



**Privacy Advisory Commission**  
**November 4, 2021 5:00 PM**  
**Teleconference**  
***Meeting Agenda***

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**Commission Members:** *District 1 Representative: Reem Suleiman, District 2 Representative: Chloe Brown, District 3 Representative: Brian Hofer, Chair, District 4 Representative: Lou Katz, District 5 Representative: Omar De La Cruz, District 6 Representative: Gina Tomlinson, District 7 Representative: Robert Oliver, Council At-Large Representative: Henry Gage III, Vice Chair* **Mayoral Representative:** *Vacant*

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*Pursuant to California Government Code section 54953(e), Oakland Privacy Advisory Commission Board Members/Commissioners, as well as City staff, will participate via phone/video conference, and no physical teleconference locations are required.*

**TO OBSERVE:**

Please click the link below to join the webinar:

<https://us02web.zoom.us/j/85817209915>

Or iPhone one-tap:

US: +16699009128, 85817209915# or +13462487799, 85817209915#

Or Telephone:

Dial (for higher quality, dial a number based on your current location):

US: +1 669 900 9128 or +1 346 248 7799 or +1 253 215 8782 or +1 646 558 8656

Webinar ID: 858 1720 9915

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**TO COMMENT:**

1) To comment by Zoom video conference, you will be prompted to use the “Raise Your Hand” button to request to speak when Public Comment is being taken on the eligible Agenda item. You will then be unmuted, during your turn, and allowed to make public comments. After the allotted time, you will then be re-muted.

2) To comment by phone, you will be prompted to “Raise Your Hand” by pressing “\* 9” to request to speak when Public Comment is being taken on the eligible Agenda Item. You will then be unmuted, during your turn, and allowed to make public comments. After the allotted time, you will then be re-muted.

**ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS:**

1) Instructions on how to join a meeting by video conference is available at: <https://support.zoom.us/hc/en-us/articles/201362193%20-%20Joining-a-Meeting#>

2) Instructions on how to join a meeting by phone are available at: <https://support.zoom.us/hc/en-us/articles/201362663%20Joining-a-meeting-by-phone>

3) Instructions on how to “Raise Your Hand” is available at: <https://support.zoom.us/hc/en-us/articles/205566129-Raising-your-hand-In-a-webinar>

1. Call to Order, determination of quorum
2. Adopt a Renewal Resolution regarding AB 361 establishing certain findings justifying the ongoing need for virtual meetings
3. Review and approval of the draft October Special Meeting 1 and Meeting 2 Minutes
4. Surveillance Equipment Ordinance – DOT – Dockless Mobility Data Sharing
  - a. Review and take possible action on Annual Reports for 2020, 2021
5. Federal Task Force Transparency Ordinance – OPD – Drug Enforcement Agency MOU
  - a. Review and take possible action on proposed memorandum of understanding
6. Surveillance Equipment Ordinance – OPD – Automated License Plate Readers
  - a. Review and take possible action on Annual Reports for 2019, 2020
  - b. Review and take possible action on Impact Report and proposed Use Policy

# OAKLAND PRIVACY ADVISORY COMMISSION

## RESOLUTION NO. 2

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**ADOPT A RESOLUTION DETERMINING THAT CONDUCTING IN-PERSON MEETINGS OF THE PRIVACY ADVISORY COMMISSION AND ITS COMMITTEES WOULD PRESENT IMMINENT RISKS TO ATTENDEES' HEALTH, AND ELECTING TO CONTINUE CONDUCTING MEETINGS USING TELECONFERENCING IN ACCORDANCE WITH CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 54953(e), A PROVISION OF AB-361.**

**WHEREAS**, on March 4, 2020, Governor Gavin Newsom declared a state of emergency related to COVID-19, pursuant to Government Code Section 8625, and such declaration has not been lifted or rescinded. See <https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/3.4.20-Coronavirus-SOE-Proclamation.pdf>; and

**WHEREAS**, on March 9, 2020, the City Administrator in their capacity as the Director of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), issued a proclamation of local emergency due to the spread of COVID-19 in Oakland, and on March 12, 2020, the City Council passed Resolution No. 88075 C.M.S. ratifying the proclamation of local emergency pursuant to Oakland Municipal Code (O.M.C.) section 8.50.050(C); and

**WHEREAS**, City Council Resolution No. 88075 remains in full force and effect to date; and

**WHEREAS**, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) recommends physical distancing of at least six (6) feet whenever possible, avoiding crowds, and avoiding spaces that do not offer fresh air from the outdoors, particularly for people who are not fully vaccinated or who are at higher risk of getting very sick from COVID-19. See <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/prevention.html>; and

**WHEREAS**, the CDC recommends that people who live with unvaccinated people avoid activities that make physical distancing hard. See <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/your-health/about-covid-19/caring-for-children/families.html>; and

**WHEREAS**, the CDC recommends that older adults limit in-person interactions as much as possible, particularly when indoors. See <https://www.cdc.gov/aging/covid19/covid19-older-adults.html>; and

**WHEREAS**, the CDC, the California Department of Public Health, and the Alameda County Public Health Department all recommend that people experiencing COVID-19

symptoms stay home. See <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/if-you-are-sick/steps-when-sick.html>; and

**WHEREAS**, persons without symptoms may be able to spread the COVID-19 virus. See <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/prevention.html>; and

**WHEREAS**, fully vaccinated persons who become infected with the COVID-19 Delta variant can spread the virus to others. See <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/fully-vaccinated.html>; and

**WHEREAS**, the City's public-meeting facilities are indoor facilities that do not ensure circulation of fresh / outdoor air, particularly during periods of cold and/or rainy weather, and were not designed to ensure that attendees can remain six (6) feet apart; and

**WHEREAS**, holding in-person meetings would encourage community members to come to City facilities to participate in local government, and some of them would be at high risk of getting very sick from COVID-19 and/or would live with someone who is at high risk; and

**WHEREAS**, in-person meetings would tempt community members who are experiencing COVID-19 symptoms to leave their homes in order to come to City facilities and participate in local government; and

**WHEREAS**, attendees would use ride-share services and/or public transit to travel to in-person meetings, thereby putting them in close and prolonged contact with additional people outside of their households; and

**WHEREAS**, on October 7, 2021, the Privacy Advisory Commission adopted a resolution determining that conducting in-person meetings would present imminent risks to attendees' health, and electing to continue conducting meetings using teleconferencing in accordance with California Government Code Section 54953(e), a provision of AB-361; now therefore be it:

**RESOLVED:** that the Privacy Advisory Commission finds and determines that the foregoing recitals are true and correct and hereby adopts and incorporates them into this resolution; and be it

**FURTHER RESOLVED:** that, based on these determinations and consistent with federal, state and local health guidance, the Privacy Advisory Commission renews its determination that conducting in-person meetings would pose imminent risks to the health of attendees; and be it

**FURTHER RESOLVED:** that the Privacy Advisory Commission firmly believes that the community's health and safety and the community's right to participate in local government, are both critically important, and is committed to balancing the two by continuing to use teleconferencing to conduct public meetings, in accordance with California Government Code Section 54953(e), a provision of AB-361; and be it

**FURTHER RESOLVED:** that the Privacy Advisory Commission will renew these (or similar) findings at least every thirty (30) days in accordance with California Government Code section 54953(e) until the state of emergency related to COVID-19 has been lifted, or the Privacy Advisory Commission finds that in-person meetings no longer pose imminent risks to the health of attendees, whichever occurs first.



**Privacy Advisory Commission**  
**October 7, 2021 5:05 PM**  
**Oakland City Hall**  
**Hearing Room 1**  
**1 Frank H. Ogawa Plaza, 1st Floor**  
***Special Meeting 1 Minutes***

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***Commission Members: District 1 Representative: Reem Suleiman, District 2 Representative: Chloe Brown, District 3 Representative: Brian Hofer, Chair, District 4 Representative: Lou Katz, District 5 Representative: Omar De La Cruz, District 6 Representative: Gina Tomlinson, District 7 Representative: Robert Oliver, Council At-Large Representative: Henry Gage III, Vice Chair Mayoral Representative: Vacant***

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*Pursuant to California Government Code section 54953(e), Oakland Privacy Advisory Commission Board Members/Commissioners, as well as City staff, will participate via phone/video conference, and no physical teleconference locations are required.*

1. Call to Order, determination of quorum

*Members Present: Hofer, Gage, Katz, De La Cruz, Brown, Suleiman, Tomlinson*

2. Review and take possible action on a Resolution (AB 361) establishing certain findings justifying the ongoing need for virtual meetings

*The Board voted unanimously to pass this resolution.*

3. Adjournment

*The meeting adjourned at 5:10.*



**Privacy Advisory Commission**  
**October 7, 2021 5:10 PM**  
**Oakland City Hall**  
**Hearing Room 1**  
**1 Frank H. Ogawa Plaza, 1st Floor**  
***Special Meeting 2 Minutes***

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**Commission Members:** *District 1 Representative: Reem Suleiman, District 2 Representative: Chloe Brown, District 3 Representative: Brian Hofer, Chair, District 4 Representative: Lou Katz, District 5 Representative: Omar De La Cruz, District 6 Representative: Gina Tomlinson, District 7 Representative: Robert Oliver, Council At-Large Representative: Henry Gage III, Vice Chair* **Mayoral Representative: Vacant**

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*Pursuant to California Government Code section 54953(e), Oakland Privacy Advisory Commission Board Members/Commissioners, as well as City staff, will participate via phone/video conference, and no physical teleconference locations are required.*

1. Call to Order, determination of quorum

*All members were present.*

2. Review and approval of the draft September meeting minutes

*The September Meeting Minutes were approved unanimously.*

3. Open Forum

*\*although accidentally omitted from the agenda, there was one Open Forum Speaker:*

*Assata Olugbala raise concern about the privately funded Chinatown Camera project that had been considered by the PAC but later withdrawn. She noted concern that no one is regulating the use of those cameras or the management of the data.*

4. Surveillance Equipment Ordinance – OPD – Automated License Plate Readers

Chairperson Hofer opened up noting the sequencing is off; normally an annual report would be presented and give insight to guide possible changes to a Use Policy. However, the reports are being presented along

with a Use Policy. He suggested starting with the annual reports because they do provide some insights. Since the reports are only from 2019 and 2020, he asked if OPD was asserting that it could not provide reports and data from further back in time.

Captain Figueroa stated that these reports represent what data OPD was able to acquire, he hopes that a technology upgrade would allow OPD to provide audits in the future.

DC Lindsey confirmed that the data for 2016, 2017, and 2018 has been purged as per the practice of deleting data after 2 years. She also stated that the department is not currently seeking an upgraded system.

Member Oliver asked several questions about purged data, and it was explained that during a systems upgrade in December, the information was purged in accordance with the 720 day mark. There is no data prior to that.

Member De La Cruz asked about the scan versus hit data in both annual reports, he asked about a more detailed breakdown of when scans and hits actually lead to an arrest or conviction. Captain Figueroa stated there is not a way to capture that in the current system. Chair Hofer asked about the third party request data and Captain Figueroa explained that those requests must be made via email to a Deputy Chief and those are retained.

In regard to the FBI team that was part of a task force, those agents had their own user account and therefore no requests for data from them were made via email. However, OPD could audit the system for when those users made a query. Chair Hofer emphasized that the Safe Streets MOU does not explicitly grant access to the FBI for ALPR data.

Member Brown noted that in 2019 the report states over 100 times that a hit was useful in a case where a vehicle was on a hot list but she points out from the two tables that the hit rate is .1 percent. This means the department is gathering a huge amount of data from completely innocent persons.

The department displayed its new online tracking system for request for data from outside agencies. This will make compliance much easier in future annual reports.

Chair Hofer displayed the lists of cases referred to in the reports and noted there is no evidence that retention beyond 48 hours is useful to solving crimes. He also provided data from the City of Richmond, CA where they have not had ALPR for two years and the crime rate is actually lower in those two years than in the prior years with ALPR.

In regard to the Use Policy, Chair Hofer noted the “right to know, need to know” language needs to be inserted and needs to transfer to requests from other jurisdictions as well.



DC Lindsey spoke about her concern that the department doesn't have clear direction from the PAC in how to move forward providing the beneficial data sets for this technology (or others). She noted her team is going back and trying to put together the right data and acknowledged the impediment the department has in capturing old data.

She went on to describe how investigators use this data and what they may look for in a case—citing a recent homicide in which a fatal car racing incident carried on for 30 city blocks and the department is searching for a license plate to ID the vehicle. She notes that the department can do a better job closing the loop to show, in the reports, how this data is useful in solving crimes.

DC Lindsey also explained the staffing shortage slows the department's ability to investigate serious crimes, noting the force is at only 685 officers currently. Therefore, they feel retaining data longer is important to preserve possible evidence in those cases.

Member Katz cited the cost of the system and its efficacy as well—with 8 million scans in one year equating to .1% hit rate and even fewer actual cases solved. Member Sulieman raised the same concern, retaining millions of pieces of data on people has such potential to cause harm. She stated there needs to be some rationale for retaining this data, suggesting that 99.99% of the data should be purged within a week and only a small fraction that is connected to a case needs to be retained.

Member Gage raised questions as to what guidelines dictate retention as there are some inconsistencies in the documents. There are references to two-year rate and one-year rates of retention being within the limits of the government code. Captain Figueroa suggested the department would need to seek legal counsel as to whether the retention period can go below one year. Chair Hofer challenged this and stated that the government code allows local bodies to set whatever retention period they want. He referenced NCRIC having a one-year retention period, and cited several other local jurisdictions have a thirty-day retention period. Member Gage agreed with the Chair's position based on his read of the government code.

Member Oliver stated his agreement with DC Lindsey that the department is short staffed and there is a significant crime problem, but he also believes the department's behavior and practices have damaged its relationship with the community and that break in trust hinders investigations more so than staffing or technology. He also was critical of the department for agreeing to providing data in the original policy that it could not provide in the first place.

Member Brown reiterated that the data shows the ALPR as a tool is very ineffective. In weighing privacy concerns and the cost of the technology, there need to be reasonable tradeoffs if the PAC were to recommend allowing its use. The retention period is one of those important items where OPD needs to come up with a data-supported retention period. Second, the audit data is insufficient to determine if any of the data is being misused.

DC Lindsey laid out an example of how the investigators might use data in a case long after it may have been gathered. The department may get a lead to search for a “green Honda” being on 55<sup>th</sup> Avenue months after the data was captured. She hopes that a new system would allow for the department to show its effective use of this data in the future to justify the cost and prove efficacy. There was further discussion about investigatory processes and how language in the reporting could be tightened up to display the use of ALPR.

Chair Hofer noted the OakDOT ALPR policy holds data for only 24 hours unless there is a reason to hold it. He suggests the department propose a policy like that. He asked the PAC if any member had a problem with the actual real-time scanning (without retention). Member Oliver noted it is a force multiplier for the department built at what cost. Member De La Cruz also stated he didn’t have a philosophical problem with the actual scan but is really concerned about retention.

Chair Hofer screen shared a yet-to-be published analysis of Bay Area ALPR data that shows no increase in investigative leads or an increase in recovered stolen vehicles across the Bay Area. The study is under peer review currently but so far has shown to be accurate. He went on to say if OPD could show that ALPR scans solve a measurable number of crimes especially homicides, then the PAC and City Council would likely support mass-surveillance in the name of public safety but .0001 rate of success does not support that. He advised that OPD needs to make decisions to use technology needs to be based on data.

Chair Hofer suggested another ad hoc meeting could take place as a next step.

There was one public speaker on the item: Assata Olugbala stated that she does not think OPD’s work (on Cease Fire) is data driven, she went on to cite the stop data and the racial disparities in that data set. She stated that only African Americans are being profiled and it’s not because of their license plates, it’s because of the color of their skin.

The item was continued to next month.

The meeting adjourned at 7:08.



# AGENDA REPORT

**TO:** Edward D. Reiskin  
City Administrator

**FROM:** LeRonne L. Armstrong  
Chief of Police

**SUBJECT:** OPD DEA Task Force MOU

**DATE:** October 28, 2021

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City Administrator  
Approval

Date

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## **RECOMMENDATION**

**Staff Recommends That The City Council Adopt A Resolution Authorizing The City Administrator Or Designee To Enter Into A Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) With The United States Department Of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) To Form The Oakland Police Department (OPD) DEA Task Force Group (Task Force) To Collaborate On Information Sharing And Focused Operations To Disrupt Illegal Drug Activity Occurring In The City Of Oakland, From October 1, 2021 Through September 30, 2022.**

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

This resolution, if approved by the City Council, will authorize OPD participation in the OPD DEA Task Force. The Task Force focuses on investigations related to trafficking of illegal drugs in Oakland. Through the MOU, the DEA will provide one or more special agents to the Task Force, and OPD will provide one officer. The DEA will also provide funding for office space, supplies, travel funds, equipment, and training, subject to funding availability.

## **BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY**

There is an established nexus between the use, manufacture, and sale of illegal narcotics and violent crime in Oakland. The mission of the DEA is to “enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States and bring to the criminal and civil justice system of the United States, or any other competent jurisdiction, those organizations and principal members of organizations, involved in the growing, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined for illicit traffic in the United States; and to recommend and support non-enforcement programs aimed at reducing the availability of illicit controlled substances on the domestic and international markets.

The DEA State and Local Task Force combines federal leverage and the specialists available to the DEA with state and local officers’ investigative talents and detailed knowledge of their jurisdiction to lead drug law enforcement investigations. The DEA shares resources with state and local officers, thereby increasing the investigative possibilities available to all.

DEA Task Forces also allow state and local police agencies to receive a share of forfeited drug proceeds; participation in DEA Task Forces also allows the DEA to pay for the overtime and investigative expenses of participating police agencies.

### ***Role of Oakland Privacy Advisory Commission with Federal Agreements***

Ordinance No. 13457 C.M.S. “Federal Transparency Ordinance,” passed June 29, 2017, requires that for MOUs with federal agencies, OPD submit a “proposed MOU and any orders, policies, and procedures relevant to the subject matter of the MOU for discussion and public comment at an open meeting of the Privacy Advisory Commission” (PAC) before execution of said agreement.

OPD personnel brought the OPD DEA MOU to the PAC in 2018; the PAC voted at their November 1, 2018 meeting to recommend a DEA-OPD MOU, but with additional language compelling DEA agents as well as OPD officers to comply with five additional policies (see below). The report, “OPD DEA Task Force MOU” presented to the Public Safety Committee on December 4, 2018, explained that staff presented a draft MOU to the PAC in 2018; the PAC voted at their November 1, 2018 meeting to only recommend a DEA-OPD MOU that included additional language requiring DEA agents participating in the MOU to comply with City of Oakland and State of California policies. The PAC requested that the MOU contain language which would compel DEA agents to also comply with following policies:

- California Senate Bill (SB) SB 54 (California Values Act)<sup>1</sup>
- Senate Bill (SB) 31 (California Religious Freedom Act: state agencies: disclosure of religious affiliation information)<sup>2</sup>; and
- The City’s pending Sanctuary City Ordinance<sup>3</sup>.
- OPD Department General Order (DGO) M-17 (establishes OPD procedures governing the function of the Intelligence Division)<sup>4</sup>; and
- DGO M-19 Sections III and VIII (A, C) (OPD policy on prohibitions regarding racial profiling and other bias-based policing)<sup>5</sup>.

The staff report to the December 4, 2018 Public Safety Committee explained that the OPD DEA Taskforce “provides critical investigative support greatly needed by OPD - and therefore recommends that the City Council approve the resolution authorizing the MOU in its current form - despite the different recommendation from the PAC” – as staff explained that the DEA will not agree to include additional language that compels DEA officers to OPD standards and procedures.

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<sup>1</sup> California Values Act (Cal. Gov. Code §7284 et seq.) curtails use of state and local resources from engaging in deportations and create safe spaces, including at schools, health facilities, and courthouses - [https://leginfo.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill\\_id=201720180SB54](https://leginfo.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB54)

<sup>2</sup> SB 31 - California Religious Freedom Act (Cal. Gov. Code §8310.3 et seq.) prohibit a state or local agency or a public employee acting under color of law from providing or disclosing to the federal government personal information regarding a person’s religious beliefs, practices, or affiliation, as specified, when the information is sought for compiling a database of individuals based on religious belief, practice, or affiliation, national origin, or ethnicity for law enforcement or immigration purposes - [https://leginfo.ca.gov/faces/biHTextClient.xhtml?bill\\_id=201720180SB31](https://leginfo.ca.gov/faces/biHTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB31)

<sup>3</sup> <https://oakland.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3701155&GUID=8153C1B0-B9FC-4B29-BDDE-DF604DEDAEAD&Options=&Search=>

<sup>4</sup> <http://www2.oaklandnet.com/oakca1/groups/police/documents/webcontent/oak063011>

<sup>5</sup> <http://www2.oaklandnet.com/oakca1/groups/police/documents/webcontent/oak032293.pdf>

The report also explained that drug trafficking and violent crime investigations are better achieved through law enforcement collaboration and information sharing. The City Council then on January 7, 2019 voted to adopt Resolution No 87475 C.M.S. which authorized the OPD-DEA MOU Taskforce in alignment with the staff recommendation.

### ***MOU Expiration Date***

The PAC, in their vote to recommend the OPD-DEA Taskforce MOU, voted that only the exact MOU presented to the PAC would be recommended – and that the Resolution for the City Council to authorize the MOU should not include language to allow for MOU extensions. Therefore, Resolution No 87475 C.M.S. did not include customary language allowing for the extension of the agreement.

### **ANALYSIS AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES**

Some MOUs for law enforcement agreements have language that states that the agreement shall continue unless one party communicates in writing the intention to end the agreement<sup>6</sup>. Some agreements are written with specific termination dates. The MOU for the DEA Taskforce has language to expire after one year. Therefore, the OPD-DEA Taskforce authorized through Resolution No 87475 C.M.S expired September 30, 2019. OPD personnel inadvertently overlooked this expiration date during the unprecedented Covid-19 pandemic but prepared to again bring the MOU for PAC and Council review once this expiration date was known.

OPD has presented annual reports of DEA Taskforce activity to the PAC as well as the City Council for the 2019 and 2020 calendar years, in accordance with Ordinance No. 13457 C.M.S. The 2020 DEA Annual Report (see **Attachment A**) provides data regarding taskforce cases.

The MOU authorizing OPD involvement with the DEA Task Force (**Attachment B**), as was the case with the 2018 MOU, stipulates that OPD will assign one OPD sworn officer to collaborate with DEA Task Force; the DEA will provide and fund eight Special Agents to be assigned to the Task Force, and subject to funding availability, also provide funding for office space, supplies, travel funds, equipment, and training.

Staff recommend that the City Council adopt a resolution to authorize the OPD-DEA Taskforce with the option to extend the MOU so that staff will not be required to bring a new resolution to the City Council for MOU authorization each year. Ordinance No. 13457 C.M.S. requires that OPD bring an annual report to the PAC and City Council each year of Taskforce activity. Staff believe, therefore, that the City Council will continue to have direct oversight of Taskforce activity.

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<sup>6</sup> The MOUs between OPD and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the United States Marshals Service (USM) only expire if one party communicates their intention to end the agreement.

### **PUBLIC OUTREACH / INTEREST**

No outreach was deemed necessary for this report beyond the standard City Council agenda noticing procedures.

### **COORDINATION**

OPD consulted with the budget bureau and the Office of the City Attorney in the development of this report and accompanying resolution.

### **FISCAL IMPACT**

There are no personnel or other costs to OPD associated with membership in the ACNTF; OPD will designate one or more officers already employed through OPD's operating budget. Any distributions of forfeited assets from ACNTF to OPD shall be deposited into Fund 2160, Org 102310, Account 46319, Project TBD, and Program PS03.

### **SUSTAINABLE OPPORTUNITIES**

***Economic:*** There are no economic opportunities associated with this report.

***Environmental:*** There are no environmental opportunities associated with this report.

***Race and Social Equity:*** OPD's collaboration with the ACNTF helps OPD to target not only illegal drug and narcotics trafficking but violent crime connected to illegal drug trafficking and associated networks through investigation via intel led policing. All residents and visitors benefit from these efforts to investigate and prosecute individuals involved in this illegal and dangerous activity.

**ACTION REQUESTED OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE**

Staff Recommends That The City Council Adopt A Resolution Authorizing The City Administrator Or Designee To Enter Into A Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) With The United States Department Of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) To Form The Oakland Police Department (OPD) DEA Task Force Group (Task Force) To Collaborate On Information Sharing And Focused Operations To Disrupt Illegal Drug Activity Occurring In The City Of Oakland, From October 1, 2021 Through September 30, 2022.

For questions regarding this report, please contact Alexis Nash, Sergeant, Criminal Investigation Division - General Crimes at [anash@oaklandca.gov](mailto:anash@oaklandca.gov).

Respectfully submitted,

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LeRonne L. Armstrong  
Chief of Police  
Oakland Police Department

Reviewed by:  
Drennon Lindsey, Deputy Chief  
OPD, Bureau of Investigations

Paul Figueroa, Captain of Police  
OPD, Criminal Investigations Division

Alexis Nash, Sergeant  
OPD, Criminal Investigations Division

Prepared by:  
Bruce Stoffmacher, Legislation and Privacy Manager  
OPD, BOS, Research and Planning

**Attachments (2)**

**A:** 2020 DEA Annual Report

**B:** Alameda OPD Narcotics Taskforce MOU







## OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT

### Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) Task Force

### 2020 Annual Report

#### OPD DEA Taskforce

The DEA State and Local Task Force combines federal leverage and the specialists available to the DEA with state and local officers' investigative talents and detailed knowledge of their jurisdiction to lead drug law enforcement investigations. The DEA shares resources with state and local officers, thereby increasing the investigative possibilities available to all. Participation in DEA Task Forces also allows the DEA to pay for the overtime and investigative expenses of participating police agencies.

#### Staffing

1. **Number of full and part time Oakland Police Department (OPD officers assigned to DEA Task Force:** One full-time officer
2. **Number of hours worked as DEA Task Force Officer:** Regular 40 hours per week.
3. **Funding source for DEA Task Force Officer salary:** OPD Budget

#### Other Resources Provided

1. **Communication equipment:** OPD handheld radio, cellular phone
2. **Surveillance equipment:** None.
3. **Clerical/administrative staff hours:** None
4. **Funding sources for all the above:** OPD Budget

#### Cases

1. **Number of cases DEA Task Force Officer was assigned to:** 19 – case detail breakdown:

The goal of the Taskforce is to conduct targeted investigations into specific drug trafficking organizations (DTO) and the individuals within the DTOs who are engaged in high level narcotics distribution and trafficking. By conducting these longer federal investigations, the Taskforce is able to ensure entire DTO's are dismantled. Confronting and weakening DTOs closes off specific avenues in which drugs flow into the community. The Taskforce focuses primarily on heroin, methamphetamine, fentanyl, and cocaine trafficking; the Taskforce does not conduct any marijuana investigations.

Below is a summary of the cases worked on in 2020:

- An investigation targeting cartel members who were transporting methamphetamine from Southern California to Oakland, CA. Multiple suspects were arrested within this investigation.
- A multi-state poly Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) operating out of Oakland. Multiple suspects were arrested and charged.
- Multi-state cocaine traffickers, who would travel to the bay area and purchase large quantities of cocaine. Multiple suspects were arrested and charged in this case.
- An investigation targeting street level narcotics dealers, operating in Oakland. This investigation is ongoing.
- A methamphetamine dealer operating within the bay area. The suspects was arrested charged during this investigation.
- A methamphetamine and fentanyl dealer operating within the Bay Area. This investigation is ongoing.
- A fentanyl dealer operating between San Francisco and Oakland, who sold large amounts of pure fentanyl. This investigation is ongoing.
- A street level buy bust operation targeting a heroin dealer operating within the city of Oakland. Multiple suspect was arrested on state charges.
- A poly Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) involved with violent gang activities within the bay area. Numerous suspects were arrested and charged federally.
- An investigation targeting violent gang members engaged in street level narcotics. This investigation is ongoing.
- A methamphetamine and cocaine trafficker operating throughout the bay area. Multiple suspects were arrested and charged federally.
- A large fentanyl and methamphetamine Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) operating within Oakland and San Francisco. Numerous suspects were arrested and charged federally.
- A poly Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) operating within Oakland and San Jose. Multiple suspects were arrested and charged federally.
- A poly Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) operating within the bay area and San Joaquin County. This investigation is ongoing.
- An investigation targeting violent gang members, selling street level narcotics, operating within the bay area. Multiple suspects were arrested during this investigation.
- An investigation targeting gang members distributing large quantities of methamphetamine, and heroin. Multiple suspects were arrested and charged federally.
- An investigation targeting a street level narcotics dealer who was armed with a firearm, operating in Oakland. The suspects was arrested and charged.
- An investigation targeting a fentanyl dealer operating in Oakland. This investigation is ongoing.

- An investigation targeting a multi-state poly Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO), operating primarily out of Oakland. Numerous suspects were arrested and charged federally.
- 2. **Number of “duty to warn” cases:** None
- 3. **General types of cases:** Narcotics investigations and money laundering investigations
- 4. **Number of times the DEA asked OPD to perform/OPD declined to perform:** None
  - a. **Reason for OPD declination (e.g. insufficient resources, local/state law):** N/A

### Operations

1. **Number of times use of undercover officers were approved:** None
2. **Number of instances where OPD Task Force officer managed informants:** None
3. **Number of cases involving informants that DEA Task Force Officer worked on:** All
4. **Number of requests from outside agencies (e.g. ICE) for records or data of OPD:** None
  - a. **Number of such requests that were denied:** N/A
  - b. **Reason for denial:** N/A
5. **Whether DEA Task Force Officer was involved in any cases where USPER (U.S. person status) information was collected:** No

### Training and Compliance

1. **Description of training given to DEA Task Force Officer by OPD to ensure compliance with Oakland and California law:** The OPD officer assigned to the DEA Task Force follows all OPD policies and has received several police trainings, including but not limited to: continual professional training, Procedural Justice Training and annual firearms training. The officer has also reviewed all provisions of the DEA Task Force MOU.
2. **Date of last training update, and last training audit:** January, 2020
3. **Frequency with which DEA Task Force Officer briefs OPD supervisor on cases:** Weekly

### Actual and Potential Violations of Local/State Law

1. **Number of actual violations:** OPD will provide information on violations that are subject to release under California’s Public Records Act (the “PRA”), Government Code section 6254. Release of any of violations not covered by the PRA, however, would violate California law (832.7), as there is only one officer assigned to this task force.
2. **Number of potential violations:** Same answer as above.
3. **Actions taken to address actual or potential violations:** The officer follows OPD policies, except where DEA policies are more restrictive. OPD leadership consults with the Office of the City Attorney to ensure that all policies conform with State and Federal laws.

- 4. Recommendations by OPD to address prevention of future violations:** OPD will continue to consult with the Office of the City Attorney and the Privacy Advisory Commission to ensure that personnel continue to follow federal, state, and local laws and policies.

**Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) and Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC)**

- 1. Whether OPD Task Force Officer submits SARs to NCRIC:** No.
- 2. Whether OPD officer receives SAR information:** No.

**Command Structure for OPD Task Force Officer**

- 1. Reports to whom at DEA?** Resident Agent in Charge (RAC) James Rider
- 2. Reports to whom at OPD?** Sergeant Valle and Lieutenant Nowak

# Memorandum




<p>Subject</p> <p>Fiscal Year 2022 - Program Funded State and Local Task Force Officer Agreement for the San Francisco Field Division and the Oakland Police Department (CA0010900) (DFN: 601-05)</p>	<p>Date</p> <p>AUG 03 2021</p>
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To

Richard M. Bachour  
Section Chief  
ODS

From

Wade R. Shannon   
Special Agent in Charge  
San Francisco Field Division

The San Francisco Field Division is submitting a new Program-Funded State and Local Task Force Agreement for fiscal year 2022 for the Oakland Police Department (CA0010900). The agreement contains all original signatures. The agreement has been executed in accordance with the guidelines issued by DEA ODS.

**One Program-Funded Task Force Officer (TFO)** – Jason Edward Amarant (S-19-0278) has been deputized and is currently assigned to **Task Force Group (Oakland)**.

Please contact Special Projects Officer Leroy Kemp at (571) 387-3745 if there are any questions regarding this agreement.

Attach: Letter of Agreement (Original and Signed by Parent Agency Head and SAC)  
OJP-4061 (Original and Signed by Parent Agency Head)  
DEA-19 (October 1, 2021 to September 30, 2022) for Fiscal Sub-Unit

**FISCAL YEAR 2022**  
**PROGRAM-FUNDED STATE AND LOCAL TASK FORCE AGREEMENT BETWEEN**  
**OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT (CA0010900) AND**  
**DEA TASK FORCE GROUP (OAKLAND)**

This agreement is made this 1<sup>st</sup> day of October 2021, between the United States Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration (hereinafter "DEA"), and the Oakland Police Department - ORI# CA0010900 (hereinafter "OPD"). The DEA is authorized to enter into this cooperative agreement concerning the use and abuse of controlled substances under the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 873.

WHEREAS there is evidence that trafficking in narcotics and dangerous drugs exists in the Greater East Bay Area of California and that such illegal activity has a substantial and detrimental effect on the health and general welfare of the people of Alameda, Contra Costa, and Solano Counties, the parties hereto agree to the following:

1. The Task Force Group (Oakland) will perform the activities and duties described below:
  - a. disrupt the illicit drug traffic in the Oakland area by immobilizing targeted violators and trafficking organizations;
  - b. gather and report intelligence data relating to trafficking in narcotics and dangerous drugs; and
  - c. conduct undercover operations where appropriate and engage in other traditional methods of investigation in order that the Task Force's activities will result in effective prosecution before the courts of the United States and the State of California.
2. To accomplish the objectives of the Task Force Group (Oakland), the Oakland Police Department agrees to detail one (1) experienced officers to the Task Force Group (Oakland) for a period of not less than two years. During this period of assignment, the one (1) Oakland Police Department officer will be under the direct supervision and control of DEA supervisory personnel assigned to the Task Force Group (Oakland).
3. The one (1) Oakland Police Department officer assigned to the Task Force Group (Oakland) shall adhere to DEA policies and procedures. Failure to adhere to DEA policies and procedures shall be grounds for dismissal from the Task Force Group (Oakland).
4. The one (1) Oakland Police Department officer assigned to the Task Force Group (Oakland) shall be deputized as a Task Force Officer of DEA pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Section 878.

5. To accomplish the objectives of the Task Force Group (Oakland), DEA will assign eight (8) Special Agents to the Task Force Group (Oakland). DEA will also, subject to the availability of annually appropriated funds or any continuing resolution thereof, provide necessary funds and equipment to support the activities of the DEA Special Agent and Oakland Police Department officer assigned to the Task Force Group (Oakland). This support will include: office space, office supplies, travel funds, funds for the purchase of evidence and information, investigative equipment, training, and other support items.
6. During the period of assignment to the DEA Task Force Group (Oakland), the Oakland Police Department will remain responsible for establishing the salary and benefits, including overtime, of the officers assigned to the Task Force, and for making all payments due them. DEA will, subject to availability of funds, reimburse the Oakland Police Department for overtime payment. Annual overtime for each state or local law enforcement officer is capped at the equivalent of 25% of a GS-12, Step 1, of the general pay scale for the Rest of United States. Reimbursement for all types of qualified expenses shall be contingent upon availability of funds and the submission of a proper request for reimbursement which shall be submitted **monthly or quarterly** on a fiscal year basis, and which provides the names of the investigators who incurred overtime for DEA during the invoiced period, the number of overtime hours incurred, the hourly regular and overtime rates in effect for each investigator, and the total cost for the invoiced period. Invoices must be submitted at least quarterly within 10 business days of the end of the invoiced period. **Note: Task Force Officer's overtime "shall not include any costs for benefits, such as retirement, FICA, and other expenses."**
7. In no event will the Oakland Police Department charge any indirect cost rate to DEA for the administration or implementation of this agreement.
8. The Oakland Police Department shall maintain on a current basis complete and accurate records and accounts of all obligations and expenditures of funds under this agreement in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and instructions provided by DEA to facilitate on-site inspection and auditing of such records and accounts.
9. The Oakland Police Department shall permit and have readily available for examination and auditing by DEA, the United States Department of Justice, the Comptroller General of the United States, and any of their duly authorized agents and representatives, any and all records, documents, accounts, invoices, receipts or expenditures relating to this agreement. The Oakland Police Department shall maintain all such reports and records until all litigation, claim, audits and examinations are completed and resolved, or for a period of six (6) years after termination of this agreement, whichever is later.
10. The Oakland Police Department shall comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, as amended, and all requirements imposed by or pursuant to the regulations of the United States Department of Justice implementing those laws, 28 C.F.R. Part 42, Subparts C, F, G, H and I.

11. The Oakland Police Department agrees that an authorized officer or employee will execute and return to DEA the attached OJP Form 4061/6, Certification Regarding Lobbying; Debarment, Suspension and Other Responsibility Matters; and Drug-Free Workplace Requirements. The Oakland Police Department acknowledges that this agreement will not take effect and no Federal funds will be awarded to the Oakland Police Department by DEA until the completed certification is received.
  
12. When issuing statements, press releases, requests for proposals, bid solicitations, and other documents describing projects or programs funded in whole in part with Federal money, the Oakland Police Department shall clearly state (1) the percentage of the total cost of the program or project which will be financed with Federal money and (2) the dollar amount of Federal funds for the project or program.
  
13. The term of this agreement shall be effective from the date in paragraph number one until September 30, 2022. This agreement may be terminated by either party on thirty days' advance written notice. Billing for all outstanding obligations must be received by DEA within 90 days of the date of termination of this agreement. DEA will be responsible only for obligations incurred by Oakland Police Department during the term of this agreement.

For the Drug Enforcement Administration:

Wade R. Shannon 

Date: 8-3-21

Name

Special Agent in Charge (SAC)

Title

For the Oakland Police Department (CA0010900)

\_\_\_\_\_  
Name

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
Title





**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS  
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER**

**CERTIFICATIONS REGARDING LOBBYING; DEBARMENT, SUSPENSION AND  
OTHER RESPONSIBILITY MATTERS; AND DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE REQUIREMENTS**

Applicants should refer to the regulations cited below to determine the certification to which they are required to attest. Applicants should also review the instructions for certification included in the regulations before completing this form. Signature of this form provides for compliance with certification requirements under 28 CFR Part 69, "New Restrictions on Lobbying" and 28 CFR Part 67, "Government-wide Department and Suspension (Nonprocurement) and Government-wide Requirements for Drug-Free Workplace (Grants)." The certifications shall be treated as a material representation of fact upon reliance will be placed when the Department of Justice determines to award the covered transaction, grant, or cooperative agreement.

**1. LOBBYING**

As required by Section 1352, Title 31 of the U.S. Code, and implemented at 28 CFR Part 69, for persons entering into a grant or cooperative agreement over \$100,000, as defined at 28 CFR Part 69, the applicant certifies that:

(a) No Federal appropriated funds have been paid or will be paid, by or on behalf of the undersigned, to any person for influencing or attempting to influence an officer or employee of any agency, a Member of Congress, an officer or employee of Congress, or an employee of a Member of Congress in connection with the making of any Federal grant, the entering into of any cooperative agreement, and extension, continuation, renewal, amendment, or modification of any Federal grant or cooperative agreement;

(b) If any funds other than Federal appropriated funds have been paid or will be paid to any person for influencing or attempting to influence an officer or employee of any agency, a Member of Congress, an officer or employee of Congress, or an employee of a Member of Congress in connection with this Federal grant or cooperative agreement, the undersigned shall complete and submit Standard Form - LLL, "Disclosure of Lobbying Activities," in accordance with its instructions;

(c) The undersigned shall require that the language of this certification be included in the award documents for all subawards at all tiers (including subgrants, contracts under grants and cooperative agreements, and subcontracts) and that all sub-recipients shall certify and disclose accordingly.

**2. DEBARMENT, SUSPENSION, AND OTHER  
RESPONSIBILITY MATTERS  
(DIRECT RECIPIENT)**

As required by Executive Order 12549, Debarment and Suspension, and implemented at 28 CFR Part 67, for prospective participants in primary covered transactions, as defined at 28 CFR Part 67, Section 67.510-

A. The applicant certifies that it and its principals:

(a) Are not presently debarred, suspended, proposed for debarment, declared ineligible, sentenced to a denial of Federal benefits by a State or Federal court, or voluntarily excluded from covered transactions by any Federal department or agency;

(b) Have not within a three-year period preceding this application been convicted of or had a civil judgment rendered against them for commission of fraud or a criminal offense in connection with obtaining, attempting to obtain, or performing a

public (Federal, State, or local) transaction or contract under a public transaction; violation of Federal or State antitrust statutes or commission of embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, falsification or destruction of records, making false statements, or receiving stolen property;

(c) Are not presently indicted for or otherwise criminally or civilly charged by a governmental entity (Federal, State, or local) with commission of any of the offenses enumerated in paragraph (1) (b) of this certification; and

(d) Have not within a three-year period preceding this application had one or more public transactions (Federal, State, or local) terminated for cause or default; and

B. Where the applicant is unable to certify to any of the statements in this certification, he or she shall attach an explanation to this application.

**3. DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE  
(GRANTEES OTHER THAN INDIVIDUALS)**

As required by the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, and implemented at 28 CFR Part 67, Subpart F, for grantees, as defined at 28 CFR Part 67 Sections 67.615 and 67.620-

A. The applicant certifies that it will or will continue to provide a drug-free workplace by:

(a) Publishing a statement notifying employees that the unlawful manufacture, distribution, dispensing, possession, or use of a controlled substance is prohibited in the grantee's workplace and specifying the actions that will be taken against employees for violation of such prohibition;

(b) Establishing an on-going drug-free awareness program to inform employees about-

(1) The dangers of drugs abuse in the workplace;

(2) The grantee's policy of maintaining a drug-free workplace;

(3) Any available drug counseling, rehabilitation, and employee assistance programs; and

(4) The penalties that may be imposed upon employees for drug abuse violations occurring in the workplace;

(c) Making it a requirement that each employee to be engaged in the performance of the grant be given a copy of the statement required by paragraph (a);

(d) Notifying the employee in the statement required by paragraph (a) that, as a condition of employment under the grant, the employee will-

(1) Abide by the terms of the statement; and

(2) Notify the employer in writing of his or her conviction for a violation of a criminal drug statute occurring in the workplace no later than five calendar days after such conviction;

(e) Notifying the agency, in writing, within 10 calendar days after receiving notice under subparagraph (d)(2) from an employee or otherwise receiving actual notice of such conviction. Employers of convicted employees must provide notice, including position title, to: Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, ATTN: Control Desk, 633 Indiana Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20531. Notice shall include the identification number(s) of each affected grant;

(f) Taking one of the following actions, within 30 calendar days of receiving notice under subparagraph (d)(2), with respect to any employee who is so convicted-

(1) Taking appropriate personnel action against such an employee, up to and including termination, consistent with the requirements of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended; or

(2) Requiring such employee to participate satisfactorily in a drug abuse assistance or rehabilitation program approved for such purposes by a Federal, State, or local health, law enforcement, or other appropriate agency;

(g) Making a good faith effort to continue to maintain a drug-free workplace through implementation of paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f).

B. The grantee may insert in the space provided below the site (s) for the performance of work done in connection with the specific grant:

Place of Performance (Street address, city, country, state, zip code)

Check  if there are workplace on file that are not identified here.

Section 67.630 of the regulations provides that a grantee that is a State may elect to make one certification in each Federal fiscal year. A copy of which should be included with each application for Department of Justice funding. States and State agencies may elect to use OJP Form 4061/7.

Check  if the State has elected to complete OJP Form 4061/7.

**DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE (GRANTEES WHO ARE INDIVIDUALS)**

As required by the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, and implemented at 28 CFR Part 67, Subpart F, for grantees, as defined at 28 CFR Part 67, Sections 67.615 and 67.620-

A. As a condition of the grant, I certify that I will not engage in the unlawful manufacture, distribution, dispensing, possession or use of a controlled substance in connection any activity with the grant; and

B. If convicted of a criminal drug offense resulting from a violation occurring during the conduct of any grant activity, I will report the conviction, in writing, within 10 calendar days of the conviction, to: Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, ATTN: Control Desk, 633 Indiana Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20531.

As the duly authorized representative of the applicant, I hereby certify that the applicant will comply with the above certifications.

1. Grantee Name and Address:

City of Oakland, Office of Finance  
455 7th Street, Room 712  
Oakland, CA 94607

2. Application Number and/or Project Name

DEA Oakland Resident Office  
1301 Clay Street, Suite 460 North  
Oakland, CA 94612

3. Grantee IRS/Vendor Number

ORI - CA0010900.

4. Typed Name and Title of Authorized Representative

5. Signature

6. Date



## DEPARTMENTAL GENERAL ORDER

### I-12: AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READERS

Effective Date: XX

Coordinator: Information Technology Unit

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The Oakland Police Department (OPD) strives to use technology that promotes accountability and transparency. This policy provides guidance for the capture, storage and use of digital data obtained through the use of ALPR technology while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public.

#### A. Description of the Technology: *Information describing the surveillance technology and how it works.*

OPD uses Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images. There are two components to the ALPR system:

1. Automated License Plate Readers: Device components include cameras which can be attached to vehicles or fixed objects and a vehicle-based computer that processes the photographs and compares the data against California Department of Justice (CA DOJ) hotlists. Data is transmitted for comparison (the hotlists are downloaded to the vehicle at the start of the patrol shift and then compared from that list). Authorized personnel can also manually enter license plates to internal OPD generated hotlists only accessible to personnel authorized to access the OPD ALPR system.
2. ALPR Database: A central repository stores data collected and transmitted by the Automated License Plate Readers.

#### B. Purpose of the Technology

ALPR technology works by automatically scanning license plates on vehicles that are publicly visible. ALPR reads these license plates, compares the license plate characters against California Department of Justice (CA DOJ) specific databases, and stores the characters along with the date, time, and location where the photograph was taken, in a database. This process allows for two functions by ALPR:

1. Immediate (real time) comparison of the license plate characters against CA DOJ databases listing vehicles that are stolen or sought in connection with a crime and/or with OPD-generated internal lists.

2. Storage of the license plate characters – along with the date, time, and location where the photography was taken – in a database that is accessible to enforcement agencies with authorized access (as defined in “Authorized Use” below) for investigative query purposes.

**C. Authorized Use:** *The specific uses that are authorized, and the rules and processes required prior to such use.*

1. **Authorized Users**

Personnel authorized to use ALPR equipment or access information collected through the use of such equipment shall be specifically trained in such technology. Sworn personnel, Police Service Technicians, -or other authorized Department personnel may use the technology. Authorized users other than sworn personnel or police services technicians (PST) must be designated by the Chief of Police or designee.

2. **Restrictions on Use**

Department members shall not use, or allow others to use, the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53). Authorized purposes consist only of queries related to criminal investigations, administrative investigations, missing persons cases, or other situations where there is a legal obligation to provide information related to an investigation. Any situation outside of these categories requires approval from a commander at the rank of Deputy Chief, Deputy Director, or higher.

- a. No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.
- b. No ALPR operator may access department, state or federal data unless otherwise authorized to do so pursuant to Section D “Data Access” below.
- c. Accessing data collected by ALPR requires a right to know and a need to know. A right to know is the legal authority to receive information pursuant to a state or federal statute, applicable case law, or a court order. A need to know is a compelling reason to request information such as involvement in an active investigation.

**D. Data Collection:** *The information that can be collected by the surveillance technology. Where applicable, list any data sources the technology will rely upon, including “open source” data.*

ALPR technology works by automatically scanning license plates on vehicles that are publicly visible. ALPR reads these license plates, compares the license plate characters (as well as vehicle attributes such as vehicle color or make and model with some ALPR systems) against specific databases, and stores the characters along with the date, time, and location where the photograph was taken, in a database.

**E. Data Access:** *The category of individuals who can access or use the collected information, and the rules and processes required prior to access or use of the information.*

ALPR server data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law.

All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data contains investigatory and/or confidential information, it is not open to public review.

**F. Data Protection:** *The safeguards that protect information from unauthorized access, including encryption and access control mechanisms.*

All data will be safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. OPD will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

1. All ALPR server data shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by username, license number or other data elements used in the search, name, date, time and purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.52). In the event that the system cannot perform these functions, OPD personnel shall explain in writing to the City's Chief Privacy Officer within seven days of receiving notice of the diminished functionality.
2. Members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for law enforcement purposes only, as set forth above in Section B.2(1)(c) "Restrictions on Use."
3. Data will be transferred from vehicles to the designated storage per the with-automated ALPR technology data transfer protocol.

**G. Data Retention:** *The time period, if any, for which information collected by the surveillance technology will be routinely retained, the reason such retention period is appropriate to further the purpose(s), the process by which the information is*

*regularly deleted after that period lapses, and the specific conditions that must be met to retain information beyond that period.*

All ALPR data uploaded to the server shall be purged from the server at the point of ~~six months~~<sup>730-180 days</sup> from initial upload. [ALPR information](#) may be retained outside the database for the following purposes:

1. Criminal Investigations
2. Administrative Investigations
3. Missing Persons Investigations
4. Investigations from other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies where there is a legal obligation to provide information.

Any situation outside of these categories requires approval from a commander at the rank of Deputy Chief, Deputy Director, or higher.

**H. Public Access:** *how collected information can be accessed or used by members of the public, including criminal defendants.*

Requests for ALPR information by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in Departmental General Order M-9.1, Public Records Access, in accordance with (Civil Code § 1798.90.55, Government Code § 6253 et seq., and applicable case law and court orders.

**I. Third Party Data Sharing:** *If and how other City departments, bureaus, divisions, or non-City entities can access or use the information, including any required justification or legal standard necessary to do so and any obligations imposed on the recipient of the information.*

ALPR server data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law. All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Personnel may also grant ALPR server access to law enforcement agencies with whom OPD has an MOU that allows data sharing. Because such data contains investigatory and/or confidential information, any requests for public records access or requests must go through the protocol as set forth in E., F, and H (above).

OPD personnel may share ALPR server data with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies when there is a legal obligation, such as a court mandate, to share such information.

Requests for ALPR server data, where there is not a legal obligation to provide the data, shall be made in writing and approved by the BOS Deputy Director or designee. These requests shall be maintained in a secure folder so that information about these requests can be shared in required annual reports with the PAC.

**J. Training:** *The training required for any individual authorized to use the surveillance technology or to access information collected by the surveillance technology.*

The Training Section shall ensure that members receive department-approved training for those authorized to use or access the ALPR system and shall maintain a record of all completed trainings. (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code §1798.90.53).

Training requirements for employees shall include the following:

- Applicable federal and state law
- Applicable policy
- Functionality of equipment
- Accessing data
- Safeguarding password information and data
- Sharing of data
- Reporting breaches
- Implementing post-breach procedures

**K. Auditing and Oversight:** *The mechanisms to ensure that the Surveillance Use Policy is followed, including internal personnel assigned to ensure compliance with the policy, internal recordkeeping of the use of the technology or access to information collected by the technology, technical measures to monitor for misuse, any independent person or entity with oversight authority, and the legally enforceable sanctions for violations of the policy.*

ALPR system audits shall be conducted annually by BOS to ensure proper system functionality and that personnel are using the system according to policy rules via sample audits, reviews of training records, and all requirements outlined in OMC 9.64 Section E “Data Protection” above explains that designated personnel will notify the City’s Privacy Officer within seven days upon a finding that the ALPR system cannot fully produce system audits due to technical issues with the system.-

**L. Maintenance:** *The mechanisms and procedures to ensure that the security and integrity of the surveillance technology and collected information will be maintained.*

- 1. ALPR Administration:** All installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the BOS.
- 2. ALPR Administrator:** The BOS Deputy Director shall be the administrator of the ALPR program, and shall be responsible for developing guidelines and procedures to comply with the requirements of Civil Code §



1798.90.5 et seq. The BOS Deputy Director is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection, and retention of ALPR data.

3. **ALPR Coordinator:** The title of the official custodian of the ALPR system is the ALPR Coordinator.
4. **Monitoring and Reporting:** The Oakland Police Department will ensure that the system is remains functional according to its intended use.... maintained according to monitor its use of ALPR technology to ensure the proper functionality of the system as defined in the policy guidelines of this document, including required audits, training, and data access records.

The ALPR Coordinator shall provide the Chief of Police, Privacy Advisory Commission, and Public Safety Committee with an annual report pursuant to OMC 9.64 (Oakland Surveillance Technology Ordinance).

By Order of

LeRonne L. Armstrong  
Chief of Police

Date Signed:



# OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT

## Surveillance Impact Use Report for the Automated License Plate Reader

**A. Description:** *Information Describing the Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) and How It Works including product descriptions and manuals from manufacturers\*.*

ALPR technology consists of cameras that can automatically scan license plates on vehicles that are publicly visible (in the public right of way and/or on public streets). The Oakland Police Department (OPD) uses only ALPR cameras mounted to patrol vehicles so that license plates can be photographed during routine police patrol operations. Each camera housing (two housings per vehicle) consists of a regular color photograph camera as well as an infrared camera (for better photography during darkness). ALPR reads these license plates with a lens and charge-coupled device (CCD) that senses and records the image (can be parked or moving vehicle plates) and connects the image to an optical character recognition (OCR) system that can connect the image to that actual license plate characters.

The ALPR system in a patrol vehicle is activated when the user logs into the software from their vehicle-based computer and starts the system. Once initiated, the system runs continuously and photographs vehicles until turned off manually;<sup>1</sup> ALPR cameras typically record hundreds of license plates each hour but exact recording rates depend on vehicle activity and how many vehicles are encountered. The system compares license plate characters against specific databases, and stores the characters along with the date, time, and location of the license plate in a database. OPD's ALPR system updates daily with three California Department of Justice (CA DOJ) hotlists: felony wants, stolen plates, and stolen vehicles. OPD can also add vehicle plates to internal OPD-created hotlists. There is no OPD ALPR connection to any federal database.

Authorized personnel within OPD can also enter specific license plate numbers into the system so that active vehicle ALPR systems will alert the officer in the vehicle if there is a real-time match between the entered license plate and the photographed license plate.

OPD personnel will contact OPD Communications Division (dispatch), or verify via their vehicle computers, anytime the ALPR system signals that a license plate on a database has been seen and OPD personnel always personally check with Communications before stopping a vehicle based on a ALPR license plate match.

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<sup>1</sup> Data captured by the ALPR system will be uploaded onto the OPD ALPR database when the computer is turned off – typically at the end of a patrol shift.

The platform software allows authorized personnel to query the system to see if a certain license plate (and associated vehicle) have been photographed. The system will show the geographic location within Oakland for license plates that have been photographed, as well as time and date. Authorized personnel can see the actual photographs that match a particular license plate query – the OCR system can incorrectly match alpha-numeric characters so the actual photographs are vital for ensuring the accuracy of the license plate query.

#### *New Features in Boss4*

OPD seeks to upgrade its current ALPR version to BOSS4, which is recommended for the improved audit capabilities of the system. If OPD upgrades to BOSS4, the following features will become available:

- The ability to search by vehicle color (e.g., Red, Black, Blue)
- The ability to search by vehicle make (e.g., Chevrolet, Ford, Mazda)
- The ability to search by vehicle type (e.g., Sedan, Truck, Van)

The ability to search by vehicle specifics (e.g., Roof Racks, Logos, Spare Tires) is also currently available in BOSS4. OPD acknowledges that this feature may implicate additional privacy concerns. OPD has already asked the vendor to disable this feature in OPD's ALPR system. If the vendor is unable to disable this feature, then OPD will only upgrade to the base BOSS4 version to improve audit capabilities.

#### *Anticipated Hotlists in BOSS4*

Authorized personnel within OPD will be able to add specific license plate numbers into the system as either an alert hotlist or a covert hotlist. Alert hotlists will alert officers in their ALPR equipped vehicles if the plate that was added to the hotlist has been located. Additionally, the officers receive further instructions including who to contact regarding the alert. Covert hotlists will not alert officers via the ALPR system. Instead, the alert will be sent to the appropriate investigator for further follow up. This ensures any real-time information necessary to further an investigation is provided to the appropriate individual.

Internal OPD specific hotlists are to be added to the system only upon the approval of the BOS Deputy Director or their designee. The designated approver must be documented in writing with a specific name or departmental position authorized to act as designee.

In addition, the following criteria/information must be provided for each request to add a license plate to any OPD hotlist:

- Vehicle must be part of an existing OPD investigation
- License Plate Number and State of Issuance
- OPD report number
- Vehicle Description
- Explanation for the request
- Which hotlist to add the plate to: Alert or Covert
- Requester's Name and Serial Number

Disapproved lists will be kept on file. Approved requests are to be added to the

specific hotlist requested with a maximum run time of 30 days. License plates will be deleted automatically from the system after that time. The requester must resubmit a new request to extend the time an additional 30 days. Should the requester desire to remove the plate from the hotlist before the 30<sup>th</sup> day, the requester must contact OPD IT by emailing [opditu@oaklandca.gov](mailto:opditu@oaklandca.gov) to request early removal.

\* As part of the purchase of the ALPR business from 3M, Neology acquired all intellectual property rights of the ALPR portfolio, including documentation such as the BOSS3 manual, as well as corresponding copyright/confidentiality elements. Neology has confirmed to OPD that they do NOT waive the copyright notice for the BOSS3 manual as it remains a relevant piece of intellectual property which Neology acquired.

**B. Purpose: How OPD intends to Use ALPR Technology**

OPD uses ALPR for two purposes:

1. The immediate (real time) comparison of the license plate characters against specific databases such as those provided by the California Department of Justice listing vehicles that are stolen or sought in connection with a crime or missing persons; and
2. Storage of the license plate characters – along with the date, time, and location of the license plate – in a database that is accessible by law enforcement agencies (LEA) for investigative purposes.

ALPR technology helps OPD personnel to leverage their public presence and to more effectively use their limited time for more critical activity. The technology can alert officers to vehicles that are stolen or connected to a serious felony crime (e.g., aggravated assault, homicide, robbery, sexual assault) immediately (by being automatically connected to criminal databases). Officers can then use the information to notify OPD personnel and/or stop the vehicle as justified by the information. The automatic process decreases the need for laborious data entry processes; therefore, officers have more time for observing public activity and speaking with members of the public. **Appendix A** to this report showcases 109 cases (2018) and 101 (2020) cases where an officer's vehicle ALPR system alerted them to a vehicle on one of the CA DOJ hotlists. Generally, these "hits" from real-time ALPR in-vehicle occurred within a few days of the crime and/or report being taken and the plate becoming populated in the CA DOJ database.


ALPR also provides an important tool for criminal investigations. The information collected by analysts and investigators can determine where a plate has been in the past, which can help to confirm whether or not a vehicle has been at the scene of a crime. Additionally, accurate photos of vehicles from the ALPR system make searching for vehicles much easier – how the vehicle differs from every other vehicle of the same make and model. The photos frequently show distinctive vehicle aspects (e.g. dents, scratches, stickers). Investigators can also confirm that the vehicle matches the license plate and whether the license plate has been switched from a different vehicle. Such information may help personnel to find new leads in a felony crime investigation.

OPD has not historically quantified ALPR usage for vehicle stops, nor for later

criminal investigations<sup>2</sup> in a way that easily allows for impact analysis. However, OPD is developing more automated processes for tracking ALPR usage in connection with investigations – OPD and the City’s IT Department are currently engaged in a multi-year new CAD/RMS implementation which will greatly improve this type of data tracking. More immediately, a new BOSS 4 system (see **Section E** below) will also allow for better use tracking.

OPD’s Criminal Investigations Division (CID), in preparation for this report, has found several cases where ALPR license plate locational data was instrumental in the ultimate arrest and arraignment of at least two homicide suspects, and with the conviction of at least one of them; **Appendix B** attached to this report, highlights specific felony cases from the year 2020 where ALPR played a pivotal role in supporting CID investigations.

In the 165 felony cases identified (in **Appendix B**), where the age of the data was substantiated, the pie-chart below shows that the age of data (at the time it was queried by OPD CID investigators varied) varied from “1-30 days” to “7-12 months.”




The types of crimes from the ALPR data age break-down above are as follows:

Armed Assault	3
Physical Assault	1
Burglary	1

<sup>2</sup> Current policies mandate documenting reasons for vehicle stops and reported race and gender of persons stopped. OPD is reviewing how to ensure that investigators note when ALPR was instrumental in criminal investigations for documenting ALPR impact.

Armed Robbery	6
Carjacking	2
Stolen Vehicle with firearms recovery	1
Vehicle Assault on Officer with a vehicle	1

A separate recent analysis of ALPR queries shows that most revealed data that was less than one month old (13 cases), and the number of cases using older data diminishes. However, there are still valuable cases using data even 18-24 months old. The chart below illustrates the recent age of this query data.



**C. Location:** *The Locations and situations in which ALPR Camera Technology may be deployed or utilized.*

OPD owns 35 sets (left and right) of ALPR vehicle-mounted cameras. Authorized personnel (as described in the Mitigations Section below) may operate ALPR camera technology on public streets in the City of Oakland, while engaged in the course of their duties.

**D. Privacy Impact:** *How is the OPD ALPR Use Policy Adequate in Protecting Civil Rights and Liberties and whether ALPR was used or deployed, intentionally or inadvertently, in a manner that is discriminatory, viewpoint-based, or biased via algorithm.*

OPD recognizes that the use of ALPR technology raises significant privacy concerns. There is concern that the use of ALPR technology can be utilized to ascertain vehicle travel patterns over periods of time. People are generally creatures of habit and often drive in their vehicles the same way to work, to visit friends and associates, to houses of worship, and neighborhood grocery stores. Research shows that “metadata”, such as individual data points such as phone numbers called, and time of day or vehicle locations, can be combined to create patterns that identify individuals. Using a simple algorithm, Stanford University lawyer and computer scientist Jonathan Mayer was able to accurately identify 80 percent of the volunteers in his study, using only open-source databases such as Yelp, Facebook, and Google<sup>3</sup>.

OPD can use the ALPR technology to see if a particular license plate (and thus the associated vehicle) was photographed in particular places during particular times; however, OPD can only use the system to make such determinations by manually querying the system based upon a right to know (see Mitigation section below). OPD also recognizes that ALPR cameras may photograph extraneous data such as images of the vehicle, the vehicle driver and/or bumper stickers or other details that affiliate the vehicle or driver with particular groups. As explained in the Description Section (A) above and the Mitigation (E) section below, authorized personnel can only manually query the ALPR system for particular license plates (or all plates within a defined area) and only for particular reasons as outlined in OPD policy. In addition, current technology cannot be used to query data based upon vehicle drivers, or based on any type of article (e.g., bumper sticker) affixed to a vehicle. Additionally, OPD has instituted many protocols (see Mitigation section below) to safeguard against the unauthorized access to any ALPR data.

OPD is also working with the ALPR vendor to disable any feature that would allow searching for a vehicle by using affixed articles in any future update. The 2013 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) report titled, “YOU ARE BEING TRACKED<sup>4</sup>” cites that privacy concerns about ALPR data tracking increase the longer the data is retained. The report states, “While holding onto “hit” data while an investigation or case is ongoing is legitimate, law enforcement agencies should not be storing data about people who have done nothing wrong” (page 16). OPD shares the concerns of the ACLU that the misuse of retained data (e.g., datamining) could lead to the abuse of privacy of people who have committed no crime. OPD is committed to restricted use policies to impede the use of ALPR data for any use outside of authorized uses (e.g., criminal investigations.).

There is concern that ALPR camera use may cause disparate impacts if used more intensely in certain areas such as areas with higher crime and greater clusters of less-advantaged communities. OPD does not affix ALPR cameras to fixed infrastructure. OPD deploys ALPR camera-affixed vehicles through every area of Oakland<sup>5</sup>, even though there may be times when OPD Commanders request that ALPR cameras be used in particular areas for short periods of time to address crime patterns. Additionally, ALPR usage does not lead to greater levels of discretionary police stops; ALPR use leads to vehicle stops only where a real-time photographed license plate matches a stop warrant for a stolen

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<sup>3</sup> Today, data scientists can accurately identify over 95% of individuals based solely on four geospatial (time, location) data points.

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/071613-aclu-alprreport-opt-v05.pdf>

<sup>5</sup> OPD often must use ALPR camera-equipped vehicles for standard patrol activity regardless of location because of limited fleet reserves.

vehicle or serious crime in a criminal database.

Databases such from the State of California Department of Justice (DOJ) can contain some outdated or inaccurate data. ALPR systems, just as in the case of a manual query in a police vehicle computer, will provide the license plate data from the related database. ALPR systems simply make the query faster. In such cases personnel will follow standard policies and procedures for stopping a motorist and requesting personal identification (explained on page 1 above in connecting to CA DOJ felony wants, stolen plates, stolen vehicles hotlists).

OMC 9.64.010 “Definitions” now requires that the Annual Surveillance Report, Section E “A summary of community complaints...” also requires that:

*“The analysis shall also identify the race of each person that was subject to the technology’s use. The Privacy Advisory Commission may waive this requirement upon making a determination that the probative value in gathering this information to evaluate the technology’s impact on privacy interests is outweighed by the City’s administrative burden in collecting or verifying this information and the potential greater invasiveness in capturing such data. If the Privacy Advisory Commission makes such a determination, written findings in support of the determination shall be included in the annual report submitted for City Council review.”*

**E. Mitigations:** *Specific, affirmative technical and procedural measures that will be implemented to safeguard the public.*

Oakland residents and visitors have a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the California Constitution. OPD may, however, photograph state-issued license plates when those plates are in public view. Because surveillance technology like ALPR allows OPD to use electronic, automatic tools that allow OPD to collect and compare publicly appearing license plate images beyond the capability of an individual officer to quickly collect and compare license plates, OPD recognizes that there may exist concerns about the accuracy, use, and storage of such information. Therefore, OPD’s ALPR policy attempts to mitigate potential invasiveness by limiting the use and storage of real-time and aggregated ALPR data.

OPD’s ALPR system, (as mentioned in Section 1 above), uses OCR to capture license plate data. ALPR cameras are designed to focus on license plates cameras, and the OCR only records the license plate characters. The Use Policy does allow that newer versions of ALPR systems may also capture vehicle attributes such as vehicle make, model and color and allow for querying of this type of data. Extraneous data (e.g. human faces) may be captured in an ALPR image capture as well. However, OPD’s current BOSS ALPR database can only query license plate numbers.

OPD’s ALPR system is maintained on premises. OPD, with City Information Technology Department support, maintains and controls its ALPR data. There are 3<sup>rd</sup> party ALPR systems available for police departments, where the ALPR data is shared with other ALPR clients. OPD does not utilize these systems and ensures that its ALPR data is only shared via explicit requests where OPD believes a right to know and need to know threshold has been achieved.

ALPR can only be used for authorized purposes consisting only of queries related to criminal investigations and other authorized law enforcement functions, as explained in DGO I-12.B-2 “Restriction on Use: 1. “Department members shall not use, or allow others

to use, the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53); authorized purposes consist only of queries related to criminal investigations and other authorized law enforcement functions.” Additionally, OPD is required to provide an annual report to the PAC (per OMC 9.64) documenting ALPR usage during the prior calendar year. The annual report will contain audit data of system queries (e.g., document aspects of use activity - time, date, and what is searched). DGO I.12, Part 2 “Restrictions on Use,” provides a number of internal safeguards, including:

Department members shall not use, or allow others to use, the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51.; Civil Code § 1798.90.53). Authorized purposes consist only of queries related to criminal investigations, administrative investigations, missing persons cases, or other situations where there is a legal obligation to provide information related to an investigation. Any situation outside of these categories requires approval of a commander at the rank of Deputy Chief, Deputy Director, or higher.

- a. No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.
- b. No ALPR operator may access department, state or federal data unless otherwise authorized to do so pursuant to Section B.2 “Restricted Access”.
- c. Accessing data collected by ALPR requires a right to know and a need to know. A right to know is the legal authority to receive information pursuant to a state or federal statute, applicable case law, or a court order. A need to know is a compelling reason to request information such as involvement in an active investigation.

**F. Data Types and Sources:** *A list of all types and sources of data to be collected, analyzed, or processed by the surveillance technology, including “open source” data, scores, reports, logic or algorithm used, and any additional information derived therefrom.*

ALPR data is composed of photographs of license plates which can be linked through OCR software to identify license plate alpha-numeric characters. License plate photographs, as detailed in Section One above, may contain images of the vehicle with particular visual details of the vehicle (such as vehicle make or model or bumper stickers). Photographs may also contain images of the vehicle driver. However, the ALPR system only annotates photographs based on license plate characters (newer systems have more advanced functionality where users can query for vehicle type and color); therefore, there is currently no way to query the system based on vehicle details (such as bumper stickers) or individuals associated with a vehicle.

All ALPR data downloaded to the server shall be purged from the server at the point of six months in alignment with Government Code section 34090. Data may be retained outside the database for the following purposes:

1. Criminal Investigations
2. Administrative Investigations
3. Missing Persons Investigations
4. Investigations from other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies where there is a legal obligation to provide information

Any situation outside of these categories requires approval from a commander at the rank



of Deputy Chief, Deputy Director, or higher.

California law does not mandate a specific retention period for ALPR data. California Civil Code Title 1.81 .23 governs "Collection of License Plate Information." While statute requires that ALPR operators to adopt a "usage and privacy policy" that specifies the "length of time ALPR information will be retained", statute does not mandate or even recommend a particular retention period. Where statute does not specify a particular retention period for a certain type of record, the required record retention period defaults to the two-year "catch-all" retention period set forth in California Government Code section 34090. ~~it does not mandate a specific retention period. However, when the legislature has not prescribed a retention period for a particular type of document, the two-year "catch-all" retention period in California Government Code section 34090 applies.~~

~~The Department has considered whether California Government Section 34090.6 might apply to ALPR data and permit destruction of ALPR records after one year. Section 34090.6 permits the head of a city department to destroy recordings of "routine video monitoring" after one year. But there is no legislative history or case law interpreting or suggesting that ALPR data constitutes "routine video recording" and thus may reasonably be governed by 34090.6.~~

~~Accordingly, the Department believes that the 2-year default retention period applies pursuant to state law.~~

~~The Department notes, however, that some Bay Area law enforcement agencies including Berkeley, Livermore, Novato, and Piedmont rely on Government Code Section 34090.6 and store ALPR data only for the one-year minimum required by that statute. The City of Alameda retains ALPR data for 6 months, though the Department does not know what legal authority Alameda relies on to support a retention period of less than one year. Section 34090.6 specifically addresses "routine video monitoring" and the destruction of video "recordings," and stipulates that the head of a department of a city may destroy recordings of routine video monitoring after one year. However, there is no legislative history or case law interpreting or suggesting that this is the appropriate retention period for ALPR data. The City ultimately believes that a 730-day data retention period is the most appropriate retention period, but that a 365-day data retention period still aligns with state law. Any data retention short of 365 days would open the City to liability risks; staff therefore believes that a 365 day ALPR data retention period aligns with internal investigatory need and State law while balancing public privacy concerns.~~

~~Therefore, even if the Department followed the untested lead of law enforcement agencies who apply 34090.6 to ALPR data, that would only reduce the retention period to one year. Any ALPR data destruction prior to the one-year minimum period mandated by statute may violate state law. Staff therefore believes that a one-year ALPR data retention period is the minimum period permissible pursuant to a reasonable though untested interpretation of existing state law. Balancing the Department's internal investigatory needs with public privacy concerns, the Department believes that going forward the one-year data retention period prescribed by law will not substantially harm its ability to use ALPR as a tool in its investigations. While the Department would be willing to destroy ALPR data after only 6 months, it is not aware of a legal basis which would permit it to do so. In the absence of City Council passing an ordinance or resolving otherwise (presumably with the input and advice of the City Attorney's Office), the Department feels it can only promise what it believes is required pursuant to state law which requires retention for no less than one year~~

under the most liberal application of state law.

**G. Data Security:** *information about the steps that will be taken to ensure that adequate security measures are used to safeguard the data collected or generated by the technology from unauthorized access or disclosure.*

OPD takes data security seriously and safeguards ALPR data by both procedural and technological means. OPD will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

1. All ALPR data downloaded to the mobile workstation and in storage shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by username, license number or other data elements used in the search, name, date, time and purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.52).
2. Members approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate LEA purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.

OPD ALPR's system is connected to the City's virtual private network (VPN) gateway and is encrypted through the transport. The encrypted data ends at the VPN gateway and the ALPR data goes into the internal SQL database where records can be search using the OPD internal BOSS3 server. Both the BOSS3 server and ALPR SQL database are internal services that can only be accessible within the OPDnet network.

The current OPD BOSS ALPR system is not-cloud based; ALPR-camera equipped vehicle computers can download (not upload) State DOJ databases as described above. However, OPD will look to upgrade this outdated system should the City Council approve DGO I-12. Only authorized OPD personnel have access to the OPD ALPR system. The ALPR coordinator is responsible for providing training on the ALPR system use to authorized personnel.

**H. Fiscal Cost:** *The fiscal costs for the surveillance technology, including initial purchase, personnel and other ongoing costs, and any current or potential sources of funding.*

OPD spent \$293,500 in 2014 to purchase the ALPR system from 3M. Neology later purchased the ALPR product line from 3M. OPD does not have a maintenance contract with Neology and therefore relies on EVO for ALPR maintenance. OPD has spent approximately \$50,000 annually with EVO-Emergency Vehicle Outfitters Inc. for ALPR vehicle camera maintenance. OPD relies on EVO to outfit police vehicles with many standard police technology upgrades (e.g. vehicle computers) as well as ALPR camera maintenance. However, OPD's current ALPR camera fleet are no longer covered by a maintenance contract and OPD now only spends approximately \$3,000 annual for software support.

The following information is a financial estimate to upgrade OPD's entire ALPR system:

- New Hardware and support for 35 vehicles: \$363,000
- New BOSS4 software (On-premise 1 year license): \$15,000
- New BOSS4 software (Hosted storage 1 year license): \$43,000

**I. Third Party Dependence:** *Whether use or maintenance of ALPR technology will require data gathered by the technology to be handled or stored by a third-party vendor on an ongoing basis*

OPD relies upon third party technology vendors to install and provide maintenance for ALPR systems (currently EVO as explained in Section H above). Vendors contracted with the City for vehicle ALPR installation and maintenance of the systems will not handle or store the ALPR data. Data gathered from each vehicle system is uploaded from the vehicle to the server for secure storage.

Maintenance of the server may require vendor supplying OPD with the server software to handle data stored in it; this access will be controlled by the City's IT Department.

**J. Alternatives Considered:** *A summary of all alternative methods considered in-lieu of ALPR, including the costs and benefits associated with each alternative and an explanation of the reasons why each alternative is inadequate*

OPD officers and investigators rely primarily on traditional policing techniques to gather evidence related to criminal investigations such as speaking to witnesses and suspects, gathering information from observations, and using standard data aggregation systems. These methods will continue to be employed as primary investigative tools that will be supplemented by use of BWCs to document police activity.

ALPR technology provides LEA personnel with a fast and efficient way to connect vehicles to violent and felonious criminal activity. This tool helps OPD's authorized personnel increase their ability to find wanted suspects and help solve crimes in a way that is unique – by creating a time map of vehicle locational activity. OPD recognizes the privacy concerns inherent in such a technology but has in place the numerous mitigations and data security protocols described in sections five and seven above respectively. However, OPD believes that the alternative to ALPR usage would be to forgo its observational and investigatory benefits. OPD personnel, without access to ALPR data, would rely on patrol officer observations and other basic investigatory processes. For example, OPD would forgo information regarding real-time stolen vehicle information without access to the ALPR system that provides real-time notifications from ALPR hits against CA DOJ databases; OPD would ultimately rely on more manual processes for writing down stolen vehicle plates – an extremely manual and less accurate process. OPD data suggest that some future violent felonies would also remain unsolved as well if there were no access to these ALPR investigatory leads.

**K. Track Record of Other Entities**

Numerous local and state government entities have researched and evaluated the use of ALPR cameras. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) documents many recent reports<sup>6</sup>. The IACP report, "News Stories about Law Enforcement ALPR Successes September 2017 - September 2018"<sup>7</sup> presents scores of cases from different national LEA

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.theiacp.org/projects/automated-license-plate-recognition>

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/ALPR%20Success%20News%20Stories%202018.pdf>

jurisdictions where ALPR data helped lead to the capture of violent criminals. A July 2014 study<sup>8</sup> from the Rand Corporation research organization found that ALPR cameras have proven useful for crime investigations in numerous cities and states, and that systems with the most database access and longest retention policies provide the greatest use in terms of providing real-time information as well as useful investigation data. The findings in this report also indicate that privacy mitigations are critical to ensuring legal use of ALPR and public privacy protections.

Personnel have reached out to local agencies to assess their experience using ALPR. Fremont Police Department personnel stated that they use their ALPR system daily. Moreover, they stated that the system has been of great benefit to their investigations over the years. However, they also stated that they do not specifically track its use in investigations and cannot easily provide quantitative data. They stated that there have not been any unexpected costs or technical system problems. The Livermore Police Department (LPD) replied that they believe their ALPR system is worthwhile to them, but they do not have any quantitative information about the efficacy. LPD personnel stated that they have quantitative data regarding the number of hits as well as search queries, but not regarding usage of the system and the effectiveness. LPD staff also stated that there have not been any unanticipated costs nor system failures. They also stated that they conduct regular audits and have not identified any civil rights or civil liberties abuses. OPD personnel are still waiting to hear back from other agencies.

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<sup>8</sup> [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR467.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR467.html)

## Appendix A:

### Cases Where the Vehicle ALPR System Alerted Officers to Vehicle on a California Department of Justice Hot List: 2018 and 2020 Data

For all the examples below, officers performed necessary verification of the stolen vehicle status before acting.

1. 18-000071; 01/05/2018; ALPR hit led to a recovered vehicle on the 1200 block of 29<sup>th</sup> Ave. by OPD. Owner contacted, and vehicle released. Age of data: 4 days.
2. 17-067819; 01/02/2018; ALPR hit on a LoJack vehicle search at 460 Euclid Ave. by OPD. Owner unable to be contacted, vehicle towed. Age of data: 1 year
3. 17-067754; 01/02/2018; ALPR hit led to a recovered vehicle at 12<sup>th</sup> & Broadway by OPD. Vehicle towed. Age of data: 1 year
4. 18-004770; 01/27/2018; ALPR hit on a parked unoccupied vehicle on 9400 block of Walnut St by OPD. Stolen out of San Leandro; vehicle towed.
5. 18-001155; 01/08/2018; OPD had an ALPR hit while driving; vehicle found parked on the 8200 block of Olive St. Unable to contact owner; vehicle towed. Age of data; 1 day
6. 18-001306; 01/08/2018; OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 9900 block of Cherry Street. Vehicle was parked and empty. Owner contacted and vehicle was released to owner. Age of data: Less than 1 day.
7. 17-067250; 01/08/2018; OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 2400 block of Kingland Ave. Vehicle was parked and empty. Owner contacted and vehicle was released to owner. Age of data: 12 days.
8. 18-001246; 01/12/2018; OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 900 block of E. 18<sup>th</sup> St. Ignition was removed. Unable to contact owner; vehicle towed. Age of data: 4 days.
9. 18-003074; 01/19/2018; OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 300 block of Peralta St. Vehicle was parked and empty. Owner contacted and vehicle was released to owner. Age of data: 2 days.
10. 18-002885; 01/16/2018; OPD had an ALPR hit on a stolen vehicle several times during this evening. The stolen vehicle was used to commit a robbery and flee the scene of the crime. Officers eventually performed a high risk stop without incident and arrested the suspect. Vehicle processed for evidence. Age of data: 2 days.
11. 18-002882; 01/16/2018; OPD had an ALPR hit on a vehicle reported stolen out of Hayward while driving on 32<sup>nd</sup> St. The vehicle was unoccupied, recovered, and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
12. 18-003926; 1/22/2018; OPD had an ALPR hit on an occupied vehicle reported stolen out of San Leandro while on patrol on the 1600 block of E 15<sup>th</sup> Street. Owner was contacted and vehicle was released to the registered owner. Age of data: Unknown
13. 18-004942; report taken on 01/28/2018; on 02/02/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit on this vehicle which was parked and unoccupied on the 1400 block of Wood St. Vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: 5 days
14. 18-005117; report taken on 01/29/2018; on 02/10/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit on this stolen vehicle which was parked and unoccupied on the 8800 block of Plymouth St. Owner was contacted and vehicle was released to owner. Age of data: 13 days.

15. 18-005441; vehicle was reported stolen out of Stanislaus; on 01/31/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit on this stolen vehicle which was parked and unoccupied on the 1200 block of 42<sup>nd</sup> Ave. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: unknown.
16. 18-006195; report taken on 02/03/2018; on 02/27/18 OPD had an ALPR hit on this stolen vehicle which was parked and unoccupied on 13<sup>th</sup> and Willow. Owner was contacted and vehicle was released to owner. Age of data: 24 days.
17. 18-007653; vehicle was reported stolen out of Newark, CA; on 02/11/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit on this stolen vehicle which was parked and unoccupied on the 2200 block of 82<sup>nd</sup> Ave. Owner was contacted and vehicle was released to owner. Age of data: unknown
18. 18-008173; on 02/15/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit on this stolen vehicle which was parked on the 2500 block of Fruitvale Ave. Vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: unknown.
19. 18-008770; vehicle was reported stolen out of Berkeley, CA; on 02/18/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit, which was being driven by a suspect on the 2000 block of Fruitvale Ave. Dispatch confirmed vehicle was still stolen and a vehicle stop was made and the occupant arrested. Vehicle was recovered and processed for evidence. Age of data: Unknown.
20. 18-009263; vehicle was reported stolen on 02/21/2018; on 03/17/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit on this vehicle on the 800 block of E. 18<sup>th</sup> St while responding to a higher priority call. After that call, the officers began to look for the vehicle and found it at a Lucky's store on the 200 block of E. 18<sup>th</sup> street. A suspect exited the vehicle and fled on foot after seeing the officers. The suspect was apprehended and the vehicle was recovered and processed. Age of data: 24 days.
21. 18-010590; vehicle was reported stolen on 02/28/2018; on 03/01/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit on this unoccupied vehicle on the 1050 block of 7<sup>th</sup> St. Vehicle owner was contacted but did not respond. Vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: 1 day.
22. 18-011643; vehicle was reported stolen by BART PD; on 03/06/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit on this unoccupied vehicle which was on the 400 block of 105<sup>th</sup> Ave. Vehicle had been stripped and abandoned. Vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
23. 18-010469; vehicle was reported stolen by SFO PD; on 02/27/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit on this unoccupied vehicle which was on the 800 block of Meade St. Suspected narcotics were found; vehicle was recovered, towed, and processed. Age of data: Unknown.
24. 18-011321; vehicle was reported stolen on 03/04/2018; on 03/06/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit on this abandoned and unoccupied vehicle while driving on the 8300 block of Holly St. Vehicle was recovered and the registered owner was contacted. The vehicle was released to the owner. Age of data: 2 days.
25. 18-012365; vehicle was reported stolen out of Castro Valley on 03/09/21; on 03/09/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit on this vehicle while driving on the 3600 block of Martin Luther King Jr. Way. The vehicle was occupied by suspect 1 who fled upon seeing the officer. Eventually, the suspect crashed the vehicle and fled the scene, evading arrest. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: less than one day.
26. 18-012841; vehicle was reported stolen on 03/12/2018; on 03/16/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit as they were driving on the 600 block of 34<sup>th</sup> St. The vehicle was unoccupied and the registered owner was contacted; the vehicle was recovered and released to her. Age of data: 4 days.
27. 18-013034; vehicle was reported stolen out of San Jose, CA; on 03/13/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit as they were driving on 45<sup>th</sup> St. The vehicle was unoccupied, was recovered, and towed. Age of data: Unknown.

28. 18-013365; vehicle was reported stolen on 03/15/2018; on 03/25/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while conducting a security check on the 2300 block of Monticello Ave. The vehicle was occupied, therefore, OPD conducted a stop and detained 4 people, with one person ultimately arrested on suspicion of vehicle theft. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: 10 days.
29. 18-013451; vehicle was reported stolen out of South San Francisco, CA; on 3/15/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 1900 block of Market St. The vehicle was unoccupied. OPD recovered and towed the vehicle. Age of data: Unknown.
30. 18-014375; vehicle was reported stolen out of Lathrop, CA; on 03/21/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on 96<sup>th</sup> Ave at Olive St. The vehicle was unoccupied and unlocked. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
31. 18-014991; vehicle was reported stolen on 03/24/2018; on 04/03/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while patrolling near 74<sup>th</sup> Ave and Hillside St. Vehicle was unoccupied. OPD attempted to contact the registered owner several times without success. Vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: 10 days.
32. 18-015017; vehicle was reported stolen out of Merced, CA; on 03/25/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 500 block of Sycamore Street. The vehicle was parked, unoccupied, and locked. The ignition appeared to be forced. Vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
33. 18-015542; rental vehicle was reported stolen on 03/27/2018; on 04/06/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit on a moving vehicle while driving on the 1600 block of International Blvd. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: 10 days.
34. 18-015575; vehicle was reported stolen by SFPD; on 03/27/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on McClure St. The vehicle was parked and unoccupied. Vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
35. 18-01563; vehicle was reported stolen by U-Haul on 03/28/2018; on 03/29/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 600 block of 55<sup>th</sup> St. The parked vehicle was occupied by an individual who was asleep. The vehicle was recovered and released to an authorized employee of U-Haul. Age of data: 1 day.
36. 18-016079; vehicle was reported stolen by Berkeley PD; on 03/30/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 900 block of Aileen St. The vehicle was parked and unoccupied. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
37. 18-016370; vehicle was reported stolen on 04/01/2018; on 04/26/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 950 block of 54<sup>th</sup> St. The unoccupied vehicle was recovered and released to the owner. Age of data: 25 days.
38. 18-017253; vehicle was reported stolen by CHP on 04/01/2018; on 04/06/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 3100 block of West St. The vehicle was parked and unoccupied. Vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: 5 days.
39. 18-017397; vehicle was reported stolen on 04/07/2018; on 04/12/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 1300 block of 84<sup>th</sup> Ave. The vehicle was parked and unoccupied. Upon inspection, it appeared the ignition was punched. The vehicle was recovered, the owner contacted, and released to the owner who stated they would get their own tow truck. Age of data: 5 days.

40. 18-017319; vehicle was reported stolen by Salinas PD; on 04/17/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving in the area of 98<sup>th</sup> Ave and Golf Links Road. The vehicle was occupied and moving. A stop was performed and the individual who was driving was detained. The vehicle recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
41. 18-017473; vehicle was reported stolen by San Francisco PD; on 04/07/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 8700 block of Birch St. The vehicle was moving and occupied, so a stop was performed. An individual was detained and subsequently arrested. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
42. 18-018559; on 04/10/2018 a vehicle was reported stolen by Berkeley PD; on 04/13/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 900 block of 47<sup>th</sup> St. The parked and unoccupied vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: 3 days.
43. 18-018708; vehicle was reported stolen on 04/14/2018; on 04/28/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 6000 block of Herzog St. The parked and unoccupied vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: 14 days.
44. 18-018572; vehicle was reported stolen on 04/13/2018; on 04/16/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on 23<sup>rd</sup> Ave. The stolen vehicle was being driven and had two occupants. A stop was conducted and the driver was detained. The driver was transported to jail for booking and the vehicle was recovered and released to the owner. Age of data: 3 days.
45. 18-018465; vehicle was reported stolen on 04/13/2018; on 05/09/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 2700 block of Martin Luther King Jr Way. The vehicle was being driven by one occupant. The registered owner did not respond to officer contacts and the vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: 26 days.
46. 18-019694; vehicle was reported stolen by San Mateo PD; on 04/20/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 2400 block of Coolidge Ave. The vehicle was parked, unoccupied, and appeared to have had the ignition punched. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
47. 18-019933; vehicle was reported stolen on 04/21/2018; on 04/26/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 900 block of 56<sup>th</sup> St. The vehicle was parked, unoccupied and the ignition had been punched. The vehicle was recovered, towed, and eventually released to the owner. Age of data: 5 days.
48. 18-020063; vehicle was reported stolen by San Francisco PD; on 04/22/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 100 block of Broadway Blvd. The vehicle came to a stop and a driver exited the vehicle. The driver was detained and eventually arrested. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown
49. 18-020126; vehicle was reported stolen by Berkeley PD; on 04/22/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 1600 block of Fruitvale. The vehicle was occupied and being driven. As the officer pulled behind the vehicle the driver exited the vehicle and began walking away. The driver was detained and eventually arrested. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
50. 18-023342; vehicle was reported stolen by Hayward PD; on 05/09/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 300 block of Chestnut St. The vehicle, which was parked and unoccupied was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown
51. 18-025012; vehicle was reported stolen on 05/18/2018; on 05/31/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 600 block of Aileen St. The vehicle was parked and unoccupied. The vehicle



- was recovered, the registered owner was contacted, and the vehicle was released. Age of data: 13 days.
52. 18-026803; vehicle was reported stolen on 05/29/2018; on 06/10/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while leaving the Motel 6 located on 1759 Embarcadero. The vehicle was parked and unoccupied. A suspect was detained and arrested after they attempted to flee on foot. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: 12 days.
  53. 18-035649; rental vehicle was reported stolen on 07/17/2018; On 08/01/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 1700 block of East 15<sup>th</sup> St. The vehicle was occupied and being driven. A stop was conducted and the driver was detained and eventually arrested. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: 15 days.
  54. 18-027930; vehicle was reported stolen on 06/04/2018; on 06/10/2021 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on Foothill Blvd and 55<sup>th</sup> Ave. The vehicle was occupied with one driver and one passenger. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: 6 days.
  55. 18-030958; vehicle was reported stolen by San Leandro PD; on 06/21/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 1200 block of 106<sup>th</sup> Ave. The vehicle was occupied and being driven. A stop was initiated and the driver and 2 passengers exited the vehicle. The driver was detained and eventually arrested. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
  56. 18-028277; vehicle was reported stolen on 06/06/2018; on 06/09/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving in the 900 block of 32<sup>nd</sup> St. The vehicle was parked and had two occupants. Officers approached the vehicle and detained the two occupants. Both were later determined to not be the driver of the vehicle and were released. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: 3 days.
  57. 18-028347; vehicle was reported stolen by San Leandro BART PD; on 06/07/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on Genoa St. approaching Arlington Ave. The vehicle, which was parked and unoccupied, was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
  58. 18-029589; vehicle was reported stolen on 06/13/2018; on 06/15/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 7000 block of Hawley St. The vehicle, which was parked and unoccupied, was recovered, the registered owner was contacted and the vehicle released to them. Age of data: 2 days.
  59. 18-029643; vehicle was reported stolen by San Mateo SO; on 06/14/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 800 block of Filbert St. The vehicle was parked with an occupant in the driver's seat who appeared to be asleep. The officer's approached the vehicle and found drug paraphernalia on the occupant's lap. The officers opened the driver side front door and took the occupant into custody. A .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol, which was loaded, was recovered from a backpack in the vehicle. The suspect was arrested for vehicle theft, unlawful possession of a firearm, and possession of a controlled substance. The vehicle was recovered, processed, and towed. Age of data: Unknown
  60. 18-047164; rental vehicle was reported stolen on 09/17/2018; on 09/27/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 2500 block of MacArthur Blvd. The officer observed the vehicle and performed a stop on the vehicle and detained the driver, who was eventually arrested. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: 10 days.
  61. 18-030401; vehicle was reported stolen on 06/18/2018; on 06/23/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 400 block of 45<sup>th</sup> St. The officer then detained and eventually arrested the driver. The vehicle was recovered and released to the registered owner. Age of data: 5 days.

62. 18-032872; vehicle was reported stolen by San Francisco PD; on 07/02/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 2000 block of Fruitvale Ave. The vehicle was occupied and being driven. The officer performed a stop and detained and eventually arrested the driver. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown
63. 18-035234; vehicle was reported stolen on 07/15/2018; on 7/25/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 1800 block of Park Blvd. The vehicle was parked and unoccupied. The vehicle was recovered and released to the registered owner. Age of data: 10 days.
64. 18-035545; vehicle was reported carjacked on 07/17/2018; on 07/23/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 2300 block of East 17<sup>th</sup> St. The vehicle was parked with the passenger side door open and illuminated brake lights. An occupant was observed sitting in the passenger seat was detained and began to walk away. The occupant indicated the need for medical assistance. The suspect was transported to a local hospital, the vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: 6 days.
65. 18-036708; vehicle was reported stolen on 07/23/2018; on 07/24/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 3900 block of Martin Luther King Jr Way. The vehicle was occupied and being driven. The driver was arrested. The vehicle was recovered and released to the owner. Age of data: less than one day.
66. 18-037409; vehicle was reported stolen on 07/27/2018; on 08/09/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while in the Greyhound Parking Lot located at 2103 San Pablo Ave. The vehicle was parked with two occupants. Both occupants were detained and the registered owner was called who stated they already found the vehicle. The detainees were released from the scene without incident and the vehicle was removed from SVS. Age of data: 13 days.
67. 18-037413; vehicle was reported stolen by Vallejo PD; on 07/27/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 2200 Block of Fruitvale Ave. The vehicle was occupied and driving in the opposite direction. The officer performed an enforcement stop and detained the driver, ultimately arresting him. The vehicle was recovered and towed as the registered owner was not available. Age of data: Unknown.
68. 18-038390; vehicle was reported stolen by Hayward PD; on 08/01/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 9600 block of B St. The vehicle was occupied and parked. Officers approached the vehicle and asked the vehicle occupant to exit the vehicle, he was detained and eventually arrested. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
69. 18-038218; vehicle was reported stolen by San Mateo Sheriff's Office; on 07/31/2018; OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 4400 block of San Pablo Ave. The vehicle was occupied and being driven. The driver was detained. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
70. 18-038277; vehicle was reported stolen on 07/31/2018; on 08/18/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 400 block of 3<sup>rd</sup> St. The vehicle was parked and unoccupied. The registered owner was contacted and she was able to recover and start/drive the vehicle. Age of data: 19 days.
71. 18-041202; vehicle was reported stolen by Concord PD; on 08/16/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 9400 block of Hillside St. The vehicle was parked and unoccupied. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.

72. 18-040484; vehicle was reported stolen on 08/12/2018; on 09/01/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 3800 block of High St. The vehicle was parked and unoccupied. The owner had a family member pick up the vehicle from the scene. Age of data: 20 days.
73. 18-045025; vehicle was reported stolen by Rohnert Park PD; on 09/05/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 600 block of Tyler St. The vehicle was parked and unoccupied. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
74. 18-044650; rental vehicle was reported stolen by Alameda County Sherriff's Office; on 09/03/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 6300 block of Avenal. The driver was asked to exit the vehicle and detained. The passenger was also detained. Both would eventually be placed under arrest. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
75. 18-044086; vehicle was reported stolen by Berkeley PD; on 08/31/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on Lancaster St. approaching East 7<sup>th</sup> Street. The vehicle was parked and unoccupied. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
76. 18-046652; vehicle was reported stolen by Emeryville PD; on 09/14/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 950 block of 46<sup>th</sup> St. The vehicle was parked, unoccupied and had a punched ignition. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
77. 18-044728; vehicle was reported stolen by Vallejo PD; on 09/04/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on 12<sup>th</sup> St. near Wood St. The vehicle was unoccupied and double parked. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
78. 18-044916; vehicle was reported stolen by Hayward PD; on 09/05/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 1200 block of 7<sup>th</sup> Ave. The vehicle was being driven and had one visible passenger. The driver and passenger were detained and the driver was eventually arrested. The passenger was released. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
79. 18-045275; vehicle was reported stolen on 09/06/2018; on 10/11/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on 59<sup>th</sup> St. near Shattuck Ave. The vehicle was parked, unoccupied, and had two parking citations. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: 35 days.
80. 18-046864; vehicle was reported stolen by Albany PD; on 09/15/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while stopped on the 4100 block of Linden St by a moving vehicle. The officer conducted an enforcement stop and ordered the driver out of the vehicle. The driver was detained. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
81. 18-049830; vehicle was reported stolen by San Jose PD; on 10/01/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while traveling on the 2300 block of 100<sup>th</sup> Ave. The vehicle was unoccupied, parked, had the windows down and had a parking citation on the windshield. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
82. 18-048126; vehicle was reported stolen on 09/22/2018; on 10/01/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 1500 block of 76<sup>th</sup> Ave. The vehicle was occupied and being driven in front of the officers. The officers then conducted an enforcement stop, detaining and eventually arresting the driver. Narcotics were found on the driver. The vehicle was recovered and released to the registered owner. Age of data: 9 days.
83. 18-048859; vehicle was reported stolen on 09/26/2018; on 10/08/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 9000 block of Holly St. The vehicle was unoccupied and parked. The vehicle was recovered and released to the registered owner. Age of data: 12 days.
84. 18-049585; vehicle was reported stolen on 09/30/2018; on 10/01/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 2200 block of Auseon Ave. The vehicle was unoccupied, parked, had the

- windows down, hood propped open, and a missing battery. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Less than one day.
85. 18-050226; vehicle reported missing by CHP Castro Valley; on 10/03/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 8800 block of D St. The vehicle was unoccupied and parked. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
  86. 18-051095; vehicle was reported missing on 10/08/2018; on 10/11/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit on a moving and occupied vehicle while driving on the 10600 block of Russet St. The officers pulled behind the vehicle and it parked. The driver exited the vehicle and started walking away. The officers detained the driver and eventually arrested them. A shaved key was found on the driver in addition to narcotics paraphernalia. The vehicle was recovered and released to the registered owner. Age of data: 3 days.
  87. 18-051452; vehicle was reported stolen by Hayward PD; on 10/10/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 2200 Block of East 12<sup>th</sup> St. The vehicle was parked and occupied. The vehicle had mismatched plates with one of them being reported as stolen. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
  88. 18-051538; vehicle was reported stolen on 10/10/2018; on 10/14/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 4100 block of Shafter Ave. The vehicle was parked, unoccupied and unlocked. A messy search had been conducted in the vehicle. The vehicle was recovered and released to the registered owner. Age of data: 4 days.
  89. 18-056673; vehicle was reported stolen on 11/08/2018; on 11/08/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while being parked on the 3000 block of Fruitvale Ave. The vehicle had passed the officers and had at least one occupant. The driver was arrested, the vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: less than one day.
  90. 18-052122; vehicle was reported stolen by Emeryville PD; on 10/14/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 5600 block of Lowell St. The vehicle was parked, unoccupied, and had a forced ignition. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
  91. 18-052446; vehicle was reported stolen on 10/15/2018; on 10/20/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while parked on the 300 block of Adams St. The vehicle was parked, unoccupied, secured, and showed no sign of forced entry. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: 5 days.
  92. 18-052517; vehicle was reported stolen on 10/16/2018; on 10/17/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 2600 block of Fruitvale Ave. The vehicle was occupied and being driven. The officers conducted an enforcement stop and the driver immediately parked, exited the vehicle and began to walk away. The driver was subsequently arrested, the vehicle was recovered and released to the registered owner. Age of data: one day.
  93. 18-053328; vehicle was reported stolen on 10/20/2018; on 10/22/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 600 block of East 11<sup>th</sup> St. The officers conducted an enforcement stop and detained the individual. The individual was placed under arrest, the vehicle was recovered and released to the registered owner. Age of data: 2 days.
  94. 18-053923; vehicle was reported stolen by Contra Costa CHP; on 10/23/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 1100 block of Foothill Blvd. The vehicle was parked, unoccupied, and had a forced ignition as the officer was able to start the car with his patrol car key. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
  95. 18-054669; a rental vehicle was reported stolen by San Jose PD; on 10/27/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving near 23<sup>rd</sup> Ave and East 12<sup>th</sup> St. The officers began to search for the vehicle

- and found it in a nearby parking lot. The driver was detained and placed under arrest. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
96. 18-055179; vehicle was reported stolen by San Leandro PD; on 10/30/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 1100 block of 62<sup>nd</sup> St. The vehicle was parked and unoccupied. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
97. 18-055786; rental vehicle was reported missing by San Jose PD; on 11/03/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 2700 block of Fruitvale Ave. The vehicle was occupied and being driven, so the officer conducted an enforcement stop. The driver was detained and released during the investigation. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
98. 18-055919; vehicle was reported stolen by San Leandro PD; on 11/04/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while parked on the 2400 block of East 12<sup>th</sup> St. The vehicle was occupied and being driven so an enforcement stop was conducted. The driver and passenger were detained. The driver was eventually arrested and the passenger was released. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
99. 18-057704; vehicle was reported stolen on 11/14/2018; on 11/18/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while doing a security check on 69<sup>th</sup> Ave south of International Blvd. The vehicle was parked and unoccupied. The vehicle was recovered and released to the registered owner. Age of data: 4 days.
100. 18-060070; vehicle was reported stolen by San Jose PD; on 11/28/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 2400 block of 90<sup>th</sup> Ave. The vehicle was occupied and being driven so an enforcement stop was conducted. The driver and passenger were detained and the officers noted the ignition has been forced. The driver was eventually arrested and the passenger was released. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
101. 18-59848; vehicle was reported stolen on 11/27/2018; on 12/04/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 3000 block of 64<sup>th</sup> Ave. The vehicle was parked, unoccupied, and had a punched ignition. The vehicle was recovered and the registered owner was contacted, but they were unable to pick up the vehicle, so it was towed. Age of data: 7 days.
102. 18-058377; vehicle was reported stolen on 11/18/2018; on 11/25/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while patrolling 7700 MacArthur Blvd. The vehicle was occupied and being driven. Upon noticing the officer, the driver left the vehicle and an enforcement stop was conducted with the driver being detained and eventually being placed under arrest. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: 7 days.
103. 18-059887; vehicle was reported stolen by San Leandro PD; on 11/27/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 1100 block of 102<sup>nd</sup> Ave. The vehicle was parked, unoccupied, had a fresh smell of marijuana, and had a punched ignition. The vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
104. 18-061851; vehicle was reported stolen on 12/08/2018; on 12/10/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 2000 block of Montana St. The vehicle was parked, unoccupied, and the ignition seemed intact. The registered owner was contacted but did not answer; the car was recovered and towed. Age of data: 2 days.
105. 18-062010; vehicle was reported stolen by San Leandro PD; on 12/09/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 3000 block of Maple Ave. The vehicle as parked, unoccupied, unlocked, had the interior stripped and had damage to the ignition. The vehicle was recovered

and released to the registered owner who said he would have AAA tow the vehicle. Age of data: Unknown.

106. 18-063724; vehicle was reported stolen by Concord PD; on 12/18/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 6300 block of MacArthur Blvd. The vehicle was located and being driven. The driver was eventually arrested, the vehicle was recovered and towed. Age of data: Unknown.
107. 18-064170; vehicle was reported stolen on 12/21/2018; on 12/24/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 1100 block of 7<sup>th</sup> Ave. The vehicle was parked and unoccupied. The vehicle was recovered, the registered owner contacted, and the vehicle released to them. Age of data: 3 days.
108. 18-064321; vehicle was reported stolen on 12/22/2018; on 12/23/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 1100 block on East 12<sup>th</sup> St. The vehicle was parked, unoccupied, and locked. The vehicle was recovered, the registered owner contacted, and the vehicle was released to them. Age of data: 1 day
109. 18-064626; vehicle was reported stolen on 12/24/2018; on 12/25/2018 OPD had an ALPR hit while driving on the 1100 block of 11<sup>th</sup> Ave. The vehicle was parked and unoccupied. The vehicle was recovered and the registered owner was contacted. The vehicle was towed as contact could not be made with the registered owner. Age of data; less than 1 day.

Summary:

- Of the 109 cases – age of data was unknown in approximately 53 incidents.
  - The age of data ranged from 1 day to over 1 year.
  - The raw average for the age of data was 19.88 days.
1. 20-000094 1/3/2020: Oakland Police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 1/1/20. Two days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. Officers recovered the vehicle from the 800 Blk of 35th Street. Age of Data 2 days.
  2. 20-001459 1/8/2020: Hayward police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 1/4/20. Four days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. Officers recovered the vehicle from the 1500 Blk of 32nd Street. Age of Data 4 days.
  3. 20-005991 2/21/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 1/31/20. Twenty one days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. Officers recovered the vehicle from the 1200 blk of E 17th St. Age of Data 22 days.

4. 20-004363 1/26/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 1/23/20. Three days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. Officers were able to set up surveillance on the vehicle and observe the suspect return to the vehicle. The suspect drove the vehicle away and was stopped a short distance later where he was arrested. The vehicle was then recovered from the 1700 Blk of International Blvd. Age of Data 3 days.
5. 20-005852 1/30/2020: San Francisco police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 1/25/20. Five days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 900 Blk of Adeline Street. Age of Data 5 days.
6. 20-007296 2/22/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 2/6/20. Sixteen days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted to the stolen vehicle by their vehicle ALPR system. The officer conducted a vehicle stop on the vehicle where they arrested a parolee who was driving the vehicle. The vehicle was then recovered from the 1600 Blk of 84th Ave. Age of Data 16 days.
7. 20-007088 2/5/2020: San Jose police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 2/1/20. Four days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 300 Blk of Chestnut Street. Age of Data 4 days.
8. 20-009430 2/18/2020: Emeryville police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 2/11/20. Seven days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 1500 block of E 17th St. Age of Data 7 days.
9. 20-009783 2/19/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 2/12/20. Seven days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. Officers observed a suspect in the vehicle. The suspect was arrested and showed to be on probation for theft. The vehicle was then recovered from the parking lot of 5701 Foothill Blvd. Age of Data 7 days.
10. 20-010282 2/26/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 2/22/20. Four days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 4400 Blk of Macarthur Blvd. Age of Data 4 days.

- 11.20-009885 2/26/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 2/20/20. Six days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 3650 Blk of Greenacre Rd. Age of Data 6 days.
- 12.20-011144 3/5/2020: Oakland technician took a report of a stolen vehicle on 2/26/2020. Seven days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 600 block of Sycamore Street. Age of Data 7 days.
- 13.20-011926 3/4/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 3/2/20. Two days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 1900 blk of 8th Ave. Age of Data 2 days.
- 14.20-011826 3/1/2020: San Francisco police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle. Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 2800 block of School St.
- 15.20-012142 3/3/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 3/2/20. One day later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 800 Blk of 77th Ave. Age of Data 1 day.
- 16.20-012178 3/3/2020: San Leandro police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle. Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 1000 Blk of 77th Ave.
- 17.20-012182 3/3/2020: Hayward police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle. Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 7600 Blk of Spencer St.
- 18.20-012187 3/3/2020: Salinas police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle. Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 800 Blk of 77<sup>th</sup> Ave.



- 19.20-012378 3/5/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 3/3/20. Two days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 1900 blk of 11th Ave. Age of Data 2 days.
- 20.20-014139 3/18/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 3/12/20. Six days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 2500 blk of 11th Ave. Age of data 6 days.
- 21.20-014288 4/6/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a carjacking on 3/13/20. Twenty four days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted to the carjacked vehicle parked on the side of the road by their vehicle ALPR system. Officers set up surveillance on the vehicle and a suspect was arrested for possession of the stolen vehicle. The vehicle was then recovered from the 2200 Blk of E 20<sup>th</sup> St. Age of Data 24 days.
- 22.20-014273 3/13/2020: San Mateo police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 2/21/20. Twenty three days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted to a stolen vehicle driving in the 1000 block of Pine St by their vehicle ALPR system. Officers stopped the vehicle and arrested two suspects out of the vehicle. The vehicle was then recovered. Age of Data 23 days.
- 23.20-014139 3/18/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 3/12/20. Six days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 2500 blk of 11th Ave. Age of Data 6 days.
- 24.20-015252 5/15/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 3/20/20. Fifty Six days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 3300 block of E 16th St. Age of Data 56 days.
- 25.20-016962 4/8/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a carjacking on 3/30/20. Nine days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted to the carjacked vehicle parked on the side of the road by their vehicle ALPR system. A suspect was observed in the vehicle. The suspect was arrested. The vehicle was recovered from the 1400 Blk of 16th Ave. Age of Data 9 days.
- 26.20-017760 4/4/2020: San Leandro police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 3/31/20. Four days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of

the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 1100 Blk of 2nd Ave. Age of Data 4 days.

27. 20-017979 4/10/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 4/6/20. Four days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 1800 Blk of E 15<sup>th</sup> St. Age of Data 4 days.
28. 20-018110 4/10/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 4/7/20. Three days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. A suspect was in the vehicle and was on probation for stealing vehicles. The suspect was arrested. The vehicle was then recovered from the 3900 blk of Alameda Ave. Age of Data 3 days.
29. 20-019320 4/17/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of an embezzled vehicle on 4/15/20. Two days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. A suspect was in the vehicle and was arrested for the embezzlement of the vehicle. The suspect was on probation for stealing a vehicle. The vehicle was then recovered from the 1400 block of Lakeshore Ave. Age of Data 2 days.
30. 20-018994 4/22/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 4/13/20. Nine days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 2500 Blk of High St. Age of Data 9 days.
31. 20-019089 4/17/2020: Oakland technician took a report of a stolen vehicle on 4/13/20. Four days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 900 block of 10th Ave. Age of Data 4 days.
32. 20-019145 4/15/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 4/14/20. One day later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted to a stolen vehicle by the vehicle ALPR system. The vehicle was being driven in the 8400 Blk of San Leandro St. The driver was able to evade officers and fled. Age of Data 1 day.
33. 20-020185 4/21/2020: San Leandro police officers took a report of a stolen vehicle on 4/17/2020. Four days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted by their vehicle ALPR system that there was a stolen vehicle parked on the side of the road. The vehicle was then recovered from the 2700 block of 10th Ave. Age of Data 4 days.

- 34.20-036667 7/25/2020: Patrol Officers were alerted by the ALPR system affixed on top of their patrol vehicle of a Stolen Vehicle parked on the street in the 1400 block of 19<sup>th</sup> Ave. The vehicle was occupied by Two (2) individuals who fled and were later detained by officers. Two (2) Loaded Firearms were recovered with additional ammo kept on their person. A large amount of Narcotics were also seized as well scales and small individual baggies. Both individuals were arrested for the above detailed offences. Age of Data 4 days.
- 35.20-057145 11/20/2020: Patrol Officers were alerted by the ALPR system affixed on top of their patrol vehicle of Stolen Vehicle. Officers on viewed the stolen vehicle traveling east bound on the 6500 block Foothill Blvd. One (1) individual fled the vehicle and was later arrested by on viewing Officers for Vehicle Theft and Being in Possession of Stolen Property. Age of data missing.
- 36.20-043136 8/30/2020: Patrol Officers were alerted by the ALPR system affixed on top their patrol vehicle traveling southbound on the 1100 block 9<sup>th</sup> Ave. Two(2) individuals were taken into custody without incident. Officers located Loaded Firearm on one of the individuals. Both individuals were arrested for being in possession of a stolen vehicle as well as various Firearm charges. Age of Data 8 days.
- 37.20-019145 4/15/2020: Patrol Officers were alerted by the ALPR system affixed on top their patrol vehicle of a stolen vehicle traveling on the east bound on the 6900 block of San Leandro St. Officers attempted to detain the occupants of the vehicle but the occupants fled at a high rate of speed. Officers elected to not continue further action. Suspects still outstanding. Age of Data 1 day.
- 38.20-059390 12/05/2020: Patrol Officers were alerted by the ALPR system affixed on top of their vehicle of a stolen vehicle traveling west bound on Highway 580 on Seminary Ave. One (1) individual was taken into custody without incident. The suspect was charged with Vehicle Theft and in Possession of a Stolen vehicle. Age of Data 2 days.
- 39.20-063338 12/28/2020: While on Patrol Officers located an unoccupied Stolen vehicle at 201 Embarcadero (Estuary Park). Officers were alerted by their ALPR system affixed on top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Age of Data 1 day.
- 40.20-060937 12/12/2020: While on Patrol Officers located an unoccupied Stolen vehicle on the 800 block of Pine St. Officers were alerted by their ALPR system affixed on top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Age of data 25 Days.

41. 20-059195 12/11/2020: While on Patrol Officers located a unoccupied Stolen vehicle in the area of Macarthur Ave and Pierson St. Officers were alerted by their ALPR system affixed on top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Age of Data 8 days.
42. 20-054176 11/2/2020: While on Patrol Officers located an unoccupied Stolen Vehicle on the 800 block of Broadway. Officers were alerted by their ALPR system affixed on top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Age of Data 4 days.
43. 20-058452 11/28/2020: While on Patrol near 7<sup>th</sup> St and Campbell St, Officers were alerted by their ALPR system affixed on top of their vehicle of a Stolen Vehicle. Officers detained One (1) individual without incident. The individual was later arrested for Vehicle theft and possession of a Stolen Vehicle. Age of Data missing.
44. 20-036580 11/27/2020: While on Patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle on the 600 block of 32<sup>nd</sup> St. Officers were alerted by the ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol Vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Age of Data 1 day.
45. 20-057842 11/24/2020: While on Patrol Officers were alerted of a Stolen Vehicle traveling southbound on the 2600 block of Fruitvale. Officers were alerted on the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol Vehicle. One (1) Individual was taken into custody without incident. The individual was arrested for Vehicle Theft. Age of Data 1 day.
46. 20-057430 11/22/2020: While on Patrol Officers were alerted of a Stolen Vehicle traveling south bound on the 16<sup>th</sup> Ave bridge heading towards Embarcadero Ave. Officers were alerted by the ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol Vehicle. One(1) individual was taken into custody without incident. That individual was arrested for vehicle theft, possession of a stolen vehicle, and in possession of marijuana. Age of Data 14 days.
47. 20-057357 11/21/2020: While on Patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle on the 1300 block of 5<sup>th</sup> St. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to the top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Age of Data 4 days.
48. 20-047595 11/15/2020: While on Patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle on the 4500 block of Roberts Ave. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to the top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 9/25/2020.
49. 20-056291 11/15/2020: While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle IFO 1643 8<sup>th</sup> St. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR

system affixed to top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 11/15/2020.

- 50.20-049020 11/11/2020: While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle on the 1200 block 12<sup>th</sup> St. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to the top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of theft 9/19/2020.
- 51.20-052629 11/09/2020: While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle on the 3400 block of Magnolia. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to the top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 11/08/2020.
- 52.20-054734 11/08/2020: While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle on the 2200 block of E 19<sup>th</sup> St. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to the top of their patrol vehicle. The vehicle had been carjacked earlier that week. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 11/05/2020.
- 53.20-055061 11/14/2020: While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle on the 3200 block of Kingsland Ave. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to the top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 11/08/2020.
- 54.20-054880 11/07/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system that is affixed on top of their patrol vehicle of a stolen vehicle traveling south bound on the 1200 block of 19<sup>th</sup> Ave. One (1) individual was taken into custody without incident. The individual was arrested for an outstanding Felony Bench warrant as well as for stolen vehicle and knowingly being in possession of a stolen vehicle. This individual was on probation for various past crimes including stealing vehicles. Date of Theft 11/06/2020.
- 55.20-053512 11/02/2020: While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle on the 1700 block of 16<sup>th</sup> St. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 10/29/2020.
- 56.20-054063 11/2/2020: While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle on the 2600 block of Chestnut. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 10/29/2020.
- 57.20-053879 11/1/2020: While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle on the 800 block Mandela Parkway. Officers were alerted of the stolen

vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 8/1/2020.

- 58.20-052301 10/27/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by the ALPR system affixed to the top of their patrol vehicle of a stolen vehicle traveling west bound on the 1700 block of E 12<sup>th</sup> St. One (1) individual was taken into custody without incident. The individual was arrested for vehicle theft, being possession of a stolen vehicle, and probation violation. Date of Theft 10/23/2020.
- 59.20-052736 10/26/2020: While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle on the 300 block of Peralta. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 10/13/2020.
- 60.20-052724 10/25/2020: Robbery Investigator sent out a department wide email on 07 Aug 20 detailing the robbery and sent an Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) photo of the suspect vehicle. Field contact reports of occupants inside the suspect vehicle were requested. Officers viewed this email, including the attached suspect vehicle photo. The subject was also wanted in connection to a murder investigation. Officers used ALPRS hits to track down known location of the suspect and patterns of places traveled. Officers located the suspect vehicle and that individual was taken into custody and transported to CID investigations. Date of original incident 08/7/2020 2 Months Apart.
- 61.20-052629 10/25/2020: While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle IFO 3420 Magnolia St. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 10/15/2020.
- 62.20-052428 10/23/2020: While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle IFO 3420 Magnolia St. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 10/20/2020.
- 63.20-053299 10/23/2020: Outside Agency Report No.: Berkeley Report 20-48997 While on patrol Officers located an unoccupied stolen vehicle IFO 100 Admiral Toney Way. Officers were alerted of the stolen vehicle by the ALPR system affixed to top of their patrol vehicle. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 11/23/20.
- 64.20-051391 10/27/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to a unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 900 block of 10<sup>th</sup> St. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 10/23/2020.

- 65.20-040168 10/6/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to a unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 900 block of 10<sup>th</sup> St. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 10/6/2020.
- 66.20-049103 10/6/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked IFO 1212 Center St. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 10/4/2020.
- 67.20-048660 10/5/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by the ALPR system affixed to the top of their patrol vehicle of a stolen vehicle parked in the lot of 3232 Foothill Blvd. One (1) individual was taken into custody without incident. The individual was arrested for vehicle theft, being possession of a stolen vehicle, and probation violation. Date of Theft 10/1/2020.
- 68.20-049020 10/11/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 1200 block of Peralta St. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 9/19/2020.
- 69.20-049008 10/3/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system of a stolen vehicle traveling west bound on the 1500 block of E 12<sup>th</sup> St. The Officers were alerted by ALPR system affixed on top of their vehicle. One (1) individual was taken into custody without incident. This individual was later arrested for stolen vehicle and possession of burglary tools. Date of Theft 9/3/2020.
- 70.20-049103 10/4/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 1200 block of Center St. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 10/4/2020.
- 71.20-048696 11/1/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 3400 block West St. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 10/1/2020.
- 72.20-47676 9/25/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the area of Rilea Wy and Kellar Ave. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Suspect still outstanding.

- 73.20-047595 11/15/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 4500 block of Roberts Ave. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Date of Theft 9/25/2020.
- 74.20-042657 8/28/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system on a Stolen License plate on a vehicle that later identified as a stolen vehicle. Officers used the ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol vehicle. Two (2) individuals were detained pending further investigation. One (1) individual was later arrested after determining that the vehicle was stolen after a file check of the vehicles VIN. Date of theft 5/7/2020.
- 75.20-035085 8/22/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system on a Stolen Vehicle traveling east bound on the 2600 block of E 12<sup>th</sup> St. Officers used the ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol vehicle. Two (2) individuals were detained for further investigation. One (1) individual was later arrested for stolen vehicle and probation violation for committing a felony while on probation. Date of Theft 7/16/2020.
- 76.20-037402 8/20/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 3500 block of Diamond Ave. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 7/29/2020.
- 77.20-038282 8/20/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system on a Stolen Vehicle traveling south bound on the 3500 block of Fruitvale Ave. Officers used the ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol vehicle. One (1) individual was detained for further investigation. That individual was later arrested for stolen vehicle and possession of a stolen vehicle. Date of Theft 8/3/2020.
- 78.20-040555 8/6/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 4600 block of Meldon Ave. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 7/28/2020.
- 79.20-040352 8/14/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system on a Stolen Vehicle traveling north bound on the 1100 block of 16<sup>th</sup> Ave. The ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol vehicle alerted the Officers and the Officers confirmed that the vehicle was indeed stolen. One (1) individual was



detained for further investigation. That individual was later arrested for stolen vehicle and possession of a stolen vehicle. Date of Theft was 8/12/2020.

- 80.20-040168 10/6/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 2400 block 21<sup>st</sup> Ave. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. After verifying the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. The owner of the vehicle was very happy to be able to recover his vehicle. Date of Theft 8/13/2020.
- 81.20-038507 8/4/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system on a Stolen Vehicle traveling east bound 2100 block of International blvd. The ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol vehicle alerted the Officers and the Officers confirmed that the vehicle was indeed stolen. One (1) individual was detained for further investigation. That individual was later arrested for stolen vehicle, possession of a stolen vehicle and parole violation. Date of theft 8/3/2020.
- 82.20-037670 7/31/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system on a Stolen Vehicle traveling east bound 1400 block of 19<sup>th</sup> Ave. The ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol vehicle alerted the Officers and the Officers confirmed that the vehicle was indeed stolen. One (1) individual was detained following a foot pursuit. A firearm was recovered. That individual was later arrested for stolen vehicle, possession of a stolen vehicle, Various firearm charges (Loaded firearm in public, concealed loaded firearm in vehicle), and a probation violation. Date of Theft 7/21/2020.
- 83.20-036747 7/26/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 200 block of Wayne Ave. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. After verifying the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. The registered owner was notified and later arrived on scene and was very happy to retake ownership of his vehicle.
- 84.20-036580 7/25/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 600 block of 32<sup>nd</sup> St. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding.
- 85.20-035588 7/20/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the Helen St. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle

and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 7/5/20.

86. 20-035206 Outside Agency Report No.: Suisun PD 20-1881 7/18/20:  
While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system on a Stolen Vehicle traveling east bound 700 block of 17<sup>th</sup> St. The ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol vehicle alerted the Officers and the Officers confirmed that the vehicle was indeed stolen. Three (3) individuals were detained. One (1) individual was determined to be the driver was later arrested for stolen vehicle, possession of a stolen vehicle, and a probation violation. Date of Theft 7/13/20.
87. 20-034760 7/16/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 1000 block of E 20<sup>th</sup> St. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding.
88. 20-034795 Outside Agency Report No.: Richmond PD# 20-6125 7/15/20:  
While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the W. Macarthur Ave. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding.
89. 20-031006 Outside Agency Report No.: Berkeley PD 20-29303 6/25/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 3300 block of 13<sup>th</sup> Ave. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding.
90. 20-036747 7/26/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 200 block of Wayne. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding.
91. 20-026866 5/31/20: Officers observed a vehicle fleeing the area at a high rate of speed after a fire had been set near the OPD gas pumps (6<sup>th</sup> St and Washington St). Officers attempted to conduct a stop of the vehicle but lost the vehicle as it fled from Officers. Officers conducted an ALPR search for past hits throughout Oakland. The search resulted with the suspect vehicle parked on the 2300 block of E15th St. Officers searched the area and located the suspect

vehicle on the 1500 block of Miller St. The suspect was arrested for fleeing and Arson.

92. 20-021377 5/20/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 2000 block of 13<sup>th</sup> Ave. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding.
93. 20-025087 Outside Agency Report No.: San Francisco 200277033 5/20/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 1300 block of E 20<sup>th</sup> St. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding.
94. 20-024942 Outside Agency Report No.: San Pablo S20-1363 5/19/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 1700 7<sup>th</sup> Ave. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding.
95. 20-024499 5/19/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 2500 block 10<sup>th</sup> Ave. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. One (1) of the license plates had been switched with another stolen license plate of another similar vehicle. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding.
96. 20-024795 5/19/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by the ALPR system of a stolen vehicle traveling south bound on the 1900 block of Embarcadero. The ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol vehicle alerted the Officers and the Officers confirmed that the vehicle was indeed stolen. One (1) individual was detained for further investigation. That individual was later arrested for stolen vehicle, possession of a stolen vehicle and an Ex-felon in possession of Body Armor.
97. 20-015252 5/15/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 3300 block of E 16<sup>th</sup> St. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding. Date of Theft 3/19/20.

98.20-021429 5/1/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 2600 block of E 27<sup>th</sup> St. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding.

99.20-021830 4/30/20: While On patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system of a stolen vehicle parked on the 4500 block of Macarthur Blvd. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. An individual was detained without incident pending further investigation. After conducting a file check, it was determined that the plates had been switched. One (1) of the license plates had been switched with another stolen license plate of another similar vehicle. The individual was later cited and release for Burglary Tools.

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## Appendix B:

### Automated License Plate Use Cases

#### **19-017673 & 19-021729**

LPR was used to match suspect vehicle which resulted in the recovery of multiple firearms and the arrest of three suspects. (Data age 5 months).

#### **20-042436**

On August 26, 2020 a residential burglary occurred. The suspect vehicle description and license plate number were obtained and the ALPR system was queried. The system showed a recent location where the vehicle had been parked. The vehicle information along with the location where the vehicle was seen parked were disseminated to officers for extra patrols in the area to search for the vehicle. (Data age 3 months)

#### **20-042543**

On August 27, 2020 an armed robbery occurred. A suspect vehicle license plate was obtained, and an ALPR query was conducted. A picture showing distinctive things about the vehicle was obtained from the system and it was disseminated to officers. (Data age 3 months)

#### **20-054741**

On November 5, 2020 a patrol unit received an alert on their vehicle computer that their ALPR system had just identified a stolen vehicle. The officers confirmed that the vehicle was stolen and conducted a high-risk vehicle stop on the vehicle. The driver was arrested for the stolen vehicle and a search of the vehicle was conducted. Officers found explosives, two firearms, ammunition, counterfeit money, and marijuana for sales. (Real Time Usage)

#### **20-054097**

On November 2, 2020 an accident occurred in the city of Oakland, The driver of one of the vehicles refused to exchange information with the other driver and instead retrieved a firearm from his vehicle and proceeded to rob the other driver at gunpoint. When officers arrived on scene the victim of the robbery provided them with the license plate of the suspect vehicle. Officers queried the ALPR system which revealed a match to the suspect vehicle. Officers were able to locate the vehicle which resulted in additional evidence. (Data Age 3 months)

#### **20-057415**

On November 22, 2020 an armed carjacking occurred. An armed suspect approached a vehicle and ordered the victim out of the vehicle at gunpoint. The suspect then fled with the vehicle. The investigator used the ALPR system to locate a photograph of the vehicle which was disseminated to officers. The vehicle was later located. (Data age 6 months)

#### **20-032901**

On July 5, 2020 a suspect physically assaulted a victim by punching her in the head ten to

twelve times and then stole her property. The victim was able to give the suspects license plate to officers. An ALPR query was conducted which revealed a picture of the vehicle which was disseminated to officers. (Data age 2 months)

**20-038069**

On August 2, 2020 a strong-armed carjacking occurred. The victim was being followed by two vehicles which boxed him in preventing his escape. The suspects pulled the victim from the vehicle and proceeded to punch and kick him. The suspects then fled with the victim's vehicle. The Investigator ran a query of the victim vehicle license plate in the ALPR system which revealed a photo of vehicle. The photograph was disseminated to officers. (Data age 1 month)

**20-058470**

On November 28, 2020 an armed carjacking occurred. Two suspects approached the victim who had just parked his car. The suspects proceeded to rob him at gunpoint and took his vehicle. The investigator ran a query in the ALPR system and obtained a photo of the victim's vehicle which he disseminated to officers. (Data age 1 month)

**20-042319**

On August 26, 2020 an attempted robbery occurred. A suspect approached the victim who was sitting in his car and pointed a firearm at him while trying to enter the vehicle. The victim was able to flee the scene and observed the suspect getting into a vehicle. The victim was able to see a partial plate on the suspect vehicle. The investigator was able to conduct an ALPR query on the partial plate and was able to identify a possible suspect vehicle and full license plate. The photograph of the vehicle was disseminated to officers. (Data age 3 months)

**20-063066**

On December 26, 2020 a residential burglary and assault with a deadly weapon occurred. The suspect entered the victim's basement and then left. Another victim followed the suspect who then shot at the victim and fled the area in a vehicle. Officers were able to obtain a partial license plate of the suspect vehicle. The investigator was able to conduct a partial plate query on the suspect vehicle which revealed a possible license plate and vehicle photo. The photograph was disseminated to officers. (Data age 1 month)

**20-003497**

On January 19, 2020 an assault on a police officer occurred. An Oakland Police officer in full uniform and in a fully marked patrol vehicle observed several motorcycles and ATVs driving recklessly. The officer attempted to conduct a vehicle stop for the reckless driving. One of the ATVs rammed the officer's driver door as he got out causing injury to the officer. An ALPR query on a Pickup truck license plate which had been transporting the Suspects and their ATVs was conducted which revealed a photograph of the suspect vehicle and common areas where the vehicle had been in the past. The photograph of the suspect vehicle was disseminated to officers. (Data age 4 months)

**20-004940**

On January 26, 2020 an assault with a deadly weapon occurred. The victim was assaulted by two suspects while in his vehicle. One of the suspects shot the victim in the neck and then both

suspects fled the scene in another vehicle. The license plate of the suspect vehicle was obtained, and an ALPR system query revealed a photograph of the vehicle. The photograph of the vehicle was disseminated to officers who were able to locate it. The vehicle was processed for evidence and the suspects were taken into custody. (Data age 6 months)

**21-002381**

On January 15, 2021 an armed robbery occurred. Two suspects approached two victims as they walked out of a sandwich shop and robbed them at gunpoint, physically ripping their purses out of their possession. The suspects fled in a vehicle and a partial license plate was obtained. Officers were able to conduct an ALPR system query which revealed a possible suspect vehicle with full license plate as well as matching damage as described by the victims. Officers disseminated the photograph of the vehicle along with the locations where the vehicle had been in the past. (Data age 1 year)

**21-002808**

On January 18, 2021 an armed robbery occurred. A suspect armed with a firearm approached victims who were exchanging groceries. The suspect pointed a firearm at the victims and robbed them. The suspect fled in a vehicle. A partial license plate was obtained for the suspect vehicle. Officers conducted an ALPR system query which revealed an entire license plate for the suspect vehicle. (Data age 1 month)

**21-04318**

On January 28, 2021 an assault with a deadly weapon occurred. A suspect vehicle was seen chasing and shooting at another vehicle. The suspect missed the intended vehicle and struck a passing vehicle with three people as well as a business. A license plate was obtained for the suspect vehicle and the Watch commander conducted an ALPR system query which revealed a photograph of the suspect vehicle. The photograph added additional details for officers to be able to locate the vehicle. (Data age 6 months)

**RD# 20-016214**

Missing Person + Homicide Case – A female was reported missing. During the CID investigation, a positive hit was recorded by an ALPR system (based on the vehicle license plate registered to the missing person). Officers responded, and her deceased remains were found in the truck of the vehicle. There is an ongoing homicide investigation. (Data age TBD)

**RD# 20-017986**

Human Trafficking Case – A juvenile was a victim of human trafficking. The CID investigator utilized ALPR to identify the suspect. The victim was safely relocated. A Ramey warrant<sup>9</sup> was authorized for the suspect's arrest. (Data age TBD)

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<sup>9</sup> A Ramey Warrant is an arrest warrant that is obtained by a police agency directly from a judge and bypassing the district attorney (DA) (who otherwise issues arrest warrants). In the interest of faster processing due to the nature of the crime and/or DA availability, a police agency may skip the district attorney and go directly to a judge. The police agency must submit a declaration, along with a report, to the judge setting out their reasons for requesting that the judge issue the warrant; the judge must believe that there is probable cause, and sufficient evidence that the suspect has committed a crime.

**RD# 20-017986**

Human Trafficking Case – A DOE was kidnapped and the victim was able to provide investigators with a license plate. Investigators inputted the license number into the OPD ALPR system so officers could identify a suspect if there was an ALPR hit. (Data age TBD)

**RD# 20-043740**

Human Trafficking Case – undercover OPD officers were working a sting operation when they were approached by a subject who attempted to kidnap them. The suspect was arrested and taken into custody, but his accomplice fled the scene. Body-worn camera (BWC) footage and officer observation captured the suspect vehicle. A Ramey warrant is now pending for the outstanding suspect. (Data age TBD)

**RD# 20-000543**

Sexual Assault – A person was sexually assaulted. ALPR was used to locate and arrest the suspect. This case has been charged by the DA's Office. (Data age TBD)

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## MEMORANDUM

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**TO:** LeRonne L. Armstrong  
Chief of Police,  
Chief of Police

**FROM:** Drennon Lindsey, Deputy Chief of Police  
OPD, Bureau of Investigations

**SUBJECT:** Automated License Plate  
Reader – 2019 Annual  
Report

**DATE:** October 1, 2021

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### **Background**

Oakland Police Department (OPD) ALPR Policy 430 (430.8 Agency Monitoring and Controls) states that the “ALPR Coordinator shall provide the Chief of Police and Public Safety Committee with an annual report for the previous 12-month period.” This report was completed in 2021, later than the requirement of ALPR Policy 430. OPD did not complete this report in 2020 or initially present it to the PAC and City Council as personnel were focused at this time on development of a new ALPR Policy. OPD’s ALPR Surveillance Use Policy (SUP) is still undergoing review by the PAC at the time of the production of this report.

### **2019 Annual Report Details**

- A. A description of how the surveillance technology was used, including the type and quantity of data gathered or analyzed by the technology:

*Table 1 shows the total scans by month – the total license plate photographs made and stored each month (7,871,254 total for the year). The table also shows the number of times the vehicle-based systems had a match (“hit”) with a California Department of Justice (CA DOJ) database (8,596 total for 2019). OPD’s very outdated ALPR system can only quantify these two figures; the system can no longer quantify individual queries or perform any audit functions, as the software is no longer supported from the original vendor. Prior to the loss in functionality, the system could run reports that detailed the reasons for queries (e.g. a type of criminal investigation). OPD can only provide more comprehensive use data if and when a newer ALPR system is acquired.*

**Table 1: 2019 OPD ALPR Scans and Hits**

Month	Year	Scans	Hits
Jan	Jan	718,492	918
Feb	Feb	709,900	786
Mar	Mar	859,603	757
Apr	Apr	653,588	646
May	May	677,340	744
Jun	Jun	772,016	694
Jul	Jul	817,540	840
Aug	Aug	731,297	742
Sep	Sep	523,283	569
Oct	Oct	508,108	637
Nov	Nov	483,950	615
Dec	Dec	416,137	648
<b>2019 Totals</b>		<b>7,871,254</b>	<b>8,596</b>

- B. Whether and how often data acquired through the use of the surveillance technology was shared with outside entities, the name of any recipient entity, the type(s) of data disclosed, under what legal standard(s) the information was disclosed, and the justification for the disclosure(s):

*The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had access to OPD ALPR data without following the standard data access request protocols outlined in Policy 430.9 "Releasing or Sharing ALPR Data." OPD has provided this level of access because there is a Council-approved Safe Streets Task Force Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)<sup>1</sup>. OPD believes that the Task Force MOU allowed for ALPR data-sharing with specific FBI agents who have been co-located with OPD in the Police Administration Building and worked- on homicide cases. However, OPD personnel ran an audit of ALPR data queries and discovered that there were no queries from these FBI personnel. OPD has decided to revoke access to FBI these agents as of 9/28/2021 to alleviate concerns over data privacy.*

*The following police agencies made specific requests to OPD for ALPR data related to specific criminal cases (the number to right of agency = amount of data requests):*

- *San Francisco Police Department - 4*
- *Fremont Police Department - 5*
- *Piedmont Police Department - 1*
- *Alameda County Sheriff's Office - 1*
- *Berkeley Police Department - 4*
- *California Highway Patrol - 1*
- *Alameda County District Attorney's Office - 1*
- *San Mateo County Sheriff's Office - 3*
- *Union City Police Department - 1*

<sup>1</sup> The mission of the FBI San Francisco Violent Crimes Safe Streets Task Force MOU is to identify and target for prosecution criminal enterprise groups and individual responsible for crimes of violence such as murder and aggravated assault, as well as other serious crimes. The MOU does not specifically address the sharing of ALPR data; however, the MOU does specifically articulate protocols for data sharing.

*OPD personnel provided the requested ALPR data in each of these data request cases, as each case complied with the Policy 430.9, including a request with name of agency, person making request, and intended purpose for the data with approvals being reviewed by authorized personnel with records maintained. OPD has developed new protocols and automated forms for internal tracking of future requests which will be part of future ALPR annual reports.*

- C. Where applicable, a breakdown of what physical objects the surveillance technology hardware was installed upon; using general descriptive terms so as not to reveal the specific location of such hardware; for surveillance technology software, a breakdown of what data sources the surveillance technology was applied to:

*The ALPR cameras are installed upon fully marked OPD patrol vehicles (29 operational; 6 inoperable).*

- D. Where applicable, a breakdown of where the surveillance technology was deployed geographically, by each police area in the relevant year:

*These vehicles are assigned to the Bureau of Field Operations I (administered out of the Police Administration Building in downtown Oakland) as well as Bureau of Field Operations II (administered from the Eastmont Substation). The vehicles are deployed throughout the City in a patrol function to allow for large areas of the City to have ALPR coverage as the patrol vehicles are used to respond to calls for police service.*

- E. A summary of community complaints or concerns about the surveillance technology, and an analysis of the technology's adopted use policy and whether it is adequate in protecting civil rights and civil liberties:

*Members of the public have spoken at PAC meetings regarding concerns of negative impacts to privacy protections (e.g., that OPD could use ALPR server data to establish travel patterns of particular vehicles associated with particular license plates, and/or that ALPR data can be inadvertently released through inadequate privacy protocols). OPD has also heard comments that more advanced ALPR systems may be used to track other vehicle attributes (e.g. bumper stickers). Furthermore, OPD personnel are aware of media reports of ALPR systems where a lack of updates between local systems and State CA DOJ databases lead to inaccurate stolen vehicle notifications, which have led law enforcement to stopping motorists because of stolen vehicle notifications.*

- F. The results of any internal audits, any information about violations or potential violations of the Surveillance Use Policy, and any actions taken in response unless the release of such information is prohibited by law, including but not limited to confidential personnel file information:

*2019 audits were performed solely to ensure system functionality. The current system is outdated, and the software is not supported from the original vendor. Prior to this loss in function, the system could be used to run reports for sample audits that detailed the reasons for queries (e.g., type of criminal investigation). The ALPR system can currently quantify*

*only hit and scan data as noted in Part A above. However, with support from the software vendor as well as the Information Technology Department, 2019 data has since been audited for accuracy (see **Appendix A** to this report below).*

*OPD can only provide more comprehensive use data if and when a newer ALPR system is acquired. OPD has developed a plan for future robust ALPR system audits - should OPD be allowed to purchase an updated system after approval of the updated ALPR SUP. A more robust system oversight and review protocol will include: Use Policy review and training, same use audits, authorized user control, IT oversight, and review of the requests for ALPR data from outside agencies.*

*ALPR 430 lists a six-month ALPR server data retention policy. However, OPD has maintained a 730-day data retention policy during 2019, based upon legal counsel, and in alignment with the draft DGO I-12 ALPR Policy. The draft Surveillance Impact Report for draft DGO I-12 ALPR, Section F. "Data Types and Sources" provides more detailed information about OPD's ALPR data retention protocols.*

*OPD's ALPR 430 Policy does not explicitly delineate a separate data-sharing process for law enforcement agencies where there is a Council-approved MOU in place (as explained in Section B above). OPD recognizes that current data-sharing practice does not align with the limits set forth in ALPR 430. The new draft DGO I-12 ALPR Policy, Section I. "Third Party Data Sharing," provides for separate protocols for 3rd party data sharing where there is a Council-approved agreement or taskforce, and when the data is shared in connection with criminal investigations.*

- G. Information about any data breaches or other unauthorized access to the data collected by the surveillance technology, including information about the scope of the breach and the actions taken in response:

*The City's Information Technology Department (ITD) confirmed to OPD that they have not detected any ALPR information breaches at the time of OPD's inquiry for the production of this annual report.*

- H. Information, including crime statistics, that helps the community assess whether the surveillance technology has been effective at achieving its identified purposes:

*The ALPR system does not allow for automated connections to the many cases where ALPR is instrumental in either immediate notifications to stolen vehicles and/or vehicles connected to other crimes. The system also does not offer any automation to cases where crimes are investigated, and ALPR provides useful data. Therefore, OPD has conducted time-consuming research as part of updating the Surveillance Impact Report for review of a new Surveillance Use Policy. The Surveillance Impact Report, which was offered for presentation as part of the February and March 2021 PAC meetings (as the PAC reviewed a draft ALPR Surveillance Use Policy), highlights many uses (see **Attachments A and B**) of the draft Surveillance Impact Report). Section (A) above shows that there were 8,596 hits against CA DOJ cases. OPD estimates that there were hundreds of cases in which ALPR was in OPD investigations in 2019. In 2019, there were 254 OPD incident reports that had either the keyword LPR or ALPR or both in the narrative (including supplements). Auto thefts represent most of these cases; however, these reports also relate to cases of violent crime. OPD personnel conducted manual reviews of 2020 cases where vehicle ALPR*

system data alerted officers to vehicles on CA DOJ hotlists as well as cases where OPD CID investigated criminal cases using ALPR data. However, these reviews were for 2020 data, and include many stolen vehicle and car jackings (as well as some cases related to homicide, rape and human trafficking).

I. Statistics and information about public records act requests regarding the relevant subject surveillance technology, including response rates:

OPD received six ALPR-related PRRs in 2019; there are 11 open ALPR-related PRRs as of December 31, 2019. These requests related to the number of ALPR camera systems (see Section C above), ALPR data (the license plate number, date, time, and location information for each license plate recorded for related to either specific license plates or all captured data during certain time periods), and OPD emails related to ALPR data. Other requests related to the sharing of data with other agencies as outlined in Section B above. There are also PRRs relating to technology contracts.

For all ALPR PRRs, OPD can generally provide date and time information. OPD cannot provide information related to locations where license plates were photographed, nor information related to the specific vehicles. Some of these PRRs have been processed and completed in 2021 during the time of the production of this latest iteration of this report – status information below reflects recent updates made in 2021. The following is the list of PRRs outstanding during 2019:

PRR#	Nature of Request	Status	Content Provided
RT 16630	All records responsive to the below requests dated from January 1, 2014 through July 28, 2016. - The full documentation of all contracts or non-disclosure agreements (enacted OR IN EFFECT between the above dates) with the companies "Persistent Surveillance Systems" or "Vigilant Solutions" (more of request: <a href="https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/RT-16630">https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/RT-16630</a> ).	Still being processed	n/a
RT 17577	All ALPR data ever collected or generated by the Oakland Police Department	closed	2019, 2020, 2021 ALPR scans along with date and time stamp (OPD does not have access to any previous years as they have been purged); some records are not being released, or have been redacted pursuant to Gov. Code Sec, 6255(a) as the public interest in nondisclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure; City of San Jose vs Superior Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1008
RT 17949	All ALPR data ever collected or generated by the Oakland Police Department	open	2019, 2020, 2021 ALPR scans along with date and time stamp (OPD does not have access to any previous years as they have been purged); some records are not being released, or

PRR#	Nature of Request	Status	Content Provided
			<i>have been redacted pursuant to Gov. Code Sec, 6255(a) as the public interest in nondisclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure; City of San Jose vs Superior Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1008</i>
18-391	<i>What company (or companies) makes Oakland's license plate readers, and with which cities and other law enforcement agencies Oakland shares its LPR data.</i>	<i>open</i>	<i>n/a</i>
18-649 –	<i>The names of all agencies, organizations and entities with which the Oakland Police department shares Automatic License Plate Reader (“ALPR”) data, such as the National Vehicle Location Service;            * The names of all agencies and organizations from which the department receives ALPR data;            * The names of all agencies and organizations from which the department shares “hot list” information;            * The names of all agencies and organizations from which the department receives “hot list” information; more of request:  <a href="https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/18-649">https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/18-649</a></i>	<i>open</i>	<i>OPD ALPR Policy 430:  <a href="https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/documents/618507/download">https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/documents/618507/download</a></i>
19-1546	<i>How many automated license plate readers the Oakland Police Department has in use currently? Are they in fixed locations or on police cars, or other? How many vehicles on your hotlist currently? What's is the hit rate currently, and what was it in March 2018? How long is this data retained for? Is there a formal data retention limit? Have you shared any of this LPR data with any third parties, including non law enforcement bodies? If so, who? Have you bought license plate data from any third parties, and if so who? Has there been any communication between the department and representatives from or people acting on behalf of US Immigration and Customs enforcement and / or US Border Patrol? If so, please can you share all</i>	<i>Open</i>	<i>Content not yet provided</i>

PRR#	Nature of Request	Status	Content Provided
	<p>correspondence (inc attachments)?                      More information:  <a href="https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/19-1546">https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/19-1546</a></p>		
19-1897	<p>Oakland Police Department representative Bruce Stoffmacher verbally represented to the Privacy Commission (and via the draft automated license plate reader policy he presented) that 147 emails exist wherein an officer requested that an automated license plate query be performed due to an investigative need.</p>	closed	redacted emails
19-2270	<p>all ALPR data ever collected or generated by the Oakland Police Department, including at a minimum, the license plate number, date, time, and location information for each license plate recorded; more information:  <a href="https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/19-2270">https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/19-2270</a></p>	open	Content not yet provided
19-3334	<p>A copy of all contracts signed between the Oakland Police Department and Palantir Technologies, Inc., from 2008 to the present, including all existing annexes, addendums, exhibits or modifications to these contracts. This should include any contracts with the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC) through which the Oakland Police Department has access to Palantir software as a NCRIC member agency.</p> <p>2. Any audits, progress statements, performance assessments, or internal or external reports concerning Palantir's software, hardware or services for the Oakland Police Department from 2008 to the present.</p> <p>3. A copy of all email communications between Oakland Police Department personnel and representatives of the company Palantir Technologies, Inc. from the domain "@palantir.com" from 2008 to the present.</p>	closed	The Oakland Police Department does not have any contracts with Palantir Technologies.

PRR#	Nature of Request	Status	Content Provided
	<p>4. A copy of all email communications among Oakland Police Department personnel, and between Oakland Police Department personnel and the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC) containing the terms "Palantir", "Vigilant Solutions", "license plate recognition", "LPR" or "ALPR".            More information:  <a href="https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/19-3334">https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/19-3334</a></p>		
19-6125	<p>All Automated License Plate Reader data that Oakland PD has regarding 2008 Ford E-150 van, #8N22328 created or recorded on or after December 8, 2019.</p>	open	Content not yet provided
19-1382	<p>Information related to California Senate Bill 34 (ALPR) requires the Oakland Police Department to maintain a record of access that captures certain information (cut and paste below for ease of your reference); more information:  <a href="https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/19-1382">https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/19-1382</a></p>	closed	Data with the User ID, Justification entry and date/time provided

J. Total annual costs for the surveillance technology, including personnel and other ongoing costs, and what source of funding will fund the technology in the coming year:

Zero; OPD did not incur any maintenance, licensing, or training costs. Training is completed using OPD's online training portal as well as staff time.



K. Any requested modifications to the Surveillance Use Policy and a detailed basis for the request:

*OPD and the PAC are developing and reviewing a new ALPR Surveillance Policy contemporaneous to the production of this report for OPD ALPR Use Policy 430. OPD is requesting PAC review and recommendation to City Council of this new Surveillance Use Policy (SUP). This new policy will cover all required areas of OMC 9.64.*

Respectfully submitted,

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LeRonne L. Armstrong,  
Chief of Police

Reviewed by,  
Drennon Lindsey, Deputy Chief  
OPD, Bureau of Investigations

Paul Figueroa, Captain  
OPD, Criminal Investigations Division

Carlo Beckman, Police Services Manager  
OPD, Research and Planning Section

Tracey Jones, Police Services Manager  
OPD, Research and Planning Section

Prepared by:  
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OPD, Research and Planning Section

David Pullen, Officer  
OPD, IT Unit, Bureau of Services

## ***Appendix A***

### **2019 ALPR Accuracy Audit**

Policy 430 states in section 430.7(c) System Monitoring and Security: ALPR system audits shall be conducted on a regular basis by the Bureau of Services. The purpose of these audits is to ensure the accuracy of ALPR Information and correct data errors.

Determining accuracy of captured ALPR data is difficult based on the fact that license plates can be in length from 1 character to 7 characters. These characters can be in many different formats due to the age and type of the vehicle as well as personalized plates. The one thing that remains constant with California plates is the character limit is set at 7. Per the policy this audit is meant to correct data errors. This audit cannot correct the errors. What this audit can do though is show how the system is working on a year to year basis to make sure the ALPR system optical recognition algorithm is operating as it should and the error rate stays very low.

Method of Audit:

- Compiled all captures for the year.
- Sorted all captures to identify all that were over 7 characters.
- Divided the number of bad captures by the total captures to obtain the percentage of time the system was not correct.

#### **2019 Audit**

A query of all plates for 2019 revealed 6,616,879 captures. A sort of captures containing over 7 characters was completed. The amount of captures over 7 characters resulted in 7,804 captures. The percentage of bad captures with over 7 characters equals 0.118% of the total captures. After looking at the bad captures it appears that the system sometimes captures road signs and other objects containing text. Due to the very low percentage of incorrect captures it appears the system is working correctly but the optical recognition system has some small issues with identifying license plates. It should be noted that the photo obtained at the time of the system capture will show the user what the optical character recognition thought was a license plate.

### **2019 ALPR Justifications Audit**

Lexipol Policy 430 Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) was created prior to the implementation of justification and auditing features being activated on our ALPR system. In the policy there is mention of a right to know and a need to know prior to accessing ALPR data but there is no mention to what must be entered into the software justification fields. The Current ALPR system has the following fields in the justifications tab: (Audit, BOLO Post Scan Query, Crime Scene Query, Criminal Investigation, Test, Trend Analysis). One of the above Justifications must be selected prior to continuing with the Query. There are two additional free form boxes (Justification Note and File Number). The Justification Note box must have something entered in order to continue with the query. The File Number can be bypassed without entering anything.

SB34 (Automated license plate recognition systems: use of data) was passed by the California Legislature. In this law there are several requirements that a government entity must abide by. In Section 1798.90.52 the law states, "If an ALPR operator accesses or provides access to ALPR information, the ALPR operator shall do both of the following:

- a. Maintain a record of that access. At a minimum, the record shall include the following:
  1. The date and time the information is accessed.
  2. The license plate number or other data elements used to query the ALPR system.
  3. The username of the person who accesses the information, and, as applicable, the organization or entity with whom the person is affiliated.
  4. The purpose for accessing the information.

- b. Require that ALPR information only be used for the authorized purposes described in the usage and privacy policy required by subdivision (b) of Section 1798.90.51.

In February of 2021 raw ALPR Justification data was retrieved by City IT and the Neology vendor for years 2019 and 2020. This raw data was extracted directly from the database and was not retrieved as it normally would have been from the software included with the BOSS3 system.

Method of Audit:

Ensure the following state requirements were included in the ALPR queries to include:

1. Data and time of Query
2. License plate of other data used to query
3. Username of person accessing
4. Purpose of the access

The 2019 ALPR justification data consisted of 5547 queries. All the queries included an identifiable Username as well as a date and time of the query. There were 108 queries that had no license plate or other querying characters. There was only 1 query that had no purpose of access identified. A character must be entered into the plate tab to conduct a query as well as a justification reason (purpose of the access). Due to these sections being completely blank it is unknown if the system allowed this to occur, which is highly unlikely, or if it was due to the way the raw data was extracted from the server. The current system is unable to run automated justification audits at this time. The department was only able to run these audits after obtaining the raw data and going through the data manually.



## MEMORANDUM

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**TO:** LeRonne L. Armstrong  
Chief of Police

**FROM:** Drennon Lindsey, Deputy Chief of Police  
OPD, Bureau of Investigations

**SUBJECT:** Automated License Plate  
Reader – 2020 Annual  
Report

**DATE:** October 1, 2021

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### **Background**

Oakland Police Department (OPD) ALPR Policy 430 (430.8 Agency Monitoring and Controls) states that the “ALPR Coordinator shall provide the Chief of Police and Public Safety Committee with an annual report for the previous 12-month period.” This report was completed in 2021, later than the requirement of ALPR Policy 430. OPD did not complete this report in 2020 or initially present it to the PAC and City Council as personnel were focused at this time on development of a new ALPR Policy. OPD’s ALPR Surveillance Use Policy (SUP) is still undergoing review by the PAC at the time of the production of this report.

### **2020 Annual Report Details**

- A. A description of how the surveillance technology was used, including the type and quantity of data gathered or analyzed by the technology:

*The number of times ALPR technology was used in 2020 is shown in **Table 1**. More specifically, Table 1 shows the total scans by month – the total license plate photographs made and stored each month (2,591,990 total for the year). Table 1 also shows the number of times the vehicle-based systems had a match (“hit”) with a California Department of Justice (CA DOJ) database (4,150 total for 2020). OPD’s very outdated ALPR system can only quantify these two figures; the system can no longer quantify individual queries or perform any audit functions, as the software is no longer supported from the original vendor. Prior, the system could run reports that detailed the reasons for queries (e.g. a type of criminal investigation). OPD can only provide more comprehensive use data if and when a newer ALPR system is acquired.*

**Table 1: 2020 OPD ALPR Scans and Hits**

Month	Year	Scans	Hits
Jan	2020	391,547	552
Feb	2020	276,834	396
Mar	2020	316,767	379
Apr	2020	336,103	662
May	2020	316,319	571
Jun	2020	149,050	255
Jul	2020	116,318	169
Aug	2020	118,521	213
Sep	2020	93,011	117
Oct	2020	102,491	171
Nov	2020	207,760	372
Dec	2020	167,269	293
<b>2020 Totals</b>		<b>2,591,990</b>	<b>4,150</b>

- B. Whether and how often data acquired through the use of the surveillance technology was shared with outside entities, the name of any recipient entity, the type(s) of data disclosed, under what legal standard(s) the information was disclosed, and the justification for the disclosure(s):

*The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had access to OPD ALPR data without following the standard data access request protocols outlined in Policy 430.9 “Releasing or Sharing ALPR Data.” OPD has provided this level of access because there is a Council-approved Safe Streets Task Force Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)<sup>1</sup>. OPD believes that the Task Force MOU allowed for ALPR data-sharing with specific FBI agents who have been co-located with OPD in the Police Administration Building and worked- on homicide cases. However, OPD personnel ran an audit of ALPR data queries and discovered that there were no queries from these FBI personnel. OPD has decided to revoke access to FBI these agents as of 9/28/2021 to alleviate concerns over data privacy.*

*The following police agencies made specific requests to OPD for ALPR data related to specific criminal cases (the number to right of agency = amount of data requests):*

- *Berkeley Police Department – 2*
- *Daly City Police Department – 1*
- *Fremont Police Department - 5*
- *Livermore Police Department - 2*
- *San Francisco Police Department - 1*
- *San Jose Police Department – 1*

*OPD personnel provided the requested ALPR data in each of these data request cases, as each case complied with the Policy 430.9, including a request with name of agency, person making request, and intended purpose for the data with approvals being reviewed by*

<sup>1</sup> The mission of the FBI San Francisco Violent Crimes Safe Streets Task Force MOU is to identify and target for prosecution criminal enterprise groups and individual responsible for crimes of violence such as murder and aggravated assault, as well as other serious crimes. The MOU does not specifically address the sharing of ALPR data; however, the MOU does specifically articulate protocols for data sharing.

*authorized personnel with records maintained. OPD has developed new protocols and automated forms for internal tracking of future requests which will be part of future ALPR annual reports.*

- C. Where applicable, a breakdown of what physical objects the surveillance technology hardware was installed upon; using general descriptive terms so as not to reveal the specific location of such hardware; for surveillance technology software, a breakdown of what data sources the surveillance technology was applied to:

*The ALPR cameras are installed upon fully marked OPD patrol vehicles (29 operational; 6 inoperable).*

- D. Where applicable, a breakdown of where the surveillance technology was deployed geographically, by each police area in the relevant year:

*These vehicles are assigned to the Bureau of Field Operations I (administered out of the Police Administration Building in downtown Oakland) as well as Bureau of Field Operations II (administered from the Eastmont Substation). The vehicles are deployed throughout the City in a patrol function to allow for large areas of the City to have ALPR coverage as the patrol vehicles are used to respond to calls for police service.*

- E. A summary of community complaints or concerns about the surveillance technology, and an analysis of the technology's adopted use policy and whether it is adequate in protecting civil rights and civil liberties:

*Members of the public have spoken at PAC meetings regarding concerns of negative impacts to privacy protections (e.g. that OPD could use ALPR server data to establish travel patterns of particular vehicles associated with particular license plates, and/or that ALPR data can be inadvertently released through inadequate privacy protocols). OPD has also heard comments that more advanced ALPR systems may be used to track other vehicle attributes (e.g. bumper stickers). Furthermore, OPD personnel are of media reports of ALPR systems where a lack of updates between local systems and State CA DOJ databases lead to inaccurate stolen vehicle notifications, which have led law enforcement to stopping motorists because of stolen vehicle notifications.*

- F. The results of any internal audits, any information about violations or potential violations of the Surveillance Use Policy, and any actions taken in response unless the release of such information is prohibited by law, including but not limited to confidential personnel file information:

*2019 audits were performed solely to ensure system functionality. The current system is outdated, and the software is not supported from the original vendor. Prior to this loss in function, the system could be used to run reports for sample audits that detailed the reasons for queries (e.g., type of criminal investigation). The ALPR system can currently quantify only hit and scan data as noted in Part A above. However, with support from the software vendor as well as the Information Technology Department, 2019 data has since been audited for accuracy (see **Appendix A** to this report below).*

*OPD can only provide more comprehensive use data if and when a newer ALPR system is acquired. OPD has developed a plan for future robust ALPR system audits - should OPD be allowed to purchase an updated system after approval of the updated ALPR SUP. A more robust system oversight and review protocol will include: Use Policy review and training, same use audits, authorized user control, IT oversight, and review of the requests for ALPR data from outside agencies.*

*ALPR 430 lists a six-month ALPR server data retention policy. However, OPD has maintained a 730-day data retention policy during 2019, based upon legal counsel, and in alignment with the draft DGO I-12 ALPR Policy. The draft Surveillance Impact Report for draft DGO I-12 ALPR, Section F. "Data Types and Sources" provides more detailed information about OPD's ALPR data retention protocols.*

*OPD's ALPR 430 Policy does not explicitly delineate a separate data-sharing process for law enforcement agencies where there is a Council-approved MOU in place (as explained in Section B above). OPD recognizes that current data-sharing practice does not align with the limits set forth in ALPR 430. The new draft DGO I-12 ALPR Policy, Section I. "Third Party Data Sharing," provides for separate protocols for 3rd party data sharing where there is a Council-approved agreement or taskforce, and when the data is shared in connection with criminal investigations.*

- G. Information about any data breaches or other unauthorized access to the data collected by the surveillance technology, including information about the scope of the breach and the actions taken in response:

*The City's Information Technology Department (ITD) confirmed to OPD that they have not detected any ALPR information breaches at the time of OPD's inquiry for the production of this annual report.*

- H. Information, including crime statistics, that helps the community assess whether the surveillance technology has been effective at achieving its identified purposes:

*The ALPR system does not allow for automated connections to the many cases where ALPR is instrumental in either immediate notifications to stolen vehicles and/or vehicles connected to other crimes. The system also does not offer any automation to cases where crimes are investigated, and ALPR provides useful data. Therefore, OPD has conducted time-consuming research as part of updating the Surveillance Impact Report for review of a new Surveillance Use Policy. The Surveillance Impact Report, which was offered for presentation as part of the February and March 2021 PAC meetings (as the PAC reviewed a draft ALPR Surveillance Use Policy), highlights many uses (see **Attachments A and B**) of the draft Surveillance Impact Report). Section (A) above shows that there were 4,150 hits against CA DOJ cases. OPD estimates that ALPR was hundreds of times in OPD investigations in 2020. In 2020, there were 180 OPD incident reports that had either the keyword LPR or ALPR or both in the narrative (including supplements). Auto thefts represent most of these cases; however, these reports also relate to cases of violent crime.*

*OPD personnel conducted manual reviews of 2020 cases where vehicle ALPR system data alerted officers to vehicles on CA DOJ hotlists as well as cases where OPD CID investigated criminal cases using ALPR data. The data includes many stolen vehicle and car jackings (as well as some cases related to homicide, rape and human trafficking).*

Appendix A to the ALPR Surveillance Impact Report (**Attachment A**), the parallel document to the draft SUP being presented to the PAC for review, provides over 100 cases where the vehicle ALPR System alerted officers to vehicles on a CA DOJ hot list during the 2020 year. These examples are a few of the hundred cases listed:

- Example #25 20-016962 4/8/2020: Oakland police officers took a report of a carjacking on 3/30/20. Nine days later Oakland officers on patrol were alerted to the carjacked vehicle parked on the side of the road by their vehicle ALPR system. A suspect was observed in the vehicle. The suspect was arrested. The vehicle was recovered from the 1400 Blk of 16th Ave. Age of Data 9 days.
- Example #82: 20-037670 7/31/2020: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system on a Stolen Vehicle traveling east bound 1400 block of 19<sup>th</sup> Ave. The ALPR system affixed on top of their Patrol vehicle alerted the Officers and the Officers confirmed that the vehicle was indeed stolen. One (1) individual was detained following a foot pursuit. A firearm was recovered. That individual was later arrested for stolen vehicle, possession of a stolen vehicle, Various firearm charges (Loaded firearm in public, concealed loaded firearm in vehicle), and a probation violation. Date of Theft 7/21/2020.
- Example #95 - 20-024499 5/19/20: While on patrol Officers were alerted by their ALPR system to an unoccupied stolen vehicle parked on the 2500 block 10<sup>th</sup> Ave. The ALPR system that is affixed above their patrol vehicle provided a picture of the vehicle and the license plate. One (1) of the license plates had been switched with another stolen license plate of another similar vehicle. Officers verified the vehicle was indeed stolen and unoccupied. Suspect still outstanding.

Most cases alerted OPD to stolen vehicles - the ALPR hits led to the recovery of scores of stolen vehicles. In some cases, the ALPR system alerted officers to vehicles connected to carjackings – an ALPR hit on April 8, 2020 led to the arrest of a carjacking suspect. In another case in August 2020, an ALPR photo connected to a robbery case led to the arrest of a suspect connected to a homicide investigation. In the case noted on July 31, 2020 in the Appendix A, officers were alerted to a stolen vehicle while traveling east bound on 19<sup>th</sup> Ave. One individual was detained following a foot pursuit. A firearm was recovered. That individual was later arrested for stolen vehicle, possession of a stolen vehicle, various firearm charges (included having a loaded firearm in public, and a concealed loaded firearm in a vehicle), and a probation violation.

I. Statistics and information about public records act requests regarding the relevant subject surveillance technology, including response rates:

*OPD has received zero PRRs in 2020 related to ALPR; there were 11 total open ALPR-related PRRs as of December 31, 2020. These requests related to the number of ALPR camera systems (see Section C above), ALPR data (the license plate number, date, time, and location information for each license plate recorded for related to either specific license plates or all captured data during certain time periods), and OPD emails related to ALPR data. Other requests related to the sharing of data with other agencies as outlined in Section B above. There are also PRRs relating to technology contracts.*

*For all ALPR PRRs, OPD can generally provide date and time information. OPD cannot provide information related to locations where license plates were photographed, nor information related to the specific vehicles. Some of these PRRs have been processed and*



completed in 2021 during the time of the production of this latest iteration of this report – status information below reflects recent updates made in 2021. The following is the list of PRRs outstanding during 2020:

<b>PRR#</b>	<b>Nature of Request</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Content Provided</b>
RT 16630	All records responsive to the below requests dated from January 1, 2014 through July 28, 2016. - The full documentation of all contracts or non-disclosure agreements (enacted OR IN EFFECT between the above dates) with the companies "Persistent Surveillance Systems" or "Vigilant Solutions" (more of request: <a href="https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/RT-16630">https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/RT-16630</a> ).	Still being processed	n/a
RT 17577	All ALPR data ever collected or generated by the Oakland Police Department	closed	2019, 2020, 2021 ALPR scans along with date and time stamp (OPD does not have access to any previous years as they have been purged); some records are not being released, or have been redacted pursuant to Gov. Code Sec, 6255(a) as the public interest in nondisclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure; City of San Jose vs Superior Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1008
RT 17949	All ALPR data ever collected or generated by the Oakland Police Department	open	2019, 2020, 2021 ALPR scans along with date and time stamp (OPD does not have access to any previous years as they have been purged); some records are not being released, or have been redacted pursuant to Gov. Code Sec, 6255(a) as the public interest in nondisclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure; City of San Jose vs Superior Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1008
18- 391	What company (or companies) makes Oakland's license plate readers, and with which cities and other law enforcement agencies Oakland shares its LPR data.	open	n/a
18- 649 –	The names of all agencies, organizations and entities with which the Oakland Police department shares Automatic License Plate Reader ("ALPR") data, such as the National Vehicle Location Service;	open	OPD ALPR Policy 430: <a href="https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/documents/618507/download">https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/documents/618507/download</a>

PRR#	Nature of Request	Status	Content Provided
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* The names of all agencies and organizations from which the department receives ALPR data;</li> <li>* The names of all agencies and organizations from which the department shares "hot list" information;</li> <li>* The names of all agencies and organizations from which the department receives "hot list" information; more of request: <a href="https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/18-649">https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/18-649</a></li> </ul>		
19-1546	<p>How many automated license plate readers the Oakland Police Department has in use currently? Are they in fixed locations or on police cars, or other? How many vehicles on your hotlist currently? What's is the hit rate currently, and what was it in March 2018? How long is this data retained for? Is there a formal data retention limit? Have you shared any of this LPR data with any third parties, including non law enforcement bodies? If so, who? Have you bought license plate data from any third parties, and if so who? Has there been any communication between the department and representatives from or people acting on behalf of US Immigration and Customs enforcement and / or US Border Patrol? If so, please can you share all correspondence (inc attachments)? More information: <a href="https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/19-1546">https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/19-1546</a></p>	Open	Content not yet provided
19-1897	<p>Oakland Police Department representative Bruce Stoffmacher verbally represented to the Privacy Commission (and via the draft automated license plate reader policy he presented) that 147 emails exist wherein an officer requested that an automated license plate query be performed due to an investigative need.</p>	closed	redacted emails
19-2270	<p>all ALPR data ever collected or generated by the Oakland Police Department, including at a minimum,</p>	open	Content not yet provided

PRR#	Nature of Request	Status	Content Provided
	<p><i>the license plate number, date, time, and location information for each license plate recorded; more information:</i>  <a href="https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/19-2270">https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/19-2270</a></p>		
19-3334	<p><i>A copy of all contracts signed between the Oakland Police Department and Palantir Technologies, Inc., from 2008 to the present, including all existing annexes, addendums, exhibits or modifications to these contracts. This should include any contracts with the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC) through which the Oakland Police Department has access to Palantir software as a NCRIC member agency.</i></p> <p><i>2. Any audits, progress statements, performance assessments, or internal or external reports concerning Palantir's software, hardware or services for the Oakland Police Department from 2008 to the present.</i></p> <p><i>3. A copy of all email communications between Oakland Police Department personnel and representatives of the company Palantir Technologies, Inc. from the domain "@palantir.com" from 2008 to the present.</i></p> <p><i>4. A copy of all email communications among Oakland Police Department personnel, and between Oakland Police Department personnel and the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC) containing the terms "Palantir", "Vigilant Solutions", "license plate recognition", "LPR" or "ALPR".</i>  <i>More information:</i>  <a href="https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/19-3334">https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/19-3334</a></p>	closed	<p><i>The Oakland Police Department does not have any contracts with Palantir Technologies.</i></p>
19-6125	<p><i>All Automated License Plate Reader data that Oakland PD has regarding 2008 Ford E-150 van, #8N22328 created or recorded on or after December 8, 2019.</i></p>	open	<p><i>Content not yet provided</i></p>

PRR#	Nature of Request	Status	Content Provided
19-1382	Information related to California Senate Bill 34 (ALPR) requires the Oakland Police Department to maintain a record of access that captures certain information (cut and paste below for ease of your reference); more information: <a href="https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/19-1382">https://oaklandca.nextrequest.com/requests/19-1382</a>	closed	Data with the User ID, Justification entry and date/time provided

- J. Total annual costs for the surveillance technology, including personnel and other ongoing costs, and what source of funding will fund the technology in the coming year:

Zero; OPD did not incur any maintenance, licensing, or training costs. Training is completed using OPD's online training portal as well as staff time.

- K. Any requested modifications to the Surveillance Use Policy and a detailed basis for the request:

OPD and the PAC are developing and reviewing a new ALPR Surveillance Policy contemporaneous to the production of this report for OPD ALPR Use Policy 430. OPD is requesting PAC review and recommendation to City Council of this new Surveillance Use Policy (SUP). This new policy will cover all required areas of OMC 9.64.

Respectfully submitted,

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## **Appendix A**

### **2020 ALPR Accuracy Audit**

Policy 430 states in section 430.7(c) System Monitoring and Security: ALPR system audits shall be conducted on a regular basis by the Bureau of Services. The purpose of these audits is to ensure the accuracy of ALPR Information and correct data errors.

Determining accuracy of captured ALPR data is difficult based on the fact that license plates can be in length from 1 character to 7 characters. These characters can be in many different formats due to the age and type of the vehicle as well as personalized plates. The one thing that remains constant with California plates is the character limit is set at 7. Per the policy this audit is meant to correct data errors. This audit cannot correct the errors. What this audit can do though is show how the system is working on a year to year basis to make sure the ALPR system optical recognition algorithm is operating as it should and the error rate stays very low.

Method of Audit:

- Compiled all captures for the year.
- Sorted all captures to identify all that were over 7 characters.
- Divided the number of bad captures by the total captures to obtain the percentage of time the system was not correct.

### **2020 Audit**

A query of all plates for 2020 revealed 2,592,055 captures. A sort of captures containing over 7 characters was completed. The amount of captures over 7 characters resulted in 2,843 captures. The percentage of bad captures with over 7 characters equals 0.111% of the total captures. After looking at the bad captures it appears that the system sometimes captures road signs and other objects containing text. Due to the very low percentage of incorrect captures it appears the system is working correctly but the optical recognition system has some small issues with identifying license plates. It should be noted that the photo obtained at the time of the system capture will show the user what the optical character recognition thought was a license plate.

### **2020 ALPR Justifications Audit**

Lexipol Policy 430 Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) was created prior to the implementation of justification and auditing features being activated on our ALPR system. In the policy there is mention of a right to know and a need to know prior to accessing ALPR data but there is no mention to what must be entered into the software justification fields. The Current ALPR system has the following fields in the justifications tab: (Audit, BOLO Post Scan Query, Crime Scene Query, Criminal Investigation, Test, Trend Analysis). One of the above Justifications must be selected prior to continuing with the Query. There are two additional free form boxes (Justification Note and File Number). The Justification Note box must have something entered in order to continue with the query. The File Number can be bypassed without entering anything. SB34 (Automated license plate recognition systems: use of data) was passed by the California Legislature. In this law there are several requirements that a government entity must abide by.

In Section 1798.90.52 the law states, "If an ALPR operator accesses or provides access to ALPR information, the ALPR operator shall do both of the following:

- a. Maintain a record of that access. At a minimum, the record shall include the following:
  1. The date and time the information is accessed.
  2. The license plate number or other data elements used to query the ALPR system.

3. The username of the person who accesses the information, and, as applicable, the organization or entity with whom the person is affiliated.
  4. The purpose for accessing the information.
- b. Require that ALPR information only be used for the authorized purposes described in the usage and privacy policy required by subdivision (b) of Section 1798.90.51.

In February of 2021 raw ALPR Justification data was retrieved by City IT and the Neology vendor for years 2019 and 2020. This raw data was extracted directly from the database and was not retrieved as it normally would have been from the software included with the BOSS3 system.

Method of Audit:

Ensure the following state requirements were included in the ALPR queries to include:

1. Data and time of Query
2. License plate of other data used to query
3. Username of person accessing
4. Purpose of the access

The 2020 ALPR justification data consisted of 3996 queries. All the queries included an identifiable Username as well as a date and time of the query. There were 166 queries that had no license plate or other querying characters present. There was only 1 query that had no purpose of access identified. A character must be entered into the plate tab to conduct a query as well as a justification reason (purpose of the access). Due to these sections being completely blank it is unknown if the system allowed this to occur, which is highly unlikely, or if it was due to the way the raw data was extracted from the server. The current system is unable to run automated justification audits at this time. The department was only able to run these audits after obtaining the raw data and going through the data manually.

Annual Surveillance Report  
For  
DOCKLESS MOBILITY DATA

November 4, 2021

The following report concerning Dockless Mobility Data and associated data aggregation and analysis software technology procured and used by Oakland's Department of Transportation (DOT) for management of shared mobility programs was prepared in accordance with the annual reporting requirements of the City of Oakland's Surveillance and Community Safety Ordinance (O.M.C. 13498).

**BACKGROUND**

In September 2018, City Council adopted Ordinance 13502 C.M.S to establish regulations and new permits to operate and park dockless bike and scooter sharing programs in the public right of way. In September 2018, City Council adopted Ordinance 13508 C.M.S., amending Ordinance 13497, the Fiscal Year 2018-2019 Master Fee Schedule, establishing fees for the new dockless scooter sharing permit program.

In October 2019, The City Council approved resolution 87862 C.M.S, (1) authorizing the city administrator to enter into data sharing agreements with dockless mobility service providers for dockless mobility program management and enforcement purposes; (2) approving the surveillance impact report for the Department of Transportation's (DOT's) use of dockless mobility data; (3) approving and adopting the surveillance use policy for DOT's use of dockless mobility data as City policy; and (4) authorizing DOT to procure and use any necessary data aggregation or analysis software that complies with the approved surveillance use policy for DOT's use of dockless mobility data.

In April, 2020, DOT procured data analysis and aggregation software from Populus Technologies, Inc. This software intakes the real time location data from each permitted vehicle and provides staff with an online portal to view and query that data. Staff can use this software to monitor compliance with the program's regulations, calculate permit fees and perform various data analyses. This software procurement was allowed and completed in accordance with the approved Data Use Policy (see Attachment B).

**2020-21 Annual Report Details**

**A. Description of how the surveillance technology was used, including the type and quantity of data gathered or analyzed by the technology:**

This surveillance technology was used to intake and aggregate data from shared dockless

vehicles owned by permittees under the City’s shared dockless mobility program. Each shared dockless vehicle includes a GPS enabled module that shares its location in real time with the City’s third-party software provider, Populus Technologies, Inc. via an Application Programming Interface (API) in the Mobility Data Specification (MDS) format. The software provided by Populus, known as “Mobility Manager,” automatically aggregates this data and provides City staff with an online portal, in which the data can be viewed and queried (see Image 1 for the “Live Map” of real-time vehicle locations). Staff use this data primarily to enforce compliance with the program’s rules, including areas where vehicles cannot be parked (such as near Lake Merritt), areas where a minimum number of vehicles must be deployed (such as Fruitvale and East Oakland), to monitor fleet sizes and to calculate invoices for the parking fee.

Vehicles are not visible on the live map when being rented or used by a rider. In addition, staff are not able to see or query individual trips. Instead, trips are joined to street segments or census block groups. For example, staff can see how many trips were taken on a given street segment, but not the origin and destination of any trip (see Image 2). Staff can also see the total number of trips that begin or end in each city block, but not where any individual trips begin or end (see Image 3). This trip data has been used to inform transportation planning projects. For example, staff provided data on how many shared scooter trips were occurring on 14<sup>th</sup> Street in downtown Oakland, a location where a protected bike lane is being planned.

At present, two DOT staff in the Parking and Mobility Division have access to Mobility Manager. Both DOT staff directly oversee aspects of the shared dockless mobility program.

**Image 1: Live Map**






Image 2: Routes





Image 3: Trip Origins



**B. Whether and how often data acquired through the use of the surveillance technology was shared with outside entities, the name of any recipient entity, the type(s) of data disclosed, under what legal standard(s) the information was disclosed, and the justification for the disclosure(s):**

No potentially sensitive or legally protected data procured through the use of dockless mobility data was shared with any outside entities. Aggregated data about the total number of dockless vehicle trips and trip length was shared publicly on the internet in a blog post entitled “The Year in Review: 2019 OakDOT Shared Mobility Snapshot” on the blog website “Medium” in June 2020. This data was aggregated to the citywide level, and therefore sharing it is consistent with the approved Data Use Policy and other relevant privacy laws.

**C. Where applicable, a breakdown of what physical objects the surveillance technology hardware was installed upon; using general descriptive terms so as not to reveal the specific location of such hardware; for surveillance technology software, a breakdown of what data sources the surveillance technology was applied to:**

The Global Positioning System (GPS) enabled modules are installed by dockless mobility permittees on their shared dockless vehicles. The shared dockless vehicles are distributed throughout Oakland in an unpredictable manner. The DOT does not own or maintain any physical objects involved in the surveillance technology.

**D. Where applicable, a breakdown of where the surveillance technology was deployed geographically, by each police area in the relevant year:**

Shared dockless vehicles were deployed throughout Oakland, with most vehicles concentrated in the flatland areas west of Interstate 580 and Highway 13.

**E. A summary of community complaints or concerns about the surveillance technology, and an analysis of the technology's adopted use policy and whether it is adequate in protecting civil rights and civil liberties:**

Staff have not received any complaints or concerns about DOT’s use of dockless mobility data. Staff continues to believe that the technology’s use policy is adequate in protecting civil liberties.

**F. The results of any internal audits, any information about violations or potential violations of the Surveillance Use Policy, and any actions taken in response unless the release of such information is prohibited by law, including but not limited to confidential personnel file information:**

Staff are not aware of any violations or potential violations of the approved Surveillance use Policy.

**G. Information about any data breaches or other unauthorized access to the data collected by the surveillance technology, including information about the scope of the breach and the actions taken in response:**

There were no known dockless mobility data breaches, and staff are not aware of any unauthorized access.

**H. Information, including crime statistics, that helps the community assess whether the surveillance technology has been effective at achieving its identified purposes:**

The aggregated data obtained under the surveillance use policy has primarily been used to determine if permittees under the shared dockless vehicle program are in compliance with the city's requirements. Staff have found instances in which permittees were not in compliance and informed the permittee in order for them to address the issue. In general, this has been effective.

**I. Statistics and information about public records act requests regarding the relevant subject surveillance technology, including response rates:**

DOT has received zero public records requests in 2019 and so far in 2020 related to dockless mobility data.

**J. Total annual costs for the surveillance technology, including personnel and other ongoing costs, and what source of funding will fund the technology in the coming year:**

The annual cost for the software platform that DOT uses to intake dockless mobility data is \$15,000.

**K. Any requested modifications to the Surveillance Use Policy and a detailed basis for the request:**

No modifications are requested at this time.

For questions regarding this report, please contact Kerby Olsen, New Mobility Programs Lead, at (510) 238-2173 or [kolsen@oaklandca.gov](mailto:kolsen@oaklandca.gov).

**Attachments:**

- A. Populus Data Security and Storage Practices
- B. Approved Data Use Policy

## Attachment A: Populus Data Security and Storage Practices

### Data Security and Storage Practices


The following is a brief overview of Populus’s data security and storage practices. All data accessible on our platform has been aggregated to protect any potential identifiable information. An expanded version of our data management, privacy, and security policies may be made available upon request.

**Populus Data Security.** Populus exclusively uses Google Cloud for its data storage and processing services. Google Cloud security is described in detail on their [website](#). Google Cloud implements software-level measures such as firewalls, layered DMZs, intrusion detection, DOS protection and access management of end-user data. Google also implements hardware-level measures such as hardware provenance, a secure boot stack, and security of the physical premises. The use of a single cloud rather than multiple clouds eliminates security breaches that can occur in the transmission of data.

**Storage of Data.** Populus encrypts all city data at rest and in transit with controlled access. Populus supports encryption solutions that are certified against U.S. Federal Information and Processing Standard 140-2, Level 2, or equivalent industry standard, and does not store encryption keys and keying material with any associated data.

**Protection of Disaggregate Trip Data.** All disaggregate data are stored using Google Storage and are processed to an aggregate form using Google Compute Engine before leaving Google Cloud to transmit to the web and other clients. Populus ingests only location data from GPS traces. No PII in the form of rider information (e.g., names, contact information) is associated with the feeds, limiting the amount of personal information we have access to and store.

**Mobility Manager Access and Data Flow.** Access to the platform is granted via a secure, permissions-based security system in order to facilitate the protection of potentially sensitive mobility operator or trip data. Different features of the platform can be made available to users with different levels of access. The process for capturing, storing, and processing the data for display follows a workflow (below) that both secures the data and utilizes it to the fullest extent possible in order for the city to gain the most insight for evaluation and strategic planning.



# DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

## PROPOSED USE POLICY Data Sharing Agreement with Dockless Mobility Service Providers for Program Management and Enforcement

Kerby Olsen, Shared Mobility Coordinator  
Eva Phillips, Program Analyst I  
Parking and Mobility Division  
Department of Transportation  
City of Oakland  
*May 31, 2019*

### 1. Purpose

The City of Oakland Department of Transportation (DOT) intends to enter into data sharing agreements with existing and future dockless mobility service providers operating in Oakland, such as, but not limited to, GPS-enabled dockless bikeshare, e-scooters, and shared vehicle or ride providers who work within the public right-of-way. This agreement would allow dockless mobility operators to share anonymized trip and parking data, as defined by the Mobility Data Specification (MDS), with DOT.

DOT requires trip and parking data from dockless mobility service providers in order to effectively manage their impact on the public right-of-way. This includes enforcing permits, communicating events and informing transportation planning and policy.

By requiring operators to be transparent in their operations through the sharing of data, DOT can monitor compliance and ensure operators are meeting demand, equity goals, and responding to complaints.

### 2. Authorized Use

Access to trip and parking data shared under this agreement will be limited to designated officials within DOT solely for the purposes of enforcing permits, communicating events and informing transportation planning and policy.

Transportation planning and policy purposes include, but are not limited to:

- a) Understanding utilization rates
- b) Designating dockless mobility-related infrastructure (parking zones, bike lanes, etc.)
- c) Prioritizing infrastructure improvements
- d) Monitoring safety and collisions
- e) Permit Enforcement

### **3. Data Collection**

DOT is not involved in the collection of dockless mobility data. Data is generated by GPS-enabled dockless vehicles and collected by each individual dockless mobility service operator.

### **4. Data Access**

Authorized staff may be from the City's Department of Transportation (DOT) Parking and Mobility Division or other DOT teams that contribute to the planning and monitoring of dockless mobility programs and infrastructure.

Data will be accessed through a third-party mobility management platform. Authorized users of the data platform will require a unique username and password. Any data stored and used by DOT outside the platform will have first been aggregated by the third party mobility management vendor to the block or street level, removing privacy risk, and will therefore not require strict access controls.

### **5. Data Protection**

DOT will depend on its third-party vendor to securely store, transmit, and audit the data. DOT has not yet undergone the procurement process for the third-party vendor, and therefore does not know the official data protection protocol. However, the third-party vendor will adhere to industry standards for encryption, transmission, logging, and auditing.

As an example of industry best practices, one possible vendor, Remix, outline's their data security protocol on their website here: <https://www.remix.com/security>. Other vendors follow similar operating procedures.

### **6. Data Retention**

Raw data may be stored by the third-party vendor for no more than 2 years and will be deleted after being aggregated to the block or street level. If the contract between the third-party vendor and DOT is severed, all data will be deleted from third party servers.

### **7. Public Access**

The public may access trip and parking data through public records requests. However, DOT will only release data in a highly aggregated and obfuscated form to the point where privacy risk is removed.

### **8. Third-Party Data-Sharing**

Data shared by dockless mobility service providers under this agreement will be ingested, aggregated and stored by a third party primarily to reduce privacy risk. In order to protect raw data from public records requests, DOT will not ingest, store, or access raw trip data. A third-party aggregator reduces the risks of surveillance and re-identification. In addition, because this

is real-time data, the ingestion and management of data this size is time and labor intensive. DOT does not have the staff capacity to do this work in-house.

## **9. Training**

Training will be provided by the third-party mobility management vendor and will be limited to authorized DOT staff. Staff will direct the third-party vendor to incorporate this use policy and related privacy policies and procedures into its operating procedures.

## **10. Auditing and Oversight**

Auditing procedures will vary depending on the third-party vendor and will follow industry best practices. Industry best practices include logging and reporting data using systems such as AWS CloudTrail or Google Cloud Audit. The third-party vendor will also engage an external team for a regular review of security practices to ensure they are up to standard and follow best new industry practices.

## **11. Maintenance**

The third-party vendor will maintain and manage trip all raw trip and parking data.

Questions or comments concerning this draft Use Policy should be directed to Kerby Olsen, Shared Mobility Coordinator, Parking and Mobility Division, via email at [kolsen@oaklandca.gov](mailto:kolsen@oaklandca.gov) or phone at (510) 238-2173.