THE FIELD

Candidates and campaign workers speak up about traditional campaigning:

“As a candidate for office in Oakland, sitting and former councilmembers and mayors alike advised me to secure a professional consultant who had experience consulting Oakland candidates who won their election,” said Nayeli Maxson Velázquez, former candidate for City Council in 2018. “These consultants are expensive to hire. After I had secured one such consultant, the pressure to fundraise became overwhelming. Although my original vision was a grassroots door-to-door campaign, the pressure from consultants and from prospective endorsers to fundraise in order to establish viability made it difficult to protect time for me, the candidate, to knock on doors. My time was deemed by the experienced elected officials and professionals I spoke with as better spent on the phone raising money from those who had funds to donate than spent on speaking with prospective voters at the door. After months of prioritizing raising money over canvassing voters, I found it difficult to stay connected to the residents I was seeking to represent and had to push back on consultants, simply raise fewer funds, and had less money to spend on online ads and mailers during the final push of the campaign.”

“This method of campaigning further disenfranchises voters who are Black and of color,” said Erika Bernard, former Regional Organizing Director for a presidential campaign in Northern California. “What it does is maintain a system that keeps wealth and political power in white communities. In my almost five months of campaigning I made thousands of phone calls. In those thousands of phone calls, I only spoke with one Black woman. I questioned senior leadership as to why this kept happening. Their response was that if people don’t engage with campaigns then their information won’t be in [the campaign consultant vendor’s voter information data system].”

Nationally, only one percent of campaign consultants are people of color, said Chuck Rocha, of Solidarity Strategies, upon the launch of the National Association of Diverse Consultants. “The lack of diversity among our elected officials and the top aides who help them win office impairs their ability to understand the diverse perspectives in their districts. If we are more intentional about the way that we ensure diversity in political campaigns, public offices and the rooms where decisions are made, it will transform the way that political leaders show up during moments of crisis. It is also how we can effect change that is inclusive and

DRAFT

meaningful.”

⁴ *Id.*

⁵ *Enhancing Political Engagement in Oakland: Barriers and Solutions*, Dyana Mardon, MPP, Spring 2018, p. 4. Citing Lioz, Adam, “Stacked Deck: How the Racial Bias in Our Big Money Political System Undermines Our Democracy and Our Economy,” Demos, 2014.


⁶ Comments made by Dyana Mardon, summarizing interviews with local candidates during her research for *Enhancing Political Engagement in Oakland: Barriers and Solutions*, Dyana Mardon, MPP, Spring 2018.

⁷ Comments provided to Commission staff by Nayeli Maxson Velázquez, candidate for Oakland City Council District 4 in the 2018 Election, along with other candidates throughout the course of the Commission’s review.

Campaign Data Reveals Racial and Income Disparities

Campaign finance data⁸ shows that campaign donors are overrepresented in areas of the City that are disproportionately wealthy and white and non-representative of the racial and socioeconomic diversity of Oakland residents overall.

Over half of contributions from Oakland residents (52 percent) come from neighborhoods in just four zip codes (94611, 94610, 94618, and 94612). Over 80 percent of Oaklanders live in zip codes that are ethnically and racially diverse.⁹ However, campaign data from Oakland’s 2014, 2016, and 2018 election cycles shows that 42 percent of contributions made to Oakland candidates came from the three Oakland zip codes that are comprised of residents with the highest median household income in the City. Additionally, the data shows that these same zip codes contain over a 50 percent white population.¹⁰



⁸ The Oakland campaign finance data used for this report comes from the City of Oakland Public Ethics Commission Public Portal for Campaign Finance and Lobbyist Disclosure, data from most recent filings for the years 2013 – 2019, last accessed 5/21/19. Oakland campaign committees submit campaign finance data according to the deadlines and reporting requirements of the California Political Reform Act.

⁹ For the purposes of this report, diverse zip codes are defined as 50 percent or more residents identifying as people of color. Source: U.S. Census Bureau; American Community Survey, 2017 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, <<http://factfinder.census.gov>>; Last accessed 5/31/2019.

¹⁰ *Id.*

The three zip codes in Oakland, mentioned above, with a majority of white residents and the highest household incomes (94611, 94618, 94610) contributed over \$1 million to candidates in the last three City elections, while residents in the City's three most diverse zip codes (94601, 94603, 94621) contributed just over \$136,000. This data further highlights the fact that donors are concentrated in the wealthiest and whitest Oakland neighborhoods.

Moreover, in zip code 94611, which includes Montclair and parts of the Oakland Hills, is home to just 9 percent of Oakland's total population but is the source of 18 percent of all contributors over \$100 from Oakland residents (400 donors per election on average). Sixty-four percent of residents in that zip code are white, and the median household income is almost double that of Oakland households overall.¹¹


In contrast, the similarly sized zip code 94603, which includes East Oakland, is comprised of a population made up of 96 percent people of color and a household income that is below the median. Here, the donors accounted for less than 1 percent of all Oakland contributors of over \$100 (21 donors per election on average). All told, zip code 94611 contributed 18 times the amount to City candidates as zip code 94603 did in the last three elections.

This is mathematically correct. However the implication that all this money buys some sort of undue influence is ridiculous. Two examples are police allocation and road paving. These two issues are the most prevalent concerns when speaking door to door or small groups in zip 94611. Police beat 13z is one of two 94611/District Four beats. There is 1 (that is the number 1, uno) police officer regularly assigned to beat13z. Street paving priorities were decided to by the city council to be for underserved/communities of color. See last page for sample of the reporting/debate.

Non-Oaklanders Hold Political Power

Across the 2014, 2016, and 2018 elections, roughly half of all contributions to Oakland candidates came from outside of Oakland. Contributions coming from outside of Oakland are quite common across all campaigns, and some receive an even higher proportion of outside funds.

Candidates for Council District seats not only receive most of their funds from non-residents, most of their Oakland donors are not district residents,¹² and overall elections in districts with larger low-income communities of color, such as Districts 3, 6, and 7, receive more outside funding. During the 2016 District 7 election, for example, 65 percent of itemized contributions came from individuals, businesses, or committees based outside of the City. Just seven percent of contributions came from district residents.



DRAFT

¹¹ *Id.* Median household income for Oakland residents was \$68,442 in 2018.

¹² Data for Oakland campaign contributions was geocoded using TAMU GeoServices, a service of the Texas A&M University Department of Geography, which provides free geographic information processing services to researchers to assist in geospatial-related research and data processing, analysis, and visualization. Goldberg DW. 2019. Last accessed 5/22/2019.

Campaign Donors or Independent Spenders Choose Who Wins Elections




The fact that the donor class is not fully representative of Oaklanders is a problem because political giving can provide access and influence elected officials. In addition, candidates who raise the most money in campaign contributions almost always win in Oakland elections, meaning those who contribute to a candidate’s campaign – and help their choice candidate win – are the ones who actually get to choose City leaders.

In Oakland, those who raise the largest amount of money in campaign contributions, or who receive the benefit of independent expenditures spent to support them or oppose their opponents, typically win their race for elective office.

This completely ignores the obvious factor of incumbency. In the five city council and city wide elections beginning in 2010, there were 17 races with an incumbent. 14 times the incumbent won, a rate of 82%. Of course, contributions tend to follow incumbents, but there is a huge advantage in Oakland politics to be an incumbent besides just the money. A simple imposition of term limits for city council seats would address this issue, without extra city spending or large “outreach” campaign to voters.

Across the 2014, 2016, and 2018 elections, 92 percent of the seats were won by the candidate who received the most in contributions and/or had the most supporting independent expenditures.

Independent expenditures, or expenditures made in support of or opposition to a candidate running for office paid for by individuals or committees that are separate from a candidate’s campaign committee, are increasing with each election cycle and have become particularly influential in Oakland Unified School District Board races. For example, a single political action committee outspent candidates, spending over \$600,000 in



DRAFT

independent expenditures during the 2014, 2016, and 2018 elections. **The authors/analysts should interview this GoPac. Believe it to be funded by the Rogers Foundation. What were the Pac's reasoning for spending this amount in OUSD elections? What issues were the PAC trying to address? Is the reason that the PAC was trying to advance minority success in Oakland schools? Is that equity?** During that time, six out of the nine candidates supported by the PAC won their respective races for the seven-member board. **And what policies are those candidates proposing ??**

Campaign Donors Shape Policy Outcomes

The above dynamics result in certain groups having greater influence over campaigns; this in turn has substantive impact on government decisions such as policy outcomes. UC Berkeley Goldman School of Public Policy student Brooke Barron looked further at voting and contribution rates from low-income communities and people of color as part of her work for the American Civil Liberties Union

How is it possible that this analysis overlooks the power of city employee and other unions in Oakland politics? Please observe Table X in this report. Counting Oakland Rising and Citizens for Oakland as ½ union based, out of 18 political action groups, 11 are union or 61%

An underappreciated aspect of union pacs is their tendency to enter election spending in the last month to support union candidates (see District 4 2018 City Council election with approx. 60k in union pac spending the last two months and Rebecca Kaplan campaigns as examples)

Out of a 1.6 billion total city spending, 70% or more is employee compensation. The impact of fiscal policy controlled by employee unions is unmatched by any group - decisions on employment contracts made by city council and OUSD Board cost taxpayers tens of millions.


(ACLU) of Northern California, in collaboration with Bay Rising, California Common Cause, Every Voice, and MapLight.¹³ This 2018 review cited multiple authorities concluding that policy outcomes depend on who engages in the political process.¹⁴

While Barron describes political participation as inclusive of voting, donating, protesting, volunteering for a campaign, contacting elected officials, and running for office, her research found that elected officials and candidates for office are most responsive to two groups: voters and political donors. The latter group, political donors, is more influential, as research cited by Barron indicates that elected officials are more responsive to donors' interests and priorities than voters,¹⁵ and that non-constituent donors have more influence on policymakers than constituent non-donors.¹⁶

There are two large problem with this analysis. These are national findings NOT Oakland. In Oakland, voting blocks make a big impact in policy decision. A few visits to Oakland city Council meetings will show the activists in action for hours and hours, with city council members ignoring staff recommendations in favor of the crowd. An interview with current city councilmembers and city admin to see how the “Oakland system” works would be much more insightful than a study of US Congress. An even bigger problem is the complete lack of analysis on the impact of unions, especially city employee unions, on policy both behind the scenes and at actual meetings. (see prior pages)

Political scientist Martin Gilens shows that when federal policy preferences diverge by income level, “the views of the affluent make a big difference, while support among the middle class and the poor has almost no relationship to policy outcomes,” and identifies the upper-income group’s disproportionate status as donors as an explanation. “When people participate in the political process through voting and donating to political campaigns, they gain access to and influence over policymakers,” Barron concludes. “Policy change requires political engagement.”

Lastly, a view of the racial diversity of elected officials in Oakland after the 2018 election, compared with the diversity of Oakland’s population overall, reveals and reiterates the impact of the above dynamics on the outcomes of who is represented in Oakland City government.¹⁷ For example, almost half of Oakland’s elected officials are white, yet white residents represent only 27 percent of Oakland’s total population. **This is not true. Appendix 4 shows Oakland**



white population is 29%

Also, the racial breakdown of 18 Oakland elected officials from city council, OUSD, city wide offices is

White 5 28%

Black 6 33%

Hisp 3 17%

Asian 4 22%

Also, a “racial” analysis that just counts people’s race does NOT have anything to do with city policies enacted by white elected officials. Example, Kaplan constantly proposes policies, such a cannabis equity and defunding police, that is supported by equity activists. Kalb proposed and wrote the Oakland Police Commission initiative, marked as a gain by equity activists of all races, Libby Schaaf encouraged the illegal occupation of rental housing and forbidding Oakland Police from evicting the Black women/children while providing support for “Moms4housing” initiative. This is a very small list of policy actions by white elected officials supported by large amount of contributions in their races in Oakland that completely contradicts the supposition that white officials do not support various equity initiatives.

¹³ *Building Political Power through Policy Reform in Oakland*, Brooke Barron, MPP, August 2018.

¹⁴ *Id.* Citing Martin, Paul and Michele Claibourn. “Citizen Participation and Congressional Responsiveness: New Evidence that Participation Matters.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, January 2013. And Griffin, John and Brian Newman. “Are Voters Better Represented?” *Journal of Politics*, 2005. And Barber, Michael. “Representing The Preferences of Donors, Partisans, and Voters in the U.S. Senate,” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 2016.

¹⁵ Barber, Michael. “Representing the Preferences of Donors, Partisans, and Voters in the U.S. Senate,” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 2016.

¹⁶ Rhodes, Jesse and Brian Schaffner. “Economic Inequality and Representation in the U.S. House: A New Approach Using Population-Level Data.” April 7, 2013. Canes-Wrone, Brandice and Nathan Gibson. “Senators Responsiveness to Donors versus Voters.” Prepared for SSRC Anxieties in Democracy Conference. Princeton University. October 2016.

¹⁷ Bay Area Equity Atlas, a partnership of The San Francisco Foundation, PolicyLink, and the USC Program for Environmental and Regional Equity. <https://bayareaequityatlas.org/indicators/diversity-of-electeds#/>.

Campaign Finance System Perpetuates Distrust in Government

The above disincentives and political realities are both exacerbated by and contribute to the level of distrust in government – which the Commission heard from community leaders is more prevalent in low-income neighborhoods and communities of color.

Political scientists studying racial efficacy, the perception that American institutions and society operate and disburse justice in a racially equitable manner, found that Black Americans with low feelings of racial efficacy are less likely to vote and feel less politically efficacious, more political mistrust, and greater feelings of alienation than do white people.¹⁸

“Trust is a luxury that many people of color do not enjoy.”

—Mary Li, Multnomah Idea Lab

“Trust is a luxury that many people of color do not enjoy,” said Mary Li of the Multnomah Idea Lab during a presentation on systems change through an equity lens.¹⁹

The Need for Change

To recap, Oakland’s existing campaign finance system gives donors from outside of Oakland and Oakland residents in wealthier, whiter neighborhoods disproportionate influence in choosing elected officials and shaping policy outcomes over everyone else. **There is no evidence cited that supports this contention.** Campaign finance data shows nearly half of all donors to Oakland campaigns reside outside of the City while Oakland residents who do fund campaigns are usually from neighborhoods that are primarily wealthy and white. In a city like Oakland, where the candidate with the most funds behind them almost always wins, this means low-income residents and people of color are disproportionately missing from the political decision-making process. **There is no evidence cited that supports this contention. See the appendix five page as a small example of underrepresented Oakland citizens gaining access to tens of millions of paving contracts.**

This is an equity issue.

For Oakland to live its values and embrace a local democracy built on principles of equity and inclusion, it must structure its campaign process so that candidates from all backgrounds can run for office and realistically win and so that the voices of low-income residents and people of color matter.

DRAFT

¹⁸ Matt Barreto, Jonathan Collins, Gregory Leslie, Tye Rush. “Perceived Racial Efficacy and Voter Engagement Among African Americans: A Cautionary Tale from 2016.” March 2018. Using data from the African American Research Collaborative survey. Also citing prior research by Hughes and Demo 1989, Bobo and Gilliam 1990.

¹⁹ *Lessons in Systems Change Through and Equity Lens*, Stanford Social Innovation Review Webinar, December 12, 2018. Verbal comments made by Mary Li.

NEW PARADIGM NEEDED FOR EQUITABLE ENGAGEMENT

While Oakland’s existing campaign finance and public financing laws focus mostly on the problem of big money in politics, modern trends in a variety of good government disciplines inspire new thinking about both the end goals as well as the methods used to achieve them. Rooted in theories of social justice, public participation, racial equity, and user-centered design, enhancing meaningful and productive civic engagement should be the focus of efforts to redesign our campaign process here in Oakland. The new system should be designed to ensure that the diverse array of Oaklanders are the ones who can influence the selection of City leaders and policy outcomes.

Equity Demands Intentional Restructuring of Systems

Democracy in America was founded on principles of equality and equal representation, but in the 21st century, “one person, one vote” does not do justice to the individual, institutional, and structural racism that has occurred throughout our nation’s history. **This is a disturbing sentence. The one person one vote is the cornerstone of democracy in the USA. Does the author propose that structural racism be addressed by apportioning extra weight to minorities votes over white voters?** The data discussed in prior sections of this report clearly show disparate political engagement outcomes based on race, geographic location, and socio-economic status. **There is no evidence of a “disparate” outcome from city policies in Oakland, just that white/rich areas put more money in to races than minority/poor areas. What are city policies resulting from this discrepancy ?**

Equity, not just equality, requires that we understand and resolve structural gaps so that race, income, or socio-economic status does not “predict success, and we have successful systems and structure that work for all.”²⁰ Racial equity means “we no longer see disparities based on race and we improve results for all groups.”²¹ Equity practitioners advise that, in order to appropriately address racial inequities, we must identify racial barriers to participation and seek out input from those who have been marginalized in the current system.²²

“We believe that in order to disrupt our nation’s deep and pervasive inequality of opportunity and results, generate new possibilities for community ownership of government, and establish a new narrative for a truly inclusive democracy, it is essential to transform government.”
—Government Alliance on Race & Equity

Oaklander Input

The Public Ethics Commission attempted to solicit input from Oaklanders in 2018 to gather preliminary information about potential barriers to participation in the political process. Commission staff partnered with U.C. Berkeley Goldman School graduate student Dyana Mardon in the Spring of 2018 to create an online survey of political participation beliefs and activities by Oaklanders.²³

DRAFT

²⁰ Advancing Racial Equity and Transforming Government: A Resource Guide to Put Ideas into Action, Local and Regional Government Alliance on Race & Equity, p. 15, www.racialequityalliance.org, accessed in 2017.

²¹ Racial Equity: Getting to Results, Local and Regional Government Alliance on Race & Equity, p. 5, May 2017.

²² Jacque Larrainzar, Policy Analyst with the City of Oakland's Department of Race and Equity, speaking to the Commission at its subcommittee meeting on ...

²³ The link to the survey went out to all PEC email lists, website and social media platforms, including Twitter, and Facebook, as well as the City of Oakland's main NextDoor account. Individuals and organizations that asked to receive communications about the PEC's campaign finance project also received a direct email and invitation to send the survey link along to their friends and organization members.

DRAFT

By June 2018, the PEC received 526 online survey responses, reflecting a group of disproportionately white (69 percent of respondents), older (60 percent were 55 or older), and higher income individuals (45 percent reported incomes of over \$100,000). By comparison, whites make up roughly 27 percent of Oakland's population **This is not true. Appendix 4 shows Oakland white population is 29%** Oakland residents who are 55 and older comprise 28 percent of the population, and 32 percent of Oaklanders make over \$100,000. Only 12 percent of online respondents identified as Black/African American, 6 percent Asian, 6 percent Hispanic/Latino/Latina, less than 1 percent American Indian, and the rest reporting either Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, other, or two or more races.

Because this initial round of online outreach yielded responses from a predominantly-white, older and wealthier cohort, Commission staff then partnered with Open Oakland and California College of the Arts volunteers to conduct in-person surveys of people attending community events around Oakland that yielded a predominantly African American survey group. This second survey phase yielded 66 responses, reflecting 45 percent identifying as Black/African American, 30 percent white/Caucasian, 8 percent Asian, 3 percent Hispanic/Latino/Latina, 1.6 percent Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, and 11 percent identifying as two or more races. 29 percent of in-person respondents were in the 35-49 age bracket, 24 percent were 25-34, 21 percent were 50-64, 10 percent 45-54, 8 percent 65+, and 6 percent 18-24, and the rest were under 18. Income ranges were evenly split among all categories between 10-20 percent, except for the income range of \$30-60,000 representing the most respondents at 25 percent.

These survey results, while not statistically representative, provide at least a glimpse of some of the sentiments of Oaklanders on the issue of participation in campaigns and elections. This was a helpful first step in hearing from Oaklanders; however, much more community engagement is needed to solicit input from a broader, more diverse range of residents.

Overview of Survey Responses

Of the online respondents, 45 percent said they have donated to an Oakland candidate's campaign and 35 percent have volunteered for a candidate's campaign. In-person respondents were similar, with 50 percent saying they donated to an Oakland candidate's campaign, and 31 percent saying they have volunteered for a candidate's campaign.

A hefty 86 percent of online respondents said they believe that money influences who is elected, 74% said that money influences political outcomes, and 72 percent said that money influences the amount of access a person might have to an elected official in Oakland. Of the online respondents, 28 percent of white respondents said candidates and elected officials do not care about their concerns, compared to 44 percent of online respondents who identified as people of color and said candidates and elected officials do not care.

In-person respondents agreed even more strongly with statements about the influence of money in elections, political decisions, and access to officials. Most notably, 89 percent of in-person respondents believed that money influences who is elected, 94 percent believed money influences how officials make political decisions in Oakland, and 83 percent believed money influences the amount of access someone might have to an elected official in Oakland.

Desire for More Information

In terms of potential solutions, the online survey posed a list of seven ideas to encourage broader and more diverse political participation, with respondents favoring the availability of more and better

DRAFT

information about local candidates, including information about contributions and independent expenditures made to support or oppose candidates as well as information about how their elected official has voted on issues that are important to them. For example, 78 percent of online respondents were interested in seeing information that displays legislative vote history for incumbent City Council members, with 23 percent choosing this option as their first choice among a list of seven options, 31 percent as their second choice, and 24 percent as their third choice. Online responses also reflected significant interest in candidate debates to encourage broader and more diverse political participation.

The in-person surveyors altered this question to simplify it for easier consumption and instead asked whether the respondent agreed that the option would help them determine who to support in a local election. In-person responses showed similar interests in having access to better information about local candidates at their fingertips, being able to look up how their elected official has voted on issues that are important to them, and seeing who makes contributions and independent expenditures in support of candidates. In-person respondents also favored candidate debates as helpful to determine who to support.

This survey, while offering some idea of political involvement and feedback from Oaklanders, provides merely a small sampling of viewpoints regarding Oaklander's current practices and potential thoughts about barriers and potential advances in political engagement in Oakland. Certainly, more work should be done, particularly by local non-profit entities with a focus on reaching traditionally disenfranchised communities, to understand barriers and incorporate these realities into better design of our local democratic systems.

DESIGNING THE SYSTEM FOR EQUITY

The design of the political engagement system is paramount to ensuring successful outcomes toward our policy objectives. In light of the problems articulated above, and in consideration of the evolution of equity, public participation, and political reform work in recent years, this section aims to provide an overview of best practices and new ideas to inspire work that could move Oakland forward. The goal is to create a campaign process that actually produces a more equitable system and ensures all of Oakland’s communities are involved in recruiting, evaluating, and selecting their City leadership.

Democracy Dollars Incentivize Broader Engagement in Seattle

What if every Oaklander received \$100 from the City to contribute to a candidate of their choosing? Seattle residents overwhelmingly adopted such a measure in 2015 by approving a ballot measure to create a Democracy Voucher Program, the first program in the nation to provide public funds directly to citizens to spend on the candidate of their choice. Starting in 2017 for two at-large council seats and the City Attorney race, Seattle residents received four \$25 checks from the city that they could give to their selected candidate(s). Participating candidates who want to redeem the City payments must meet certain requirements, such as agreeing to accept only contributions of \$250 or less, gather a threshold number of signatures and small contributions, and limit their overall campaign spending.

So far, the following benefits have been reported from Seattle’s new system:

- **Contributors Tripled** – Data from Seattle’s first election cycle with vouchers in 2017 showed the number of campaign contributors tripled from the comparable election cycle for the same races in 2013, with more than 25,000 Seattle residents participating as campaign donors in 2017, three times the 8,200 resident donors in 2013.
- **New Contributors** – Roughly 84 percent of the 2017 election cycle’s Seattle donors were estimated to be new donors; including about 20,900 individuals who

HONEST ELECTIONS SEATTLE

Initiative 122, passed by Seattle voters on November 3, 2015, declared that the “peoples’ initiative measure builds honest elections in the City of Seattle” and “prevents corruption, by giving more people an opportunity to have their voices heard in our democracy” and “ensuring a fair elections process that holds our elected leaders accountable to us by strengthening voters’ control over City government...” The measure further imposed contribution limits, revolving door rules, and disclosure requirements on candidates for elective office.

The initiative, now codified as Seattle Municipal Code Chapter 2.04, outlines the process for issuing and redeeming Democracy Vouchers and assigns the administration of the program to the Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission. Four \$25 vouchers are to be delivered to each registered voter on the first business day of every municipal election year and may be completed and submitted by mail, in person, or electronically to the candidate, the candidate’s designee, or the Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission.

For a candidate to be able to receive voucher funds, the candidate must register for the voucher program, participate in three public debates, comply with campaign laws and spending and contribution limits (\$250 for Council and City Attorney candidates, \$500 for Mayoral candidates), and may not solicit contributions to any committee making independent expenditures.

Using a Democracy Voucher is a public act, and information about the assignment, use, and tracking of vouchers is publicly available to prevent forgery, fraud, or misconduct.

had not contributed to city candidates in the 2015 or 2013 cycles. And 71 percent of these new donors were voucher donors.²⁴

- **More Representative Contributors** – An academic review of Seattle’s voucher program in 2018 found that “compared to cash contributors in the 2017 election, participants in the Democracy Voucher program were generally more representative of the Seattle electorate. Low and moderate-income residents comprise a substantially larger share of voucher users than cash donors. Voucher users are more likely than cash donors to come from the poorest neighborhoods in the city. Residents under 30 years old make up a larger share of voucher users than cash donors.”²⁵
- **Earlier and More Participation in 2019** – In the first two months that vouchers were distributed by the city between February and April 2019, with all seven Seattle city council seats up for election in November 2019, more than 11,000 Seattle residents had redeemed their vouchers, which is already more individual donors participating in city campaigns in all of 2015 before vouchers existed.²⁶ By the end of the 2019 election, 38,092 residents returned more than 147,128 Democracy Vouchers.²⁷

Is that \$14.7 million in spending ? What is Oakland’s current budget for campaign finance matching budget?

Cash in the Hands of All Voters Changes Candidate Behavior

Candidates who ran in Seattle’s first iteration of its voucher system experienced an entirely new framework for campaigning. Since every voter now had campaign “cash” to give to a campaign, all voters became the target of campaign outreach efforts. Under the new system, candidates were incentivized both to educate voters about how to use their own vouchers and to ask them to give their vouchers to support the candidate. **What is to stop business interest, activist groups from advertising to give vouchers to the candidate they support ? Does that defeat some of the purpose of this effort? Note that employee activist led takeover of the Seattle council...was this a reason ?**

For example, Teresa Mosqueda, a former labor activist who is third-generation Mexican-American and the daughter of educators and social justice activists, ran under the new voucher system for the at-large district 8 City Council seat in 2017. She said the new system incentivized candidates to go out and talk to every voter, so that is how she focused her campaign.²⁸ “The democracy vouchers encourage candidates to spend time talking with actual residents, rather than asking wealthy donors to write large checks,” said Mosqueda about her campaign experience. “I spent my evenings and weekends in neighborhoods around Seattle talking about the issues we care about.” Mosqueda won her election to office with a 20-point lead and tipped the Seattle City Council toward a majority of people of color and a supermajority of women. “Candidates like me, who pledged to use democracy vouchers and refuse donations over \$250, were more connected to the city’s diverse population,” she added. As a result, she said, she spent her “first eight months in office bringing forward legislation that comes directly from community — from domestic workers protections to affordable housing solutions.”²⁹

The new system also can change behavior for candidates who do not participate in the voucher program but who run against candidates who do. For example, one Seattle nonprofit leader shared

²⁴ First Look: Seattle’s Democracy Voucher Program, Reducing the Power of Big Money and Expanding Political Participation. Win/Win

DRAFT

Network and Every Voice. P. 2. November 15, 2017.

²⁵ Jennifer Heerwig and Brian J. McCabe. Expanding Participation in Municipal Elections: Assessing the Impact of Seattle's Democracy Voucher Program. University of Washington, Center for Studies in Demography & Ecology. P. 1. April 3, 2018.

²⁶ Seattle's Democracy Voucher Program is Already Sparking a Lively Election Season. Margaret Morales. Sightline Institute. April 23, 2019.

²⁷ Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission. Democracy Voucher Program Biennial Report 2019. P. 5.

²⁸ Teresa Mosqueda. Seattle City Councilmember. Speaking at the Bay Area Political Equality Collaborative Convening. January 23, 2018.

²⁹ Teresa Mosqueda. *I'm Still Paying Off My Student Loans — Here's How I Funded My Campaign (And Won)*. Bustle.com, August 14, 2018.

his observation that Jenny Durkin, the winning mayoral candidate in the 2017 election who did not use the voucher system to fund her campaign opted to join in candidate forums that started to pop up in communities that previously were not the target of campaign efforts, simply because the new voucher availability in those communities drew the voucher system candidates there and she needed to stay competitive by being in the room with the other candidates. Durkin won, and she later hired staff into her Mayoral administration that she met in those new communities which, without the voucher system in place pushing the other candidates to reach out to those communities, she would never have encountered.³⁰

Outreach Efforts Are Critical to Building Community Engagement and Promoting Vouchers

While the voucher system was significant as the first of its kind in the country, also significant is the level of community outreach specifically intended to engage communities of color into the campaign finance process, conducted parallel to the implementation of the voucher system. These civic engagement programs – some woven into the voucher program and others separate from it – provided a strong network of infrastructure that helped bridge different communities in a way that enhanced success of the program and other organizations with shared civic participation goals.

As part of the voucher program implementation, the Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission (SEEC), charged with administering Seattle’s Democracy Voucher Program, created an Advisory Committee to ensure a variety of local community organizations are involved in the implementation of the program – specifically, to provide staff with input on program and policy design, participation and access for diverse communities, outreach and education, and user testing.³¹ With guidance from the Advisory Committee, staff conducted focus groups for user testing of the design of the voucher and the messaging and communications strategies of the program. Feedback from the focus groups went into the final design of the voucher and the informational material that went out to voters, as well as other communications elements.³²

Community Liaisons Connect and Build Trust

The Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission partnered with the city’s Department of Neighborhood Community Liaisons to implement outreach with communities of color to connect residents with City services and ensure that they have every opportunity to participate. Between August and October 2017, Community Liaisons conducted personal outreach at events, door-to-door, and via social media to Somali, Hispanic/Latino, African American, Chinese, and Vietnamese communities.³³ The City of Seattle had created Community Engagement Coordinators and Community Liaisons as part of a new strategy of bringing an equity focus to engaging communities – whether in civil rights advocacy or elections issues – that incorporated a people-centered approach to reaching communities through trusted sources or leaders at the neighborhood level who could help connect people to the City and

³⁰ Aaron Robertson. Managing Director, Policy and Civic Engagement. Seattle Foundation. Interview August 17, 2018.

³¹ Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission. Democracy Voucher Program Biennial Report 2017. P. 21. Advisory Committee member organizations included Sightline Institute, League of Women Voters, Chief Seattle Club, LGBTQ Allyship, The Seattle Public Library, Latino Community Fund, King County Elections, Asian Counseling and Referral Service, Washington Democracy Hub, Washington CAN (Community Action Network), Municipal League of King County, Washington State Public Disclosure Commission, Win/Win Network.

³² Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission. Democracy Voucher Program Biennial Report 2017. P. 9-10.

³³ Seattle Democracy Voucher Program Evaluation, BERK Final Report for the City of Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission. P. 11. April 25, 2018.

its services. These efforts included trainings, ambassador academies, and small stipends for liaisons, among others.³⁴

In addition, Seattle’s Neighborhood Service Centers and Customer Service Bureau, all of which act as “little city halls” in a variety of locations throughout the City, were convenient drop-off locations that also made City staff available to members of the public to answer questions and educate visitors about their vouchers and the program.³⁵

Lastly, Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission staff also conducted general outreach to various communities, including distributing communications via website and social media, translating materials in 15 languages, and providing 47 presentations and 57 tabling events between July 2016 and November 2017.³⁶

Nonprofit Sector Working to Empower and Raise Capacity of Individual and Community Influence

Concurrently to the SEEC Community Liaison work, the Seattle Foundation and King County Elections (King County includes the City of Seattle) partnered in 2017-18 to work with dozens of community-based organizations to increase the participation of under-represented communities in the broader democratic process. They partnered again to create the Voter Education Fund and other initiatives to invest over \$400,000 in community-based organizations to help remove barriers to voting in diverse communities. Other initiatives included grants for peer learning and technical assistance to strengthen grantee abilities to have meaningful influence over systems and policies, as well as grants to fund partnerships that increase the civic voice and participation of underrepresented communities.³⁷ These programs, among others, grew out of the Seattle Foundation’s rebuilding of their grantmaking model in the past several years to focus on racial equity, impacting upstream or “root cause” policy or systems rather than focusing on effects, and creating enabling systems for communities of color to have greater influence over decisions – and decision-makers – that impact them.³⁸

While difficult to measure, the combination of these programs flourishing alongside Seattle’s voucher system likely helped influence the outcomes experienced in Seattle and should be something Oakland should consider if the City adopts a voucher-style financing program.

Small Dollar Matching Programs Offer Another Alternative for Reform

A more common public financing model is a small-dollar matching funds system as adopted by New York City, Los Angeles, and more recently, Berkeley. Matching funds systems lift up the comparative power of small donors by using government funds to “match” contributions up to a certain amount from donors meeting certain criteria. For example, New York City operates a matching funds system for city elections that will match the first \$175 raised from a city resident at a rate of six-to-one, i.e. with \$1,050 in additional public funds to the candidate. That means spending time seeking a \$100 donation

³⁴ Jacque Larrainzar, Policy Analyst, City of Oakland Department of Race and Equity, former Policy Director, City of Seattle

³⁵ Seattle Democracy Voucher Program Evaluation, BERK Final Report for the City of Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission. P. 12. April 25, 2018.

³⁶ Seattle Democracy Voucher Program Evaluation, BERK Final Report for the City of Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission. P. 7. April 25, 2018.

³⁷ Seattle Foundation. <https://www.seattlefoundation.org/communityimpact/Center-Community-Partnerships/vibrant-democracy>. Accessed August 17, 2018.

³⁸ Aaron Robertson. Managing Director, Policy and Civic Engagement. Seattle Foundation. Interview August 17, 2018.

from a city resident is just as valuable as spending time seeking a \$700 donation from an out-of-state lobbyist.


Candidates participating in the New York City matching funds system must meet specific eligibility requirements and thresholds, such as a certain number of \$10 donations, expenditure limits, and caps on the total amount of public funds received. The match is only provided for contributions raised within New York City, thus incentivizing candidates to fundraise from the people they will eventually represent.³⁹

The system has effectively changed the incentives for New York City candidates when fundraising. Multiple studies have found that the system has (1) increased the number of small donors, (2) increased the proportion of candidates' fundraising that comes from small donations, and (3) increased the socioeconomic, geographic, and racial diversity of the donor pool.⁴⁰

One Brennan Center study compared New York City's 2009 City Council elections (which used the matching funds system) with New York State's 2010 Assembly elections occurring in the same geographic location (New York state does not have matching funds), reasoning that this was the same political geography, the same constituents, and the same pool of potential donors. In New York City elections, almost 90 percent of the city's census block groups were home to at least one donor, showing residents were engaged in local politics across the city. By contrast, in the State Assembly elections, only 30 percent of the city's census block groups had a donor living in each home.⁴¹

The graphic to the right shows how donations were more distributed under the matching funds system, as reflected in the breadth depth of colors across the district.⁴²

Matching funds are already in use across California. The City of Los



³⁹The thresholds number of donations that must be raised and the spending limits that must be followed all differ by office sought.

⁴⁰Michael Malbin, et. al., "Small Donors, Big Democracy: New York City's Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States," *Election Law Journal*, Volume 11, Number 1, 2012. Elisabeth Genn, et. al., "Donor Diversity Through Public Matching Funds," Brennan Center for Justice, May 2012. Michael Malbin, et. al., "Would Revising Los Angeles' Campaign Matching Fund System Make a Difference?" The Campaign Finance Institute, Sept. 2016.

⁴¹Elisabeth Genn, et. al., "Donor Diversity Through Public Matching Funds," Brennan Center for Justice, May 2012.

⁴²Michael Malbin, "Citizen Funding For Elections," The Campaign Finance Institute, 2015.

DRAFT

Angeles operated a one-to-one matching system for years, which was increased in 2013 to a two-to-one match in primary elections and a four-to-one match in general elections, and is now a six-to-one match system.

In 2016, the City of Berkeley's voters adopted via initiative a matching funds system that closely mirrors New York City's six-to-one system, except that instead of requiring participating candidates to abide by an expenditure limit, Berkeley requires participating candidates to limit all donations accepted at \$50, essentially making it impossible for a Berkeley candidate participating in the matching funds system to be influenced by a direct donor.

San Francisco, Sacramento, Long Beach, and Richmond all use some version of a matching funds system, but match at lower rates.⁴³ It does not appear that the results found in New York City elections are replicated when a city uses a low match, such as one-to-one.

Matching programs differ from voucher programs in that individuals still need to provide the initial contribution, albeit a small amount, in order to trigger distribution of additional funds to the candidate. Vouchers, by contrast, are provided to everyone in the City in a manner that intends to provide equity across the board.

Innovative Data and Information-Sharing Empowers Communities

The above reforms, and particularly the voucher system, aim to enhance participation by incentivizing candidates to seek out contributions from all residents, not just the wealthy. In addition, innovations in civic engagement and technology enhance participation by illuminating the activities in and around government in a way that provides information and access at one's fingertips so those who are participating can make informed decisions about who can best represent them. Mobile phone applications, online resources, community events, and in-person tutorials are some of the ways cities can provide more and better information about candidates, and in turn, invite and empower individuals to participate in the process in an easier and more effective manner.

Innovative online tools provide new ways of accessing information and data in user-friendly formats developed for easy viewing of what was previously unavailable online or in any electronic form. For example, Oakland's Open Disclosure application, designed by OpenOakland volunteer coders and designers in partnership with the Public Ethics Commission, displays local campaign funding data in a way that is easy to consume by an everyday resident. The application also links to VotersEdge, a broader state platform designed by Maplight and the League of Women Voters of California Education Fund that provides a comprehensive, nonpartisan online guide to elections covering federal, state, and local races across California. Oakland voters can therefore get consolidated information about candidates, ballot measures, and campaign finance information in one virtual place.

While Oakland leads other cities in its availability of campaign finance data, the City does not collect and publish City councilmember vote history data online. As mentioned earlier in this report, 78 percent of online survey respondents (and similar representation by in-person survey respondents)

⁴³ For more information about public financing systems around California, see Nicholas Heidorn, "California Municipal Democracy Index," California Common Cause, December 2016.

expressed interest in such information as helpful in determining whether to support the incumbent candidate or a new candidate for that seat. **This is possibly a good idea, but since 80 – 90% of city council votes are unanimous or one vote against this may not be as informative as people think. Most of the horse trading/policy discussion are hashed out before the votes. But can't hurt depending on how much effort it takes.**

Empowering Communities Through Effective Public Engagement

Leading practitioners in public engagement note that traditional ideas about the “public square” are out of date. The traditional expectation was that information should go out first and that people needed to be educated and then they would become politically involved. “Instead of a linear progression from education to involvement,” they argue, “public life seems to seethe and spark with connections and reactions that are often unexpected and always hard to map.”⁴⁴ Practitioners now instead ask “how to bring ‘new voices’ – meaning young people, poor people, recent immigrants, and people of color – into the public square.”⁴⁵

It is important to consider different types of engagement, including “thick” engagement, which occurs mainly in groups – either face-to-face, online, or both – and consists of dialogue, deliberation, and action planning, versus “thin” engagement by individuals – usually online – that is easier, faster and potentially more viral.⁴⁶ The new online environment is seen as both transformative and yet still not equitable and empowering for people of color, low-income people, and other marginalized groups.⁴⁷

In addition, more attention must be given to questions of infrastructure and how institutions ought to operate, including serving as potential intermediaries or platforms that can collect and organize big data, and curate and interpret that data for its community.⁴⁸ To help communities build new public squares that facilitate equitable technological interaction and meaningful personal network connections, thought leaders suggest focusing on the following four questions:⁴⁹

1. What kinds of infogagement [information plus engagement] infrastructure and institutions at the community level would support the best flow of news, information, and engagement?
2. How can such an infrastructure support a high level of democratic engagement across the community, especially for people who have borne the brunt of past injustices and inequalities?
3. What should be the complementary, constructive, yet independent roles of journalists, public officials, and technologists?
4. What are the core democratic skills needed by people in each of these professions, and how can we provide them?

⁴⁴ Infogagement: Citizenship and Democracy in the Age of Connection. Matt Leighninger. Philanthropy for Active Civic Engagement. September 2014. P. 1.

⁴⁵ *Id.*


⁴⁶ *Id.*

⁴⁷ *Id.*

⁴⁸ *Id.* P. 1, 2, 12.

⁴⁹ *Id.* P. 3.

The Public Ethics Commission published a collaborative transparency report in 2014 to help guide the City toward a more advanced approach to opening up City government, not just by making records more accessible but also by expanding the way the city proactively involves, collaborates, and empowers its residents. The Commission highlighted the International Association of Public Participation’s spectrum of participation as follows:⁵⁰



Innovative cities are pushing the envelope on moving their organizations toward the “Empower” end as much as feasible, depending on the issue and level of public impact of a decision. Oakland should keep this empowerment-oriented framework in mind as it considers how best to design a new public financing system.

⁵⁰ *Toward Collaborative Transparency*, January 2014, Public Ethics Commission, citing the International Association of Public Participation Spectrum, which was reprinted with permission from the IAPP.

CONCLUSION

Oakland’s system of campaign finance, which drives the selection of City government leaders, is ripe for redesign. The goal of this report was to identify areas where the City’s current public financing system fails to achieve its intended objectives and to explore alternatives to the current system that could produce better outcomes for Oakland. Based on the above research, the Commission makes the following findings:

1. Outcomes produced by the current system show significant disparities in who has influence in the selection of City leadership and the resulting decision-making process. While this concept of certain individuals and groups having outsized influence is nothing new, the data now provides clear evidence of the disparities and a foundational benchmark that can be used to measure improvement.

True, but how does the outsized influence of public employee unions impact this conclusion. There is no evidence in this report that tracks how much city spending would be without the union money, or which policies are impacted.

<https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Oakland-city-workers-rally-outside-City-Hall-13578995.php>

“employees rallied outside City Hall on Thursday as a new round of contract talks began. But there’s reason to believe this time will be different, said union leaders and two City Council members who joined them.

Newly elected City Councilwomen Nikki Fortunato Bas and Sheng Thao, alongside aides to new Council President Rebecca Kaplan, rallied with a few hundred members of International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers Local 21.”

2. A system of providing Democracy dollars (like the Seattle Democracy Voucher Program) shows the most promise for bringing equity to the campaign finance process since it equips all voters with campaign “cash” to contribute to campaigns, thereby incentivizing candidates to engage across demographics regardless of wealth and history of prior engagement.

A much simpler, cheaper and effective approach would be to institute city council and oUSD board term limits. Every election examined since 2010 shows a significant increase in candidates, with roughly equal or at last order of magnitude in spending. See District 2 and District 4 in 2014, District 5 in 2012. Two terms, just like the Mayor of Oakland

3. A Democracy dollar system must be accompanied by broad public engagement infrastructure-building efforts, similar to those created in Seattle, to ensure a fertile ecosystem of candidates

DRAFT

and community leaders, connections between City liaisons and communities, effective communications and outreach, and other elements needed for successful integration of a new system of broader and more diverse participation. **This is a bigger problem in Oakland than the writer appreciates, IMO. Half of the Oakland electorate still don't understand ranked choice voting, much less a whole new financing system such as this one. Small, easy steps are better than large initiatives IMO.**

In addition to the above findings, the Commission recommends the City explore the following ideas as part of reforms that could further develop a more authentically democratic process:

1. **Candidate support** – Providing candidates with more resources, support, and a platform for communicating would reduce a candidate's need to fundraise to pay for the costs of campaigning, thus lessening the big money side of the scale and lifting the public participation side. Resources and support may include offerings such as a “how to run for office” workshop for first-time candidates, a recording opportunity to make a 30-second campaign video through the City's KTOP recording studio, a 30-minute recorded interview option where a neutral moderator interviews each candidate with the same set of questions and the City posts all candidate interviews online, and a website platform available to each candidate, along with training on how to set up a campaign website and initiate fundraising. **This is an excellent idea A large part of the value of political consultants is setting up these website/databases. A standardized system for Oakland candidates, that is easily used and hooked in to credit card transactions would be a great asset for new candidates.** Alameda County also should consider providing voter data to candidates at no cost so candidates can initiate voter outreach without having to use campaign funds to pay the cost of acquiring this public information (or paying consultants to purchase it).
2. **Candidate information hub** – Survey respondents expressed interest in seeing more trustworthy information, from neutral sources rather than from campaigns themselves, regarding candidates running for office so they have the tools to assess a candidate's performance and potential as a City leader. The Commission currently partners with Open Oakland, the city's Code for America brigade of volunteer civic technology coders and designers, to provide a consolidated and easy-to-use website for information about who is funding and supporting candidate and ballot measure campaigns in Oakland. The City and its

DRAFT

partners should consider how to produce, offer and share more content about candidates running for office more widely and in a manner that is meaningful to residents, particularly low-income communities and people of color. Candidate forums should be video-recorded and made available for online viewing.

3. **Incumbency information and access** – To ensure fairness when an incumbent is in office, in a position to make and influence decisions on laws, policies, and contracts, and has access to City communication methods and target audience, there must be restrictions in place to maintain a level playing field. This might include stricter limits on the use of City resources to communicate to constituents, particularly during the 6-12 months before an election. In addition, the City should collect and provide easy public access to Councilmember vote history that shows how the incumbent has voted on legislation and other matters while in office so the public can further discern whether they want the incumbent to continue to stay in office.
4. **Additional restrictions** – The City should continue to explore and develop creative solutions that lift up the voices of Oaklanders from all demographics in contrast to allowing the system of big money, and particularly big money from outside of Oakland, flowing into local races that impact those who live and work here. This might include contribution restrictions placed on those who do not live or work in Oakland or incentives for seeking out locally-based contributions over those from outside of Oakland as a way to empower those who are affected by local decisions. Such restrictions could supplement a new public financing approach to cultivate trust by marginalized Oaklanders who may believe they have no chance at effective participation against well-funded interests.

At this moment in our nation’s history, Oakland has an opportunity to rethink its outdated campaign finance system and reshape it into a process that facilitates meaningful dialogue, widespread outreach and communication across all demographics, and expansive and diverse participation by all Oaklanders of all races and income levels. The above findings, including data showing outcomes for the past several elections, provide a benchmark from which we can build new programs and effect better outcomes toward the vision we want: widespread, inclusive, and equitable influence by Oaklanders in the political process, and specifically, the selection of City elected leaders.



DRAFT

DRAFT

APPENDIX 1



DRAFT

Council District 1: Contributions by Oakland Residents, 2016





DRAFT

Council District 2: Contributions by Oakland Residents, 2018





DRAFT

Council District 3: Contributions by Oakland Residents, 2016





DRAFT

Council District 4: Contributions by Oakland Residents, 2018




DRAFT

Council District 5: Contributions by Oakland Residents, 2016





DRAFT

Council District 6: Contributions by Oakland Residents, 2018



DRAFT

Council District 7: Contributions by Oakland Residents, 2016



DRAFT

APPENDIX 2

Table X. Contributions to Council Races by Donor Location, 2016 and 2018 Elections

Office	Donor location	Donor district	Total contributions	Percentage
City Council, District 1	IN OAKLAND	Donor in district	\$31,186	22%
		Donor outside district	\$41,632	29%
	OUT OF STATE	Donor outside district	\$5,645	4%
	WITHIN CA	Donor outside district	\$66,045	46%
City Council, District 1 Total			\$144,508	100%
City Council, District 2	IN OAKLAND	Donor in district	\$78,656	26%
		Donor outside district	\$92,894	30%
	OUT OF STATE	Donor outside district	\$21,725	7%
	WITHIN CA	Donor outside district	\$113,497	37%
City Council, District 2 Total			\$306,772	100%
City Council, District 3	IN OAKLAND	Donor in district	\$19,627	15%
		Donor outside district	\$38,335	29%
	OUT OF STATE	Donor outside district	\$2,850	2%
	WITHIN CA	Donor outside district	\$72,421	54%
City Council, District 3 Total			\$133,233	100%
City Council, District 4	IN OAKLAND	Donor in district	\$86,885	18%
		Donor outside district	\$140,144	29%
	OUT OF STATE	Donor outside district	\$34,175	7%
	UNKNOWN	Donor outside district	\$25	0%
	WITHIN CA	Donor outside district	\$229,031	47%
City Council, District 4 Total			\$490,260	100%
City Council, District 5	IN OAKLAND	Donor in district	\$20,404	20%
		Donor outside district	\$34,297	34%
	OUT OF STATE	Donor outside district	\$4,522	5%
	WITHIN CA	Donor outside district	\$40,894	41%
City Council, District 5 Total			\$100,118	100%
City Council, District 6	IN OAKLAND	Donor in district	\$46,119	13%

Table X. Contributions to Council Races by Donor Location, 2016 and 2018 Elections

Office	Donor location	Donor district	Total contributions	Percentage
City Council, District 6	IN OAKLAND	Donor outside district	\$139,864	41%
	OUT OF STATE	Donor outside district	\$17,465	5%
	WITHIN CA	Donor outside district	\$138,512	41%
City Council, District 6 Total			\$341,960	100%
City Council, District 7	IN OAKLAND	Donor in district	\$6,100	7%
		Donor outside district	\$26,730	29%
	OUT OF STATE	Donor outside district	\$7,650	8%
	WITHIN CA	Donor outside district	\$52,450	56%
City Council, District 7 Total			\$92,930	100%

SOURCE: City of Oakland Public Ethics Commission Public Portal for Campaign Finance and Lobbyist Disclosure; Data export from e-filed FPPC Form 460 - 496 transactions for most recent filings for years 2013 - 2019. Last accessed 5/21/19.

DRAFT

DRAFT

APPENDIX 3

Table 1A. Campaign Finance Summary by Candidate, 2014

Election	Office	Outcome	Candidate	Contributions	Loans	Public Financing	IE - Support	IE - Against
11/4/2014	City Auditor	Won	Roberts, Brenda	\$69,175	\$62,000	\$0		
11/4/2014	City Auditor	Lost	Raphael, Len	\$37,785	\$0	\$0		
11/4/2014	City Council, District 2	Won	Guillen, Abel	\$110,520	\$0	\$17,921	\$132,453	
11/4/2014	City Council, District 2	Lost	Blackburn, Kevin	\$62,212	\$1,600	\$17,921		
11/4/2014	City Council, District 2	Lost	King, Dana	\$93,612	\$0	\$17,921	\$1,129	
11/4/2014	City Council, District 2	Lost	Park, Andrew	\$67,826	\$0	\$17,921		
11/4/2014	City Council, District 4	Won	Campbell Washington, A	\$105,078	\$140	\$17,921	\$110,082	
11/4/2014	City Council, District 4	Lost	Broadhurst, Jill	\$85,821	\$0	\$17,921		
11/4/2014	City Council, District 6	Won	Brooks, Desley	\$70,779	\$2,500	\$17,921	\$1,129	
11/4/2014	City Council, District 6	Lost	Johnson, Michael	\$39,742	\$13,000	\$0		
11/4/2014	City Council, District 6	Lost	Moore, James	\$10,758	\$0	\$0		
11/4/2014	City Council, District 6	Lost	Nosakhare, Shereda	\$30,925	\$4,000	\$17,921		
11/4/2014	Mayor	Won	Schaaf, Libby	\$458,908	\$0	\$0	\$9,894	
11/4/2014	Mayor	Lost	Kaplan, Rebecca	\$347,445	\$0	\$0	\$11,444	\$8,450
11/4/2014	Mayor	Lost	Karamooz, Saied	\$2,610	\$0	\$0		
11/4/2014	Mayor	Lost	Mccullough, Pat	\$200	\$0	\$0		
11/4/2014	Mayor	Lost	Parker, Bryan	\$416,132	\$70,000	\$0	\$20,296	
11/4/2014	Mayor	Lost	Quan, Jean	\$404,861	\$106,000	\$0		\$8,450
11/4/2014	Mayor	Lost	Ruby, Courtney	\$160,160	\$18,000	\$0		
11/4/2014	Mayor	Lost	Siegel, Dan	\$264,569	\$175,000	\$0		
11/4/2014	Mayor	Lost	Tuman, Joe	\$278,014	\$8,000	\$0	\$8,450	
11/4/2014	Mayor	Lost	Washington, Sammuell	\$30,335	\$0	\$0		
11/4/2014	Mayor	Lost	Williams, Charles	\$11,835	\$0	\$0		
	School Board Director,							
11/4/2014	OUSD District 2	Won	Eng, Aimee	\$28,845	\$0	\$0	\$51	
	School Board Director,							
11/4/2014	OUSD District 4	Won	Senn, Nina	\$23,232	\$3,500	\$0	\$34,119	

Table 1A. Campaign Finance Summary by Candidate, 2014

Election	Office	Outcome	Candidate	Contributions	Loans	Public Financing	IE - Support	IE - Against
11/4/2014	School Board Director, OUSD District 4	Lost	Debro, Karl	\$4,174	-\$8,000	\$0		
11/4/2014	School Board Director, OUSD District 4	Lost	Shakir-Gilmore, Saleem	\$17,639	\$0	\$0	\$34,066	
11/4/2014	School Board Director, OUSD District 4	Lost	Spigner, Cheri	\$18,748	\$0	\$0		
11/4/2014	School Board Director, OUSD District 6	Won	Gonzales, Shanthi	\$65,861	\$0	\$0		
11/4/2014	School Board Director, OUSD District 6	Lost	Almanzor, Renato	\$12,093	\$0	\$0	\$63,318	
11/4/2014	School Board Director, OUSD District 6	Lost	Dobbins, Christopher	\$5,000	\$0	\$0		

SOURCE: City of Oakland Public Ethics Commission Public Portal for Campaign Finance and Lobbyist Disclosure; Data export from e-filed FPPC Form 460 - 496 transactions for most recent filings for years 2013 - 2019. Last accessed 5/21/19.

Table 1B. Campaign Finance Summary by Candidate, 2016

Election	Office	Outcome	Candidate	Contributions	Loans	Public Financing	IE - Support	IE - Against
11/8/2016	City Attorney	Won	Parker, Barbara	\$67,909	\$0	\$0		
11/8/2016	City Council, At Large	Won	Kaplan, Rebecca	\$147,423	\$0	\$0		
11/8/2016	City Council, At Large	Lost	Hummel, Francis "Matt"	\$1,750	\$0	\$0		
11/8/2016	City Council, At Large	Lost	Moore, Peggy	\$118,646	\$0	\$0		
11/8/2016	City Council, At Large	Lost	Quan, Bruce	\$75,623	\$0	\$0		
11/8/2016	City Council, At Large	Lost	Sidebotham, Nancy	\$396	\$0	\$0		
11/8/2016	City Council, District 1	Won	Kalb, Dan	\$113,161	\$0	\$35,844		\$13,242
11/8/2016	City Council, District 1	Lost	Corbett, Kevin M.	\$42,542	\$0	\$34,645		
11/8/2016	City Council, District 3	Won	Gibson-Mcelhane, Lynet	\$127,257	\$0	\$6,807		
11/8/2016	City Council, District 3	Lost	Session, Noni D.	\$10,634	\$0	\$0		
11/8/2016	City Council, District 5	Won	Gallo, Noel	\$48,119	\$0	\$35,844		\$39,316
11/8/2016	City Council, District 5	Lost	Gonzales, Viola	\$69,742	\$15,000	\$0		
11/8/2016	City Council, District 7	Won	Reid, Larry	\$72,976	\$0	\$0		
11/8/2016	City Council, District 7	Lost	Hodge, Marcie	\$24,064	\$19,857	\$0		
11/8/2016	City Council, District 7	Lost	Imara, Nehanda	\$24,966	\$5,000	\$0		
School Board Director, OUSD								
11/8/2016	District 1	Won	London, Jody	\$22,344	\$0	\$0	\$2,691	
School Board Director, OUSD								
11/8/2016	District 1	Lost	Macleay, Don	\$5,144	\$0	\$0		
School Board Director, OUSD								
11/8/2016	District 3	Won	Hinton Hodge, Jumoke	\$25,392	\$7,575	\$0	\$90,423	
School Board Director, OUSD								
11/8/2016	District 3	Lost	Wiginton, Kharyshi "Ms. K	\$5,798	\$0	\$0	\$7,405	
School Board Director, OUSD								
11/8/2016	District 5	Won	Torres, Rosie	\$25,033	\$2,750	\$0	\$7,405	\$6,988
School Board Director, OUSD								
11/8/2016	District 5	Lost	Hassid, Mike	\$8,486	\$0	\$0		

Table 1B. Campaign Finance Summary by Candidate, 2016

Election	Office	Outcome	Candidate	Contributions	Loans	Public Financing	IE - Support	IE - Against
School Board Director, OUSD								
11/8/2016	District 5	Lost	Hutchinson, Mike				\$7,405	
School Board Director, OUSD								
11/8/2016	District 5	Lost	Trenado, Huber	\$21,685	\$0	\$0	\$99,289	
School Board Director, OUSD								
11/8/2016	District 7	Won	Harris, James	\$27,586	\$0	\$0	\$122,967	
School Board Director, OUSD								
11/8/2016	District 7	Lost	Jackson, Chris	\$13,562	\$0	\$0	\$7,405	\$6,988

SOURCE: City of Oakland Public Ethics Commission Public Portal for Campaign Finance and Lobbyist Disclosure; Data export from e-filed FPPC Form 460 - 496 transactions for most recent filings for years 2013 - 2019. Last accessed 5/21/19.

Table 1C. Campaign Finance Summary by Candidate, 2018

Election	Office	Outcome	Candidate	Contributions	Loans	Public Financing	IE - Support	IE - Against
11/6/2018	City Auditor	Won	Ruby, Courtney	\$47,225	\$1,500	\$0		
11/6/2018	City Auditor	Lost	Roberts, Brenda	\$57,047	\$0	\$0		
11/6/2018	City Council, District 2	Won	Fortunato Bas, Nikki	\$133,395	\$5,000	\$18,345	\$113,017	
11/6/2018	City Council, District 2	Lost	Guillen, Abel	\$200,652	\$0	\$18,345	\$47,524	\$4,808
11/6/2018	City Council, District 4	Won	Thao, Sheng	\$100,088	\$0	\$18,345	\$115,667	
11/6/2018	City Council, District 4	Lost	Harris, Pamela	\$71,451	\$6,000	\$18,345	\$435	
11/6/2018	City Council, District 4	Lost	Hummel, Francis "Matt"	\$14,929	\$1,500	\$18,345		
11/6/2018	City Council, District 4	Lost	Maxson, Nayeli	\$58,294	\$0	\$18,345	\$435	
11/6/2018	City Council, District 4	Lost	Michelson, Charlie	\$95,313	\$0	\$15,288		
11/6/2018	City Council, District 4	Lost	Simmons, Joseph	\$59,142	\$38,600	\$0		
11/6/2018	City Council, District 4	Lost	Tanios, Joseph	\$24,920	\$0	\$14,441		
11/6/2018	City Council, District 6	Won	Taylor, Loren	\$150,965	\$0	\$18,345		
11/6/2018	City Council, District 6	Lost	Brooks, Desley	\$105,785	\$100	\$0	\$25,363	\$167,016
11/6/2018	City Council, District 6	Lost	Middleton, Natasha	\$77,815	\$0	\$18,345		
11/6/2018	City Council, District 6	Lost	Rodriguez, Marlo	\$25,483	\$15,080	\$0		
11/6/2018	City Council, District 6	Lost	Whitaker, Mya	\$18,176	\$0	\$0	\$435	
11/6/2018	Mayor	Won	Schaaf, Libby	\$501,645	\$0	\$0	\$7,672	
11/6/2018	Mayor	Lost	Brooks, Cat	\$190,048	\$0	\$0	\$2,363	
11/6/2018	Mayor	Lost	Houston, Ken	\$0	\$0	\$0		
11/6/2018	Mayor	Lost	Karamooz, Saied	\$9,549	\$0	\$0		
11/6/2018	Mayor	Lost	Price, Pamela	\$97,996	\$32,500	\$0		
11/6/2018	Mayor	Lost	Tatmon, Marchon	\$20,837	\$5,267	\$0		
11/6/2018	Mayor	Lost	Troupe, Cedric			\$0		
11/6/2018	School Board Director, OUSD District 2	Won	Eng, Aimee	-\$2,915	-\$3,500	\$0		
11/6/2018	School Board Director, OUSD District 4	Won	Yee, Gary	\$27,899	\$5,000	\$0	\$145,995	

Table 1C. Campaign Finance Summary by Candidate, 2018

Election	Office	Outcome	Candidate	Contributions	Loans	Public Financing	IE - Support	IE - Against
11/6/2018	School Board Director, OUSD District 4	Lost	Doutherd, Clarissa	\$55,131	\$0	\$0	\$20,847	
11/6/2018	School Board Director, OUSD District 6	Won	Gonzales, Shanthi	\$40,473	\$0	\$0	\$1,577	
11/6/2018	School Board Director, OUSD District 6	Lost	Wilson, Anthony	\$12,255	\$0	\$0		

SOURCE: City of Oakland Public Ethics Commission Public Portal for Campaign Finance and Lobbyist Disclosure; Data export from e-filed FPPC Form 460 - 496 transactions for most recent filings for years 2013 - 2019. Last accessed 5/21/19.

DRAFT

DRAFT

APPENDIX 4

Table #. Oakland Zip Codes with Percentage of Population and Race/Ethnicity

Zip Code	Percentage Total Population	Hispanic/Latino	White	Black/African American	American Indian and Alaska Native	Asian	Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander	Other Race	Two or More Races
94601	11.6	52.0	9.3	16.7	0.6	16.7	0.7	0.2	3.8
94602	6.9	15.8	38.6	16.1	0.5	21.6	0.3	0.7	6.4
94603	7.7	56.2	4.0	31.2	0.2	5.0	0.8	0.1	2.5
94605	10.1	25.1	16.9	43.8	0.4	6.0	0.2	0.5	7.0
94606	8.8	20.7	19.0	17.3	0.7	37.0	0.9	0.6	3.8
94607	6.1	14.2	20.6	31.9	0.5	28.2	0.5	0.2	3.9
94608	6.9	13.1	38.8	27.0	0.4	14.7	0.6	0.4	5.0
94609	5.1	13.9	44.4	24.3	0.3	9.1	0.3	0.3	7.4
94610	7.2	10.6	50.6	16.9	0.3	14.7	0.2	0.4	6.2
94611	8.8	7.3	64.3	6.8	0.2	14.7	0.6	0.3	5.8
94612	3.7	11.2	29.7	27.4	0.8	26.4	0.2	0.4	3.9
94613	0.2	24.7	33.2	4.9	0.0	30.7	0.9	0.2	5.4
94618	3.8	8.9	69.0	3.6	0.1	11.8	0.4	0.4	5.8
94619	5.6	18.5	30.4	21.3	0.2	22.4	0.4	0.2	6.6
94621	7.7	59.6	3.6	30.6	0.1	2.3	1.1	0.2	2.4

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2013-2017 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates. Table B03002 - HISPANIC OR LATINO ORIGIN BY RACE.

Table #. Oakland Zip Codes with Population by Race/Ethnicity

Zip Code	Total Population	Hispanic/Latino	White	Black/African American	American Indian and Alaska Native	Asian	Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander	Other race	Two or more races
94601	50,763	26,418	4,719	8,495	284	8,457	362	98	1,930
94602	30,098	4,754	11,614	4,833	143	6,508	97	217	1,932
94603	33,952	19,066	1,345	10,593	72	1,701	277	37	861
94605	44,260	11,115	7,493	19,391	173	2,671	87	232	3,098
94606	38,441	7,946	7,303	6,649	274	14,224	347	219	1,479
94607	26,904	3,832	5,532	8,577	128	7,586	138	63	1,048
94608	30,041	3,929	11,658	8,120	120	4,416	168	129	1,501
94609	22,339	3,098	9,920	5,439	66	2,030	60	66	1,660
94610	31,354	3,326	15,865	5,312	98	4,617	67	128	1,941
94611	38,684	2,826	24,871	2,632	61	5,702	241	124	2,227
94612	16,027	1,793	4,754	4,396	136	4,230	28	64	626
94613	864	213	287	42	0	265	8	2	47
94618	16,566	1,470	11,427	602	12	1,963	70	63	959
94619	24,536	4,536	7,452	5,230	50	5,507	96	56	1,609
94621	33,557	20,002	1,214	10,270	41	778	378	83	791

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2013-2017 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates. Table B03002 - HISPANIC OR LATINO ORIGIN BY RACE.

Table #. Oakland Zip Codes with Median Household Income and Percentage of Households by Income Range

Zip Code	Median household income	Percentage of Households by Income Range				
		0 to \$59K	\$60K to \$99K	\$100K to \$149K	\$150K to \$199K	Over \$200K
94601	\$44,666	63.0	19.9	11.3	3.1	2.6
94602	\$78,347	39.0	19.6	15.0	10.3	16.1
94603	\$49,793	58.2	23.3	13.5	2.8	2.2
94605	\$66,211	46.3	21.7	17.9	6.8	7.2
94606	\$48,421	60.0	20.2	11.4	4.9	3.5
94607	\$41,870	59.8	14.4	13.6	6.0	6.2
94608	\$68,352	44.7	18.5	17.0	9.5	10.3
94609	\$73,765	42.0	20.7	18.4	9.9	9.0
94610	\$87,059	33.0	22.8	18.0	10.8	15.4
94611	\$120,601	26.4	16.5	17.2	11.9	28.0
94612	\$42,880	59.7	16.2	9.8	4.4	9.8
94613		100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
94618	\$133,125	20.9	18.4	15.3	13.2	32.3
94619	\$82,994	34.6	23.7	17.1	10.2	14.4
94621	\$34,566	70.4	19.6	7.2	1.8	1.1

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2013-2017 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates. Table B19001 - HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS (IN 2017 INFLATION-ADJUSTED DOLLARS) and B19013 - MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS (IN 2017 INFLATION-ADJUSTED DOLLARS).

DRAFT

APPENDIX 5

<https://www.spur.org/news/2019-04-18/politics-potholes-oakland-fairness-equity-city-budgets-and-public-good>

According to the proposal, OakDOT will look at street condition and traffic safety history when deciding which major streets to pave. For local streets, the department will look at street condition, proximity to schools and equity as the criteria. Specifically, the department divided the city into zones and weighed two factors equally to decide how to dole out the money among them: how many miles of poor roads lie in each zone, and how many households qualify as “underserved” – meaning they are low income, people of color, non-English speakers, elderly or young.

What this means practically is that two kinds of streets will now get more of the funds: those with more vehicle volume and more traffic from heavier vehicles (and thus more wear and tear), and those in neighborhoods populated by underserved people.

Current Pavement Conditions, City of Oakland

A look at OakDOT’s map of street conditions shows that those two types of streets tend to be in the same neighborhoods. To some, spending more on paving those streets is what fairness looks like.

“Personally, I’ll say the consensus among our neighbors is that we’ve been fighting for this for years. We should not have to beg and plead – it should just be automatic,” Preston Turner [told the San Francisco Chronicle](#) after OakDOT presented a preview of the plan at the Eastmont Police Station in East Oakland. Though he welcomed the paving plan and the greater focus on his neighborhood, he said that he wouldn’t actually believe it until he saw the paving starting.

Others weren’t so pleased.

“I feel that monetarily it’s horribly unfair – we’re paying 500 percent more in taxes and only getting 10 percent of the money,” a resident told OakDOT Director Ryan Russo at a presentation of the plan in the North Oakland hills.

This new approach is the result of the city’s attempt to become equitable in how it spends its money. City Council directed OakDOT to include equity in the paving plan, and this intention was also in the department’s 2016 strategic plan, [which SPUR supported](#). Oakland defines equity as fairness grounded in the belief that identity should have “no detrimental effect on the distribution of resources, opportunities and outcomes for our city’s residents,” according to [the OakDOT presentation](#).

Table X. Independent Expenditures for Candidates by Committee

Committee Name	2014	2016	2018	Grand total
FAMILIES AND EDUCATORS FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION, SPONSORED BY GO PUBLIC SCHOOLS ADVOCATES	\$131,553	\$329,345	\$145,995	\$606,893
UNITY PAC, A SPONSORED COMMITTEE OF THE ALAMEDA LABOR COUNCIL, AFL-CIO	\$178,487		\$105,974	\$284,461
EAST BAY WORKING FAMILIES, A COALITION OF UNIONS AND COMMUNITY GROUPS			\$140,825	\$140,825
OAKLANDERS FOR RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP, OPPOSING DESLEY BROOKS FOR OAKLAND CITY COUNCIL 2018			\$135,785	\$135,785
OAKLAND EDUCATION ASSOCIATION POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE		\$59,239	\$19,304	\$78,543
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTER LOCAL 55 POLITICAL ACTION, SPONSORED BY: INT'L ASSOC. OF FIREFIGHTER LOCAL 55	\$16,113		\$55,640	\$71,753
OAKLAND POLICE OFFICER'S ASSOCIATION - POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE	\$18,983	\$52,410		\$71,393
CITIZENS FOR OAKLAND	\$42,250			\$42,250
CITIZENS FOR A UNITED OAKLAND, OPPOSING DESLEY BROOKS FOR CITY COUNCIL 2018			\$31,230	\$31,230
WORKING FAMILIES FOR ABEL GUILLEN FOR OAKLAND CITY COUNCIL 2014, SPONSORED BY THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL 55 PAC AND TEAMSTERS DRIVE COMMITTEE - FEC #C00032979	\$23,523			\$23,523
OAKPAC, OAKLAND METROPOLITAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE	\$11,846			\$11,846
GAY AND LESBIAN VICTORY FUND COMMITTEE TO SUPPORT REBECCA KAPLAN FOR CITY OF OAKLAND MAYOR 2014	\$10,000			\$10,000
OAKLAND RISING COMMITTEE SPONSORED BY MOVEMENT STRATEGY CENTER ACTION FUND			\$9,185	\$9,185
OUTFRONT MEDIA LLC			\$7,672	\$7,672
OAKLAND CIVIL LIBERTIES ALLIANCE	\$5,723			\$5,723
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS LOCAL 595 PAC	\$5,000			\$5,000
CALIFORNIA FEDERATION OF TEACHERS COPE			\$1,543	\$1,543
EAST BAY RENTAL HOUSING ASSOCIATION PAC		\$148		\$148
	\$443,479	\$441,142	\$653,153	\$1,537,774

SOURCE: City of Oakland Public Ethics Commission Public Portal for Campaign Finance and Lobbyist Disclosure; Data export from e-filed FPPC Form 460 - 496 transactions for most recent filings for years 2013 - 2019. Last accessed 5/21/19.